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Abstract 
The thesis explores priority setting in the National Health Service. It focuses on the 
changing way in which rationing issues are dealt with in the wake of the Health Service 
reforms and the separation of function between purchasing and providing health care. 
It examines how managers within sample District Health Authorities justify their 
priority-setting agenda. 
Two connected themes are also analysed. One is how health needs assessment and the 
call for a 'primary care led NHS' presage a more dominant role for Public Health 
medicine in informing purchasing. Secondly, how evidence based medicine together 
with the use of clinical protocols/guidelines, measurement of outcomes and the use of 
clinical/medical audit, become factors in the decision making process. - 
Theoretically, the thesis attempts to demonstrate a practical use for the Foucauldian 
concept of 'governmentality' as a framework with which to analyse contemporary 
changes in health policy. The principal concern is the role experts play within the 
problematisation of government associated with liberalism. This includes their role 
within the institutions and technologies of governance that reflect the notion that the 
strength of the liberal state is derived from securing the well being of the population. In 
turn this reflects the self-critical dynamic within liberal problematisations of defining 
the legitimate boundaries of government responsibility in a society made up of 
autonomous individuals. 
The PhD is based on semi-structured interviews (32 in total), conducted with the Chief 
Executives and principal directors of six English District Health Authorities, together 
with the Chief Officers of their associated CHCs. The District Health Authorities were 
selected - afler a general review of Health Authority Purchasing Plans for 1996/97 - 
from those Authorities that acknowledged the rationing debate in their purchasing 
intentions and represented a cross-section of gainers and losers with respect to the new 
funding formula. 
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Chapter 
Setting priorities in the new NHS 
Introduction 
The aim of the thesis is to investigate the theoretical and empirical value of employing 
the conceptual framework of 'governmentality', associated with the French social 
theorist Michel Foucault, to analyse contemporary British health policy. 
Governmentality analysis situates social and economic change as reflecting shifts in the 
cmentality' of government. The main focus of the thesis will be an analysis of health 
policy as it relates to the problem of governance of health care within liberal forms of 
govemmentality. In particular, the thesis shows how the governmentality framework 
can be used to analyse how certain regulatory discourses and practices come to be 
institutionalised within the British National Health Service (NHS). 
Empirical evidence in the form of interview data will be presented which illustrate how 
the NHS reforms of the 1980s and 1990s can be seen as part of a neo-liberal formula 
of governance which articulated a 'free market' rationale as the basis of social policy. 
The consequence of this new articulation is that the concepts of priority-setting and 
rationing become embedded as dominant discourses and emergent practices within 
health policy. One of the most important aspects of this is the way in which neo-liberal 
forms of health governance re-code and re-problematise the function of the health care 
system predominantly in terms of economics. This process of re-coding entails 
reinterpreting the provision of health care services within the NHS as historically a 
form of implicit rationing. The new health economics discourse presents a form of 
exI. Vicit rationing as a reasoned and ethical response to the contemporary problem of 
maximising the benefits of health care within limited resources. However, of equal 
importance is the way in which the perceived shift in the formula of governance also 
results in a different conceptualisation of the subject of health governance and creates a 
new relationship between bureaucratic control of the health system and regulatory 
medical expertise. 
The NUS and health governance 
Axiomatically, the NHS is an institutional solution to the problem of providing 
comprehensive health care for the British population. However, using 'governmentality 
analysis', it will be argued that the problematisation of health care for which the NHS 
became the preferred solution, is directly related to a particular discourse of welfare 
liberal governance that renders lived reality amenable to political calculation. In 
essence, the NHS is an institution which provides collective social insurance as part of 
the management of health care resources in a welfare state. However, there are 
inevitable consequences when the state becomes responsible for managing the 
collective health risks of the population. In doing so it implicitly engages in a discourse 
of health care governance which ultimately manifests itself in an political debate about 
the best use of health resources. Furthermore, it will be argued that one of the 
consequences of this discourse is that collective provision subjectifies the individual as 
a passive consumer of health care within a system dominated by the medical profession 
functioning as a form of regulatory expertise. The power of the autonomous medical 
profession within a welfare liberal fonn of health governance, it is suggested, results in 
limited bureaucratic control over the allocation of resources. Therefore, political 
control over the health care system often revolves around control and size of global 
budgets. The difficulty for government of this form of governance is that the inherent 
tension between bureaucratic control and medical professional exper-tise often makes 
itself apparent in terms of 'crisis' within the health care system. 
The shift to a different form of liberal health governance can be seen as one 
consequence of the political difficulties caused by such recurrent 'crises' within 
welfarism. It is argued that the form of governance which ultimately sought to replace 
welfare liberalism reflected a neo-liberal economic discourse. One of the consequences 
of this new problematisation of governance was that it re-conceptualised the provision 
of health care in terms of an economic discourse. The problem of managing health care 
resources without the guidance of the 'invisible hand" of the market is therefore seen to 
express itself as a 'fundamentally moral or political problem' (Fleck 1994: 386). As 
patterns of services evolve within the health service the implication is that there are 
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continuous unconscious value judgements being made that mean that resources spent 
on some treatments or procedures produce more welfare than that derived from any 
alternative use of resources. This further implies that some individuals are valued more 
highly by society than others. Therefore, this moral question embedded in health care 
provision can only be addressed by a new understanding of priority-setting which 
incorporates a supposedly 'neutral' form of analysis. 
Setting priorities for health care 
The compromises agreed between the government and representatives of medical 
interests in order to get the NHS started in 1948, resulted in clinicians enjoying a very 
high degree of control over their conditions of employment and a great deal of 
influence over the production of health policy. One of the consequences of this high 
level of clinical autonomy is that, paradoxically, the main agents of rationing (when 
priority decisions are manifested in real decisions) are the medical professionals 
themselves. The development of the GP's 'gatekeeper' role into secondary care, along 
with clinical autonomy and waiting lists, have combined together to become the main 
mechanism of rationing in the NHS (Harrison 1995). 
The NES is not unique in being a state-funded and predominantly state-provided 
health care system, although it does occupy a position at the extreme end of the 
continuum between public and private (market) systems. But one of the consequences 
of this is that the problem of setting priorities becomes even more acute and is 
necessarily played out in the political arena. Indeed, as Mein et al. acutely observe, 
'rationing is a word whose semantic origin evokes notions of reason but whose use 
often prompts unreason" (Klein et al. 1996: 7). The rationing/priority-setting debate is 
inclined to be emotional and confrontational, often not about the patterns of priorities 
themselves but about the size and adequacy of global budgets for health care. 
The 'problem' of rationing or priority-setting is intrinsically an economic concept. In 
classical economic theory it is usually asserted that the interplay of supply and demand 
within a free market will tend towards an equilibrium position where resources will be 
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allocated equitably. However, the act of rationing or priority-setting of 
health care I 
resources implies that there is no natural tendency to allocate resources 
justly. As the 
1979 report of the Royal Commission on the NHS remarked: 
the demand for health care is always likely to outstrip supply and... the 
capacity of health services to absorb resources is almost unlimited. 
Choices have therefore to be made about the use of available funds and 
priorities have to be set (Royal Commission 1979: 5 1). 
The clear implication of this statement is that the conventional means of bringing 
supply and demand into some semblance of equilibrium (ic the presence of a market in 
health care services), is not perceived as a solution to the problem of making difficult 
choices about priorities. The conventional wisdom is that the distribution of health care 
resources cannot be lefl to the market because medical care is inherently full of 
uncertainties (see Arrow 1963). It is impossible for individuals to know when they are 
going to be ill, or possess the expert knowledge necessary to calculate the potential 
severity of the illness or the likely costs incurred both in terms of treatment and loss of 
welfare that results. Furthermore, the practice of expert knowledge itself represents a 
problem for markets in health care services in that it is the source of asymmetries of 
information that could be exploited to produce monopoly control over the provision of 
health services. Additionally, the confiision over interests within a market dominated 
by health care expertise may be injurious to the doctor/patient relationship based on 
trust and expectations of altruistic behaviour (Le Grand 1986). Therefore, it is clear 
that there are a number of intrinsic problems associated with markets in health care 
which may ultimately lead to 'market failure'. When markets 'fail', the price of a good 
(in this instance health services) no longer carries sufficient information necessary for 
consumers to calculate any change in welfare as a result of consumption. The 
consequence of this is that any allocation of health resources that results will not 
necessarily meet health needs equitably. In effect, while free markets 'allocate' 
resources, other forms of distribution imply rationing or priority setting, either by price 
or as in the case of the NHS by some other (usually implicit) means. 
However, since the 1970s, and particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, the question of 
setting priorities for health care spending has become an increasingly problematic issue I- 
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within the political regulation of the NES. The command economy structure of the 
NHS was increasingly challenged by an economic and political doctrine that questioned 
the role of the welfare state within society. With the election in 1979 of a radical 
government that espoused a political doctrine based on neo-liberal economic theory, a 
search be-an for new 'market' solutions to problems previously thought not to be 
amenable to economic discourse. Increasingly the work of the health economist was 
seen to offer a technical solution to the problem of setting priorities within the NHS 
and to offer the prospect of 'de-politicising' the whole priorities issue. As Ashmore et 
al. (1989) observe: 
[Health economists] are collectively committed to making the economic 
practicalities of the NHS more rational and... their concept of 
rationality implies the need for greater uniformity of action throughout 
the system, more systematic appraisal of ends and means across the full 
range of economic decisions, a significant reduction in the influence of 
political factors within the system of health care, and the widespread 
use of allocative procedures designed in accordance with the basic 
concepts of economic theory (Ashmore et al. 1989: 36). 
However, what was proposed by health economists was not a solution that would lead 
to the resolution of market failure - where rationing would be transformed into 
cneutral' allocation. What was proposed was a 'rational' solution that would result in 
the health needs of the populations being met more efficiently and result in a more 
morally justifiable pattern of priorities. The political danger of this new economics 
rationale was that altering the stalits quo ran the risk that rationing, which hitherto was 
implicit and distanced the government from making hard choices, would become 
transformed into a much more explicit process. Thus, far from being value 'neutral' 
and apolitical, the whole process of making priority decisions would become intensely 
political and unstable. Furthermore, it is clear that a shift in the discourse in which the 
debate about health care takes place had a profound effect on other aspects of health 
governance. The new discourse changed the relationship between medical expertise 
and bureaucratic control which manifested itself in new forms of management 
structure. Equally important, the shift in the health discourse created a new 
conceptualisation of the relationship between the individual and health care governance 
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and hence a new set of subjects and categories for the health discourse. All of these 
issues can be usefully explored using 'governmentality analysis'. 
The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part One consists of four theoretical chapters that 
explore the general theme of govermnentality and related topics and establish it as an 
analytical framework that provides new insights into contemporary health and welfare 
policy. Part Two consists of three chapters which apply the analysis to the NHS, and 
present empirical evidence of 'post-reform' activity derived from case study interviews 
with District Health Authority directors and Chief Officers of Community Health 
Councils (CHCs). 
The first chapter of Part One begins with a discussion of a well-established theoretical 
framework, namely post-Fordist analysis, which contests the same historical evidence 
as governmentality analysis. It is necessary and useful to review this approach in order 
to understand the value and distinction of Foucauldian framework used later. 
Therefore, there is a brief discussion of three 'schools' of post-Fordist analysis 
identified by Bagguley (1991), these are the 'regulationist' school which is associated 
with Aglietta (1979), the 'institutionalist' school represented by the work of Piore and 
Sabel (1984) and finally, the 'managerial' school or the 'flexible firm' thesis associated 
with Atkinson (1984) and Atkinson and Meager (1988). Of the various schools 
described most attention is paid to the Marxist inspired 'regulationist' variant of post- 
Fordist analysis. This is for two reasons: firstly, it is the least deterministic of the 
schools identified; and secondly it is associated with a body of work that explores the 
implications of post-Fordism for welfarism. 
One of the leading theorists whose work is discussed is Jessop (1989,1991 1992, 
1994) and his concept of the 'Schumpeterian workfare state' (SWS) as a direct 
replacement for the Keynesian welfare state (KWS). A limited critique of the Jessop's 
work, and post-Fordist analysis in general, is presented on the grounds that it gives 
only a partial account of contemporary welfare state in that it fails to account for non- 
class relations. However, the main point of the chapter is to contrast post-Fordist 
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analysis with that of postmodernist forms of analysis (of which 'governmentality 
analysis' is an example) and to indicate that any investigation of contemporary NES 
organisation and practices needs to be connected with broader explanations of welfare 
state restructuring. This is followed by a discussion about whether postmodern ideas 
can form the basis of a progressive critical politics if they reject the concept of 
cuniversalism' (see Taylor-Gooby 1994; Mishra 1993; Fitzpatrick 1996; Hillyard and 
Watson 1996). The central difficulty revolves around questions of epistemology. The 
second part of the chapter deals with a critical appraisal by commentators such as 
Rorty (1986,1992), Habermas (1985), Walzer 1986, Hoy (1986) and Dreyfus and 
Rabinow (1983,1986) of Foucault's work as a leading postmodern/poststructuralist 
theorist. The final part of the chapter outlines Foucault's (1978) concept of 
governmentality'. This is accompanied by a discussion of governmentality by Gordon 
(1991), Burchell (1991), Pasquino (1991) who develop the concept of governmentality 
as applied to liberal mentalities of governance. 
Chapter 3 examines the implications of Foucault's particular use of power by 
contrasting it with Robert Alford's (1975) influential account of policy formation 
within health care systems. Alford's concept of 'structural interests' is discussed and 
its relevance to the contemporary NES debated; Alford's own use of power as 
manifested in competing structural interests is central to the chapter. A brief discussion 
of conventional approaches to power from Dahl (1957) to Lukes (1974) is contrasted 
with Foucault's notion that power is always implicated with knowledges - to form a 
power/knowledge discourse - that provides the categories that make non-discursive 
reality amenable to rational discourse. This idea is developed by Rose (1993) and Rose 
and Miller (1992) who describe the governance of health as a form of regulatory 
control of populations. Rose and Miller propose the idea of expertise as being central 
to regulatory regimes. This theme is further developed in chapter 4, which discusses 
the role medical expertise plays within liberal forms of health governance and the 
regulation of populations. In this chapter there is also a review of the professions 
literature and its compatibility with governmentality analysis, for example Freidson 
(1970,1973,1994), Larson (1995), Light (1995) and Johnson (1972,1977,1995). 
There is also a discussion of professional (medical) autonomy, the relationship of 
professions to the state and ideas such as deprofessionalisation (Haug 1975; Haug and 
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Lavin 1983; Starr 1982). The chapter ends by reviewing the debate about the 
developing techniques of audit and evidence based medicine (EBM) as technologies of 
management control (Mooney and Ryan 1992; Pollitt 1993; Kenison et al. 1994). 
Chapter 5 explores the concepts of implicit and explicit rationing/priority-setting policy 
within liberal forms of health governance. There is a discussion of 'market failure' 
when applied to the provision of health care (Le Grand 1982) and the problems of 
'just' rationing policy (Fleck 1994; Daniels 1993). Klein et al. (1996) provide a 
classification of rationing strategies which is discussed and assessed. The following 
section considers the debate about the merits of implicit rationing strategies in the form 
of the classic 'tragic choice' formulation of Calabresi and Bobbit (1978). This is 
contrasted with the explicit priority setting rationale developed in the state of Oregon, 
USA (Buist 1992; Honigsbaurn 199 1), and the problems associated with central rules- 
based rationing processes (Mechanic 1992). Subsequent sections of the chapter 
examýine emerging technologies of rationing such as the Quality Adjusted Life Year 
(QALY) and Quality of Well-Being (QWB) scales and their use within the new context 
of purchasing and assessing health needs associated with the NES reform process 
initiated by the 1989 White Paper [Vorkingfor Patients. Following on from this 
discussion there is an examination of how individuals have become the subject of the 
new health discourse. The new discourse demands a sort of 'prudentialism' (O'Malley 
1992) of individuals, a self-management of personal risk. It is argued that in many 
respects this resembles the construction of the individual within classical economics - 
honto econolnicits. The last part of the chapter presents a critique by the American 
sociologist Mark Granovetter (1974,1985,1992) of works such as those by Becker 
(1976) and Williamson (1975) which present economic models of behaviour as the 
basis for explaining all social behaviour. 
In Part Two of the thesis Chapter 6 seeks to place the development of the NES within 
a governmentality theoretical framework. This chapter makes use of a common body 
of evidential material provided by established historical accounts of the development of 
NHS as an institution and its place within the formulation of health policy (see Klein 
1995; Allsop 1995; Ham 1992; Mohan 1995; Stacey 1988; and Webster 1998). 
However, the use made of this historical data within govemmentality analysis does lead 
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to a clear divergence with conventional accounts of policy formation. Governmentality 
analysis does seek to place the development of the NHS within an historical context 
yet does so without imposing a 'grand narrative' structure on the data. The potential 
problems for governmentality analysis in using periodisation as part of the description 
of NHS development (and the related difficulties connected with the concept of a 
policy process) are discussed in this chapter. The following two chapters, Chapters 7 
and 8, present and analyse empirical evidence describing the role played by health 
authorities in corm-nissioning health services to meet local health needs and the way in 
which new technologies of priority-setting shape the 'rationing' debate. Additionally, 
in Chapter 8 there is a discussion and analysis of the influence that different forms of 
consumer representation have over health authority commissioning decisions. These 
chapters both increase our knowledge about health authority and CHC activity and 
critically engage with previous research on the same topic, including Appleby (1994), 
Appleby et al. (1992), Barnes and Cox (1996), Freemantle and Harrison (1993), Ham 
(1980), Harrison and Wistow (1992), Flynn et al. (1997), Freemantle et al.. (1993), 
Redmayne et al (1993), Redmayne (1995), Klein et al (1996), Lupton et al. (1995) and 
Ranade (1995). The thesis concludes by arguing that governmentality analysis provides 
new understanding of the 'problem' of health care governance that hitherto have not 
been fully explored, and provides a conceptualisation of the contemporary rationing 
and priority-setting debate that reflects much mor e complex societal issues than 
conventional accounts of NHS development can accommodate. 
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Chapter 
Theorising the Contemporary Welfare State 
introduction 
Before considering the application of a 'governmentality' framework for analysing 
health policy, it is necessary to review a broader range of theories that concern 
themselves with developments in the welfare sate, and place them in some kind of 
context. The primary purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to outline some influential 
theoretical perspectives that seek to account for changes in contemporary Britain 
(especially in the sphere of welfare) and the welfare state and to prepare the theoretical 
ground for subsequent chapters. However, it is not in itself meant to be a 
comprehensive review of current thinking in this area. The more specific aim is to 
counterpoint the post-Fordist debate against postmodern ways of thinking, in other 
words, to compare and contrast a methodology that overtly relies on the logic of the 
grand or meta-narrative to give it its internal consistency, against a programme of 
investigation that specifically rejects such notions. The strateg behind this gy 
investigation is to explore whether abandoning the meta-narrative inevitably results in 
confusion and inertia, and more importantly ends in the jettisoning of positive 
Cuniversal' notions such as citizenship and the 'progressive' ideals at the heart of the 
Enlightenment experiment. A key issue for debate is whether postmodemist ideas are 
themselves a source of emancipatory politics by disrupting 'universal' categorisations 
that trap individuals within, and subject them to, the discipline of a coercive welfare 
discourse. Consideration of these questions is necessary in order to appreciate the 
purpose and value of the Foucauldian approach discussed later. 
The end of the post-war consensus? 
It is clear that Britain has experienced major changes in the last 30 years. The post-war In 
boom of the 1950s and 1960s encapsulated in the certainties of the 'never had it so 
good' ethos, gave way to the doubt and pessimism of the 1970s. Rising commodity 
prices - especially the price of oil - rising unemployment, labour unrest and high 
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inflation coupled with low growth (so called 'stagflation'), seemed to herald a long- 
term international crisis in capitalist accumulation. In Britain, the post-war consensus 
on the welfare state was beginning to be questioned. The declaration by a Labour 
government that you could no longer spend their way out of recession appeared to 
signal that the bold experiment with Keynesian economics had failed. Indeed, 
Keynesian economics was perceived as part of the problem of maintaining economic 
stability, not the solution. Governments could no longer have faith in the macro- 
economic levers of power. Controlling demand no longer held out the promise of an 
escape from the vicissitudes of the economic cycle - only the prospect of double-digit 
inflation and deep economic recession. Perhaps as a result, in the late 1970s and early 
1980s there was a reassertion of liberal, supply-side economics, and a retreat in direct 
state control in economic activity (see Hutton 1996). 
In Britain, the election of a radical, overtly ideological Conservative government in 
1979 appeared to reinforce this trend. The Thatcherite espousal of laissez-faire, neo- 
liberal, monetarist economics and the call for a new entrepreneurial spirit to be allowed 
to flourish, freed from the dead hand of the state, reshaped the political landscape. The 
strategy privileged liberty over equity, emphasising the lights of the individual at the 
expense of the collective. The 1980s saw a developing and ever-widening government 
programme wedded to the rhetoric of 'rolling back the state'. It seemed only a matter 
of time that the institutions of the welfare state, with its ever expanding budget, would 
be subject to the same forces of competition that had led to the privatisation model 
becoming the template for state controlled industries and other services. In housing, 
the council house tenants' 'Right to Buy' commitment was an early policy, together 
with the push to transfer the remit for the construction of social housing from local 
government and be given to Housing Action Trusts and housing associations. Policy 
initiatives in education and health came in the latter part of the 1980s with the 1988 
Education Act and the 1989 White Paper Morkingfoi- Patients. The emphasis was on 
consumer choice, and above all competition. In education this included greater parental 
right to choose their children's school, 'empowered' by the information contained in 
league tables that purported to monitor school standards. This expansion of 'choice', 
together with the right of some schools to 'opt-out' of Local Authority control (given 
parental approval), introduced a new dimension into education directly from the 
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discipline of the market with schools in effect having to market themselves in 
competition with neighbouring schools, with the tacit understanding that some 'failing' 
schools might not be able to attract enough pupils and would have to close. Similarly, 
one saw the same rhetoric of choice and competition employed in NES reforms. For 
example, the Patient's Chartei-, created in November 1991 as part of the Citizen's 
Chai-tei- initiative, set out a number of 'rights' for NHS patients on waiting times and 
basic standards of quality in NHS facilities (DoH 1991). And more significantly, as part 
of [Voi-kingfoi- Patients (1989) it was proposed that to mimic the working of the 
market there should be a split in function between providers and purchasers which 
would create an internal or quasi-market. On the provider side there would be semi- 
independent, self-governing 'Trust' status for some hospital and community units 
financed through winning contracts to supply health care services. The most important 
purchasers would be restructured District Health Authorities, given the role of meeting 
local health needs, and in order to fulfil this role, placing contracts with appropriate 
providers - be they directly managed units, self-governing trusts or private suppliers. In 
addition, some General Practices would be able to opt for fundholding status and 
control their own budgets to purchase a range of hospital services for their patients. 
Taken as a whole with all the other welfare reforms, could it be argued that these the 
first stages of a 'recommodification' of the welfare state, the start of a new market in 
welfare services? Or are other processes at work? The question is - which are the most 
appropriate theoretical structures to make sense of these changes? The rest of this 
chapter explores some of these themes. 
The transition to the Post-Fordist State 
Some commentators have argued that there has been a fundamental change in the 
political economy of the welfare state in advanced capitalism. The theoretical 
framework that posits a transition from a 'Fordist' state structured around mass 
production and mass consumption, to a 'post-Fordist' state based on more 'flexible' 
ways of working and organisations, in many ways represents an archetypal grand 
narrative position (see Jessop 1989,1991,1992,1994; Piore and Sabel 1984). It 
situates contemporary change within a holistic frame of reference, incorporating a 
historical perspective, that envisages a process exerting its influence across multiple 
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generations. The kernel of the different kinds of Post-Fordist theory (see Bagguley 
1991), is to seek to comprehend the economic and social upheavals that came to a 
head in the 1970s in terms of a crisis within the prevailing regime of capitalist 
accumulation. As noted earlier, the resultant changes in political thinking and the rise 
of neo-liberal economics, especially in Britain, seemed to represent a reaction to a 
crisis that challenged the post-war political consensus at the heart of the Keynesian 
welfare state. It is postulated that a new regime of accumulation would entail 
significantly different patterns of individual and institutional consumption and 
production. The question being advanced, therefore, is if this was truly a crisis in the 
previous regime of accumulation, can one ascribe the shift to a neo-liberal form of 
economics as being characteristic of a new regime of accumulation? At face value the 
evidence does seem to suggest that a profound change had taken place. However, it 
could also be argued that using a framework that places so much stress on 
discontinuities will inevitably lead to the temptation of over-interpreting the empirical 
evidence, putting undue emphasis on the inevitable changes that take place in any 
society. But an even greater problem, even if one accepts that a transition has taken (or 
is taking) place, is to identify and disentangle those changes which are characteristic of 
the new regime from those which may be transitional and those that are part of an 
attempt to prop-up the failing previous regime. This is a daunting prospect for any 
researcher. 
Fordism to Post-Fordism? 
The basis of much thinking on post-Fordism is predicated to some extent on theories 
of long-waves of economic activity, particularly those of Schumpeter (1939,1982). 
Building on the work in the 1920s of the Soviet economist Nicholai Kondratieff, who 
followed a broadly Marxist line, Schumpeter, and others such as Mensch (1979), 
perceived the cyclical aspect of long-waves as stemming from the bunching of 
technical innovations. At some point in the long-wave, economic possibilities would 
open up as the previous innovation cycle became exhausted and these could be 
exploited by entrepreneurs taking advantage of new more favourable conditions. The 
reality of these waves has often been questioned (see Kuznets 1940, on Schumpeter), 
but such theorising found a more receptive audience when predicted log-wave 
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downturns in the world economy appeared to anticipate the boom years of the 1950s 
and 1960s and the international crises of the 1970s (see Hall 1988: 57). This in turn 
stimulated new interest in theories that gave prominence to technological innovation as 
a dynamic for change, and these included those that sought to explain contemporary 
crises in terms of a shift from Fordist to post-Fordist technologies. 
Bagguley (1991) identifies three schools of post-Fordism; the 'Regulationist school'; 
the 'Institutionalist school'; and the 'Managerial school'. Each incorporates a different 
set of dynamics for the transition to a post-Fordist state. The Fordist state is typically 
defined in terms of a system of mass production aligned with mass consumption, 
dependent on the assembly line production of standardised commodities with 
standardised labour processes, and underpinned by a Keynesian-style welfare state. 
The Iregulationist' school derived from a Marxist economic perspective, and 
associated with the work of Aglietta (1979), incorporates two inter-linked areas where 
the resolution of crises in capitalism can take place; the mass production/mass 
consumption based regime of capital accumulation and its associated socio-institutional 
structure, the mode of regulation. In this scheme, the crisis in capitalism in the 1970s 
was of an 'organic crisis' (Aglietta 1979: 385) within the 'Fordist' regime of capital 
accumulation as the rigidities inherent in the mass production processes and its 
associated division of labour limited the ability of capital to maintain profits. Therefore, 
in order for capitalism to resolve this crisis and restore profitability, the regime of 
accumulation has to be reshaped by making production more flexible, the labour 
market less rigid and new forms of consumption developed - neo-Fordism. New forms 
of management are also now needed to administer the new production processes and 
this is mirrored in new modes of state regulation, that include a welfare system more 
appropriate to the needs of the new regime of accumulation. 
The "Institutionalist' school, represented in the work of Piore and Sabel (1984), is in 
many ways less deterministic about outcomes than the regulationists. For them the 
crisis in capitalism has a number of possible causes but principally it is seen as the 
result of structural problems in mass production leading to a mismatch between mass 
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production and mass consumption. Mass production, resulting in the saturation of the 
market in mass consumption goods, cannot respond to the demand for differentiated 
products as the market becomes fragmented thereby compromising profitability. The 
key to resolving this conflict is through new high technology production machinery, 
flexible enough to meet the different needs of the market as well as develop new niche I- 
markets. 
The 'Alanagerial' school and the 'flexible firm' thesis, associated with Atkinson 
(1984) and Atkinson and Meager (1988), emphasises the restructuring of the labour 
market around notions of core/periphery workers. In the new labour market, and to 
some extent as a consequence of the introduction of new technology, workers are 
valued for the degree of 'functional flexibility' they are able to exhibit. Therefore, the 
favoured few that possess the skills to adapt to new circumstances can enjoy a high 
degree ofjob security while the rest, dependent on the extent to which they can be 
easily replaced, at best have to make do with self-employment or short-term contracts, 
or for those at the outer edges of the periphery be subject to the uncertainties of 'hire 
and fire'. 
It is clear from the nature of their arguments that, to some degree, all the above can be 
accused of determinism in one form or another. For Elam (1990), as noted by Williams 
(1994: 51-52), the problem of economic and technological determinism for the 
institutionalist and managerial schools respectively, places considerable limits on the 
viability of their theoretical frameworks. Only the regUlationist school, he contends, is 
thought to have the versatility to account for a variety of economic, political and 
institutional influences because it can offer tno areas where transformation can take 
place; in the regime of accumulation and in the mode of regulation. This leaves as 
'unwritten' what a post-Fordist economy will resemble and what form and function the 
post-Fordist welfare state will take. 
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Post-Fordism and welfare 
One of the best developed explorations of the implications post-Fordist ideas have for 
welfare is that of Jessop (1989,1991,1992,1994) who works within the definition of 
post-Fordism advanced by the regulationist school. As noted above, the Marxist or 
neo-Marxist economic theorising which lies at the heart of the regulationist rationale, 
raises distinct problems of determinism. The reliance on the base/superstructure model 
does imply that in some way the economic circumstances of class relationships 
dominates, and that, in the last instance, the base of economic relations will 
circumscribe the possibilities of welfare reconstruction. Jessop himself neatly side-steps 
this argument by building into his model a high degree of discretion as to the nature 
and influence of the forces which may be at play in the transformation to a post-Fordist 
society. To illustrate this, Jessop outlines four dimensions that can be used to define 
Fordism and post-Fordism and where he argues the transformation will take place (see 
below): 
1. the labour process considered as a particular configuration of the technical and 
social division of labour; 
2. an accumulation regime, ie, a macro-economic regime sustaining growth in 
capitalist production and consumption; 
3. a social mode of economic regulation, ie, an assembly of norms, institutions, 
organisational forms, social networks, and patterns of conduct which sustain 
and guide a given accumulation regime; and 
4. a mode of societalisation, ie, a pattern of institutional integration and social 
cohesion which complements the dominant accumulation regime and its social 
mode of economic regulation and thereby secures the conditions for its 
dominance within the wider society. 
(Jessop 1994: 14) 
Using these dimensions one can examine the differences that Jessop expects to see 
with the transformation to a post-Fordist state (Figure 1). 
The emphasis on flexibility is a characteristic of the other schools of post-Fordism 
outlined earlier. What is different is the introduction of the 'Schumpeterian workfare 
state', or SWS, as a direct replacement for the Keynesian welfare state (KWS) in the 
previous Fordist mode of regulation. To be even more precise, Jessop associates the 
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Figure 1 Key features of the Fordist and Post-Fordist state 
Fordism Post-Fordism 
labour process mass production of flexible production 
complex consumer process, flexible high- 
durables tech machines, flexible 
-workforce 
accumulation balance of mass production flexible and permanently 
regime and mass consumption innovative, new markets 
for differentiated goods 
social mode of institutionalised collective supply side innovations; 
regulation bargaining and a flatter, leaner 
Keynesian welfare state organisational structures; 
'Schumpeterian workfare 
state' 
modc of urban, 'middle-class', unresolved 
societalisation Avage-carning society 
(based on Jcssop 1994) 
SWS with a 'hollowing out' of the state as power is dissipated and devolved to other 
institutions. As previously mentioned, using the base/superstructure model, the welfare 
state has to be seen in terms of its function in reinforcing and promoting the regime of I 
accumulation. The key distinctions between the SWS and the Keynesian welfare state, 
are: the emphasis placed on the supply side of the economy as opposed to direct state 
intervention in managing demand, and the SWS's functions in underpinning the 
flexibility of the labour market and securing international competitiveness. As Jessop 
states: 
In this sense [the Schumpeterian workfare state] marks a clear break 
with the KWS as domestic full employment is de-prioritised in favour of 
international competitiveness and redistributive welfare rights take 
second place to a productivist re-ordering of social policy... In this 
sense its new functions would also seem to correspond to the emerging 
dynamic of world capitalism (Jessop 1994: 24). 
it is self-evident that a SWS has severe consequences for those advocating ideas of 
'universalist' welfare state (see Taylor-Gooby 1994, Offe 1994). The Keynesian welfare 
system is cast as the villain of the piece, part of the reason for the failure of the 
previous regime of accumulation. In this view notions of welfarism are couched in the 4: ) 
rhetoric of limited government, so that welfare spending is seen as a 'burden' on the 
system, as unhelpful to labour flexibility and symptomatic of structural rigidities within 
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the economy that hinder supply side reform. 
The fear is that the SWS, and post-Fordist analysis in general, may lead to the 
crecommodification' of welfare with a blurring of the distinction between public and 
private forms of provision. As Bagguley (1994) describes: 
The recommodification strategy essentially reasserts labour-market 
discipline and re-introduces some kind of market rationality in the 
consumption of welfare services. Recommodification. consists of cuts 
and sales. However, the structural and technical-economýic limits to this 
strategy have lead to a shift in focus. This shift in focus has two 
principal dimensions. One, the development of market rationality in the 
internal organisation of state welfare, and two, the development of 
market rationality in the politics of welfare (Bagguley 1994: 77). 
However, it has to be pointed out that not all post-Fordist analysis leads to such 
pessimistic conclusions. Sabel, for example, suggests that welfare responsibilities 
could, to a degree, be re-collectivised under the auspices of private industries, but with 
the consequence that the universal aspect of the welfare state may wither away to 
become a 'ramshackle version of itself (Sabel 1994: 143). Even so, one has the feeling 
that Jessop's formulation of the 'hollowed-out' SWS has more intuitive credibility. 
However, given the high level of abstraction, it is prudent to heed Jessop's own 
warnings of the dangers of falling into the teleological trap of an a pfioi-i assumption of 
an emerging SWS, and allow the evidence to fall into the neat categorisations this 
produces. Jessop is at pains to point out the unfixed nature of the changes yet to take 
place. A great deal of negotiation has still to take place. As he states: 
Thus a more detailed analysis of the SWS would need to explore the 
structural coupling between each type of Fordism and the character of 
the nation-state and the problem this creates; the complexities of the 
capital relation in each regime type and its implications for the forms of 
economic and political struggle over crisis-resolution; the path 
dependency of the trajectory out of crisis which emerges in and through 
such struggles; and the problems that arise when the pre-SWS lacks the 
capacity to manage transition (Jessop 1994: 28). 
is 
indeed this indeterminacy does lead one to question the suitability of a post-Fordist 
theoretical framework in accounting for actual empirical evidence. This is made more C. 
problematic in as much that contemporary change may be ascribed not to the post- 
Fordist state itself but to a transitional period that combines both a post-Fordist 
dynamic and the 'last gasp' efforts of the previous Fordist regime of accumulation to 
regain profitability. Historical distance is needed. As Jessop states, 'time alone is the 
test of whether a putative transitional regime will prove adequate to the alleged task. 
This indicates the need for ex ýpost' analyses of how post-Fordist states emerge rather 
that ex ante (and therefore teleological) accounts of the necessary forms of transition 
to post-Fordism' (Jessop 1994: 22). Perhaps even more fundamentally, it is evident 
that much of the theorising around notions of post-Fordist transition centres on 'ideal 
types', based on discrete categorisations that encapsulate the essence of the theory, yet 
at the same time lead one to marginalise the complexities of real life situations. As 
Jessop himself points out, post-war Britain until the 1970s economic crises may not 
conform to the ideal type of a Fordist state, but something more akin to a 'flawed' 
form of Fordism. As Esping-Andersen (1990) suggests in his typology of countries by 
their welfare regimes - liberal, conservative, social democrat - Britain could be 
described as a 'mixed case', at the margins of the liberal category. So, returning to 
Jessop, what may be taking place might not be the transition from one ideal type 
(Fordism) to another ideal type (post-Fordism), but of a 'flawed' Fordism to a form of 
'flawed' post-Fordism with all the complex contingencies that will involve. 
Critique of the post-Fordist position 
It is evident that we need to undertake a critique of post-Fordism. In this section there 
will be a continuation of the critical assessment of the post-Fordist debate in terms of 
two areas. Firstly, a limited return to the difficulties in dealing with 'ideal type' 
categorisations. And secondly, a discussion of the privileged role class relations play in 
post-Fordist theorising and the consequences this has for non-class divisions. 
As was discussed above, post-Fordist analysis provides us with an interesting example 
of the problematic nature of dealing with 'ideal tYPes' (see Cochrane 1991). Such I- 
theorising leaves the researcher wishing to use post-Fordist analysis in a dilemma. The 
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closer one adheres to the undiluted form of whatever post-Fordist formulation is 
thought to be appropriate, the easier it is in some ways to collect empirical evidence 
and allow it to fit the economic, institutional and social patterns the theory dictates. 
The problem, when the issue of complexity and contingency are pointed out, becomes 
one ofjustifying the validity of your arguments against the accusation that any 
discernible patterns are an artefact of the type of reasoning used. There is a possibility 
of seeing discontinuities where there may be none, marginalising inconsistencies that 
do not fit the pattern and neglecting other interpretations of the evidence. On the other 
band, if one includes complexity in the argument, the problem now becomes one of 
interpretation. The smallest of contingencies may have a great impact on the particular 
trajectory of development. Conceivably, cause and effect may be impossible to discern 
and so become the subject of endless speculation that even detailed expost 
investigation will not settle. One can look to long-wave theories themselves to see this 
process at work. The vast body of work generated over the last seventy or eighty years 
has failed to establish whether long waves are an actual phenomenon or not. 
The second set of critiques explore areas that have direct consequences for the next 
part of this chapter. They revolve around the use of class relations as the basis of much 
of post-Fordist thinking. As was noted earlier in this chapter, the Marxist 
base/superstructure model that forms the bedrock of 'regulationist' school post-Fordist 
analysis, is predicated on economic class relationships. Moreover, it could be argued 
that economic relationships through links in production and consumption or changes in 
the labour market within manufacturing, also play a decisive role in other formulations 
of post-Fordism, However, the danger in giving so much prominence to the economic 
dimension is that it gives the appearance that all other aspects of social life are - maybe 
in the last instance - the epiphenomena of class relationships. This entails marginalising 
other dimensions of social life that give rise to the experience of women and ethnic 
minorities within and, importantly, outside the sphere of paid employment. As Williams 
argues: 
... the conceptualisations of the welfare state, or welfare regimes, used in post-Fordist analyses are rooted in a white, male, able-bodied 
experience of welfare which ignores or marginalises the significance of 
other social relations. In particular, the relevance of social relations 
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other than class is ignored in relation to: the organisation ofpaid and 
unpaid work in welfare; the consumption of welfare; conflict and 
struggles over the distribution and delivery of welfare provision; the 
ideological content of welfare policies and practices; and the outcomes 
of welfare policies. In so far as issues of, say, gender or 'race', are 
brought in then they are either seen as the consequence of the 
organisation of welfare in relation to production or to class-capital 
relations, or they are subsumed under a more generic concept such as 
'inner-city problems', 'underclass', 'New Social Movements', or 
'family'. In particular rarely is the power of explanation or the power of 
agency granted to gender, 'race' or any social relation other than class 
(Williams 1994: 57). 
As she further points out, such terms as core, periphery and skill are assumed to be 
gender-neutral (ibid.: 56) despite the volume of evidence to the contrary that has 
amassed over the years. The delineation of 'men's work, and 'women's work', and the 
definitions of skill which they embody, especially in manufacturing, are usually decided 
by male-dominated management or male-dominated trade unions, independently of 
their importance to the production process (see Cockburn 1983; Meegan 1988). In 
failing to take account of the non-class relations, post-Fordism. neglects to notice these 
continuities in the experience of women and others, whilst overemphasising the 
discontinuities elsewhere. 
Additionally, what is missing is an appreciation that all welfare regimes are in some 
ways gendered or have a 'race' dimension and this must be acknowledged by any 
theoretical framework that aspires to provide a comprehensive account of 
contemporary change. As Carter and Rayner point out: 
.... [A] social policy perspective would also seek to recognise the very different experiences of women (and ethnic minorities) within individual 
welfare periods - in both the public and private spheres. The welfare 
state as developed in the three decades following the Second World 
War - the Fordist welfare state - was itself a gendered settlement with 
regards to its founding assumptions, structures and day-to-day 
outcomes. Assumed differences about roles, life cycles and social 
horizons of men and women were so fundamental as to be the 
cornerstones of pension and benefit provision (and indeed major 
influences on other sectors such as education). The welfare state itself 
as an organisation and employer was similarly constructed upon a 
gender template (Carter and Rayner 1996: 357). 
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It would be no exaggeration to assert that welfare regimes can only function because 
of the endered division of labour, 'that ensures that a large proportion of actual caring 9 ID 
is delivered outside the public realm' (ibid.: 355), by women in the multiple role of 
mother - looking after children; daughter - caring for ageing parents; and partner - 
assuming responsibility for monitoring male health. Therefore, to concentrate on 
economic class relations is to fail to account for an important dimension of welfare, the 
unseen bulk of welfare activity that does not register in the formal economy, and which 
post-Fordist analysis conspicuously fails to address. As Carter and Rayner argue: 
Welfare then is an iterative and complex relationship with the economy 
and processes of accumulation. Similarly the 'welfare state' has always 
stood proxy for a variety of activities in the public and private realms. 
Unfortunately this richness and diversity is not captured by the rather 
blunt claim of a post-Fordist transformation (ibid.: 356). 
The case for Postmodernism 
The previous section outlined some important critiques of the post-Fordist position. In 
particular, it was noted that focusing almost exclusively on changes in economic 
relationships fails to recognise the significance in society of non-economic 
relationships. Although this was suggested in the context of post-Fordism and the 
supposed transition to a post-Fordist society, this form of critique can be extended to 
cover Fordist ideologies. One of the ke y concepts of which is the notion of 'universal' 
welfare. For many, as argued earlier, aspirations of universalism are central to notions 
of 'progressive' politics, even if in the extreme situations they are the 'least worst' 
option (Taylor-Gooby 1994, Offe 1994). The perceived danger must be that 
programmes that threaten universalism, are seen to threaten the progressive, 
aspirational politics inwMch the concept is embedded. However, by definition the all- 
encompassing nature of universal welfare leaves it open to a similar critique used on 
post-Fordism. The danger appears to be that individuals within 'progressive' welfare 
become subject to a discourse that institutionalises difference and hidden biases, 
thereby dis-empowering large sections of society. For example, if we take the 
'recommodification' debate and reverse it to look at 'decommodification' - the 
22 
removal of a number of welfare services from market provision - we see a familiar set 
of critiques. If one takes the work of Esping-Andersen (1990), where it is argued that 
universal welfare rights, through 'decommodification, underpin social rights and 
enable political mobilisation, it has been argued that this does not take account of the 
gendered nature of welfare. Using a similar argument to that deployed against post- 
Fordism, it is argued that this kind of theorising neglects the largely unpaid role played 
by women as carers in the domestic setting. Decommodification could only be seen to 
enhance freedom for both sexes if the gendered roles in domestic labour and caring are 
overlooked (Williams 1994: 59). Williams goes on to highlight three areas where 'the 
rights of decommodification may not be extended fully to women': many women work 
part-time and are denied many full-time benefits; men may make claims based on the 
nature of their paid work-, whereas for women access to benefits is through matemal or 
marital status; many allowances are based upon a gendered division of labour at home, 
especially around caring, denying benefits to those whose caring roles are deemed to 
be part of 'normal duties'. Expanding on this, Williams points out that: 
... the post-war welfare settlement 
depended upon women's unpaid 
caring work in the home (and to that extent welfare was never entirely 
state provided) and reinforced both this and their economic 
dependency. Furthermore the development of mass provision was also 
made possible through the availability of low-paid labour from the 
colonies and ex colonies. At the same time the 'universalism' of many 
of the post-war services and benefits was based on the norm of the 
white, British, heterosexual, able-bodied Fordist man, and often 
excluded women and black people upon whose paid and unpaid labour 
it depended. In different ways, in different industrialised countries a 
welfare settlement was struck according to a combination of a balance 
of class forces, the availability of cheap labour, cultural and political 
traditions and expectations which themselves were rooted in specific 
interrelations of capital, patriarchy and imperialism (Williams 1994: 61). 
Thus there is a need to develop a theoretical understanding that on one hand can 4D 
challenge the assumption that in different ways seem to underpin both post-Fordist and 
universalistic welfare, while at the same time still possess a sense of social justice and a 
dynamic emancipatory politics. The next section argues that some forms of 
postmodemist thinking supply such a theoretical framework that allows for greater 
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insight into the functioning of societies in transition than that provided by so-called 
4progressive' theorising. 
Postmodernism and 'progressive' politics 
The relationship between postmodern thought and 'universalism', in one form or 
another, has provoked a great deal of debate (see Taylor-Gooby 1994; Mishra 1993; 
Fitzpatrick 1996; Hillyard and Watson 1996). It is often asserted that the adoption of 
postmodernist forms of thinking, and the explicit denial of the grand narrative, is a 
'backwards step', limiting the development of a 'progressive' politics. For Taylor- 
Gooby, as mentioned earlier, any threat to 'universal' notions of welfare must by their 
nature be a retrograde step. And moreover, as Fitzpatrick observes, Taylor-Gooby 
insists that: 
postmodernist theory is largely blind to the increasing universality of 
economic liberalism. Its constructive role is limited, therefore. On the 
plus side, it stresses the individual and the group, as well as recognising 
the declining authority of the nation-state and the declining legitimacy 
of a centralised welfare state. But, on the negative side, it does not see 
the significance of economic fragmentation, labour market instability, 
inequality, privatisation and quango-run regulation (Fitzpatrick 1996: 
305-306). 
However, as Fitzpatrick (ibid.: 306) points out, Taylor-Gooby appears to have equated 
modernism with the Keynesian welfare state to produce an overly reductive 
interpretation of postmodernism. In this scheme of things, if postmodernism means the 
rejection of the modernist narrative, it must also entail a re*ection of the welfare state, I 
and by extension, positive and progressive politics, and vice versa. Furthermore, as 
Hillyard and Watson point out, Taylor-Gooby seems to misunderstand what is meant 
by postmodernism. Unlike Marxist or neo-Marxist theorising, for example, there are no 
core ideas to turn to, or a central body of work or a particular author. As they state, 
'Taylor-Gooby falls into the trap that many commentators on postmodernism have 
fallen into before of using the term in a reified way - 'an 'it', if you like which 'does' or 
'is' such and such' (Hillyard and Watson 1996: 322). When approaching such themes 
as the ubiquity of liberalism, postmodern thinking can engage with the 'reality' of its 
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effect on particular groups within society. However, at the same time, postmodern 
ideas emphasise that while such notions as economic liberalism aspire to be universal 
this impact is fragmented. There are categorisations embedded in its ideology that 
force individuals to become subject of a discourse. As Hillyard and Watson (1996) 
argue: 
Postmodernism has produced a vast array of literature drawing 
attention to the tyranny of the binary structuring of thought in modern 
society. In each binary opposition there is a hierarchical privileging of 
one side against the other. The discipline of social policy is replete with 
oppositions with one side carrying overtones of moral superiority: the 
abled and the dis-abIed, the employed and the unemployed, the healthy 
and the sick, the depraved and the deprived, the criminal and the law 
abiding and home and work. Postmodern theory disrupts these 
categorisations arguing for an interconnectedness and a relatedness or 
for difference or fragmentation against structures based on division and 
domination (op. cit.: 323-324). 
Looking back at the critique of concepts of universalism in welfare, and ideas 
surrounding decommodification., one can see these binary oppositions at work: paid 
and unpaid work; white and ethnic minority; the world of work and the domestic 
domain; full-time work and part-time work; 'men's work' and 'women's work'. In 
many ways the postmodemist emphasis on difference and fragmentation could form the 
basis of challenging these categorisations in a politics of resistance, analogous to a 
'progressive' modernist politics. However what results is a specific, particular politics 
which in challenging categorisations cannot then try and replace them with something 
else. Postmodernism cannot with one voice deny the universal, yet at the same time 
cannot Present anything to act as its replacement and present itself as an alternative 
universal discourse. As such there can be no 'Progressive' agenda, an unambiguous 
political direction to follow. Without doubt this does represent a considerable break 
with the modernist politics. 
Foucault, truth and power 
For an influential alternative postmodern method of thinking one must turn to the body 
of work associated with the poststructural theorist Michel Foucault. It is central to his 
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argument that the individual is, in some way, created, categorised, and subjectified by 
the discourse in which they are implicated. In his works from Madness and 
Civilisation (1970) Me Bh-11i of the Clinic (1973) onwards, he seeks to develop the 
idea that societies have their own 'regimes of truth': 
... 
its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it 
accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances 
which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by 
which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value 
in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with 
saying what counts as true (Foucault 1985: 93). 
For Foucault the truth 'is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which 
produce and sustain it, and to the effects of power which it induces and which extend 
it" (ibid.: 93). The product of this fusion of truth and power creates the bedrock on 
which fields of knowledge are constructed and which in turn provides the categories in 
which individuals become objects within that knowledge. Individuals become subjects 
of particular discourses but also subject to them. Additionally, the more knowledge the 
discourse requires about the individual the more the individual is subject to the 
discourse. Moreover, often it is the body of the individual itself which is the centre of 
the discourse, through medical science for example. Therefore these discursive regimes 
are in effect normative regimes, disciplining and regulating society, often through 
exercising power over the body (bio-politics), with the collection of information acting 
as a technology of surveillance. 
Foucault appears to be specifically rejecting the Althusserian concept of 
'interpellation', that individuals become subject to ideology through the function of 
networks of institutions, Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) (Althusser 1985). This 
is the idea that individuals unconsciously allow themselves to be subject to these 
ideologies because they feel themselves to be directly addressed by them and can 
comprehend themselves in terms of the 'reflection' provided by the ideology itself For 
Foucault there is no need to invoke the concept of interpellation because 'power 
relations can materially penetrate the body in depth, without depending even on the 
mediation of the subject's own representations. If power takes hold in the body, this 
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isn't through its having first to be interiorised in the people's consciousness' (Foucault 
1980: 196). For example, in his description of Bentham's concept of the 'Panopticon' 
one can see how in this more 'rational', less barbaric forms of punishment, part of a 
science of penology, it is the body of the prisoner that becomes the subject of the 
discourse, having to develop new behaviours appropriate to the new regime. The 
prisoner does not have to be in agreement with the rationale behind the incarceration 
strategy to be subject to it (Foucault 1979; also see Eckermann 1997: 156-157). 
Foucault: methodologies and discontinuities 
While the above does not misrepresent the broad thrust of Foucault's work it is 
illustrative of some of the profound problems one encounters in trying to make 
practical use of the Foucauldian 'opus'. At worst, it represents an eclectic approach, 
selecting concepts from different - and difficult - works and presenting them 
unqualified as part of a coherent whole. For example, the idea of the 'Panopticon, and 
by extension the model of society in which it is a central concept, comes from 
Disciplh)e wid Pimish (1977), whereas the emphasis on the body as the focus of 
power and normalisation. is more developed in Foucault's idea of 'bio-power' 
associated with later works such as 77ie History of Sexuality (1981,198 5,1986). In 
this instance there is a great deal of overlap in the arguments that underpin both these 
works, so the juxtaposition of these two concepts is not too egregious. However, such 
an approach fails to do justice to the variety and complexity of Foucault's task and 
more importantly, it exacerbates some of the difficulties inherent in Foucault's 
theorising. 
One of the problems with understanding Foucault's work is Foucault himself. A 
prolific author of many books, articles, published lectures, interviews - both academic 
and non-academic, produced over several decades, this amounts to a vast body of 
work. Perhaps it is not surprising given the vastness of the output that there are subtle 
(and the not so subtle) shifts of emphasis developed in his work over the years. The 
more charitable of Foucault's interpreters deduce an almost evolutionary process at 
work, with a consistent set of central concepts continuously subject to dynamic 
analysis by a self-critical author of rare originality (see Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983; 
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Rochlitz 1992). Foucault himself did refer to his ongoing work as a 'slalom', or having 
foundations built on shifting ground (see Janicaud 1992: 292). However, many others 
are far less forgiving of the inconsistencies and contradictions they see in his work. For 
many, self-criticism smacks of vacillation, more akin to intellectual dilettantism, a 
product of 'infantile leftism' (Walzer 1986) or someone engaged in 'radical chic' 
polemics (Rorty 1986). The problem in part stems from a confusion of what role 
Foucault is fulfilling (presupposing that he has to be assigned to a particular role). Is lie 
a historian as he sometimes professes to be? Does one try to engage his work from a 
philosophical perspective? Is he a social theorist constructing grand schemes? Or 
perhaps a more modest essayist? Or is he simply the product of a style particular to 
French academic philosophy? One which 'forbids you just to settle for being clever 
enough to have found interesting new descriptions to replace a boring old one', and 
instead insists they be part of a rigorous methodology, 'an illustration of a grand 
theory, the result of having adopted the fight starting point' (Rorty 1986: 43). As a 
consequence of this uncertainty, a veritable industry has grown up interpreting and 
reinterpreting Foucault's work as well as adapting it to new fields of investigation (see 
Armstrong 1992; Burchell et al. 199 1; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983; Gordon 198 1; 
Rabinow 1984). However, as one might have anticipated, this feverish activity has 
done little to quell charges of misrepresentation and confusion. The next section of this 
chapter discusses two of the most contentious areas of Foucault's work: the 
epistemological consequences of his methodologies and the impact this has on the 
possibility of Foucault's politics. The importance of this discussion is that it forces the 
researcher to examine the basis of Foucault's methods as a practical research 
programme. 
Epistemology and the Archaeology of Knowledge 
Foucault describes the 'archaeological' method in terms of the set of rules for certain 
historical periods which define a discursive space and which gives rise to discursive 
practices 'characterised by the delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a 
legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the 
elaboration of concepts and theories. Thus, each discursive practice implies a play of 
prescriptions that designates its exclusion and choices' (Foucault 1977; cited in 
28 
Davidson 1986: 221-222). Therefore, historical investigation must go beyond the 
simple collection of historical texts. It must provide some understanding about the 
'conditions of existence' of discourse (Foucault 1968; in Burchell et al 1991: 60). The 
'set of rules which at a given period and for a given society', define and regulate the 
discursive domain in which things can be thought of as 'real' entities (ibid.: 59). In 
effect, the archaeology method seeks to uncover the conditions in which claims about 
what can be said to be true are made. What marks out Foucault's methodology as 
different from other forms of historical analysis is its openly anti-historicism, anti- 
Hegelian stance. Foucault states that he is not trying to 'question discourses about 
their silently intended meanings... or about the contents they may conceal' (ibid.: 60). 
As Rorty states, Foucault's methodology offers, at best: 
'... brilliant redescriptions of the past, supplemented by helpful hints on 
how to avoid being trapped by old historiographical assumptions. These 
hints consists largely in saying: do not look for progress or meaning in 
history; do not see history as a given activity, or any segment of culture, 
as the development of rationality or freedom; do not use any 
philosophical vocabulary to characterise the essence of such activity or 
the goal it serves; do nof assume that the way this activity is presently 
conducted gives any clue to the goals it served in the past' (Rorty 1986: 
47; author's emphasis). 
It is not the intention to present a detailed critique of Foucault's epistemology, but 
discussion of it is relevant in as much as it impinges on the validity of Foucault's 
supposedly political pronouncements that are judged to have a moral or ethical 
dimension. These difficulties stem in part from Foucault's own pronouncements that he 
is not trying to create alternative epistemologies (see Foucault 1980; in Burchell et al 
1991: 85; Rorty 1986). However, it is also clear that such early works as flie 
Ai-chaeoloýy of Knonledge (1972) and The Ordei- of 77iings (197 1) do contain 
elements of reasoning than can be interpreted as making truth claims - if of the second- 
order kind. And while Foucault himself, as noted above, does not make such claims, 
others have suggested that the archaeology method can form a basis for a new 
epistemology (see Hacking 1979). Such positions can be sustained because the 
archaeology method does appears to owe a great deal to a kind of quasi-structuralism, 
in that 'things attain to significance in so far as they are able to form the elements of a I 
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signifying system' (Foucault 1970: 382). However, although it should be noted that 
Foucault considered his method to be resolutely anti-structuralist (see Foucault 1984: 
56), the parallels with normative rule-based use of language are self-evident. The 
method clearly suggests that the discourses in which individuals are embedded, and 
from which they derive subjectivity, can be uncovered. Any methodology which claims 
to be able to reveal the workings of the normative regimes within discourses appears to 
be making truth claims analogous to the claim that uncovering the structure of 
language allows one to say meaningful things about how language is used to describe 
the world. 
However, there are great difficulties associated with this way of thinking. The most 
prominent one is the charge of relativism. Given that individuals are subjectified by 
discourse and that discourses change over time - hence the need for an 'archaeological' 
method - then any truth claims made by individuals are only made relative to the 
particular historical discourse in which they are situated. This leads to two major 
problems. Firstly, the methodology will privilege discontinuity over continuity. 
Secondly, if an individual is subject to a discourse which encompasses and regulates 
the totality of lived experience then how do discourses change over time? The 
methodology says nothing about how these changes may come about. Even more 
importantly - using an argument often levelled at relativistic forms of reasoning -a 
researcher methodically and painstakingly sifting the historical evidence is as subject to 
a historical discourse as anyone else. M. eaningfiil discussion of past discourses is only 
possible by transcending all discourses which, by its own reasoning, is not possible. As 
Hoy argues: 
As supposedly true descriptions of past discourses, the archaeologist's 
own utterances have to except themselves from this relativity, 
producing Foucault's contradictory attitude as he shifts from the stance 
of the disinterested, objective historian to that of the partisan, engaged 
social critic. The archaeologist cannot criticise either past or present 
discourses by appealing to truth or falsity. Archaeolog is designed to cy 
avoid the Whiggish assumption of the necessary superiority of later 
theories (for instance, our own) over earlier ones (Hoy 1986: 5-6). 
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Thus, as Hoy suggests, Foucault finds himself in a contradictory position. The 
archaeological method allows him to lay bare the normative regimes of truth that are 
embedded in discourses but at the same time the method robs him of the ability to 
compare how 'good' or ethical these regimes are because he is denied any external 
yard sticks by which to judge them. in a partial answer to these criticisms Foucault's 
later works, for example Discipline and Punish, employ a variation on the archaeology 
theme, using the method of 'genealogy'. However, as can be seen in the next section, 
while the new methodology answers some of the criticisms outlined above, many of the 
same fundamental problems remain. 
Genealogy and Foucault's politics 
The 'genealogy' method represents a subtle shift in Foucault's thinking. Whereas 
archaeology is preoccupied with examining discourses, 'genealogy' is more interested 
in how power and discourse interact to produce power/know] edge, ie. that which gives 
meaning to social practices and to the institutions in which they operate. Therefore, 
unlike archaeology, by focusing on the power/knowledge discourse genealogy caii map 
gradual changes that do take place in rationality and meaning over time. However, like 
archaeology, the genealogy method is not concernedwith grounding itself within a 
search for origins. As Foucault states: 
Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken 
continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things; its 
duty is not to demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present, 
that it continues secretly to animate the present, having imposed a 
predetermined form on all its vicissitudes. Genealogy does not resemble 
the evolution of a species and does not map the destiny of a people. On 
the contrary, to follow the complex course of descent is to maintain 
passing event in the proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the 
minute deviations - or conversely, the complete reversal - the errors, the 
false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those 
things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that 
truth or being does not lie at the root of what we know and what we 
are, but the exteriority of accidents (Foucault 1984: 8 1). 
One of the strengths of genealogy is that the historian/researcher accepts they are as 
subject to power/knowledge discourses as everyone else. As Hoy suggests, this opens 
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up the possibility immanent social criticism. 'As a genealogist Foucault is able to 
diagnose the organizing trends of our culture only because he, too, is subjected to 
them' (Hoy 1986: 13-14). However, even though this form of critique does not rely on 
being independent of the current power/knowledge discourse (and so be subject to the 
criticisms offered against archaeology), it does seem to imply two things: the ability to 
view the present from the privileged vantage point of a fictitious future not granted to 
other mere mortals; or that discourse is not as totalising as it was assumed. 
in part these problems are due to the 'post-structural' position inherent in the 
genealogy method. Genealogy does not lay claims of uncovering the truth or of any 
essentialism for the method itself, which was the charge against archaeology (or by 
extension the position of rule-based language in structural linguistics). Discourses 
become free-floating, with no correspondence to any external reality. In many ways 
this is a similar position to that described earlier when discussing the archaeological 
method, except this time we have to look at the problem from the other way around. 
Previously it was argued that the epistemological problems associated with the 
archaeology method denied the historian/researcher the basis for critical political 
comment. With genealogy (because it opens up the possibility for political action), it is 
the lack of any external reference points which leads to the same charge - that any 
political stance must be nihilist or anarchist in nature (Walzer 1986; Ghicksmann 
1992). This is exacerbated by Foucault's position on power. In traditional theorising 
about power relations (be it derived form Marx, liberalism or other kinds of modernist 
thinking), knowledge and power are separate entities, knowledge is part of the power 
dynamic in which one group or class exercises power over other groups or classes in 
suppressing their conscious or unconscious 'real' interests. But because Foucault 
denies discourse any external reference points, power becomes fused with knowledge 
to create the concept of power/knowledge. Genealogy becomes the method of charting 
the changing nature of this discourse which makes 'reality' meaningful. Ironically, this 
knowledge becomes 'unknowable'. So 'real' cannot be assumed to have any tangible 
reality as a concept. It is power without a subject. Power/knowledge creates fields of 
power that simply exist, they are inescapable, so attempting to extricate oneself from 
one set of power relationships only involves one being subject to a different set. 
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The new question that now arises is how can one know if a particular 
power/knowledge discourse is any 'better' than any other alternative power/knowledge 
discourse? This is the charge levelled against Foucault in Nancy Fraser's often cited set 
of questions: 
Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought domination to be 
resisted? Only with the introduction of normative notions of some kind 
could Foucault begin to answer this question. Only with the 
introduction of normative notions could he begin to tell us what is 
wrong with the modern power/knowledge regime and why we should 
oppose it (Fraser 1981: 238). 
In essence, this forms the basis of the critique of Foucault presented by the leading 
theorist RIrgen Habermas (1985). Clearly Foucault's own ideas do not allow for 
Habermas's own formulation of the 'ideal speech community' -a normative 
counterfactual whereby one could envisage a 'rational consensus' brought about by the 
free, undistorted critical dialogue of competent individuals. However, what is more 
important is not that this particular formulation is rejected, but that Foucault denies all 
attempts of external validation of truth claims. Without this 'normative yardstick' 
critique is not possible. Therefore, Foucault is dubbed an 'irrationalist'. 
Similar arguments are used in the critique of Foucault employed by Michel Walzer, 
irritated by 'Foucault the polemicist' who, paradoxically, deliberately denies himself a 
directing centre yet seems to engage in radical politics. In his own defence, Foucault 
often stated that he did not like to get involved in polemics (Foucault 1984: 381), or 
that his work was not part of a 'political project' (ibid.: 375). That is not say Foucault 
was not a radical. However, as Janicaud is at pains to point out, Foucault was at pains 
to separate his own militancy from the 'scientific nature of his work' and that 'one 
would seek in vain any militancy in Pie Archaeology qfKnoitledge, in The 01-del- of 
Discow-se, or even in Die Oi-dei- of Ahigs' (Janicaud 1992: 291). For Walzer even the 
possibility of militancy or radicalism is at odds with Foucault's own methodology. For 
Foucault 'there would appear to be no independent standpoint, no possibility for the 
development of critical principles' (ibid.: 64). So that ultimately Foucault's 
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antidisciplinarian politics degenerates into 'mostly rhetoric and posturing' (ibid.: 65). 
Furthermore, because of the stress Foucault places on the role of discipline within 
Western capitalism, Walzer describes Foucault as a functionalist of the more 
pessimistic kind, relying on an invisible hand that leads Foucault to wonder how such a 
complex system, 'given that no one person could have conceived it in its entirety, ... 
can be so subtle in its distribution, its mechanisms, reciprocal controls and adjustments' 
(Foucault 1980: 62). 
This pessimistic reading of Foucault is possible for many of his works. For example 
Disciplhie widPinfish does extend the carceral regime beyond the prison gates to 
become a model for a carceral society. As Foucault suggests, 'why should we be 
surprised if prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks and hospitals. All of which 
resemble prisons' (Foucault 1977: 228). There is a feeling that individuals trapped in 
these disciplinary discourse are ciphers, docile bodies - beings with socially constructed 
bodies - 'bodies-without-organs' of the type associated with Deleuze and Guattari 
(1984; 1988), subjectified and 'totally imprinted by discourse' (Butler 1990). Walzer's 
reading of Foucault is that to resist a disciplinary regime only results in being enmeshed 
in another regime of power with no yardstick to compare which regimes is 'better'. 
Therefore, Foucault, he argues, is implying that all power systems must be abolished. 
As Walzer states: 
'And so Foucault's radical abolitionism, if it is serious, is not anarchist 
so much as nihilist. For on his own arguments, either there will be 
nothing lefl at all, nothing visibly human- or new codes and disciplines Z2 
will be produced, and Foucault gives us no reason to expect that these 
will be any better that the ones we now live with. Nor, for that matter, 
does he give us any way of knowing what "better" might mean' (Walzer 
1986: 61). 
In effect, what Walzer appears to be arguing is that if there seems no way of 
distinguishing between the 'carceral society' and the evil of the 'Gulag society', what 
hope is there of any progressive politics? Another problem lies in assuming that the 
carceral society is an artefact of modemist ways of thinking. That 'a subtle, calculated 
technology of subjection' (Foucault 1984: 2 10) is necessary for modem capitalism to 
flourish. Therefore, the implication would be that if Foucault's work is a warning 
34 
against the dangerous technologies of subjection inherent in capitalism then he seems 
to be presenting a case a( )), ainst modernism or is at least against the Enlightenment 
experiment. This is a difficult problem. If modernism and the Enlightenment as they are 
conventionally seen, represent the possibility of movement towards a moral end-point 
(or at least the presumption of an end-point for society to aspire even if it is not 
realisable), then the honest answer would be that Foucault is anti-Enlightenment. It is 
evident that many more critical commentators would be willing to level the charge that 
Foucault is anti-modemism/anti-Enlightenment, but at the same time suspect that 
Foucault cannot help but employ some unannounced moral or ethical standpoint 
(hence the charge by Habermas that Foucault is a 'crypto-nonnalist'; see Habermas 
1985; also see Taylor 1986; Walzer 1986). Therefore, if Foucault were to be consistent 
and deny himself a moral yardstick, then his politics must inevitably be dubbed nihilist. 
Foucault and nihilism 
The question now becomes one of asking whether nihilism is in any way compatible 
with modernist or enlightenment thinking? The most obvious answer is a resounding 
no. Yet it has been argued that Foucault does present us with a new fon-n of nihilism, 
one capable of sustaining 'the conditions of moral action' (Ghicksmann 1992: 339; and 
Veyne 1992). This is a difficult trick to pull off but it clear in his last few works 
Foucault was trying to reposition himself as a thinker in the enlightenment tradition. In 
one of his last works Miat is Dilightenment? (1984), Foucault returns to re-analyse 
Kant's own 1784 essay of the same title. This is ironic given that a critique of Kant 
was the spur for the production of The Ordei- of Things (see Hoy 1986: 21-22). 
Coming full circle, Foucault argues that modernity, postmodernity or whatever label is 
given to a particular epoch, do not refer to periods of history punctuated by 
discontinuity, but rather they are characterised by 'attitudes', by which he means: 
... a mode of contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain 
people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting 
and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of 
belonging and presents itself as a task. A bit, no doubt, like what the 
Greeks called ethos (Foucault 1984: 39). 
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The use of the notion of ethos present the opportunity of breaking free of the 
'blackmail' of being 'for or against' the Enlightenment. Foucault advances the View 
that as 'beings who are historically determined, to some extent, by the Enlightenment' 
that analysis of ourselves should be directed towards testing 'the "contemporary limits 
of necessity", that is, towards what is not or is no longer indispensable for the 
continuation of ourselves as autonomous subjects' (ibid.: 43). What Foucault seems to 
be saying is that the Enlightenment experiment cannot be reduced to a search for an 
"essential kernel of rationality" (ibid.: 43), but that the Enlightenment tradition is the 
embodiment of the principle of 'permanent critique of our historical era' (ibid.: 42). It 
is through the genealogy method that the critique is realised, rationalities questioned 
and categories disrupted. As Hoy points out, this has much in common with arguments 
advanced by Adorno and Horkheimer in Pie Dialectic ofEnlightenment, that the 
'pious belief in the unqualified value of enlightenment contradicts the enlightenment's 
own aspiration for rational autonomy' (Hoy 1986: 22). It is through the evocation of 
cpermanent critique' that Foucault can square the circle of uniting his own perceived 
nil-fflism with the tradition that has fuelled West thinking for the last two and a half 
centuries. 
Foucault the poet? 
It is not the function of this chapter to judge how successful Foucault is in performing 
this philosophical sleight of hand so that he can align himself with the Enlightenment 
project. It is clear that his claim to be included in the Enlightenment tradition has to be 
approached with scepticism coming from a man who seemed intent on undermining it 
for most of his working life. However, scepticism is one thing, to dismiss Foucault as 
'flawed, but interesting" because of it is quite another. This is the equivalent of 
presenting Foucault's work as a necessary philosophical irritant, albeit 'rhetorically 
inflated and drained of moral distinctions, it never the less captures something of the 
reality of contemporary society' (Walzer 1986: 53). One way of rescuing Foucault 
from this damnation by faint praise is to point out that, above all else, Foucault was not 
concerned with epistemology but with methodology. Therefore, the problem becomes 
not one of Foucault's moral standpoint, or lack of it, but the standpoint of those that 
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make use of Foucault's work, in particular the use of his genealogy methodology as 
the basis of a research agenda. 
Rorty (1992) presents Foucault as someone who 'wanted to do good to his fellow 
humans while at the same time having an identity which had nothing what so ever to 
do with them. He wanted to help people without taking their vocabulary as the one in 
which he spoke to himself He wanted to help them while inventing a self which had 
nothing much (indeed, as little as possible) to do with theirs' (Rorty 1992: 321). The 
implication is that the Foucauldian ethic is a totally personal one. Foucault tries to do 
good for fellow human beings in his own terms, if this happens to correspond with 
doing 'good' within universalistic concept of that notion then so be it. Hence the 
suspicion 'that whilst being so wicked in theory (being so anti-universalist, so relativist, 
so opportunist), he was so good in practice (militating on behalf of prisoners, the mad 
and so on)' (Miller 1992: 258), and that Foucault was acting in accordance with some 
unconscious or unstated general principles. But as we will now never know, perhaps 
Foucault can be given the benefit of the doubt. So, as Rorty goes on to suggest, we 
may not be dealing with Foucault the philosopher, a dealer in aporias, but with 
Foucault the poet: 
For philosophers, as opposed to poets, are traditionally supposed to 
offer a 'basis' for our moral obligations to others. They are supposed to 
have what Fraser calls 'an adequate normative perspective'. Unlike 
poets, philosophers are supposed to a'rational', and rationality is 
supposed to consist in being able to exhibit the 'universal validity' of 
one's position. Foucault, like Nietzsche, was a philosopher who claimed 
a poet's privileges. One of these privileges is to rejoin'What has 
universal validity to do with meT I think that philosophers are as 
entitled to this privilege as poets, so I think this rejoinder sufficient 
(Rorty 1992: 333). 
However, can the work of a 'poet' form the basis of theoretical approaches to 
empirical research? Are there circumstances that make this possible? Even though 
Foucault's analysis is most coherent when it constructs his own private universe, with 
no intention of establishing alternative models of society, it could be argued that 
Foucault's methodology is an important heuristic device alerting us to 'contemporary 
danger'(Dreyfus and Rabinow 1986: 118). This becomes possible because Foucault, as 
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Hoy puts it, 'paints a picture of a totally non-nalised society, not because he believes 
our present society is one, but because he hopes we will find the picture threatening' 
(Hoy 1986: 14). However, it is evident that in presenting social discourse as partial and 
not totalising, individuals can no longer be seen as docile bodies 'imprinted by 
discourse' as suggested earlier, rather they must be autonomous reflexive individuals, 
capable of resistance. These are not the individuals that inhabit Foucault's earlier 
works, or even 'genealogical' works such as DiscilWine andPunish. But this 
reformulation of the autonomous individual is characteristic of Foucault's very last 
works. This was demonstrated above in Foucault's commentary on Kant, Miat is 
Enlightenment?, but it is also present in The Hisimy of Sexuality and his work on 
cgovernmentality' -a discussion on the 'art of government'. 
But where is the space for individuals to be reflexive and autonomous within 
Foucault's theorising? Is this space outside discourse in some way? Again we return to 
the charge that Foucault is being disingenuous by creating some sort of essentialist 
position beyond the reaches of discourse. One can avoid this by taking refuge in the 
notion that discourses are always partial, only seeking to make limited sense of the 
mass of reality which is by its nature non-discursive. Although discourses may be 
presented as totalising by those whose power is legitimised by them, the reality is that 
there is always a gap, a 'non-discursive "residue" [which] enables resistance to 
power/knowledge, no doubt providing a resource to the reflexive self as it is inscribed 
by discourse' (Fox 1997: 44). In a form that resembles the theory of 'structuration' 
associated with Anthony Giddens (1979), it is suggested that this non-discursive 
'residue' can be the site of reflexivity and resistance because it gives space for 
alternative discourses to exist. The constant friction between the presentation of 
discourses based on supposedly universal truths and the contingencies of everyday life 
creates the possibility of alternative social categorisations developing as the basis for 
the production of 'counter discourses' and resistance to the dominance of a particular 
power/knowledge regime. 1. 
We are still left with the problem that if the counter-discourses becomes themselves 
dominant, what criteria are there to decide if it is any 'better' that the one it replaced. 
We seem to be going round in circles. As Hacking notes, even two of Foucault's 
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staunchest supporters, Dreyfus and Rabinow, sense that Foucault 'owes us a criterion 
of what makes one kind of danger more dangerous that another' (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow 1983: 264, cited in Hacking 1986: 238). But now that discourses are seen to 
be inhabited by reflexive, autonomous individuals at least there is some possibility of 
rectifying the situation. 
Governmentality 
As mentioned above, one area of Foucault's later work which employs this less 
pessimistic view of the individual is his analysis of 'governmentality'. Foucault defined 
governmentality three ways as either: the 'institutions, procedures, analyses and 
reflections, the calculations and tactics" that support a particular rationale of power 
and apparatuses of security, with populations as their target; or the tendency of this 
type of power becoming pre-eminent in the West resulting in 'the formation of a whole 
series of governmental apparatuses... and in the development in a whole series of 
saiVoi-s'; or the historical process since the Middle Ages whereby the state ofjustice 
become 'governmentalised' (Foucault 1978: in Burchell et al. 1991) At its most basic 
governmentality can be see as the extension of Foucault's methodologies into the arena 
of state theory. As Gordon states, for Foucault 'ft]here was no methodological or 
material discontinuity between the respective, micro-physical and macro-physical 
approaches to the study of power' (Gordon 1991: 4). In effect, govemmentality links 
the techniques of discipline and control of individual living bodies (bio-politics) directly 
to state policies. However, unlike more traditional forms of analysis of state power, 
governmentality shifts the focus of interest from the institutions towards the pi-actices 
of government. These practices are in turn directly related to, and are legitimised by, a 
'rationale of government'. The difference between this and similar concepts such as the 
Gramscian notion of 'hegemony', is again the idea that power/knowledge regimes 
produce fields of power which are simply thei-e, and cannot be reduced to serving the 
interests of one group or another (see Smart 1986). Therefore, government is as much 
a product of a discourse as the individuals are subjectified by it. The state becomes a 
fiction, the central idea of sovereignty part of the rationale of government. Government 
becomes defined in terms of the 'conduct of conduct', as 'a form of activity aiming to 
shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons' (Gordon 1991: 2). 
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For Foucault the greatest flowering of discourses about the 'art of governance' comes 
with the rise of liberalism in the eighteenth century (Foucault 1978: in Burchell et al. 
1991). This contrasted with earlier concepts of government, in particular those 
elaborated in such works as Macchiavelli's Rie Nince - where government is seen in 
terms of the rational means of protecting the integrity physical of the state, a raison 
d'&at. In turn, the early modem formula of government set out in 771e Pfince is 
contrasted with the 'cameralist' or 'police' states in the German speaking territories 
afler the Thirty Years War where government is directed at establishing order. In 771e 
Pfince legitimacy is essentially imposed on the state, and government reflects this. In 
the 'police' state governmental legitimacy derives from its ability to establish order 
through an administrative rationale. The difference between this and Macchiavellian 
concepts is that the prime concern of government is not the physical integrity of 
territory but the 'happiness' of the population (see Pasquino 1991). The strength of the 
state is identified with the well-being of the population and the proper functioning of 
the mercantile economy. But to do this the government must actively and continuously 
seek to have knowledge of the population. The more the state can generate knowledge 
of individual circumstances the more it can intervene to maximise general prosperity. 
The dynamic becomes circular: state governance guarantees order, order allow 
individuals to flourish, happy individuals guarantee the strength of the state. It is the 
nature of government in the 'police' state to not just intervene in state activity but to 
continuously intervene. Although the 'science of police' generates the first modem 
system of economic sovereignty, 'of government understood as an economy', it has no 
autonomous rationality. The consequence being, that '[t]he economy of a functioning 
whole is a machine which has to be continuously made and not merely operated, by 
govemment'(Gordon 1991: 11). This forms a crucial distinction between the 'police' 
and liberal states. 
In liberal forms of govemmentality the political economy is considered to be 
autonomous, guided by the invisible hand so eloquently described in the works of 
Adam Smith. Although this seems a minor change in the formula of govemmentality, I 
the repercussions are considerable. The invisible, and unknowable, hand that regulates 
the political economy is based on the actions of the autonomous enlightened 
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individuals in the pursuit of their own self interest. Most importantly, it is through this 
process of regulation that order is created. It does not have to be guaranteed by the 
state because order is considered to be the natural state of things - individuals free of 
the fetters of autocratic government would flourish and live in harmony with his 
neighbours (as opposed to Hobbesian notions that free from all constraints life would 
be 'nasty, brutish, and short'). The autonomous individual becomes self-regulating and 
discipline becomes internalised. The consequences for the state are also profound. The 
state no longer derives legitimacy through the guarantee of order. Unlike the 'police' 
state, there is no need to continuously remake the machinery of economic regulation. 
The role of state is that of the caretaker providing routine maintenance. However, the 
'strength of the state' is still situated in the happiness of the population. It is the 
government's principal role to guarantee 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness', to 
coin a phrase. This results in a dilemma for liberal governments. On one hand, the role 
government is predicated on minimum intervention in the political economy to provide 
as much freedom for individuals to make their own choices - the classic formula of 
'negative' freedom. On the other hand, there is a pressure on governments to pursue 
maximum welfare by actively intervening in society to ameliorate inherent social 
disadvantages for some sections of the population - so called 'positive' freedom. 
Therefore, the Western 'art' of liberal government is a dynamic, self-critical process. 
The parallels with Foucault's musings on the meaning of the Enlightenment are quite 
clear. The streng h of the liberal form of govemmentality is that it is essentially a 
process of critical problematisation of the nature of government. The central dynamic 
is the tension between minimum government and a 'will to knowledge' about 
populations - multiplying the categories which individuals are subjected to and 
subjectified by, in the pursuit of the most efficient fon-n of government, underpinned by 
the rationale of a particular power/knowledge regime. The power of governmentality is 
that it allows the investigation of different aspects of liberal forms of government as 
essentially different aspects of the problematisation of power (see Rose and Miller 
1992; Rose 1993). As Rose argues, historically different forrns of liberalism should not 
be understood as 'periodisation': 
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'Rather, they are an inevitable schematic way of identifying a number of 
distinct - if not sharply delineated or mutually exclusive - 
problematizations of rule: ways of asking what should be ruled, by 
whom and through what procedures. It is these problematizations that 
accord the activity of politics its intelligibility and possibility at different 
times; it is these problematizations that shape what are to be counted as 
problems, what as failures and what as solutions' (Rose 1993: 285) 
The value of Rose and others' work is that it opens up the study of liberal policy 
making, government rationality and the management of populations to new ways of 
thinking. However, the difference between this and traditional policy studies is the 
notion that liberal conceptions of government and population are not fixed but are the 
product of changing power/knowledge discourses in which they are embedded. The 
critical dynamic at its heart is the dilemma 'of not governing enough versus the fear of 
governing too much' (ibid.: 292). 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to review several recent influential theoretical approaches 
to the welfare state and introduce govemmentality as a useful analytical framework and 
practical methodology that could account for changes in contemporary welfare policy. 
The device employed in the chapter was to compare governmentality analysis - 
incorporating Foucault's concept of 'genealogy' - as an example of postmodern or 
post-structuralist theory, with an alternative and influential framework, post-Fordist 
analysis, which also portrays changes in welfarism as resulting from a shift in the 
regulatory regime. The value of the post-Fordist comparison is that it is an example of 
a type of analysis that relies for its internal coherence on a grand or meta-narrative. In 
comparison, postmodernism (and governmentality analysis) rejects the grand narrative 
framework but without providing an alternative to put in its place. The debate is 
whether this also means the rejection of 'progressive' critical politics. There is no 
attempt to provide an answer to this problem, except to point out that Foucault does 
provide the basis for a personal politics if not universal one. However, this does not 
detract from the argument that govemmentality is a practical methodology for 
providing a means of investigating the discursive space which 'renders reality thinkable 
in such a way that it is amenable to political deliberation' (Rose and Miller 1992: 179). 
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The governmentality framework is essentially a 'heuristic device' for producing new 
insights into the policy making process. The next chapter makes use of the work of 
Rose and Miller and the governmentality framework to investigate the production of 
health policy and the role of 'expertise' within formulas of liberal governance. This is 
contrasted with other accounts of the health policy process, in particular that described 
in the work of Robert Alford (1975) and his concept of 'structural interests' within 
health care systems. 
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Chapter 3 
Governmentality and risk: health care and the re-problematisation of 
governance 
Introduction 
It is clear from the previous chapter that Foucault's concept of governmentality causes 
considerable problems for traditional ways of analysing the role of government. In 
particular, it is his specific formulation of how power is exercised that disrupts notions 
such as freedom, individuality and ideology. Foucault states directly that his work 'has 
not been to analyse the phenomenon of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of 
such an analysis... [but) to create a history of the different modes by which, in our 
culture, human beings are made subject' (Foucault 1983: 208). Therefore, 
goverrimentality is not a methodology for identifying those individuals, groups or 
institutions who somehowpossess power over others, but is an attempt to understand 
how a power/knowledge discourse underpins the technologies of government that 
legitimise those power relationships. Governmentality is the investigation of the 
discursive space that allows lived reality to become amenable to political deliberation. 
In the case of liberal formulas of governmentality, this discourse reveals a reflexive 
problematisation of the nature of government - its scope and its limits - that includes 
those who exercise power as much as those subject to it. Formal governmental 
structures become the temporary reification of the particular formulations of this 
problematised space. 
The purpose of this chapter is to use ideas of governmentality as advanced by Foucault 
and others to explore, at the meso level of analysis, the production of health policy and 
to account for contemporary changes in policy connected with the British NHS. The 
first part of the chapter -will compare 'governmentality' analysis with a well-established 
theoretical framework for health policy analysis, namely that associated with Robert 
Alford. The purpose of contrasting these two approaches is to demonstrate the 
possibility of using the concept of govermnentality to break free of the constraints of 
traditional theoretical frameworks with their oppositions of left and right, public and 
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private etc., and establish that govemmentality represents a powerfW, coherent, yet 
practical, means of exploring how the problems of providing health care are managed 1ý -- 
in contemporary liberal regimes. 
Classifying health policy 
In order to discuss Alford's approach to analysing health care policy making it is best 
to place it within some kind of context. To help us in this Osborne (1997) offers a 
convenient system of classification of approaches to health policy. He argues that most 
health policy analyses are based on a 'reactive" idea of the relationship between the 
concept of health and its management, expressed in policy terms. Health policy 
analyses tend to be reactive in that 'on the one hand, policy is viewed as a reaction to 
objective problems of health need and provision, and on the other, the state of health is 
viewed as a product of the relative effectiveness of policy' (Osborne 1997: 173). He 
goes on to group these reactivist accounts into three broad categories: 
The 'meliorist approach'. This views health policy in terms of the gap between an 
objective problem of health need and the current state of medical knowledge. As 
medicine progresses, certain situations that are determined to be intolerable because of 
lack of understanding or availability of treatment, are finally overcome, and, as 
knowledge moves on, new ones arise to take their place. Therefore, health policy is 
concerned with managing this evolutionary process of dealing with 'objective problems 
cropping up in the social, vital or political environment' (ibid.: 174). 
The lanti-medicalist approach'. This approach can be seen as a rejection of the 
notion that problems of health care have an objective basis. Health policy is seen to 
cconstruct its concerns, and that health problems are always relative to particular 
societies and contexts' (ibid.: 174). Often medicine and those associated with its 
practice, are seen in a negative light. As Osborne observes, this approach is where 
Foucault's ideas are usually invoked, generally accompanied by a narrow reading of 
works such as Madness and Civilisation, The Birth of the Clinic or 777e Histoly of 
Sexuality (see Armstrong 1997). But typically, Osborne argues 'this kind of approach 
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tends only to replace the dualisms of reactive accounts of health policy with a monism 
centred on 'power, or 'desire' or some other such concept' (ibid. ). 
The 'critical approach'. In this approach it is not the objective reality of certain health 
related intolerables that is the central issue, but the way in which policy is 'the product 
of negotiations or clashes of interest between different concerned parties' (ibid.: 174). 
This is a very broad cate-orisation that encompasses a range of analytical perspectives 
from pluralism to Marxism. It includes most of the influential contemporary analyses, 
for example, Navarro (1978), Cawson (1982), Ham (1992), Harrison et al. (1990), 
Allsop (1995), Klein (1995), Mohan (1995). 
Constructing Alford's structural interests model 
It is in this final category that one could place Robert Alford's influential 1975 work 
Health Care Politics. This is a detailed study of the problematic state of health care in 
New York highlighted by numerous Commissions of Investigations that reported from 
1950 to 1971. What he presents in his work is essentially a critique of policy analysis 
from within conventional political science. He argues that a 'narrow concept of the 
pluralist political process as one of winning legislative victories and an activist image of 
interest groups are inadequate ... to explain the persistence of health "crises" and the 
barriers to health care reform' (ibid.: 17). Furthen-nore, he suggests that reforms based 
on pluralist models, be they 'market' models that advocate more competition in health 
care, or those based on 'bureaucratic' models that argue for strategic control and 
regulation of health care, are all unlikely to work in the long run. This is because they 
fail to account for the way in which certain groups develop vested interests in the 
system and are able to undermine attempts at reform. Therefore, a more appropriate 
explanatory framework would be one in which certain interests are seen as 'structural', 
in that they are 'served or not served by the way they "fit" into the basic logic or 
principles by which the institutions of society operate' (ibid.: 14). Alford elaborates on 
this idea by developing a tripartite arrangement of 'dominant', 'challenging' and 
'repressed' groups, each with a different set of structural interests. He argues that: 
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Dominant structural interest are those served by the structure of social, 
economic, and political institutions as they exist at a given time. 
Precisely because of this, the interests involved do not continuously 
have to organise and act to defend their interests; other institutions do 
that for them. Challenging structural interests are those being created by 
the changing structure of society. Repressed structural interests are the 
opposite of dominant ones (although not necessarily always in conflict 
with them); the nature of the institutions guarantees that they will not 
be served unless extraordinary political energies are mobilised (ibid.: 
14). 
In terms of health care, the dominant group comprises those who share the common 
status of medical professional and act as 'professional monopolists', in that they exhibit 
a high degree of autonomy over their activities, are self-policing and control entry into 
the profession. It is this group whose interests are predominantly served by the current 
system and derive popular support from it. The challenging 'corporate rationalisers' - 
in the context of American health care - are a diverse group that includes hospital 
administrators, medical schools, government health planners, and public health 
agencies, all of whom share a common interest in the implementation and development 
of new technology or responsibility for health care organisational structures. These 
'rationalisers' wish to further their own agendas by promoting a new structural 
arrangement in which their interests are dominant and provides a mechanism for 
managerial control over clinical behaviour. The third 'repressed' grouping, referred to 
as the 'community population', consists of a disparate collection of the poor, those just 
above Medicare income, families who cannot afford the high cost of medical insurance 
and those with chronic conditions. This group's concerns are not served by any 
powerful structural interests and cannot rely on institutional backing to support their 
cause. Moreover, although this group may score the occasional victory, because of 
their heterogeneous nature their demands 'are easily compromised, soothed, or co- 
opted into the bases of legitimation of the activities and role of dominant or 
challenging structural interests' (ibid.: 218). 11 
Through this classification of 'dominant', 'challenging' and 'repressed' interests, 
Alford seeks to demonstrate the difficulties a pluralist model of health care would have 
in following the complex web of relationships and temporary alliances that exist 
beneath the surface of interest group politics. With regard to the medical profession, 
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pluralist analysis might misinterpret its heterogeneous nature and internal conflicts over 
territory, as a fracturing of medical interests. However, as Alford argues, because 
medical interests 'are at present dominant ones, with their power and resources safely 
embedded in law, custom, professional legitimacy, and the practices of many public 
and private organisations, they do not need to be as visibly active or as cohesively 
organised as those groups seeking change' (Alford 1975: 191). This in turn depends on 
a form of ownership of the dominant model of health and health care. This 'medical 
model', with its emphasis on professional autonomy, individualised, patient centred 
care, is a very familiar one which enjoys a great deal of popular support. It is this 
model which is reflected in the legal and organisational structures that bolster and 
legitimise medical power. 
To counter this power, the corporate rationalisers must adopt a method that seeks to 
undermine medical dominance in the delivery of health care, and instead present health 
care problems as best met by technical or organisational'solutions. The language used 
is one of co-ordination, integration and planning, that privileges apparently neutral Z 
concepts such as efficiency and effectiveness. However, it is clear that problems will 
occur when this administrative rationale starts to impinge on areas demarcated as the 
responsibility of medical professionals. It is in the interests of corporate rationalisers to 
manage the ensuing conflicts so that they 'are absorbed in a higher synthesis 
determined by technical criteria - themselves defined by the administrator' (ibid.: 205). 
But this will only be possible if rationalisers can appropriate for themselves an 
alternative form of legitimacy for their actions. Therefore, in effect, any challenge to 
dominant interest becomes a challenge to the dominant health paradigm, with the 
ultimate aim of placing limits on medical professional power by reducing their status to 
that of employee serving the new model of health. 
In relation to repressed community population interests, Alford again makes the point 
that occasional high profile victories enjoyed by community pressure groups are no 
measure of the influence these groups have on health care provision. Indeed Alford 
argues the opposite is the case in that the 'representative' nature of many high profile 
planning committees relies on the disparate interests of repressed groups to obscure 
the decision making process. As Alford states, 'the structure of participation maximises 
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the chances of stalemate by setting up rules of decision-making in such a way as to 
prevent any major interests from seriously being damaged (the requirement of 
"consensusý'), and by failing to allocate enough power to the decision-making bodies 
on which community groups are represented' (Alford 1975: 221). Such victories that 
do occur are then likely to be because it suits the structural interests of one on other of 
the dominant groups. Underlying the powerlessness of community population activists, 
what Alford calls 'equal-health advocates', is the inability to invoke their own 
institutional support to advance a model of health care that would further community 
interests. Real power for these equal-health advocates can only come by creating 
cconsciousness among the community population of the causes of the situation' (ibid.: 
220). 
At this point it is quite reasonable to ask of Alford what kind of health care system 
would meet these repressed community interests. In part Alford answers this by 
outlining the 'ideal' health system. He states: 
Such a system recognises the needs for both professional autonomy, on 
the one band (guaranteed by strong professional organization, control 
over training, and high quality biomedical research), and a co-ordinated 
and integrated health care delivery system on the other (taking 
advantage of the knowledge and application of medical technology and 
a complex division of labor between paraprofessionals and various 
levels of specialized practitioners who provide both preventive and 
medical care). The primary care practitioner, responsible for families, is 
seen as the key "interface", linking the patient with a series of more 
specialised professional and hospital services. In the ideal system the 
services are presumed to be available without regard to income, 
through various types of subsidies, insurance programmes, and the like 
(ibid.: 250-1). 
Why such a system has not come to pass, and why the present system in the US is in 
ccrisis' (as of 1975), is for Alford not because of the failure of market or bureaucratic 
policies but because of conflict between the major structural interests. Furthermore, 
these conflicts reflect the unequal distribution of power and resources within American 
society. To reiterate, pluralist political analysis and solutions will fail because they 
cannot account for underlying structural interests. Therefore, the only possibility of 
reform is in raising consciousness to defeat or consolidate the social power 'that has 
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been appropriated by various discrete groups and that preserves existing allocations of 
social values and resources' (ibid.: 25 1 ). 
Structural interests: testing the strength of the model 
In this section the Alford model of structural interests and elite power groupings will 
be examined two ways. There will be a discussion of the concept of power embedded 
in Alford's theoretical position. But, firstly, we must examine the adequacy of the 
Alford framework in its own terms, and how well it can be translated into a UK 
context. 
The Alford model and the NHS 
The first point that must be made about the Alford model is that it has its origin in the 
analysis of a specific health care system as it operated at a specific time. While most 
health systems have their own peculiarities, the American 'system' (if it can be called 
that), in many ways stands apart from those developed in other Western industrialised 
nations in being predominantly market based. At the time of writing in 1975, Alford 
describes a health care system dominated by provision within the hospital. 
Additionally, these, and other health care institutions., are mostly privately owned, be 
they for-profit or non-profit organisations. As noted earlier, Alford is also concerned 
with the large section of the population that has limited direct access to health care. In 
the Years that have elapsed since his work was published it appears much of Alford's 
pessimism about the nature of reform has been well founded. As North (1995) points 
out, Alford wrote before the introduction into the US health care system of most of the 
technologies associated with the third party payer role adopted by private insurers or 
the state funded Medicare or Medicaid systems. These technologies include the 
creation of Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs), that act as primary care 
gatekeepers, or insurance appointed case managers to oversee treatment, or approved 
care regimes associated with Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs). As they are often 
viewed as placing restriction on the autonomy of medical professionals, they can all be 
easily defined as strategies associated with the interests of the corporate rationaliser. 
However, despite the introduction of these reform technologies, the interests of many 
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of the same groups described by Alford in 1975 are still not served by the US health 
care system. As many as 37 million of the US population in 1992 were without 
adequate health cover (Goldberg 1994; Buist 1992). This is despite the fact that health 
care costs have exploded, reaching perhaps 14% of American GDP. Moreover, even 
modest plans to reform the system at the federal level, such as the Clinton Plan, have 
foundered amidst accusations of 'socialised medicine' and denial of consumer choice 
(see Paton 1996). It appears that Alford's analytical framework still fits the evidence 
very well within an American context, in explaining how the system operates and the 
direction of ftiture development. The question is whether this is a framework that fits 
other health care systems, in particular, the NES? 
Afford and the NHS 
It is not surprising that given its success in identifying structural interests within the 
American health care system, that the Alford model has proved influential in a number 
of analyses of the British NHS system (see Allsop 1995; Harrison et al. 1990; Ham 
1992). The case for the Alford model is ffirther strengthened when the Conservative 
health reforms of the 1980s and 1990s are taken into account. The Griffiths report 
(1983), the 1989 White Paper Moi-kingfor Patients and the NHS and Community 
Care Act (1990), amongst others, ushered in market inspired mechanisms that parallel 
the third party payer technologies outlined above. The separation of purchaser and 
provider function created the opportunity for a quasi-market to be developed. 
Purchasers were given the task of acting more strategically, appropriating a technical, 
neutral language that parallels that of the corporate rationaliser. However, it is equally 
apparent that many of the purchaser inspired strategies, such as clinical effectiveness, 
audit and proposals for evidence based medicine etc., are far from neutral, and can be 
seen as mechanisms of control aimed at limiting the autonomy of action of a powerful 
medical professional whose interests were served by the previous system. (The NHS 
reforms will be examined in greater detail in subsequent chapters). So far the model 
appears to fit with structure of the contemporary NES, as it reflects a market-led 
health care system. However, there is a case for highlighting three key areas where the 
model becomes problematic. They are: the structural interests of GPs; the identification 
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of group interests served by the rhetoric of 'crisis; and the degree to which repressed 
interests are accommodated by the NES as a state controlled health care system. 
The role of the fundholding GP 
One of the practical difficulties of using the Alford model is in allocating a particular 
category of individuals to one or other of the structural interest groups. It is one of the 
strengths of the model that most of the time this is not too difficult. However, the NES 
reforms present those wishing to utilise the model with a problem when dealing with 
GP fundholders. As North (1995) notes, in the Alfordian context, GP fundholders 
appear to be fulfilling two different roles simultaneously, in that they are providers of 
primary health care and, at the same time, act as 'informed purchasers' of care in their 
own right. Alford, in his model, does allow for certain groups of medical professionals 
to be co-opted into management. However, the function of informed purchaser does 
seem to imply that these GPs must themselves adopt the strategic management role of 
the corporate rationaliser as part of their remit as medical professions - without it 
having to be imposed from outside. It could be argued that the anomalous position of 
fundholders is a mere curiosity soon to disappear now that a new Labour government 
no longer advocates fundholding as the preferred option for GPs. But the problem 
remains that other policies that enhance the role of the GP as primary care gatekeeper 
are still in place. The use of locality management and GP commissioning teams, expand 
the purchaser role for the GP beyond fundholding. Taken to its extreme, if this 
enhanced purchasing role is accompanied by the devolving of budgets to locality level 
then it appears that more of the strategic planning role typical of the corporate 
rationaliser will fall to GPs as well. Given the direction of these changes and the 
increasing influence of GPs in the health care system it is difficult to see how this can 
be incorporated into the Alford model. As North (1995) states: 
In terms of Alford's typology [the creation of the purchaser/provider 
split] has made the categorisation of GP fundholders problematic. As 
purchasers, would they be more appropriately described as corporate 
rationalisers? Since the reforms GP fundholders have had a direct and, 
in some instances, robust relationship with providers... However it 
should not be forgotten that GP fundholders, along with non- 
fundholders. 
1 are providers also. Since the interface between primary 
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and secondary care is considered to be an area of possible savings and 
competition, GP fundholders in particular are in potential competition 
with trust based providers (eg family planning, outpatient procedures 
and certain operations of a less heroic scale) North (1995: 122). 
As mentioned earlier, the anomalous position the GP fundholder as a product of the 
Conservative reform process initiated by the 1989 White Paper Mol-kingfol- Patients 
may be rectified with the arrival of a Labour government in 1997. The Labour Party 
election manifesto committed the incoming government to act to reverse the 'two-tier' 
health service which Labour had identified as an unwelcome by-product of the 
fundholding system. However, the reform of fundholding as sýt out in the White Paper 
Rie neit, NHS. niodel-ii, depeitdable (DoH 1997) presents even greater problems for 
the Alford model. Although the implications of the White Paper will be discussed in the 
final chapter, it is relevant to mention that one of the central themes of the new reform 
process is to increase the involvement of GPs and other primary care workers in the 
commissioning process. The White Paper envisages that GPs (fundholders and non- 
fundholders) and community nurses would form 'primary care groups' which would 
ultimately evolve into 'primary care trusts' that would take over commissioning from 
Health Authorities. The basis of the new arrangement for commissioning health care 
would still continued of reflect the concepts of clinical effectiveness and evidence 
based medicine that were part of the Health Authority remit. Again we see the 
distinction between the professional monopolist and the corporate rationaliser being 
blurred. A distinction which can only be accommodated in the Alford model by 
fracturing the central concept of structural interests associated with particular 
groupings. However, it is the identification of a well-defined set of structural interests 
that gives the model its internal cohesion and explanatory power. To weaken this 
structure is to weaken the model. 
The rhetoric of Crisis 
A different concern with the Alford framework is in the method of identifying 
challenging interests. Almost by definition challenging groups have to disrupt the 
present system that serves the needs of dominant interests, and make their interests 
paramount. Alford makes it quite clear that the rhetoric of 'crisis' in the US health 
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system, assists challenging corporate rationaliser by discomforting dominant 
professional monopolists and destabilising their entrenched power. As Alford states: 
It is significant that most definitions and diagnoses of health 'crisis' do 
not come from professionals. The AMA [American Medical 
Association] and other professional associations have largely reacted 
defensively, proposing alternatives and compromises only when other 
interest groups have raised challenges to existing practice. When 
institutions and laws continuously serve dominant structural interests, 
challenge must come from elsewhere (Alford 1975: 209-2 10). 
For Alford, 'crisis' has to been seen as the by-product of the struggle between 
competing interests. This is not to say that the language of 'crisis' does stem from real 
inadequacies in the health system, but Alford points out that the language of 'crisis' is 
instigated by the official Commissions of Investigation, whose composition is 
dominated by individuals associated with the interests of the corporate rationaliser. 
However, in a UK context, the link between 'crisis' in the NHS and the interests of 
corporate rationaliser is more difficult to sustain. It is one of the innate characteristics 
of the NHS that while medical professional are theoretically free make any decisions 
they feel is necessary to meet the health need of their patients, they do so against the 
background of finite budgets. However, one of the dynamics of health care is that new 
areas of need are continuously created as more and more new treatments and new 
technologies are developed. Therefore, the continuous expansion of need coupled with 
limited resources result is 'an irresistible force constantly clash[ing] with an immovable 
object, leading to periodic political 'crises' on the funding issue' (Ranade 1997: 2). In 
effect, dealing with recurrent 'crisis' becomes part of the political governance of the 
NHS. The Alford model is less helpful in this respect because the rhetoric of crisis can 
be associated with the concerns of those identified with corporate rationalisers interests 
and those identified with professional monopolists interests. For example, the 
difficulties in maintaining or containing health spending against a background of 
economic downturn or attempts to control government spending, will increase political 
interest in management initiatives that generate increased efficiency within the NHS 
(see Klein 1995). Effectively, the identification of 'crisis' in other spheres of 
government activity, such as the economy, forms the pretext to extend managerial 
control over health spending. To some extent, this is how one could view the Griffiths 
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Report and Workbigfoi-Patients and other aspects of the NHS reform process in the 
1980s and 1990s. However, at the same time, the rhetoric of 'crisis' is deployed by 
medical professionals to campaign against perceived cuts or shortfalls in funding, (see 
Ham 1992). The British Medical Association (BMA), as well as individual clinicians, 
have, at times, been vociferous in their opposition reforms in the health service, 
warning of the dire consequences to patient care that may result. 
Therefore, one of the main difference between the British and US use of 'crisis' 
language is in the identification of the origin of the contemporary difficulties. In the US 
it is the system itself which is in crisis, in the UK the crisis stems from difficulties in 
maintaining adequate funding for the NES, emphasising failure of financial 
management rather than failure on the part of medical professionals. The obvious 
explanation as to why the rhetoric of 'crisis' in the UK belongs to professional 
monopolists as well as corporate rationalisers, reflects the fact that the NHS is an 
almost entirely state-funded and state-owned health care system. Corporate 
rationalisers, if they can be said to exist within such a system, would necessarily be 
agents of the state and ultimately responsible for administering the system. Therefore, 
talk of 'crisis' within the NHS can be read as failure on the part of health service 
managers, and by extension, the government itself to control the health care system. 
Hence, the calls by government for management reform. On the other hand, agitation 
for more funding because of the inadequacies revealed by the medical professions can 
be seen as reflecting the secure position enjoyed by the profession. Professionals will 
not point out problems in a system in which they are implicated if they think they are 
going to be blamed for its shortcomings. C, 
The NHS and repressed interests 
Thus it appears that the Alford model starts to become problematical when used as a 
framework to explain state controlled health services. This is reinforced by the next 
issue - how are repressed interests reflected in the structure of the NHS as a health 
care system? As noted earlier, for Alford, repressed interests are repressed because 
they have no real institutional support, but ultimately, the reason for this situation is 
the lack of consciousness about the causes of their problems. In the power-play 
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between powerful structural interests, real need is not met. it is the crux of Alford's 
argument that any reform process designed to consistently meet real need will only 
perpetuate health inequalities if underlying structural interests are not taken into 
account. In essence, competition between structural interests creates a false 
consciousness that prevents 'real' interests being met. This is a powerful and 
compelling analysis of the how health systems work, especially in the American 
context. Within the NHS it has been noted that community input into the decision 
making process has been very limited. One of the consequences of recent reforms of 
District Health Authorities is their divestment of local authority representation, and, 
reflecting their new streamlined managerial agency status, their replacement with non- C) ZP 
executives recruited predominantly from the local business community. However, 
health authorities have been given the responsibility of purchasing the most appropriate 
health care for the local population, the logic of which demands some profound 
changes in health service thinking. If health care is to be purchased for the local 
population, the health authority must have some notion of what those health needs are 
and identify the most efficient methods of meeting those needs. To do this it must 
systematically engage with the local population as enjoined to do so by the government 
through such initiatives as Local Voices, and in effect to become the 'champion of the 
people' (NHSME, 1992). In the context of the Alford framework it is clear that 
community population interests cannot be fully represented within management 
controlled structures. Even statutory bodies outside these structures such as 
Community Health Councils can only have a limited impact. CHCs are charged with 
independent representation of consumer interests yet from their inception, have been 
hampered by low levels of funding, limited powers in shaping service provision beyond 
their statutory right to be informed of service changes, and weak powers of inspection 
of providers (Allsop 1995; Lupton et al. 1995; also see Chapter 8). As North points 
out: 
Despite the fact that the NHS is owned, financed, and managed by the 
state, however, the community does not have the means to express a 
view on how much is spent on local health care, or the performance of 
the Health Authority or conu-nission. The ballot box is a crude way of 
registering voter dissatisfaction with the national health service, let 
alone its local manifestation. For the present, the articulation of 
community interests is channelled through consultation exercises which, 
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though probably well-meaning, is subordinated to the corporate 
rationalisers' perception of what is appropriate (North 1995: 124). 
However, despite the above, what Alford was at pains to point out was that one must 
look beyond the pluralistic concept of competing voices to the deeper structures that 
deny the community population its 'real' interests. A strong argument is made that 
these interests can be met by an 'ideal' health care system of the kind outlined earlier 
(Alford 1975: 25 1). This 'ideal' system is comprehensive, does not depend on income, 
it has a gatekeeper role for primary care practitioners, it guarantees a fair degree of 
clinical autonomy, and most of all, there is strategic management to make best use of 
resources. In the LJK context this all seems very familiar. Put on a pair of very rose- 
coloured spectacles and what you see is the model of health care to which the NES 
aspires. Does this mean that the NHS meets repressed community population interests? 
It would take a vary brave person to say yes. But given that, it does have more than a 
passing resemblance to the 'ideal' model that competing structural interests deny 
repressed interests. So how does this fit with the Alford model? While it does not 
undermine the model it does pose some difficult problems that have to be addressed. 
The Alford model works well at identifying powerful structural interests and it is not 
difficult to assign different groups within the NHS structure to different competing 
interests. But what is more difficult is it in identifying what form the NHS would have 
to take to meet real needs once powerful structural interests are countered. Or do we 
view the NIFIS as part of the problem rather that as a source of a solution? Is the NES 
a reification of structural inequality, which must be replaced entirely if repressed 
community population needs are to met? At the heart of this problem is the concept of 
uncovering and understanding exactly what constitute unconscious, 'real' interests. 
This will be explored in the next section. 
Analysing power 
As noted earlier, the Alford model of policy making has at its heart the rejection of 
pluralist politics. In essence, it is an attempt to move beyond the conception of power 
associated with Robert Dahl (1957) and his classic study of local politics Wio 
Goiyei-ns? In this formulation of power, 'A has power over B to the extent that he [sic] 
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can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do' (Dahl 1957: 80). In order 
to study these power relations in action one has to 'determine for each decision which 
participants had initiated alternatives that were finally adopted, had vetoed alternatives 
initiated by others, or had proposed alternatives that were turned down. These actions 
are then tabulated as individual 'successes' or 'defeats'. The participant with the 
greatest proportion of successes out of a total number of successes, were then 
considered to be most influential' (ibid.: 336). For Alford this emphasis on the 
observable, 'concrete, decision making process is clearly insufficient. He seeks to go 
beyond it by incorporating other dimensions of power into his analysis. Although 
Alford does not refer to him specifically, his working hypothesis of power has much in 
common with that of Steven Lukes (1974). Lukes emphasises the importance of the 
third-dimension of power, transcending the analysis of actual conflict, be it associated 
with decision making (Dahl) or control of what reaches the agenda for discussion, the 
non-decision making process outlined in the work of Bachrach and Baratz (1970). As 
in Alford's concept of repressed interests, Lukes (1974) argues that there are: 
many ways in whichpotential issues are kept out of politics, whether 
through the operation of social forces and institutional practices or 
through individuals' decisions. This, moreover, can occur in the absence 
of actual, observable conflict, which may have been successfully averted 
- though there remains here an implicit reference to potential conflict. 
This potential, however, may never in fact be actualised. What one may 
have here is a latent conj7icf, which consists in a contradiction between 
the interests of those exercising power and the i-eal interests of those 
they exclude (Lukes 1974: 25; author's emphasis). 
This appears to be saying that A may still be exercising power over B, because B's real 
interests are not what B believes them to be (or for that matter what A believes them 
to be). This false consciousness on the part of B is a result of an ideological 
construction of consciousness that present the interests of A as natural and unalterable. 
In terms of Alford's analysis, ideologies associated with powerful structural interests 
blind repressed interests from their real needs so as to pose no threat to the position of 
those powerful interests. This form of analysis has traditionally been shared by many 
other approaches to the concept of power and policy making. It is evident in Marxian 
analysis, and other variations such Critical Theory developed by the Frankfurt School. 
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However, implicit within this theorising is that false consciousness and critical 
engagement with ideology imply that it is possible to have true consciousness, thinking 
free of ideology, and that 'ideology is the result of distortion introduced by the 
oppressive exercise of power by the dominant class. Only if such distortions were seen 
through and repression dispelled would true consciousness be possible' (Hoy 1986: 
131). 
The concept of power and ideology outlined above is quite clearly at odds with 
Foucault's notion of power/knowledge. As described in the previous chapter, for 
Foucault power and knowledge are different aspects of the same concept. In this 
formulation, knowledge is not independent of power or exists outside discourse as 
some kind of reflection of external truth. Foucault is not alone in implicating 
knowledge with power. For example, Habermas (1972) also has the notion of 
knowledge always being linked to interests. But the crucial difference for Habermas is 
that he proposes a form of self-reflexive knowledge acquisition that has an 
'emancipatory interest in achieving rational autonomy of action freed from domination' 
(Blaikie 1993: 54: also see Hoy 1986: 132). Foucault does not hold out such a 
prospect. As he states, 'it's not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of 
power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power), but of detaching the 
power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within 
which it operated at the current time' (Foucault 1984: 74-75). The previous chapter 
outlined the way in which this can lead to a pessimistic reading of Foucault. Escape 
from one discourse only results in being implicated in another one. There seems no 
hope of any kind of freedom. However, it is possible to argue that Foucault provides a 
different form of freedom, an escape from traditional ways of thinking and looking at 
how policy is created. This is only possible by looking at power differently, within the 
concept of power/knowledge, and seeing that it is not always negative. As Foucault 
states: 
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the 
fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it 
traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, 
produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network 
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which run through the whole social body, much more than as a negative 
instance whose function is repression (Foucault 1984: 61). 
This is quite a different concept of power than, for example, the one used by Alford. In 
the Alford model the focus of analysis is on conflict and repression. It forces one to 
think of certain groups as acting in a predominantly negative way. Moreover, the 
analysis forces individuals to be compartmentalised with others who are deemed to 
have the same structural interests. The model incorporated a number of oppositions: 
the powerful and the powerless; ideology and freedom; perceived interests and 'real' 
interests. It is one of the strengths of Foucault's ideas that it is possible to avoid such 
oppositions. This is especially true of governmentality and in particular the study of 
liberal form of governmentality. As Rose and Miller argue: 
[T]he political vocabulary structured by oppositions between state and 
civil society, public and private, government and market, coercion and 
consent, sovereignty and authority and the like, does not adequately 
characterise the diverse ways in which rule is exercised in advanced 
liberal democracies... Power is not so much a matter of imposing 
constraints upon citizens as of 'making up' citizens capable of bearing a 
kind of regulated freedom. Personal autonomy is not the antithesis of 
power, but a key term in its exercise, the more so because most 
individuals are not merely the subjects of power but play a part in its 
operation (Rose and Miller 1992: 174). 
The latter part of this quotation cannot be emphasised too greatly. For Foucault, 
power and freedom are not opposites. Liberal forms of governmentality are predicated 
on the notion of the autonomous, reflexive and recalcitrant individuals capable of 
resisting power. Where there is power there will always be resistance in the form of a 
4permanent provocation' between power and the individual, which Foucault describes 
as 'agonism'. But what is also important to note is that just as power somehow 'makes 
up' the individual, power itself has no essence beyond the discursive boundaries 
described by governmentality. This has practical implications in the use of 
governmentality in analysing contemporary policy formation. 
The first implication is that if power has no reality until it is exercised at the micro- 
level, the object of a govemmentality-type framework is to map out these 
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manifestations of micro-power in order to say something meaningful about the way in 
which the discursive space of government is regulated. However as Hoy notes, 'if 
power is to be taken nominalistically - not as a real substance or as a property, but 
simply as a name for a complex strategy or grid of intelligibility - then, admittedly this 
grid could be mapped in different ways, and there is no final, privileged, or 
foundational mapping (Hoy 1986: 138-140). The consequence of Foucault's 
4pragmatic nominalism, as Hoy calls it, is that this analytical mapping of micro-power 
is only valid as long as it is useful. This implied agnosticism is critically different from 
the a priori assumptions of real power and real interests that form the basis of much 
traditional ways of analysing policy, including Alford. Additionally, when agents do 
exercise power they do so througli the authority given to them by their positions within 
the mechanisms of security as part of the power/knowledge discourse. Power is not 
some tangible entity in the possession of certain individuals, groups or intuitions. As 
Rose and Miller, citing Latour (1987), state, 'a powerful actor, agent or institution is 
one that, in the particular circumstances obtaining at a given moment, is able to 
successftilly enrol and mobilise persons, procedures and artefacts in pursuit of its 
goals' (Rose and Miller 1992: 183). Therefore, it must be central aim of a 
govemmentality analysis to identify those structures and technologies (past and 
present), which validate and legitimise the actions of those actors, agents or 
institutions. It must also develop an understanding about why, in the field of all the 
possible actions, one action occurs rather than another. The next section will look at 
one such mechanism, argued to be central to the regulation of liberal formulas of 
government: the role of expertise. ZI) 
Expertise, liberalism and neo-liberalism 
In the section above, it was argued that within a governmentalitY paradigm, power can 
only be said to be real in that it produces real effects. Beyond these real effects power 
is only an abstraction that allows practical investigation as to why the actions of some 
individuals are realised and others prevented, or circumscribed. The value of 
govemmentality is that it offers a way of linking the real effects of power at the micro- 
level to the macro and meso analysis of governance as a problematisation of rule, in a 
way that renders it 'thinkable' (Rose and Miller 1992). This problematised space is 
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then analysed in tenns of those technologies of government that make up the 'complex 
of mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and 
procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental 
ambitions' (Rose and Miller 1992: 175). In liberal forms of govemmentality these 
ambitions are directed at the concept of the well-being of the population as the source 
of the strength of the state (see Chapter 2; Gordon 1991; Burchell 1991). However, 
the reflexive nature of liberalism as a mentality of government, continuously leads to 
the questioning of the boundaries between the political/public domain of government 
activity and the non-political/private domain, the preserve of the autonomous 
individual. The heart of the liberal formula of government is setting these boundaries 
appropriately. The problem for all types of liberalism is that most of the regulation of 
the population takes place in the non-political/private domain, particularly within the 
structure of the family. It is in this context, it is suggested, that the concept of expertise 
has evolved in the last two centuries as a technology of control and surveillance so that 
liberal governments, having identified this private domain outside politics, 'seeks to 
manage it without destroying its existence and its autonomy' (Rose and Miller 1992: 
180). 
One of the key concepts in the regulatory politics of population is Foucault's notion of 
'bio-power'. This includes the mass of techniques that focus on the body as 'imbued 
xvith the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: 
propagation, birth and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with 
all the conditions that cause these to vary' (Foucault 198 1; in Rabinow 1984: 262). 
The collection of data involved in this 'will to knowledge' about the activities of 
people, seems to transform the population into a centre of calculation, thereby 
rendering it somehow real and amenable to analysis (see Latour 1987). The language 
of calculation is statistics, but it is used in such a way as to render it a neutral language 
that generates and codifies 'normality' and highlights deviance. Statistics is presented 
almost as a 'moral science' (Hacking 1991). The high priests of this calculation and 
regulatory technology are defined as specialists in a form of expertise. The hope is that 
in applying the knowledge of experts, 'that problems of regulation can remove 
themselves from the disputed terrain of politics and relocate onto the tranquil yet 
seductive territory of truth' (Rose and Miller 1992: 188). The steady accretion of 
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knowledge about populations and expertise leads to a re-categorisation of individuals 
and the emergence of certain behaviours and sources of disorder, such as criminality, 
promiscuity or outbreaks of disease, being re-codified as 'social problems' and subject 
to regulatory control (see Foucault 1980; Rose 1993). In effect, liberal forms of 
governmentality seek to regulate the private domain 'at a distance' by harnessing 
'forms of authority other that those of 'the State' in order to govern' (Rose 1993: 
292). These forms of authority are essentially provided by experts and expertise. 
Expertise and health policy 
This notion of governing 'at a distance', is particularly important when dealing with 
health and health policy. As Osborne (1997) points out, health is negative concept, 
'lived in the silence of the organs, quoting Canguilhem (1989). Health is thought of in 
terms of an absence of something, such as disease or infirmity. As such it is 'simply 
impossible to institute a determinate 'right' to health' (ibid.: 179). Therefore, health 
policy must necessarily be indirect. The role of expertise, in this case professional 
medical expertise, takes on greater importance as regulator of a healthy population - 
and the ultimate source of the strength of the state. But as Osborne goes on to argue: 
A liberal capacity to govern will tend to stress the provision of 
infrastructural conditions of health living - sewage systems, clean water 
supply, a state-regulated but not state-controlled medical profession - 
but at the expense, in the main,, of direct injunctions to lead a healthy 
lifestyle, to transform oneself in the interests of one's own health and 
longevity (Osborne 1997: 182). 
However, there is clearly a danger for liberal forms of governmentality in allowing 
medical professions, and experts in general, too much autonomy. As Rose and Miller 
(1992) suggest, there is a possibility that devolved control combined with the exclusive 
technical knowledge of expertise will lead to 'enclosures'. a form of reification of the 
networks of regulatory authority, that can be defended and built upon. By way of an 
illustration, they argue that the traditional authority of clinicians within the NHS made 
'their arguments and calculations the obligatory mode for the operation of the network 
as a whole, the lines of force flowing, as it were, from the operating theatre to the 
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cabinet office and not vice versa' (Rose and Miller 1992: 188). Moreover, following 
on from this, it can be argued that the institutionalisation of medical expertise also 
institutionalises the notion of health care as being essentially curative in nature and 
focused on the individual - in effect, the creation of the 'medical model' of health care 
discussed earlier in relation to the work of Alford. Additionally, the emphasis on 
curative health care leads to health, as a concept, being seen in terms of the 
manifestation of illness and disease that is ameliorated by the ministrations of the 
medical profession. As Osborne has already observed this can result in a lack of 
personal responsibility in preventing illness. And, in certain circumstances, where there 
is a collective approach to health provision, this also leads to a degree of passivity by 
the patient and an unwillingness to confront authority. 
As the layers of expertise-based regulation have steadily built up since the nineteenth 
century, the reflexive dynamic within liberalism has started to reassert itself. The 
dynamic principle of liberalism is founded on 'the fear of not governing enough versus 
the fear of governing too much' (Rose 1993: 292). It could be argued that the growth 
of welfarism, and with it the creation of such institutions as the NHS, are the product 
of expert-based technologies of government. The questions is whether these 
government sponsored invasions of the private domain can be represented as a form of 
'arrogance of government overreach and overload' (Rose and Miller 1992: 198). The 
rise of neo-liberalism can be seen as an affirmative answer to this question. The result 
is a re-problematisation of the governed space, that sees welfarism as the product of an 
overextended government mentality that places too many limits on the interests of the 
self-reliant, self-disciplining individual of classical liberalism. As Rose and Miller state: 
Neo-liberalism re-codes the locus of the state in the discourse of 
politics. The state must be strong to defend the interests of the nation in 
the international sphere, and must ensure order by providing a legal 
framework for social and economic life. But within this framework 
autonomous actors - commercial concerns, families, individuals - are 
free to go about their business, making their own decisions and 
controlling their own destinies (Rose and Miller 1992: 199). 
Within neo-liberalism, welfarism is re-coded as a threat to the functionin., - of the state 
by virtue of the burden it places on the economy and in the malign way it which it 
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creates a culture of dependency and passivity. The principal dynamic of neo-liberalism 
is to be found in the concept of 'the market'. This leads to the assertion that free 
market economics is 'capable in principle of addressing the totality of human 
behaviour, and, consequently, of envisaging a coherent, purely economic method of 
programming the totality of governmental action' (Gordon 1991: 43). Taken to the 
extreme, this notion of homo econonficits can be seen in the work of Gary Becker 
(1976) and the 'now institutional economics' of Oliver Williamson (1975), extending 
economic models into previously non-economic subject areas (see Chapter 5). 
The Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s are a prime example of this re- 
problematisation in action. These administrations instigated a radical programme of 
reform in part guided by the central tenets of the free market. The privatisation of 
nationalised industries and utilities, competitive tendering for services and 
deregulation, can all be seen as part of a reformulation of liberalism in terms of minimal 
government and 'rolling back the state'. For those sector of governmental 
responsibility, such as the NHS, that were deemed as unsuitable for exposure to the 
full rigours of the free market, reforms attempted to mimic the mechanisms of the 
market. Thus, the purchaser/provider split and the introduction of the internal market, 
were to provide the basis of a managed, quasi-market in health care. These were 
accompanied by the creation of a new set of targets to be met - for waiting lists, return 
on capital etc. - as well as the measurement of activity - numbers of patients treated, or 
Finished Consultant Episodes (FCEs). As Osborne (1997) argues, these are consistent 
with neo-liberal technologies' production of 'surrogate' variables 'that will stand 
measure for otherwise abstract ideas of health... Neo-liberalism abandons the quest for 
an absolute that would be 'health' and opts for determinant strategies, targets and 
specifics instead' (Osborne 1997: 185). But this represents more than just the 
reorganisation of the management; neo-liberal health policy incorporates a new 
paradigm for health care. Neo-liberalism is predicated on individuals taking 
responsibility for their own health and not relying passively on the state. This manifests 
itself in the emergence of ideas surrounding the concept of a 'new regime of total 
health care' and a re-emphasis on public health (see Armstrong 1993; Nettleton 1995). 
One approach is the so called 'New Public Health', with its emphasis on health 
promotion and lifestyles. Here there is recognition that, 'many contemporary health 
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problems are therefore seen as being social rather that solely individual problems; 
underlying them are concrete issues of local and national public policy, and what are 
needed to address these problems are 'Healthy Public Policies' - policies in many fields 
that support the promotion of health (Ashton and Seymour 1988: 21). This re-coding 
of health problems as social problems is indicative of neo-liberal health policy, where, 
in contrast with the collective social risk of welfare liberalism, it is incumbent on the 
individual to engage in a form of self-entrepreneurialism, of health, to avoid risky 
behaviour so as not to place a burden on the rest of society. In reality, individualisation 
of risk becomes the new paradigm of governance, a more stringent form of self- 
governance. 
The risk society 
The concept of risk in modem western societies is not exclusive to Foucauldian forms 
of analysis. For example, two dominant figures associated with the concept of risk in 
late modernity are Ulrich Beck (1992,1994) and Anthony Giddens (1990,1991,1994). 
They advance the concept of reflexive modernity as 'a third way' between modernism 
and postmodernism (Beck, 1994: 174). Although there are differences in the emphasis 
each places on the consequence for change in particular areas of society, both agree 
that the management of an all-pervasive risk is the key to understanding the 
transformation of modernity. As the certainties of modem society break down in the 
post Cold War world, risk becomes individualised. Thus for Beck (1994): 
In the risk society, the recognition of the unpredictability of the threats 
provoked by techno-industrial development necessitate self-reflection 
on the foundation of social cohesion and the examination of the 
prevailing convention and foundations of 'rationality'. In the self- 
concept of risk society, society becomes reflexive... which is to say it 
becomes a theme and a problem for itself (ibid.: 8). 
The risk society comes about through a process of reflexive modernisation, in that as 
society modemises 'the more agents (subjects) acquire the ability to reflect on the 
social conditions of their existence and to change them in that way' (ibid.: 174). The 
key to this transformation is 'individualisation' in which the now reflexive individual 
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becomes aware of the latent dangers of the industrial society which can no longer be 
hidden, and therefore, is compelled to become dis-embedded from the conventions and 
norms of the industrial society and be re-embedded in the new risk society with all its 
contingencies (see Giddens 1991). The consequence of this is that choice has 
expanded. The individual can create a 'reflexive biography' for themselves through 
their own actions. However, the problemwith this is that former networks of trust in 
others or institutions of the state become weaker and the individual's ontological 
security becomes diminished. The individual must then attempt to devise new 
strategies of creating certainties. New networks of trust are established and more trust 
is placed in the expert or in science. But above all, some sense of security is generated 
by the reflexive management of personal risk. I 
Clearly this formulation of society based on the management of personal risk has much 
in common with the ideas associated with a governmentality type analysis outlined 
earlier. There is a shared language of reflexivity, expertise and construction of self in 
terms of risk. However, it can be argued that Foucauldian concerns with regulation of 
population and individuals through expertise and risk management, place these 
concerns within a wider, more coherent theoretical framework (see Petersen 1997). 
Liberal forms of governmentality, in creating a problematised space in which 
governance can be made 'thinkable", already incorporates an idea of reflexivity. As 
Rose (1993) points out: 
Analyses of governmentality do indeed concern themselves with a 
certain 'reflexivity' that appears to characterise the problematics of rule 
in our present. This is not indicative of some terminal stage of 
modernity; on the contrary, it is a type of analysis that emerges in 
nineteenth-century liberal political rationalities. Liberalism confronts 
itself with the question of 'why ruleT -a question that leads to the 
demand that a consistent critical scrutiny be exercised over the activities 
of those who rule - by others and by authorities themselves (Rose 1993: 
292). 
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The risky individual 
it can really be no surprise that the concept of individual risk has emerged has a 
dominant element in neo-liberal social policy. Taking a global view, the welfare state as 
a collective form of insurance, is essentially a technology of risk. Effectively, the 
technology of insurance, like governmentality, forms a bounded rationality in which 
control can be exercised over what otherwise is an undifferentiated mass of infinite 
possibility. As Ewald (199 1) states, 'as a technology of risk, insurance is first and 
foremost a schema of rationality, a way of breaking down, rearranging, ordering 
certain elements of reality' (Ewald 1991: 199). Therefore, it would not be too bold to 
assert that insurance as an institutionalisation of risk itself represents a form of 
govemmentality. Returning to the specifics of health policy and the NHS, the reforms 
of the 1980s and 1990s created market structures that echo those of private health 
insurers, but with two important differences. The NHS continues as a system that 
contains both purchaser and provider functions and the 'bottom line' of government 
investment in health is not financial return but improvement in the health of the 
population. 
In the old form of welfarism and health care as social insurance, risk was collectivised 
and unconscious. If anything risk was equated with danger, related to potential threat 
from outside the collective, from the 'abnormal" individual. However, with the neo- 
liberal re-emphasis on personal responsibility, collectivisation gives way to the 
privatisation and individualisation of risk and the duty of citizens to act prudently (see 
O'Malley 1992). The privatisation of risk is then associated with a shift away from 
curative medicine towards health promotion, such as the new public health agenda, and 
related policies such as the 'Health of the Nation' and 'Healthy Cities' initiatives. 
However, the main difference is the subtle re-construction of the subject of the 
discourse of risk. As Castel (1991) suggests: 
What the new preventative policies primary address is no longer 
individuals but factors, statistical correlations of heterogeneous 
elements. They deconstruct the concrete subject of intervention, and 
reconstruct a combination of factors liable to produce risk. Their 
primary aim is not to confront a dangerous situation, but to anticipate 
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all the possible forms of irruption of danger. 'Prevention' in effect 
promotes suspicion to the dignified scientific rank of a calculus of 
probabilities (Castel 1991: 288) 
What mark's this as different from dangerousness is that we are all subject to this 
calculus of risk. Age, gender, weight, height etc. are all inescapable factors that denote 
some form of risk to some ailment or infirmity. There are factors based on behaviour - 
what you cat (or do not eat), how much you drink, how much exercise and so on. 
Ultimately, every aspect of modem living can be viewed in terms of risk. Every activity 
is sufflused with risk. Even passivity is not risk free. The air we breathe, the food we 
eat, the water we drink. Elements of everyday life that where once the sources of 
certainty have become threats to our well-being. In that sense, life has become filled 
with risk from which we cannot escape. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, it was argued that goverrimentality analysis produces a distinctive way 
of conceptualising power relations involved in the policy making process. As such, 
governmentality provides an alternative analysis that provides an implicit critique of 
many contemporary analyses of policy fon-nation. The influential work of Robert 
Alford (1975) and his use of the concept of 'structural interest' as a factor in the 
production of health policy was critically assessed on two counts: its usefulness as a 
model of health policy in the context of the NUS; and Alford's concept of power 
linked to structural interests. The critique of Alford's position comes from Foucault's 
radical re-working of the concept of power and his concept of power/knowledge 
discourse as the framework in which certain technologies of government develop 
which legitunise groups and individuals in their use of power over others. Z-ý 
This chapter, together with preceding chapter, has made a case for Foucault's concept 
of governmentality as a practical methodology for investigating contemporary health 
policy. It provides a useful framework to analyse recent changes in the NHS, 
particularly as they relate to the rise of neo-liberalism as a new problematisation of 
liberal govemmentality. Neo-liberalism re-asserts the centrality of the autonomous 
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individual and represents a direct assault on collective social welfarism. The emphasis 
on the market and competition as the dominant model within the political economy 
redefines the role played by expertise in the technology of government. Moreover, the 
fracturing of socialised forms of welfare enjoins the individual to adopt a type of 
entrepreneurialism of the self, in effect to actively seek to manage personal risk that 
was once secured as part of collective provision. In essence, the governance of health 
care becomes the management of individuals defined in terms of the calculation of risk 
factors. This can be seen in the strategies associated with the so-called 'New Public 
Health'. The next two chapters will discuss the implications this new emphasis on risk 
has for the role of expertise and management of priorities within the NHS. 
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Chapter 
Liberalism, professional expertise and clinical autonomy 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter it was argued that the role of expertise has become a key 
technology of regulation in liberal formulas of governance. Liberal mentalities of 
governance clearly differentiate between those domains that fall within the remit of 
appropriate political activity and are, therefore, the responsibility of the government 
and those domains inhabited by the autonomous, self-regulating individual. Within 
what could be termed welfare liberalism, expertise is important in allowing the 
regulation of those parts of society ostensibly in the private domain - such as the 
institution of the family - which fall outside the formal control of the state. It is argued 
that in this discourse of rule, expertise has evolved as a means of applying a 'neutral', 
scientific body of knowledge that enables the state to control this private domain 'at a 
distance' (Osborne 1997). However, it is significant to note that despite the functional 
importance of expertise to liberalism, this does not imply that every formula of 
liberalism necessarily incorporates the role of expertise in the same way or that 
expertise is employed by the state as a conscious strategy of control and regulation. 
Instead it must be seen as part of a particular articulation that makes governance 
meaningful and amenable to political calculation as a tangible reality. 
The articulation of liberalism as a mentality of governance is founded on a simple but 
important dynamic - safeguarding the rights of the individual yet, at the same time, 
guaranteeing the 'strength of the state' which is dependent on the well-being of the 
population. Moreover, this dynamic leads to a form of reflexivity, a continuous 
questioning of the boundaries of appropriate political activity. Consequently, as part of 
this dynamic, it follows that the appropriate role of expertise is also likely to be 
questioned. Therefore, if governmentality analysis provides a framework in which to 
describe the changing nature of the articulation of governance within liberalism, then 
expertise must necessarily be viewed in the same way - as historically contingent and 
constructed through discourse. Thus any claims of 'neutrality' or extra-discursiveness 
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for the body of knowledge embedded in expert practice is inevitably subject to 
questioning, 
However, what is not clearwithin the analytical framework of governmentality, is why 
certain bodies of knowledge attain their status as fonns of expertise and why others do 
not. Similarly, it is not evident why some occupations become professions and why 
others are denied this status. These questions become particularly acute when 
discussing the role of medical professionals and the provision of health care within 
neo-liberal formulas of governmentality. In recent times, Britain has experienced a re- 41) 
awakening of free-market ideology. The consequence of this has been a series of 
reforms that have supposedly exposed the NES to the rigours and rhetoric of 
competition in the hope of providing 'value for money' and a more efficient and 
effective health service. However, any re-articulation of a liberal form of governance 
must have consequences for pre-existing forms of expertise associated with the 
previous articulation of governance. As Osborne (1993) states: 
As patients are urged to act like consumers, and doctors like 
entrepreneurs, it appears that imperatives generally associated with the 
pursuit of profit have replaced the prerogative of clinical truth in the 
organisation of medical life. This apparent denigration of clinical 
expertise in defining the priorities of the health field has had perceived 
consequences in relation to professional values. Neo-liberalism is said 
to have been corrosive of the professions, as doctors and other health 
professionals strive to maintain their autonomy against the 
encroachments of administrators and economists (Osborne 1993: 345- 
346). 
One problem with governmentality analysis is that it is ambivalent about the nature of 
the transformations of expertise. The historical contingencies that influence the 
development of expertise mean that the particular political, social and economic 
contexts in which expertise is situated take on greater empirical significance. 
Governmentality as an analytical framework impels the researcher to uncover these 
contingencies in which expertise is implicated. However, this concern with 
contemporary challenges to professional power is not unique to govemmentality. Over 
the last thirty years a large body of scholarly literature on the subject of professions has 
developed. This literature, which also examines the perceived crisis in professional 
72 
authority, can also provide an opportunity to examine the mechanism by which 
professions are created and sustained. It may answer some of the questions posed 
earlier about the evolution of professional expertise, especially that associated with the 
medical profession. Therefore, a critical engagement with this professions literature 
provides a means of understanding the particular circumstance in which professions are 
formed, and will make possible a more nuanced approach to govemmentality. As noted 
earlier, govemmentality as a form of theoretical analytical framework, in itself, 
provides no ready way of mapping particular forms of liberalism to particular forms of 
expertise. Thus the inclusion of a discussion of the historical contingencies exposed by 
the professions literature increases the explanatory power of govemmentality as a 
practical methodology. 
in the light of these arguments the rest of this chapter is divided into two parts. The 
first part reviews the literature concerning professions, emphasising the compatibility I CD 
of the analytic frameworks employed in the discussion of professions with that of a 
governmentality framework. The second part of the chapter discusses how changes in 
the nature of professional medical expertise reflect changes in the discourse of 
governance, and the effect this has on the traditional relationships medical 
professionals have with patients, other medical professional and health care managers. 
Professionalism and expertise 
It is generally accepted that the world of medicine provides perhaps the archetypal 
examples of a 'professional' occupation within the academic literature on professions 
(Freidson 1970). Additionally, medicine and medical professionals are quintessential 
examples of bodies of technical knowledge considered to exhibit the characteristics of 
expertise so important to governmentality fon-ns of analysis (Rose 1993; Osborne 
1997; Johnson 1995). Quite clearly the notion of professionalism and expertise share a 
4 common sense' definition, in that professionals and experts are both thought of as 
bodies of individuals, which through dedicated and lengthy training, are able to make 
use of valuable, but esoteric, forms of expertise for the benefit of society. But what is 
not clear is whether the academic analytical frameworks in which these two concepts 
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are implicated, demonstrate a degree of mutual compatibility so that a coherent 
synthesis can emerge that provides useful insights for both frameworks. 
Although expertise is defined more in terms of function rather than any essential nature 
it is thought to possess, it is clearly more that just an epiphenomenon of liberal forms 
of governmentality - one of the range of functional technologies of regulation that 
evolve within particular formulas of rule. Furthermore, expertise is not trapped within 
a rigid type of functionalism that precludes the development of other structures not 
directly connected with the functional imperative. As noted in Chapter 3, Rose and 
Miller (1992) suggest that experts can use the exclusive technical knowledge they 
administer to produce a process of 'enclosure', and thus develop organisational 
structures which can be defended and from which interests can be furthered. Such 
cenclosures' are interpretable as forming the basis of 'profession' organisations. As 
Johnson (1995) suggests: 
From a Foucauldian perspective, a history of the professions becomes 
one part of the transformation of power associated with 
governmentality, as 'the disposition of things'. The rapid crystallisation 
of expertise and the establishment of professional associations in the 
nineteenth century was directly linked to the problems of 
govemmentality - including the classification and surveillance of 
populations, the normalisation of the citizen-subject and the discipline 
of the aberrant subject (Johnson 1995: 11). 
In this context it is possible to outline some of the characteristics of professions as they 
relate to the function of regulating the private/non-political domain within 
governmentality analysis. The first characteristic is that these 'professions' are seen to 
have ownership, and therefore control, over a technical/scientific body of knowledge. 
Secondly, they are able to develop the body of knowledge so as to produce new 
categories of individual amenable to regulatory control. Thirdly, because of the 
functional importance of distancing the state from the overt regulation of the private 
domain, they must be seen to enjoy a large degree of autonomy of action as to how 
expert knowledge is employed. As a consequence of this autonomy, the profession has 
to protect its 'enclosure, by self-regulation of its members and control of entry into 
the profession. However, it must be re-emphasised that all these characteristics are 
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contingent on the definition of expertise as a functionally important form of regulation. 
if the articulation of governance changes, so will expertise. The result is that, in 
extreme cases, some forms of expertise will no longer be considered as expertise. In 
effect, they will have superseded and replaced by other occupations which utilise 
different forms of regulatory expertise more relevant to the new articulation of 
governance. Therefore, occupations once deemed to be professions would lose their 
status. The question that now arises is how does the above definition of 
professionalism correlate with the working definitions employed by those who analyse 
the concept of professionalism outside governmentality analysis? And if they do share 
something in common, to what extent can they be incorporated into a governmentality 
discourse? 
Professionalism and autonomy 
The immediate problem when discussing the professions literature is that each author 
utilises a slightly different definition of what make an occupation a profession. This is 
not surprising as it appears that medical professionals have great difficulty in defining 
the concept themselves (see Harrison et al. 1984). This point is reinforced by Eliot 
Freidson, one of the seminal writers on the subject of professions. As he argues, 'no 
small part of the criticism of the traditional literature on professions has been devoted 
to pointing out a lack of consensus. Because... usage varies substantively, logically, 
and conceptually' (Freidson 1994: 15). Freidson himself identifies two basic elements 
of professionalism, 'commitment to practising a body of knowledge and skill of special 
value and to maintaining a fiduciary relationship with clients' (ibid.: 200). In order to 
attain this knowledge, a long period of training is necessary, to the point where it 
becomes a source of intellectual stimulation and a 'central life interest', rather than just 
an occupation. The important fiduciary element also stems from the application of 
highly technical, esoteric knowledge. The client has to take on trust that the 
professional is acting in the client's best interests. Without an assumption of trust there 
can be no relationship between practitioner and client, and the concept of the 
profession implodes. Therefore, what marks professions from other occupations is the 
degree of autonomy granted to practitioners over how the body of technical 
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knowledge is utilised, and as importantly, the authority to exercise control over their 
- also see Johnson 1972). own work and that of others (Freidson 1970, 
The importance placed on autonomy is also reflected in alternative definitions of 
professionalism. For example, Tolliday (1978: 44) identifies four characteristics of 
medical profession activity. These are: the right to independent practice; the right to 
refuse an individual patient; the responsibility to lead and co-ordinate other health 
professionals; the over-arching primacy of medical knowledge. Similarly Light (1995), 
suggests that professional dominance of medicine can be defined in terms of an 
aggregate of a number of different dimensions: clinical autonomy; fiscal autonomy; 
practice autonomy; organisational autonomy; organisational control; institutional 
control. Elston (199 1) sums up a variety of classifications of the ways in which the 
autonomy of medical professions may be exercised over work activity. She agues that 
three main categories are reappear: 
economic autonomy, the right of doctors to determine their 
remuneration; political autonomy, the right of doctors to make policy 
decisions as the legitimate experts on health matters; and clinical or 
technical autonomy, the right of the profession to set its own standards 
and control clinical performance, exercised, for example, through 
clinical freedom at the bedside, professional control over recruitment 
and training or collegial control over discipline and malpractice (Elston 
1991: 61-62). 
Furthermore, Elston makes the interesting point that it is unclear how changes in one 
type of autonomy would affect the others. This is a question that has important 
consequences for international comparisons of medical dominance in national health 
systems. Moreover, it becomes a central problem of empirical investigation when 
considered in the context of contemporary professions literature that posits that 
medical dominance, and therefore autonomy, is in decline or at least undergoing 
profound changes. The principal agents of change are seen to be those charged with 
preventing health spending from 'getting out of control'. In many health care systems 
the agents of control are aligned with state organisations, and in the case of the NHS, 
part of the machinery of government. At the other extreme, in market systems such as 
in the US, the impetus for change comes from third-party-payers, be they private 
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insurers or the state. Either way, the state plays a key role in all Western health care 
systems. But what is unclear is the relationship between the state and medical authority 
and autonomy. Does the medical profession play an essential role in the organisational 
structures of the health care system (Freidson 1994; Light 1995)? Or are medical 
professions now facing the fate that has befallen professions of the past, the inexorable 
process of 'proletarianisation' and 'deprofessionalisation' as is the nature of 
capitalism? (Oppenheimer 1973, McKinley and Arches 1985; Haug 1975,1988; Haug 
and Lavin 1983; Starr 1982). A governmentality analysis provides no ready answer, 
since both alternatives are possible. All is dependent on how governance is articulated 
at a particular time. In the previous chapter, expertise, and therefore professionalism 
and autonomy, were presented as being functionally important to liberal forms of 
governmentality. But, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, this does not mean that 
particular forms of expertise, and that includes medical expertise, will not be under 
threat when the formula of liberal rule changes. Therefore, it be useful to examine the 
empirical evidence presented in the professions literature to see if insights can be 
obtained into the future status of the medical profession. 
Medical autonomy and the State 
At the heart of any discussion of medical autonomy, and professional activity in 
general, there is a conundrum. If one returns to the classical idealised concept of the 
'liberal profession' as the foundation of all professional activity, in essence one sees the 
simple relationship between practitioner and patient. However, as Harrison and Schulz 
(1989) point out: 
In the idealised nineteenth-century liberal concept of medicine and 
commerce, there are no third parties; there is only the direct relationship 
between the patient and his or her independent family practitioner. In 
such circumstances, clinical autonomy is not held to be an issue, since 
both parties have freedom of choice over whether to continue the 
relationship (Harrison and Schulz 1989: 199). 
As the above highlights, autonomy can only be said to have meaning when there are 
organisational structures that have the potential to circumscribe professional action. 
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Harrison and Schulz go on to suggest that this idealised presentation of professional 
activity has to be tempered by the historical facts. Medicine has always operated with 
input from third parties 'in the form of hospital owners, friendly societies and the like' 
(ibid.: 199). In the modem era medicine has become more and more implicated in 
elaborate organisational structures and therefore, clinical/medical autonomy becomes a 
more pressing issue. 
However, there is another fundamental point to be made about the relationship 
between practitioners and outside agencies. This is especially important when that I 
external agency is the state. For example, Johnson (1995) suggests that even in very 
sophisticated accounts of the process of professionalisation, there is a paradoxical 
relationship between state and the profession that is the source of dispute and 
controversy in the professions literature. As Johnson argues: 
... there 
is little doubt that a significant source of such disagreement 
(and, one might add, mutual incomprehension) is the pervasive 
conception of state/profession as a relationship between preconstituted, 
coherent, calculating political subjects; one intervening, the other 
seeking autonomy. While the professions are seen as acting to maximise 
autonomy, the state is presented as continuously extending its 
apparatuses of control throughout society, including over professions 
(Johnson 1995: 9). 
The paradox occurs because the state is seen to provide a 'shelter' (Freidson 1994: 
83), a protected space in which the profession can organise and flourish. This is 
because, for some occupations, it is accepted that the tasks which are undertaken 'are 
evaluated as being of such importance to the public good that leaving them 
unregulated would be undesirable' (ibid.: 84). In effect, this relationship between the 
state and the profession defines the boundaries of professional activity. Inside this 
boundary those licensed by the state, and therefore considered to be professionals, are 
free to organise and exercise autonomous control over the application of technical 
knowledge and the resultant division of labour. Furthermore, within this space created 
by the state, the profession is given the authority to police its own members as well as 
control entry into the profession itself by a process of credentialism. Outside the 
state/profession boundary the state reifies this arrangement by the enactment of 
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legislation. The important point to note is that legislation is not necessarily part of a 
process to make alternative forms of practice illicit. Individuals, or organised groups of 
practitioners, may still occupy the same fields of activity as licensed professions, 
utilising the same knowledge base or an alternative body of knowledge. What the 
legislation prevents these alternative practitioners from adopting is the unequivocal 
authority of a 'profession'. But, at the same time, this limited acknowledgement by the 
state of alternative practice, does not prevent the licensed profession from denigrating 
non-professionals with whom they are engaged in a form of competition. From the 
nineteenth-century onwards, the medical profession has been engaged in a ceaseless 
task of uncovering all forms of 'quackery' that pose a threat to established practice, or 
lack the supposed scientific rigour of orthodox medicine (Stacey 1988; Larson 1977; 
Larkin 1995). The medical profession can only mount this challenge because of the 
shelter, and legitimacy, provided by the state. 
In many ways these notions of a professionalism 'dependent on its dependence on the 
state' (Johnson 1995: 10), are not too dissimilar from the concept of expertise and the 
role it plays within governmentality analysis. As Johnson goes on to point out, in his 
analysis of Freidson (1970; 1973), Larson (1977) and Abbott (1988), there is a 
common notion of professionalism being constructed ideologically by its interaction 
with the state, that professions 'should not be viewed as stable and fixed 
characteristics' (Larson 1977: xii). Thus the definitions of Freidson and Tolliday stated 
earlier, are more a definition of how professions see themselves than outlining the 
essential nature of professions. Nettleton (1995) reinforces this point, suggesting that 
4simply listing the characteristics that are identified by the professions themselves 
merely reflects and reinforces their ideas and values' (Nettleton 1995: 196). Freidson 
(1995) also makes this observation, noting that the esoteric and complex technical 
knowledge that forms the basis of professional identity is not immune to being 
ultimately broken down into simple tasks and standardised. It is not desirable, in 
certain circumstances to do this, Freidson agues, because when: 
... some of the consumer's needs are reduced to standard categories, 
thus reducing the consumer to a standard object, this may seem 
oppressive and disabling. I think it can be argued that the producers of 
some goods and services should be able to exercise discretion and 
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judgement not only for the sake of their own humanity, but also for the 
sake of the humanity of the consumer (Freidson 1994: 165). 
it can be argued that here Freidson is presenting a way of conceptualising 
professionalism that is not too dissimilar from Foucault's use of expertise within 
govemmentality. One could make the case that professionalism and expertise are 
inextricably linked vAth liberal political philosophies. The connection is reinforced by 
Freidson's observation that 'the theoretical literature on the professions is almost 
wholly Anglo-American' (Freidson 1994: 19). Professional activity, as with expertise, 
appears to play a role in liberal society, but that role, however defined, is contingent 
and presumably historic, in that the construction of professional rationales can be 
investigated empirically in terms of uncovering the 'evolutionary' pathway in which 
profession are situated. 
Where this differs from governmentality analysis is that Freidson, together with Larson 
and Abbott, present their analysis of professionalism, and the formation of 
professionalism, within a tradition that emphasises the dualit of state and profession. 
For Freidson this comes about through the autonomy of technical knowledge, in 
Larson's analysis the state is a pre-constituted reflection of class power, and for 
Abbott the state provides the audience for professionals competing for jurisdiction. 
What governmentality suggests is that this emphasis on duality is misplaced. The 
governmentality argument for autonomy, expertise and professionalism, is similar to 
that employed in Chapter 3 when discussing the concept of the self-regulating 
individual within liberalism. In liberal forms of governance there is no opposition 
between individual freedom and the state, they are both aspects of a mentality of 
government that creates a bounded space in which a meaningful articulation of the 
process of governance becomes tangible. Likewise, professional autonomy in 
governmentality is not seen as being in opposition to state power. Professionalism 
togetherwith the state are forms of governance. The construction of professional 
identity around the concept of autonomy is itself part of this formula of governance, in 
that it allows regulation of the population 'at-a-distance'. 
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The power of governmentality as an analytical framework is that it resolves the 
paradoxes inherent in dualist forms of analysis. Dualism presents the state as being 
both the protector of professional autonomy and, at the same time, a threat to 
autonomy as the interventionist state attempts to exert control over the profession. In 
governmentality there is no paradox because autonomy and the state are both part of 
the same articulation of governance. Whereas in dualist thinking professional I 
autonomy is dependent on the dependence on the state, the governmentality formula 
conceptualises autonomy and the state as dependent on a particular mentality of liberal 
governance. It is the mentality of governance that is the dominant factor in determining 
the role of various forms of expertise. As argued earlier in the chapter, if the form of 
liberal governance changes then so might the range of expertise that forms part of the 
technologies of governance. As Johnson (1995) states: 
... Because governments are 
dependent on the neutrality of expertise in 
rendering social realities governable, the established profession have 
been, as far as possible, distanced from spheres of political contention - 
the source of professional autonomy. However, because government 
policies and policy objectives change over time, these boundaries are in 
constant flux, having the effect of refashioning jurisdictions, breaking 
down arenas of neutrality and constructing new ensembles of 
procedures, techniques, calculations and roles which reconstitute the 
lineaments of the state itself (Johnson 1995: 22). 
The governmentality argument also provides an answer to another paradox that 
emerges from international comparisons of health systems and the differing roles 
played by medical autonomy. Within dualist frameworks, in which autonomy and state 
control are in opposition, Dbhler (1989) suggests 'the assumption that professional 
autonomy in particular is restricted by the integration of the physician into the 
machinery of welfare bureaucracies is not only a vital part of the credo of the medical 
profession itself, but also a commonly held opinion within the social sciences' (D6hler 
1989: 180). As an illustration of this, the US health system with its minimal state 
intervention and well developed market in health care, has historically been 
characterised as representing an idealised form of clinical autonomy (Freidson 1970). 
However, in recent years, and contrary to this position, a number of writers have 
described a profession under threat, with reduced clinical autonomy, and perhaps, 
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ultimately, facing a process of deprofessionalisation (Haug 1975,1988; Haug and 
Lavin 1983; Starr 1982). As Harrison and Schulz (1989) point out, medical 
professions in the US enjoy less clinical autonomy that those in the UK, but this has to 
be balanced against a great deal more economic autonomy. Even so, 'US physicians g 
have accepted restrictions on their clinical autonomy which would be unthinkable to 
British doctors' (ibid.: 205). In essence, there seems to be no unambiguous mapping 
between the degree of state intervention in the national health care system and the 
amount of clinical autonomy possessed by medical professionals within the system. 
indeed Dbhler's (1987) comparative study of national health care systems and the 
degree of clinical autonomy enjoyed by the medical profession within them, supports 
this assertion. Using a typology that categorises health care systems by their 
corganisational density', ie the degree of market dominance by the state or market in 
health care (the UK having a high density, the US a low density), she finds that 'there Cý 
is no positive correlation between the degree of welfare state development and a 
reduced professional autonomy of physicians' (Dbhler 1989: 195). 
While the above problem is not impossible to resolve within a dualist framework, the 
fact that the problem arises in the first instance is indicative of the contradictions 
embedded in the framework, and which obstructs its potential for insight into the role 
of professions in regulating social order. In governmentality analysis these 
state/professions paradoxes do not occur, in that the state and the profession are 
basically two aspects of a form of governance. Professions are part of the regulatory 
process, which in turn, is part of a particular articulation of a formula of rule. In the 
case of the LJK, in which the health system is part of an articulation of governance that 
gives rise to a form of welfare liberalism, then the regulatory role of medical 
professions can only be legitimised by emphasising the autonomous nature of practice 
and the altruism of the profession as a whole. The example of the US health care 
system provides a stark contrast. The articulation of governance that sanctions a 
market in health care and one that has little state intervention, in theory has no need to 
rely on the altruism of the medical profession. The market itself supposedly provides 
all the figour necessary to provide a form of legitimisation of practice. The fact that the 
US market system is seen to be failing, that so many citizens have limited access to 
health care, and this is accompanied by ever increasing health care costs, is perhaps 
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indicative of the general problematic nature of free markets in health care. However, it 
is a sign of the power of the liberal articulation of governance in the US that the 
problem of inflationary health care costs (but not that of the inequalities inherent in the 
system), has developed to become part of the vocabulary of governance, in that it is 
seen to be a problem and therefore needs to be addressed. And it is the market which is 
looked on provide a solution - for the lack of any credible alternative articulation. In 
part, the introduction or appropriation of technologies directed by third-party-payer 
organisations are part of this solution. These include such things as case managers, 
diagnostic related groups (DRGs) and various forms of audit (see Chapter 3), all 
having the property of constraining clinical autonomy. In effect, they replace the 
assumed altruism of medical profession activity and re-constitute it through a market 
rationale, and become subject to technologies that produce a calculus of trust. 
The comparison of US and British health care systems has an additional heuristic 
quality in that the US system does incorporate many of the important characteristics of 
neo-liberal forms of governance - the self-reliant individual responsible for their own 
health care provision and a health care system which is market based with minimal 
state intervention. In contrast to the US, the UK system, as represented by the NHS, is 
inextricably linked with a form of welfare liberalism. If the changes in contemporary 
UK health policy are thought of, as in governmentality, as reflecting a shift to a new 
formula of liberal governance, ie a form of neo-liberalism, then the study of US 'third 
party payer' technologies may be useful in acting as an early warning of their 
introduction into the UK. The existence of such technologies could well form part of 
the vocabulary of a new form of governance for UK health care. Additionally, the shift 
to a new formula of liberal governance will involve a re-articulation of relationships 
between the instruments of governance, such as expertise, and those subject to them. 
In the case of medicine as practised in the NES, this implies new forms of relationship 
between medical profession and patients, with professional peers and other professions 
within the medical discipline, and with new organisational structures given the 
authority to manage the health care system. 
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10edicine, and the public and the decline of medical authority 
There are many aspects to the relationship between medical professionals and their 
patients - class, gender, race - but perhaps the most basic derives from the utilisation 
by professionals of an esoteric, technical knowledge. It was argued earlier that 
'ownership' of this kind of knowledge is regarded by many commentators as 
fundamental to the process by which some occupations achieve the status of 
professions. One of the mechanism that underpins this transformation, and sustains the 
profession once established, can be identified in the concept of the 
indetermination/technicity (I/T) ratio famously associated with Jamous and Peloille 
(1970). The practice of medicine is deemed to have a high I/T ratio by virtue of the 
assertion that the application of medical knowledge involves a great deal of intuitive 
thinking on the part of the clinician, and therefore, is not readily reducible to a 
standardised technical function. Hence the need for altruism in the definition of 
professional activity to balance the trust that necessarily has to be invested in the 
medical professional by the patient. However, what problematises this 
patient/professional relationship is the degree to which professions, and the knowledge 
on which they are founded, can be viewed as having been constructed and historically 
contingent, as the professions literature has highlighted. As noted in a previous section, 
Freidson (1995) suggests that even if the practice of expertise can be reduced to a 
technical exercise, some forms of knowledge, like medicine, are best administered in a 
professional context. Others have argued more critically that medical professional 
activity is not only constructed but that the process of construction reflects structural 
influences. For example, it is argued that medicine as a discipline represents dominant 
class interests within capitalist societies (Navarro 1976,1978; Johnson 1977), or that 
the division of labour dominated by the profession is gendered (Stacey 1988; Witz Cý 
1992) and involves issues of race (Akinsanya 1988; Esmail and Everrigton 1993). 
The additional effect of these criticisms is to call into question the 'neutrality' of the 
technical knowledge of medical science. Commentators have argued that not only is 
the division of labour within medicine gendered but that medical knowledge is 
gendered as well (Ehrenreich and English 1979; Oakley 1976). Another set of critiques 
calls into question the supposed effectiveness of curative biomedicine. Evidence of the 
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limits of modem medical practice is provided by McKeown (1976). As a result of a 
careful re-examination of the British epidemiological statistics McKeown demonstrates 
that the rapid declines in mortality in various disease categories have generally come 
befom the development of medical technologies to counter them. And once 
introduced, the rate of decline tends to continue on the same downwards trajectory. 
This not to say that medicine is totally ineffective, just that the power of medicine 
tends to be greatly over-stated. This theme of effectiveness of medicine has also 
generated many powerful critiques of the power of the medical discourse. In an 
influential lecture in 1972 entitled Effectiveness andEfficiency: i-andonz i-eflections on 
the heallh sei-vice, Cochrane argued that far from being grounded in a scientific 
methodology, a great deal of common medical practice is unproven as to its 
effectiveness. Moreover, a great deal of medical research is poorly done, falling well 
short of the 'gold standard' methodology of the double blind randomised controlled 
trial. Taking this analysis even further, Ivan Illich (1975; 1976) suggests that medical 
practice might not only be ineffective but iatrogenic, that modem medical intervention 
is actually injurious to health. Illich argues that not only are many forms of medical 
treatment positively harmful, but that the discourse of medical practice takes away the 
capacity of individuals to take control of their own care and deal with pain and 
suffering. 
The scepticism in curative biomedicine has increased in parallel with a society which is 
increasing less deferential to traditional forms of authority. Institutions once considered 
beyond criticism have come under public scrutiny and, from some quarters, have been 
the target of ridicule and vitriol in equally measure. The question is whether the 
critiques of the type outlined above that question the basis of medical knowledge and 
self-defined altruism, have added to a diminution of status for the medical profession. 
There is little doubt that the medical profession still retains a great deal of authority 
and in many ways recent government reforms have presented clinicians with the 
opportunity to enhance their position by appearing as guardians of the NHS public 
service ethos. However, there are a growing number of examples where one could 
argue that medical authority has been eroded. One such example is the growth in 
alternative forms of medicine and their partial acceptance as part of mainstream 
medical practice (Stacey 1988; Larkin 1995; 1995; Sharma 1992). Their growing 
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popularity could be seen as patient power at work and that an assertive, empowered 
public demands these therapies and therefore, they are supplied. The 
irony is that many 
alternative therapies are the folk medicines of yesteryear, the very same remedies once 
denounced as quackery by orthodox medicine. Many of the therapies also present a 
fundamental challenge to the biomedical basis of medical orthodoxy. They have a 
tendency to treat the body as a whole, oflen incorporating a spiritual element in the 
healing process, rather than just focus on physical sources of illness. Perhaps, it is 
telling of the inroads made by these 'alternative' forms of medicine that they are now 
classified by the British Medical Association (BMA) as 'complementary' medicine 
(Nettleton 1995). 
Another illustration of a weakening of the medical hegemony can be found in the 
recent (May 1998) disciplinary inquiry by the General Medical Council into the 
competence of two senior consultant surgeons at a Bristol hospital, in respect of a 
number of the operations they carried out on very young heart patients. The essence of 
the charges brought against the surgeons is that they failed to re-assess their own 
practice once informed of the higher-than-average death rates that resulted from heart 
operations they were performing. This was a particularly emotive case which appears 
to be one more medical scandal to be added to a ever growing list of medical failure. In 
the UK, one can include thalidomide, the over-prescription of addictive painkillers and 
anti-depressants, HIV infection in haemophiliacs from contaminated blood products, 
failures of several cancer screening services, and all the other personal tragedies that 
do not make national news. However, what is important about the Bristol case is the 
response of the Government, and more notably, the positive response of organisations 
that represent medical interests, such as the Royal Colleges. The Government proposes 
a radical expansion of quality measures and audit, and that data generated will be 
published in some form, although at an ag regate hospital/speciality level. (The C9 
practice of audit will be discussed at the end of the chapter). What is sioficant is the 
tone of the debate surrounding the Bristol case, of which the Government 
announcement forms a part. Newspapers and their leader writers have generally 
portrayed this as a victory for the patient against the monolithic power of vested 
interests. The following is typical of the sentiment expressed: 
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The oldest professional conspiracy is coming to an end... For years 
social reformers have urged policy-makers to introduce medical audit: 
an independent audit of individual medical competence. But the issue 
was so hot that the Royal Commission on Health, which reported in 
1979, refused to look at the idea. Even the boldest of health ministers 
refused to push the plan. The Patient's Charter, launched six years ago, 
carefully restricted itself to administrative measurements. Yet, suddenly, 
Frank Dobson [the Secretary of State for Health] has stood up in 
defence of patient rights. By next October he intends to produce 
preliminary clinical indicators which -will allow patients to judge their 
local hospital in relation to death rates after operations, heart attacks, 
and fractured neck [of femur] (The Guardian 11/6/98: 23). 
What the Bristol case indicates is that much of the vocabulary of an alternative form of 
governance of health care already exists, it only needs a single event, or series of 
connected events, to begin a crystallisation of consciousness to form a coherent 
articulation incorporating that vocabulary. In the above, one can see various aspects of 
the vocabulary of neo-liberalism, especially the concept of the pro-active patient 
making informed decisions, who makes use of all relevant information in the manner of 
enlightened self-interested individual. There is a confrontation with a powerfA 
organisation who 'conspire' to deny information to patients to protect their own 
interests. But most fundamentally, underlying all of these, is the concept that it may be 
possible to find the 'best deal' in treatment for the patient. The assumption is that there 
is an emergent market in health care, one not based on the exchange of physical goods, 
but one based on the concept of a free-market in expertise, 'where the relationships 
between citizens and experts are not organised and regulated through compulsion but 
through acts of choice' (Rose 1993: 296). 
Medical professionals, expertise and markets 
The juxtaposition of markets and expertise, especially in a context where expertise is 
being questioned, prompts speculation that the profession is undergoing a process of 
deprofessionalisation. The radical view is that it is undergoing a process of 
'proletarianisation', based on the assumption that it is the nature of capitalism to seek 
control the labour market, and the labour process, to degrade skill and to reduce the 
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ývork process to a technical exercise (cf Braverman 1974). The proletarianisation 
thesis, as applied to medicine, has its supporters (see Oppenheimer 1973, McKinley 
and Arches 1985). Clearly there is potential for some aspects of modem technology, 
such as computerised 'expert systems', to achieve a sort of Taylorism in medical 
practice. However, as Elston (199 1) states "proletarianisation' itself remains 
unarticulated as a concept, making its applicability to the medical profession unclear... 
best regarded as a 'slogan' rather than an analytic concept' (Elston 1991: 64). For 
governmentality, this idea that proletarianisation remains 'unar-ticulated' is all 
important. By its nature, governmentality analysis can only remain agnostic about the 
way particular forms of expertise evolve, and perhaps, ultimately fade away. 
Proletarianisation is not necessarily incompatible with governmentality. If one strips 
away its theoretical under-pinning and regards it as simply a process that leads to de- 
skilling of labour in the work process, it is an alternative that has to be considered. It is 
inevitable that some forms of expertise will no longer fulfil a regulatory role within a 
formula of governance and, therefore, will cease to be forms of expertise. The medical 
profession, at present, seems to have been spared that fate. The complex and 
indeterminate nature of health probably means that some kind of medical expertise will 
always be functionally important to liberal forms of governance. Therefore, the 
implications of a market in expertise has to be taken at face value. It is a market in 
which experts within one medical discipline compete with each other and, at the same 
time, with other novel forms of medical expertise that emerge. 
The concept of a market in expertise prompts two further questions. From where will 
these new forms of expertise/professions emerge? And what will be the currency of 
exchange in this market of expertise? A partial answer to the first question has already 
been touched upon earlier. It is quite possible that some of the more established forms 
of practice within alternative/contemporary medicine, such as osteopathy or 
acupuncture, will make the break-through into mainstream medicine. Another source of 
competitive expertise will develop as the medical division of labour becomes less 
dominated by the clinicians. For example, we may see the increasing influence of 
pharmacists, especially in the introduction of high cost drug therapies such as fl- 
interferon. However, the most notable source of competitive expertise will come from 
the challenge to patriarchal medicine, most significantly from nursing. This will in 
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effect reverse the assertion of Stacey (1988) that, 'the empirical evidence is that 
historical occupations which have made successful claims to be professions, which 
have gained work autonomy and become dominant, have all been male occupations; 
those which have succeeded less well ... have 
been female or female-dominated 
occupations' (Stacey 1988: 80). However, the majority of competition will be between 
clinicians. And in answer to the second question posed earlier, the currency will be 
their ability to demonstrate 'effectiveness'. The basis of effectiveness will be defined 
within an audit process. Therefore, the nature of the audit process will be crucially 
important as it will, in turn, reflect the values of those that set the criteria of 
effectiveness. The problem now becomes transformed into one of who controls these 
criteria. Will it be clinicians or health care managers? 
Medical professions, management and audit 
The relationship between clinicians and managers/administrators within the NUS has 
always been problematic. (The evolution of new management structures will be 
described in more detail in Chapter 6). However, within the context of this chapter, 
several relevant points can be made. This first point, which has been made in previous 
chapters, is that the British NHS is quintessentially an organisation that reflects a 
'welfare liberal' form of governance. The organisational structures of the NHS reflect 
the bargain between medical profession and the state, that 'while central government 
controlled the budget, doctors controlled what happened within that budget' (Klein 
1995: 75). Thus 'the price of preserving clinical autonomy - the fight of individual 
doctors to do what they thought right for individual patients - was accepting the 
constraints of working within fixed budgetary limits' (ibid.: 75). Clearly this 
formulation of the professions/state relation creates difficulties for those seeking to 
manage the service. Within a governmentality framework, one would expect that the 
closer that organisations employing expertise are identified with the state, the more 
autonomy granted to practitioners of that expertise, and the less power of oversight for 
managers. In other words managers would act more like administrators, making sure 
the system runs smoothly rather than having any strategic input. This is ably 
demonstrated by the excerpt below from a document outlining management structures 
envisaged by the 1974 NHS reorganisation: 
89 
Success in achieving this aim [improving health care] depends primarily 
on the people in the health care profession who prevent, diagnose and 
treat disease. Management plays only a subsidiary part, but the way in 
which the Service is organised and the process used in directing 
resources can help or hinder the people who play the primary part 
(DHSS 1972: 9). 
The inherent difficulty with this arrangement is that it leaves management in the 
unenviable position of being held to account for spending commitments for which they 
are not responsible, with clinicians responsible for spending commitments for which 
they are not accountable. And as the majority of spending is dependent on decisions 
made by medical professionals, then this will be the source of great difficulty for a 
government trying to contain costs. The problem for governments of all political 
persuasions is that it appears that it is an innate property of any formal health care 
system for cost to rise uncontrollably. In the 1970s and 1980s, the government found 
itself 'caught between the rising demands on the NHS generated by technical change 
and the ageing of the population, on the one hand, and the financial commitment to 
restraining growth of public expenditure, on the other' (Klein 1995: 13 1). Inevitably, 
the perception of the NHS as somehow 'failing' the British people inevitably results in 
it becoming even more politicised. The question is whether the politicisation of the 
NHS reflects a shift in the articulation of governance, or whether it is part of a process 
thatforces a shift in the articulation of governance. On the whole the fon-ner seems the 
more likely option, although there is no reason why reaction to exogenous factors 
should not produce the same outcome. However, it can be no coincidence that the 
1970s and the 1980s saw the rise in influence of Monetarist economic theories that 
makes a fetish of the control of public spending and minimal government - all the 
hallmarks of neo-liberalism. 
For a government faced with rising costs in the NES, the opportunity presents itself 
for devising innovative ways of managing the health care system. Many of technologies II 
utilising the incorporation of clinicians in the management process and devolving some 
budget control, have been around for many years in one form or another (Harrison and 
Pollitt 1994). However, they were given a radical new impetus, in form of 
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gmanagement budgeting, by the Griffiths Report of 1983. For many commentators the 
(3riffiths Report represents a watershed in the history of health reforms in bringing 
management of the NHS onto the agenda (see Klein 1995; Cox 1991). The report, 
with its call for a more strategic management that engaged in budgeting and resource 
management, also called for more involvement by clinicians in the managerial process. 
But the report also suggested that it is the function of management to control the 
division of labour in the health services, and by implication, that would involve the 
division of labour that includes clinicians. In many ways the Griffiths Report presents 
some difficulties for a governmentality analysis. The business background of the most 
of the group that produced the report - Griffiths himself was deputy chairman and 
managing director of the Sainsbury's retail group - is seminal in introducing into health 
care management the language of commerce. As Cox (199 1) states, 'the recurring 
themes of Griffith's managerialism are action, effectiveness, thrust, urgency and 
vitality, management budgeting, sensitivity to consumer satisfaction and an approach 
to management of personnel which reward good performance and ultimately sanction 
poor performance with dismissal' (Cox 1991: 94). It is the purpose of management to 
lead, to set goals, monitor input and output, ensure an effective workforce, strive for 
quality and efficiency, the minimum necessary for a successful firm to withstand the 
rigours of a market environment. Therefore, it would be reasonable to regard the 
Griffiths Report as reflecting a shift in the articulation of liberal governance. Yet, this is 
sustainable only to a degree. At the heart of the report, the incorporation of clinicians 
into management structures, is a solution that comes from an articulation of welfare 
liberalism. It does not re-articulate the problem in such a way as to negate it as a 
concern. Nor does it, in any meaningful way, alter the relationship between the medical 
profession and the state. As such the exhortations to enter into management can be 
easily resisted by the profession as an alien concept. As Flynn (1992) points out: 
Evidently, then, all the different schemes, under different rubrics - 
Clinical Bud eting, Management Budgeting, Resource Management - 
have encountered major problems in securing changes in attitude, 
behaviour and culture that their advocates promote. The enduring issue 
is that of clinical autonomy versus managerial control. All of these 
experiments and initiatives necessarily involve significant changes in the 
role of the hospital doctor, and each of them requires incorporation 
(and possibly subordination) of professional staff in the management 
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process. Not only are doctors faced with infonnation about their clinical 
activity, the resources used and their costs, but they are now invited to 
take an active apart in evaluating cost-effectiveness, and making trade- 
offs between alternative practices (Flynn 1992: 87). 
The essential difficulty of incorporating clinicians into management is that it asks 
clinicians to take on a role outside their own definition of professional medical 
practice. One solution is to separate the functions between supply and demand, in 
effect create a market in health care, or in the case of the NHS something that 
resembles a market, ie a 'managed market' or 'quasi-market' (the origins of the 
internal market will be discussed in chapters 6 and 7). However, what is important to 
note is that a market structure can represent coherent solution to the problem of 
clinicians and management. Quite simply, it is to limit the role of clinician to those 
activities associated with the management of supply. The demand function is to be left 
to a strategic management, with input from dedicated public health clinicians. 
The management of audit 
In any organisational structure the generation of information is of central importance in 
monitoring the work process. Of all the technologies that already exist, the process of 
audit appears the most appropriate in generating that information. However, as with all 
technologies of management control, context is all important. In the NHS, as with the 
various types of management budgeting, many forms of audit have been used. The 
Confidential Enquiry into Perioperative Deaths (CEPOD) that began in 1986 is one 
example. There have also been other such enquiries into maternal and infant deaths. 
However, the post-Griffiths management initiatives re-invigorated the audit debate. 
The new approach to audit was illustrated by Medical Audit Paper No 6, Morkingfol- 
PalieWs (1989), where medical audit is defined as: 
'... the systematic, critical analysis of the quality of medical care, 
including the procedures used for diagnosis and treatment, the use of 
resources, and the resulting outcomes and quality of life for that patient. 
Because a patient's primary concern is for a correct diagnosis to be 
made and for effective treatment to be given, medical audit must be 
central to any programme to enhance the overall quality of care given to 
patients in the NES. An effective programme of audit will help to C 
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provide the necessary reassurance to doctors, patients and managers 
that the best possible quality of service is being achieved within the 
resources available. ' (Department of Health 1989: 3). 
on face value the main functions of medical audit appear straightforward. Ideas of 
ceffective treatment' and enhancing 'the overall quality of care' point to considerations 
of efficiency. Similarly, providing 'necessary reassurance' indicates concerns for 
accountability, achieving this 'within the resources available' shows some appreciation 
of costs - and by extension cost containment. However, the Working Paper goes on to 
suggest that medical audit should also have an educational function, in that it 'must 
form part of the training ofjunior staff' (ibid.: 4). Additionally, in a later document, the 
audit process is described as being 'essentially a professional matter ... medically 
led', 
and as 'primarily an educational activity' (Department of Health 1991). Furthermore, 
despite the declaration that audit was no longer a voluntary activity, the only form 
compulsion is the injunction to clinicians, in particular consultants, that they should 
participate in some kind of medical audit with no punishment for those who do not 
attend. Thus these early techniques of internal clinical audit in the NHS contain no real 
sanctions, are centred on the education and socialisation ofjunior staff, set standards 
locally and deal with problems internally by peers not management (see Pollitt 1993; 
Black et al. 1989). Management were given powers to 'initiate an audit review, if 
necessary, and that it should be an 'external peer review or a joint professional and 
managerial appraisal of a particular service' (DoH 1989: 6). But the problem is that 
unlike the US, where external peer review is standard practice, in the UK there are no 
equivalent peer-review organisations. As Pollitt states, 'in the NHS there is, in effect, 
no external review' (Pollitt 1993: 164). 
The one thing that is clearl problematic about the audit process as outlined above, is My 
that medical dominance of audit does not produce quality information of use to health 
care commissioners. The confidential aspect of audit means that only abstract, 
generalised information reaches managers and commissioners, reducing accountability 
and weakening oversight (Kerrison et al. 1994: 156). Furthermore, former funding 
arrangements for audit 'whereby funds are ring-fenced and clinicians are not faced with 
having to justify the benefits of audit against other priorities for spending, have 
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contributed to a situation where audit is currently marginal in terms of time, 
commitment and priority. ' (ibid.: 171). Therefore, the evidence suggests that, in this 
instance, audit is not yet a technology that belongs of a new articulation of governance. 
However, the use of audit in the US context does indicate that in can be seen as part of 
a neo-liberal form of governance. In the case of the US, the market in health care 
provides the legitimacy for the policing of standards by agencies outside the medical 
profession. Again, it is useful to note that accreditation and quality reviews have 
traditionally been part of medical professional activity and a mechanism of self- 
gulation. The system was simply adopted 
(and adapted) by those who contract for reg 
health care (see Harrison and Schulz 1989). 
If audit had become a marginal activity then this is certainly not the objective set out 
for it in the Working Paper. This stresses that audit must be "centi'al to any programme 
to enhance overall quality' (1989: 3; emphasis added). However, the accent is placed 
not on management control and cost containment but on achieving greater quality of 
care within resource constraints. Therefore, one could argue that notions of efficiency 
and effectiveness are fundamental to the audit Process, not just in terms of volume of 
health care and cost-per-unit, but in terms of 'quality' outcomes that maximise patient 
welfare. The problems is of defining in any meaningful way what kind of 'quality' is to 
be pursued. It has already been noted that medical audit as practised in the NHS, is 
dominated by medical professionals idea of what audit should achieve, and thus 
cquality' is couched in terms of medical values. But this emphasis on professional 
medical ideas of care need not be the sole measure of quality. Donabedian (1988) 
points out that there are more aspects to care than this - structure, interpersonal 
relationships, use of resources as well as technical care. Thus the purpose of audit is to 
encourage those medical practices which maximise patient outcomes defined in these 
broader terms which incorporate patient and social values. A measure of quality 
outcomes such as the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) would be one (if limited) 
example (see Chapter 5). It is the nature of such measures that the cheapest practice is 
not usually the 'best practice, ie the most efficient practice. But neither is 'best 
practice' synonymous with 'ideal practice', the point being made is that "'ideal" 
medical practice cannot be achieved given limited resources, and that what we are 
striving for is "best medical practice" given the resources available' (Mooney and Ryan 
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1992: 180). Therefore audit should not be about making clinicians accountable for 
their decisions based on current practice but as a methodology whereby they are 
measured against 'best practice' and held to account for the differences between the 
two. As Mooney and Ryan observe, given 'the fact that, faced with similar patients, 
individual members of the medical profession differ so much in what they do ... [t]hey 
cannot all be right' (ibid. ). At the very least the audit cycle should be the mechanism 
which allows the clinician to think reflexively about their own practice. 
The method of medical audit adopted by the NES - internal peer review - is potentially 
very flexible. However, assessing audit in terms of the degree to which it encourages 
efficiency and effective practice, reveals some quite serious flaws in the audit design. If 
the purpose of audit is to compare current practice against 'best practice, then this 
will not be best done within an internal peer review structure. Internal review makes 
clinicians accountable to the implicit and explicit criteria of current practice, but it is 
not a process that easily lends itself to the exploration of alternative criteria of 'quality' 
health care. The typical audit practice of retrospective review of case notes is based on 
too small a sample to build up a systematic understanding of treatment and outcome. 
The emphasis on the education ofjunior staff within audit, compresses the audit cycle 
and does not allow for long term studies. As Kerrison et al. note, 'since medical audit 
is concerned with the quality of current practice, it is not identical with medical 
research' (Kerrison et al. 1994: 175). Therefore, audit cannot meet the challenge of the 
fact that 'many therapies in everyday use in all medical care systems have no scientific 
basis ie, they are of unproven benefit' (Maynard and Sheldon 1994: 7). As Bull (199 1) 
comments: 
'-whereas clinical research attempts to demonstrate a direct causative 
link between processes and outcome, audit builds on the fact that such a 
link has been established. For the medical audit model to apply, the link 
must be clear and direct. There is little sense in auditing the outcome of 
care against a given standard if that outcome is not dependent on the 
quality of the care process. There is little sense in auditing a process of 
care against a standard if it is not known how or whether the process 
will benefit the patient. ' (Bull 1992: 398). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the importance of expertise - as embodied in professions - 
as a regulatory technology associated with liberal forms of governance. As part of the 
analysis of expertise within the governmentality framework there was a critical 
engagement with the more conventional professions literature. One of the key themes 
that emerged was the nature of the relationship between professional autonomy and 
state control. It was apparent that there was a clear divergence between 
governmentality analysis and those accounts that emphasised the duality of state and 
profession. Using the governmentality framework it was argued that in liberal forms of 
governance the autonomous profession and the state are both aspects of the same 
mentality of government. The construction of the concept of autonomy of expertise is 
itself part of a formula of governance, in that it allows regulation of the population 
within the private/non-political domain beyond the responsibility of the formal state. 
The latter part of the chapter explored further the relationship of professional medical 
expertise with the state. In particular the relationship between the state and expertise 
within welfare liberal forms of governance. It was suggested that professional 
autonomy becomes more well defined the closer the state become associated with the 
delivery of welfare provision. Therefore, in welfare liberal forms of governance the 
autonomous profession plays an important function in regulating the population 'from- 
a-distance'. However, when the form of liberal governance changes so does the 
function of autonomous expertise and its relationship with the state. For medical 
expertise this may mean that accepted notions of professional altruism and 
expectations of trust are also challenged and new relationships with patients are 
formed. Similarly, the bureaucratic control of the health care system may involve new 
technologies of control, such as audit and peer review, that reflect a new articulation of 
health governance. 
It was suggested in the chapter that, hitherto, no legitin-ýisation is apparent in the UK 
that would allow direct scrutiny of individual clinical practice. However, most of the 
vocabulary is in place. The development of the work pioneered by Cochrane, and 
others, has continued and expanded. The post-Griffiths management initiatives, the 
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internal market, the increasing influence of health economics and academic research 
have all added to a re-coding of medical dominance of the NHS as a problem in search 
of a solution. It is in this context that more recent changes in audit, and the shift to a 
rijulti-disciplinary structure, can be viewed. From 1994-95 the audit money was no 
longer 'ring fenced', but distributed by Health Authorities in line with the audit 
priorities of the Authority, their commissioning intentions and problems identified from 
a number of source, both local and national. As Ranade (1997) points out, 'clearly 
these changes have tipped the balance of power further in a managerial and purchasing 
direction, and suggests a more important role for other professions in relation to 
doctors, although the DOH is acutely aware of the 'professional sensitivities' that have 
to be overcome' (Ranade 1997: 145). 
The recent Bristol case mentioned earlier, and the radical government initiatives that 
followed, suggests that these 'professional sensitivities' are in the process of being 
overcome. Pollitt (1993) makes the prophetic observation that his experience was that 
while many individual managers privately rejected the idea that 'medical 
underperformance was a medical, not a management problem... few seemed to make 
an issue of it on principle. The preferred tactic was to await a suitable test case and 
meanwhile avoid an unnecessary policy clash with the BMA' (Pollitt 1993: 164-165). 
Perhaps Bristol provides that test case. Furthermore, the technologies associated with 
extending control over the medical profession, such as audit and effectiveness criteria, 
are essentially technologies of priority setting. The use of 'evidence based medicine' 
effectively has two related purposes; to control medical professionals and provide a 
technical/scientific rationale for setting priorities. The technologies of priority-setting 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
The economic discourse of health priorities 
Introduction 
The decisions made by medical professionals continue to play a pivotal role in 
determining health care priorities. However, in the last two decades the question of 
setting priorities for health care spending has become an increasingly contentious issue 
in the political regulation of all state financed health care systems. Inevitably the 
debate revolves around the use of the 'R-word' - rationing. It is the purpose of this 
chapter to set out some of the key concepts within this rationing/priority-setting 
debate. However, a case will be made for placing the debate within a governmentality 
framework. The consequence of the shift in the articulation of governance from 
welfare liberalism to neo-liberalism is that rationales based on economic calculation 
come to the fore. The concept of priority-setting and rationing are part of this shift in 
the formula of governance. It re-codes and re-problematise the difficulty task for health 
care systems of matching health needs with the provision of health care so as to make 
it amenable to an economics discourse. This re-coding entails reinterpreting the 
provision of health care services histo , rically as a form of implicit rationing. The new 
health economics discourse, in contrast, presents a form of explicit rationing as a 
reasoned response to the contemporary problem of maximising the benefits of health 
care for the whole population given limited resources. 
To develop this argument there will be a brief discussion of the economics of health 
care and the related concepts of implicit and explicit rationing. The example of the 
Oregon Health Plan is used as an illustration of the problems and technologies 
associated with rules-based rationing. These technologies are further discussed in 
terms of their ffinction and limitations as part of the rationing/priority-setting debate, 
especially the way in which they construct the subject of the health economics 
discourse. Finally, a critique will be presented of neo-liberal economics using the work 
of the American sociologist Mark Granovetter and his concept of the embeddedness of 
economic action in social relations. The additional benefit in discussing this work is 
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that it provides a key element missing from governmentality analysis. The concept of 
extra-discursive networks of social relations introduces a mechanism which allows the 
inclusion of contingent factors that modify the totalising discourses described by 
governmentality analysis. Granovetter's work also presents a critique of the totalising 
nature of economic models of behaviour when used as the basis for explaining all social 
behaviour (Becker 1976; Williamson 1975), both in terms of providing a 'rational' and 
moral basis for priori ty-setting agendas and the development of the institution in which 
these agendas are operationalised. 
The economics of health care 
It is held almost as an axiomatic principle that in the NHS demand for health care will 
outstrip supply many times over. It is almost as equally widely held 'that the 
distribution of health care should not be left to the market... market allocation has 
been described as socially inefficient, as damaging the doctor/patient relationship and 
reducing the scope for altruistic behaviour. ' (Le Grand 1982: 23). The special nature 
of health care - with its monopolies, uncertainties, asymmetries of knowledge etc. - 
differentiates it from most consumer goods and services. As a result of this it is 
generally accepted that the supply of health care will not be brought into any 
semblance of equilibrium in a 'free market' mediated by price signals. Price, in these 
circumstances, does not carry sufficient information necessary for the consumer to 
estimate any increase in welfare through consumption. Therefore, supply and demand 
become defined in terms of 'need' rather than 'wants' and 'desires'. This is not merely 
a question of semantics. An individual denied access to a common consumer good may 
feel that they have been denied a fundamental right of ownership or consumption, but 
the rest of society may not agree. As Leonard Fleck points out, 'health care services 
are not simply. commodities in the market, like VCRs, that can befitstifiably distributed 
according to ability-to pay' (Fleck 1994: 368; emphasis added ). This is not to deny 
that distribution in the case of VCRs is innately fair, or that the market mechanism may 
indeed be mystifying some deep structural inequalities, but in market oriented 
economies this mechanism for allocating resources is at best seen as socially neutral. 
Consequently, if the provision of health care services is not based on a market price 
mechanism, the outcome is that any allocation of health resources is no longer value- 
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free. In essence, one is left with the profound problem that while ftee markets 
callocate' resources other forms of distribution imply rationing or priority-setting ltý I 
Whether done implicitly or explicitly, rationing will always involve some form of value 
judgement. Acting rationally in an economic sense implies However, unlike the 
justifiable resource allocation in the free market as outlined by Fleck, it has been 
argued that there is no analogous theory offitst rationing (Daniels 1993), 
In the context of 'market failure' and the absence of a 'just' method of resource 
allocation, the provision of health care becomes a 'fundamentally moral or political 
problem, and only secondarily economic or organisational problem' (Fleck 1994: 386). 
Because the 'invisible hand' of the market does not operate in this instance, rationing 
(or priority-setting), has to be seen as reflecting ethical/moral values. The value 
judgements assigned to the various states of health that individuals and groups use to 
legitimise rationing decisions are inextricably linked with the conceptual models used 
to operationalise 'health'. As a result, policy decisions informed by specific sets of 
value judgements and their contingent health models, may result in quite different 
courses of action. Therefore, it is instructive to go back to the concepts of 'rationing' 
and 'priority-setting' and attempt to unpack them to see if they can clarify the 
situation, so it becomes evident whose values dominate and in which circumstances. As 
Klein et al. (1996) suggest: I 
... the use of the word rationing should 
itself be strictly rationed. It 
should be reserved to describe the process by which resources are 
allocated to individuals at the point of service or programme delivery, 
while 'priority-setting' should be used to describe the process of 
determining budgets, and their distribution, which constrains the 
decisions about who gets what. Semantic pedantry will, in this case, 
help to clarify the argument (Klein et al. 1996: 7). 
This way of framing the rationing/priority-setting debate differentiates between macro 
and micro levels of analysis. Rationing occurs at the micro level when actual decisions 
are made on the use of resources as they relate to particular individuals. By their nature 
these decisions will involve input from medical professionals and, to some extent, are 
dependent on notions of autonomy of action and the proper use of technical expertise 
discussed in Chapter 4. At the other extreme, priority-setting occurs at the macro level 
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with the setting of global budgets for health care by the authority of governments. Two 
points can be made here. The first is that in health care systems where, unlike the NHS, 
funding is not solely dependent upon taxation revenues collected by central 
government, control over setting the level of the health care budget becomes blurred as 
disparate agencies define their own priorities. The second relevant point is that a great 
deal of spending by government other than on the organised health care system also 
has an impact on population 'health. The work of McKeown (1976) mentioned in the 
previous chapter emphasises this point, that the determinants of 'good health' are as 
much to be found in the provision of an efficient sanitation system and clean water as 
in direct medical intervention. 
In addition to the above, one aspect of the rationing/priority-setting debate which has 
not yet been touched upon is the analysis of priority-setting at the ineso level. This is 
the level at which health care managers (as purchasers) are the main actors. In health 
care systems such as the NHS where budgets are fixed by central government, it is at 
this meso level that a further refinement of health priority-setting takes place. The 
global funding is subdivided, by whatever means, so as to meet micro rationing 
decisions. However, the key to understanding the processes that take place at this 
meso level of priority-setting again relies on another invocation of 'semantic pedantry' 
to clarify the situation. In this instance, it is in making the distinction between 
'managing' and 'administrating'. As outlined in the previous chapter, the role of the 
NHS manager through most of their pre-Griffiths existence was to offer administrative 
support for the activities of those that play the 'primary part' in preventing, diagnosing 
and treating disease, ie medical professions, and not to be active in setting and 
managing the priority agenda (DHSS 1972; 1979). 
However, in this formulation of management responsibility there is an implicit 
understanding that the expected direction of influence - macro and meso decisions 
defining the boundaries of micro rationing possibilities - is reversed. In effect, the 
aggregate of micro rationing decisions defines meso level priority-setting, which is in 
turn administered by health service managers. Without a strategic health management 
structure to act as a buffer, this process leaves central government open to direct 
pressure from medical practitioners for more funding. This is usually achieved by 
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highlighting the perceived failings of various parts of the health system to meet patient 
needs - so called 'shroud waving'. As Klein et al. (1996) point out, 'if health care 
professionals succeed in convincing the public that the NHS is on the point of collapse 
because of inadequate funding - as they have attempted to do roughly every three years 
throughout the NHSs existence - governments are apt to turn generous, particularly 
when an election is looming' (Klein et al. 1996: 98). 
Whether these demands are met or withstood is not the substantive point to be made. 
The more significant aspect of this process is the symbolic language in which this 
particular rationing/priority-setting debate takes place. It tends to be emotional, 
confrontational and highly political, and importantly is not about rationing itself but 
about the size and adequacy of global budgets for the health care system. The problem 
for governments is that this politicisation of the priorities debate cannot go on 
indefinitely. There are pressures on spending from exogenous variable such as ageing 
populations and the inflationary health care costs associated with use of high 
technology medicine. Adding to this is the evolutionary process in health care that 
means that some therapies and medical interventions once considered experimental and 
uncertain become, in time, 'taken-for-granted' and commonplace forms of treatment. 
Often they cease to be 'health" concerns and become a part of environmental or social 
policy, as in the case of providing an efficient sewage system or water supply. The 
result is that 'each time government steps toward the target of 'health' the thing 
escapes over the horizon, leaving behind only technical problems and arguments over 
resources' (Osbome 1997: 180). 
The reform process in the NHS initiated by the Thatcher government in the 1980s, can 
be seen as an attempt to address the problem of limited resources and unlimited 
demand and the political difficulties tl-iis causes governments. However, from the 
cgovemmentality' perspective, it is more cogent to view the rationing debate as a 
consequence of a shift in the in the articulation of liberal forms of governance from a 
welfare liberal formula to that of a neo-liberal form of governance. This is not to say 
that pressures on public spending as the post-war boom ground to a halt, and the 
increasing political fallout from trying to control health care cost in the NES, were not 
significant factors in the shift to a neo-liberal form of governance. But what is 
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interesting is the way in which the discourse of economic 'crisis' in the early and mid- 
1970s coincideswith a re-problematisation and re-coding of resource allocation for 
health care so that the concept of rationing emerges as central to the academic debate 
on providing health care for the population (see Klein et al. 1996). This emergent 'neo- 
liberal' articulation of governance, with its emphasis on the primacy of the 'market' in 
the political economy, generated new forms of concomitant expertise within the 
academic debate about the efficient use of resources. One such emergent form of 
expertise is that of the health economists. As Nettleton (1995) observes: 
Since the late 1970s the health system has witnessed the emergence of a 
new occupation group - the health economists. Prior to this time such a 
professional community did not exist, but with the escalation of health 
care expenditure, the emphasis on efficiency and a recognition by 
governments that health professionals should be encouraged to monitor 
their own performance in terms of the economic consequences of their 
behaviour, the time was ripe for their entry onto the stage of health care 
(Nettleton 1995: 222). 
The idea of 'rationing' and the rise of health economics are thus essentially two aspects 
of the same (rational economics) discourse. The very concept of rationing is economic 
in origin. The ideas of allocative efficiency, of market failure in the provision of health 
care and the ethical problems of distribution of health care resources all stem from the 
problematisation of health care as an economics discourse. One of the most important 
points to be made about economic analysis is that the counterfactual argument is often 
invoked. In economics this usually entails stripping away inconvenient 'social factors' 
so as to uncover the structures that would obtain if an idealised, totally free market 
were possible. The problem of market failure makes this difficult health care systems. 
However, the basic understanding that follows from this use of the counterfactual is 
that if no market exists then the allocation of resources will, almost certainly, be 
allocatively inefficient. That is not to say that the system may be productively 
inefficient. One could imagine a factory somewhere that was a paragon of efficient 
organisation yet produced unusable articles. However, in a market environment this 
factory would quickly disappear - if it could get started in the first place. But in 
situations of command economy, as in the former Soviet Union, state sponsorship or 
political expediency could allow the factory to remain open indefinitely. This analogy is 
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directly relevant to the N-HS. It too has historically been characterised by its command 
economy structure. Therefore, one could speculate that even if it was productively 
efficient it is unlikely that the priorities it embodied would meet the real needs of the 
population. The use of the counterfactual does not lead to suggestions that market 
failure can be overcome and an ideal solution can be achieved where rationing becomes 
transformed into 'neutral' allocation. What it does indicate is that any reform process 
that moves the health care system towards this economic nirvana will not only meet the 
needs of the populations more efficiently but that the reforms are also morally 
justifiable. The problem with this rationale is that in giving a basis for altering the 
status quo - the system dominated by medical professionals - it also creates the danger 
that the formerly implicit forms of rationing that distanced the government from 
making hard choices become explicit and thus become directly associated with macro 
and meso level priority-setting. Far from being value 'neutral' and apolitical, the 
process of making priority decisions becomes intensely political and unstable. 
Strategies for rationing health care 
By definition, rationing and priority-setting are inevitable in all health care systems. If 
there is no free market in health care then there has to be rationing and priority-setting. 
However, there are voices in the in the priority-setting debate which suggest that 
rationing/priority-setting is avoidable given enough resources or more effective or 
efficient use of the money already provided for health care. As Roberts et a]. (1995) 
argue, 'those who passively accept that 'rationing is inevitable' have not thought it 
through... The main obstacles to change... are the workforce's cultural resistance and 
vested interests, weak management, and frequent political interference. These obstacles 
must all be tack-led, Until then rationing health care is unjustifiable' (Roberts et al. 
1995: 15). Such comments have variously been dismissed as 'nalve, misleading and 
manifestly incorrect' (Zimmern 1995: 19) or a "glib prescription' (Paton 1996: 36). 
However, rather than misrepresenting the situation, Roberts et al. appear to be basing 
their argument on a different conceptualisation of rationing - that rationing means 
e. xplicit rationing - hence the confusion. That rationing/priority-setting has always been 
a part of the NES, is again a statement of fact, not argument. The problem for Roberts 
et al. is that they are not engaging in an econonfic debate about rationing, nor do they 
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acknowledge that historically rationing has always been part of providing health care in I 
the NHS, but that it is done implicitly not explicitly. This tension between implicit and 
explicit forms of rationing is central to the political debate about priority-setting and 
therefore, needs to be explored in more depth. 
To illustrate the differences between implicit and explicit rationing, and who makes 
rationing/priority-setting decisions, one can turn to the series of rationing strategies 
outlined by Klein et al. (1996: 11-12). Building on the "vork of Parker (1975), Klein et 
al. distinguish between seven forms of rationing strategy: 
Rationing by denial. Whereby individuals are refused treatment because resources are 
limited or they do not fulfil the predetermined criteria of eligibility. 
Rationing by selection. This occurs when certain individuals are selected for 
treatment because it is assessed that they are more likely to benefit from the treatment 
than other individuals. 
Rationing by deflection. In this forrn of rationing health 'needs' are re-coded as best 
suited to intervention from non-health care agencies. For example, care of the elderly 
becomes the remit of Social Services not the health care system. 
Rationing by deterrence. This includes a range of strategies that substitute outright 
denial of services with the erection of barriers to access. These include Iii-niting 
information about available treatments, making the selection process onerous and time 
consuming or that the patient has to convince a 'gatekeeper' that treatment is 
justifiable. 
Rationing by delay. To act as a buffer and control demand, waiting list are used or a 
lengthy process has to be gone through in order to secure treatment. In these 
circumstance, the individual client can be offered the services they need but only when 
resources become available 
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Rationing by dilution. This form of rationing functions by offering a range of services 
to which all have access, but the quality of the service may be compromised by limited 
resources allocation, which results in fewer tests being performed or less rigorous 
examinations undertaken and so on. 
Rationing by termination. The remaining option if all else has failed is simply not to 
offer the client the treatment or services on the grounds that it would not be effective 
in their circumstances or that all possible alternatives have been exhausted and there is 
no more to offer. 
One form of rationing not described in the above list is rationing by price, where the 
individual simply cannot afford the cost of treatment or the cost of health insurance. 
This is more relevant to the discussion in a later section of the chapter dealing with 
health reforms in Oregon, USA. However, it is relevant to this discussion of rationing 
strategies in that the absence of rationing by price indicates that the above list is more 
appropriate to understanding rationing policy in state controlled, or sponsored, health 
care systems. Taking the NHS as an example of such a system, it is evident that many 
of these strategies are employed in the health services as a means of controlling 
demand. Of these, the most prominent - rationing by deflection, deterrence, delay and 
dilution - can be categorised as implicit form of rationing. The tendency is for such 
rationing decisions to be made at the micro level, by clinicians, and be partially 
obscured by the confidential doctor/patient relationship. The concept of implicit 
rationing and the role of clinicians will be examined in the next section. 
The case for implicit rationing 
As noted earlier with reference to Roberts et al. (1995), rejection of explicit rationing 
policy often reflects a failure to recognise that health care provided by the NHS has 
always been implicitly rationed and that as a result of the dominant position of medical 
professionals in the NHS, that the main agents of rationing are the clinicians 
themselves. The role of GPs as 'gatekeepers' to secondary care, clinical autonomy and 
waiting lists combine together to become the main mechanism of rationing in the NES 
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(Harrison 1995). As Harrison points out, 'clinical freedom' allows clinicians to 
creclassify some patient demands as 'needs' whilst (often subtly) rejecting others- it 
seems likely that clinicians alter their perception of 'need' in the light of available 
resources, though they do not always recognise that they are so doing, or think of it as 
rationing if they do recognise it' (Harrison 1995: 886). Therefore, it gives the 
appearance that rationing is not taking place. However, the reality from an economics 
perspective is of a rationing process that is implicit, unsystematic, ad hoc and probably 
conditioned by unconscious biases. As Mechanic (1995) observes, 'implicit rationing is 
seen to suffer from the discretion it gives doctors who may act on personal preferences 
or ignorance of medical advances. Social judgements are readily confused with 
subjective judgements of medical necessity and preferences creep in unconsciously, 
reflecting class, sex, and other social biases' (Mechanic 1995: 1657). 
However, as Mechanic argues, the alternatives to implicit rationing - rules based 
explicit rationing - are far from perfect. The reliance on the use of counterfactual 
arguments gives rise to the 'illusion that optimisation is possible' (ibid.: 1659). 
Echoing this, the classic formulation of the 'tragic choice' by Calabresi and Bobbit 
(1978) also posits that rationing is not conducive to unemotional analysis, ie rational 
analysis. This is especially true when lives are at risk, particularly when known 
individuals are at risk, such as the Child B case in the UK. The Child B case concerned 
a young leukaemia sufferer - Jaymee Bowen - whose father unsuccessfully took the 
Cambridgeshire Health Authority to courtto force them to fund further treatment that 
was denied on the grounds that it would be of limited effectiveness and detrimental to 
her quality of life (see Price 1996). The resonance of this case was amplified by seeing 
her as an individual who was suffering, and as Hadorn argues, it feels immoral to 
'stand idly by when an identified person's life is visibly threatened if effective rescue 
measures are available' (Hadorn 1991: 2219). This 'rule of rescue' appears to be a 
natural human instinct. The urge to rescue trapped mountaineers or astronauts 
stranded in space feels natural, even when directed at non-humans, such as stranded 
whales. Many of these interventions are extremely expensive and often futile, but very 
rarely is the cost of these actions questioned. However, when this 'rule of rescue' is 
applied to health care with its limited resources, these questions arise all the time. 
Allocating resources to treat some individuals implies that their lives, or quality of life, 
107 
has a higher value for society than for other individuals. Explicit rationing exposes this 
value judgement. Calabresi and Bobbit argue that implicit forms of rationing have a 
social virtue over explicit forms of rationing in that 'evasion, disguising, temporising, 
deception are all ways by which artfully chosen allocation methods can avoid the 
appearance of failing to reconcile values in conflict' (Calabresi and Bobbit 1978: 22). 
As Hall (1994) states: 
Bringing rationing decisions into the full light of public deliberation will 
only heighten their tragic nature and thus disable us from making them 
or inflict greater social grief in the process. The more forthright method 
may not be the more socially desirable one (Hall 1994: 325). 
The notion that explicit rationing is socially corrosive is particularly relevant to health 
care systems that reflect a form of social solidarity, such as the NES, which are funded 
by social insurance and privilege equality of need as the principle of allocation. Unlike 
private insurance arrangements, the NHS does not guarantee treatment, it aspires to 
provide appropriate treatment given adequate resources. Explicit rationing threatens to 
undermine this convenient fiction of equitable treatment. It removes legitimacy from 
the system of health care provision, and in uncovering the rationing mechanism, it 
threatens the relationship of trust between the patient and doctor. That relationship is 
based on the tacit agreement that the doctor has the best interests of the individual 
patient at heart and is not preoccupied with how funds are allocated (see Mechanic 
1995). If explicit rationing is to work it must incorporate new mechanisms for re- 
establishing trust, between the patient and the medical professional and with the system 
as a whole. To judge whether this is possible we must see rules based rationing in 
practice. Conveniently, the 'Oregon experiment' provides such an opportunity. 
Explicit rationing and the Oregon Health Plan 
The state of Oregon in the USA has been the focus of world-wide attention for its bold 
use of explicit rationing methodologies in setting health care priorities (see Buist 1992; 
Honigsbaum 1991). However, before going into detail about the Oregon programme it 
is relevant to point out the different context the US provides in terms of a health care 
systems. In the US there are three forms of health cover: private insurance, financed 
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by the individual, usually accompanied by employer contributions; the Medicare 
system, which is federally funded and is open to those 65 and over; and finally there is 
the Medicaid system, a state funded health care entitlement for those citizens that fall 
below a specified income and fit into other specified categories, such as families with 
dependent children or the disabled (see Kitzhaber 1993: 374). Unfortunately, many US 
citizens do not qualify under any of these schemes. This group may account for 15% of 
the population, some 37 million, many of whom have very low incomes. This is not 
counting those that are inadequately insured to meet foreseeable health needs (Buist 
1992; Goldberg 1994). Additionally, Medicaid, being a state funded system, has in 
most states been targeted to meet the financial pressure to cut the cost of state 
government. The result is that the cut-off income for eligibility for Medicaid in all 
states has decreased in recent years. In Oregon in 1989, just before the enactment of 
the Health Plan, the cut-off was 58% of federally-established poverty level (FPL), this 
placed the state just below the national average (Dixon 199 1). The ambitious objective 
of the Oregon Health Plan was to meet this challenge of limited health care to 'assure 
every Oregonian access to health care coverage' (Paige Sipes-Metzler, Director of the 
Oregon Health Services Commission 1994). The principal aim of the Health Plan is to 
achieve these ends not by increasing funding but by introducing a robust methodology 
of rationing that would allow existing resources to provide a 'basic health package' for 
all those without insurance and which would act as a baseline for those with private 
insurance. Therefore, together with Medicare provision for the 65s and over, 
practically all citizens could have some kind, of health care coverage. In part, the 
Health Plan can be viewed as the consequence of failed attempts to ration in the past. 
In 1987, it was decided by the state Senate, under the direction of the then Senate 
President, John Kitzhaber, to prioritise Medicaid resources to alleviate the state's high 
infant mortality rates. As a consequence, it was decided to stop state funding of most 
forms of transplant surgery. Unfortunately, a seven year old boy, Coby Howard, fell 
foul of this little noticed rulin,,, and subsequently died due to the lack of funding for a 
bone marrow transplant. The case, like that of Child B in the UK, became a high 
profile cause cilibre. However, rather than abandoning attempts at targeting the 
Medicaid budget, the political response was to formulate the Health Plan. 
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The basis of the Health Plan was the appointment of a Health Services Commission 
made up of a diverse, non-political group of individuals who were given the remit to 
oversee the process of devising a methodology to decide health care priorities in the 
state in a manner that would be clear and open to public scrutiny. Their initial action 
was to draw up list of health conditions using a recognised international classifications 
of diseases and their treatment in order to form a series of condition/treatment pairs. It 
was then decided by the Commission to rank the condition/treatment pairs using a 
Quality of Well-Being (QVM) scale of the type developed by Robert Kaplan. The scale 
gives weight to post-treatment quality of life in the form of a single index number. The 
condition/treatment pairs were sifted and ranked after consultation with local interest 
groups at open public meetings and the final list costed by an actuary. The generation 
of several notable anomalies in the ranking list of conditions and their treatments 
provided an early problem for the Oregon methodologgy. The Oregon commission had 
to revise their prioritisation criteria several times to eliminate the more egregious 
priority rankings - treatments for thumb sucking above life-saving appendectomies for 
example. Ironically, the initial lists included a very low ranking for many types of bone 
marrow transplant, so low they would almost certainly have been excluded from 
funding without the revision process (Hadorn 1991; Buist 1992). Eventually a final 
costed and ranked list was produced. Inevitably there had to be a cut-off point below 
which some treatments could not be allocated funding from the global budget. The cut- 
off point in 1991 was 587 in a list of 709. Using the Klein categorisation outlined 
earlier, the Oregon Health Plan coulq be characterised as 'rationing by denial'. Anyone 
needing treatment for a condition lower than 587h would not be allocated funding. 
This was made clear from the explicit nature of the rationing process which clinicians 
had to follow in order to claim state funds. 
One of the most problematic aspects of rules based rationing is the impact a 
methodology based on aggregate measures, such as the QWB, has on the decision 
making process when it is applied to individuals. The situation could easily occur 
where a particular patient needing treatment for a condition not on the funding list 
would derive greater individual benefit from consumption of that treatment than 
another individual would from receiving treatment for a condition on the list. However, 
neatly ranked lists of conditions and treatments are never so tightly drawn as to 
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preclude some degree of interpretation by medical professionals. As Hall (1994) points 
out, 'physicians are notorious for their ability to rationalise non-compliance with 
authority that contravenes their clinical judgement' (Hall 1994: 326). It is more that 
likely that clinicians will re-categorise their patients as falling within funded disease 
categories so as to ensure treatment that otherwise would not have been funded. 
Despite this ability by clinicians to 'work the system' and mitigate against the more 
unacceptable anomalies, many argue that all 'rules-based' rationing processes are 
fatally flawed. As Mechanic (1992) asserts: 
[Centralised rule-making] is too distant from the realistic contingencies 
of disease, the complexity of co-morbidity , and the 
diversity of 
personal and family situations, to extend to specific clinical decisions 
under the conditions of uncertainty that characterise much of medical 
care. In a large and culturally heterogeneous society it is especially 
difficult to anticipate varying needs, expectations and tastes of patients 
and their families (Mechanic 1992: 172 1). 
Even if, as in Oregon, the priority-setting methodology does include a great deal of 
public consultation reflecting the diversity of the state's population and value systems, 
is this the same as saying that a democratic procedure legitimises the moral constraints 
involved in rationing? It could be argued that Oregon's experiment in explicit 
rationing, and the limits placed on individual choice by the values of the majority, are a 
price worth paying to improve health care cover for the large proportion of the 
population of the state, and the US in general, that are either underinsured or have no 
insurance at all. The US health care system in general has not shared the NES's 
aspirations of equity and comprehensiveness, nor would one expect these collectivist 
ideals to flourish within a political and economic system which historically put its 
emphasis on the liberty of the individual. In this light a redistribution of health care 
resources through explicit rationing is a practical methodology that has a chance of 
reaching some kind democratic acceptance - not because it is philosophically just or 
equitable - but that in the American tradition it can be seen to be 'rational'. One of the 
defining features of the Oregon experiment was the use of a 'rational' technology of 
priority-setting in the form of the Quality of Well-Being (QWB) scale. The next section 
explores some of these new technologies of priority-setting and the 'rational' 
economics discourse in which they are situated. 
III 
Rationing and the use of cost-utility analysis 
It is the function of all health care systems to maximise the 'health' of their populations 
given the resources available. If a 'free' market in health care was possible then the 
price would provide all the information necessary for the consumer to trade off costs 
against increased welfare that would accrue to the individual through consumption of 
health services. This is the premise of cost-benefit analysis that forms the basis of 
most economic theory. However, because of market failure in health care this form of 
analysis is not available. It is simply not possible for the patient, or their advisors, to 
equate particular states of health and quality of life in monetary terms. Nevertheless, in 
recent years there has been a proliferation of measures aimed at evaluating health 
status in non-monetary terms. Three types are discernible. The first group are disease- 
specific measures, such as Kurtzke's scale for Multiple Sclerosis. These measures have 
their origins as tools primarily for use by clinicians and tend to embody a narrow 
medical perspective when measuring quality of life experienced by the patient. Another 
group of measures are the generic, multi-dimensional instruments, like the Nottingham 
Health Profile and the SF-36 questionnaire which measure social functioning and 
mental health as well as physical well being. Because of their generic nature they can 
be used to gauge health status across a range of conditions. As a consequence, they do 
have their economic uses. As with disease specific measures, generic instruments can 
be used to perform cost-effectiveness analysis when comparing different treatments 
for the same condition. 
However, despite the value of this procedure in ranking effectiveness of treatments for 
a particular condition (for example drug therapies instead of an operation), they cannot 
be used to compare the costs associated with treating different conditions. What is 
needed is a single measure that incorporates effectiveness and quality of life in a single 
score that can then be costed and compared across conditions. One of the key features 
of the Oregon health plan was the use of a quality of well-being index (QWB) - 
although cost comparisons were not used in Oregon. A similar measure that has been 
widely discussed in the UK is the quality adjusted life year or QALY (see Williams 
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1985; Gudex 1986; Robinson 1993). The potential for costed QALYs is that it can 
replicate some of the characteristics of market cost-benefit analysis in the form of cost- 
utility analysis. As such, it appears the ideal instrument for use as part of a rationing 
and priority-setting- debate. However, because it is a proxy measure of the benefits 
derived from the consumption of health services, its use is problematical, involving 
many methodological and ethical dilemmas. 
The QALY consists of two parts - one supposedly objective, the other highly 
subjective. The objective part relies on the 'science' of medicine, the technical study of 
treatment and average expected outcomes in physical terms. This leads to two sets of 
difficulties. The problem with the objective measure of health outcomes, as highlighted 
by the discussion of audit in Chapter 4, is that the science of medicine has increasingly 
been regarded as deficient by independent commentators. As Maynard and Sheldon 
have pointed out, 'many therapies in every day use in all health care systems have no 
scientific basis' (Maynard and Sheldon 1995: 7). The additionally difficulty is that even 
when evidence is available the standard of research is often poor. As the editor of the 
British Medical Journal (BMJ), Richard Smith, recently remarked, in his opinion only 
5% of published articles achieved minimum scientific standards, and 'in most journals 
it's less than I per cent' (Smith 1998). In part, this questioning of the scientific basis of 
medical practice reflects governmental edicts for 'evidence based medicine' (EBM). At 4D 
present the standard of scientific research in medicine may be questionable, but at least 
there is a prospect that more rigorous research is possible. Moreover, EBM raises 
questions not only of effectiveness but how that effectiveness is measured - in terms of 
clinical measures or 'patient centred' quality of life. As such, it can seen, along with 
audit, as an integral part of the rationing/priority-setting debate into effective use of 
limited resources (and as part of a new articulation of health care governance). 
Assuming that the scientific basis of medical practice can be demonstrated, and that is 
still open to debate, it still leaves open the question of comparing the effects of 
treatments across a range of conditions. Like the quality of well-being index, the post- 
treatment outcomes need to be given a quality of life weighting, and in the case of the 
QALY this done using the Rosser index (see Rosser et al. 1982). The Rosser index 
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involves producing a matrix of weighting scores derived from measuring the values a 
sample of the population places on quality of life. The matrix is constructed using two 
dimensions - disability and distress. The disability categories range from 'no disability' 
to 'unconscious', the distress categories from 'no distress' to 'severe' distress. The 
values in the matrix have a range I (no disability and no distress), to 0 which equates 
to death. (Interestingly, as an aside, in the Rosser et al. (1982) study there are two 
health stateswith negative scores, 'confined to bed and in severe distress' and 
'unconscious', presumably in a permanent vegetative state. This implies a health status 
'worse than death'). Using the research evidence of expected post-treatment health 
status, the weighting can then be employed to produce a quality adjusted life year 
score for treatment using a pre-determined time scale to judge effectiveness. So if for 
condition A, treatment X produces 3 QALYs and treatment Y produces 2 QALYs, 
then it appears treatment X should be recommended. However, what if treatment X is 
three times more expensive than Y? In these circumstances the cost per QALY of X is 
twice that of Y, so it follows that Y should be purchased. The logical extension of this 
analysis is then to compare the cost per QALY for condition A against other 
conditions. If the marginal cost per QALY for treatment Y is less than for other 
alternative uses of this money, then Y should be purchased. This inevitably leads to the 
creation of 'league tables' of marginal cost per QALY rankings (see Maynard 1991). 
However, there are technical and ethical problems associated with the use of 'league 
tables' that have to be addressed if they are to be part of an explicit rationing/priority- 
setting decision making process. 
Firstly, QALYs can only be commensurate if they are created within a shared tightly 
defined methodology. They must cover the same time period, even refer to the same 
country, they must share the same quality matrix and share a host of other technical 
details - discounting, cost calculations, baselines etc. (see Mason et al. 1993; 
Drummond et al. 1993). Thus the calculation of the QALY becomes a highly technical 
enterprise fraught with problems. Even so the temptation is still to collect QALY 
studies and arrange them in 'league tables', gloss over their differences, and use these 
as a basis for decision making. Again, an additional difficulty with aggregate measures 
is the recurrent problem of moving from the general to the particular, from the abstract 
to the concrete. If the QALY is to use the best available evidence, it must be calculated 
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using national, or international data. Therefore, the cost per QALY calculus will be 
subtly influenced by local factors - differences in local medical expertise, variation of 
approach within treatment areas, availability of specialist equipment and staffing levels, 
even variations in local pay rates would alter QALY calculations. However the ability 
to recalculate QALYs to suit local circumstances is beyond the expertise, available 
time or resources of local purchasers. QALYs can only be seen as one aspect of the 
technical exercise of purchasing. In the absence of simple unproblematic yardsticks to 
judge such rationing decisions, a dialogue of technocrats may evolve - excluding the 
public from the debate. 
Aside from the methodological problems, there are additional difficulties associated 
with the values incorporated into the initial quality of life weighting index. As one 
would expect, the subjective measure of 'quality of life' used to weight expected 
outcomes will include a degree of variation between individuals' assignment of social 
value to different levels of pain and disability. However, even if the variation is within 
'acceptable' statistical limits, including population differences - between professional 
and Jay values for example - the quality of life weighting still remains an aggregate 
measure. In fact both aspects of the QALY - the objective and the subjective - are 
aggregates because they reflect collective studies and collective values respectively. 
Furthermore, as demonstrated in the Oregon example earlier, it is in the nature of 
aggregate measures to produce paradoxical results when applied to individuals. Two 
individuals undergoing the same treatment with similar expected outcomes may rate 
their own post-treatment (and pre-treatment) quality of life completely differently and 
therefore their individual QALY scores would also be different. However, it simply is 
not practical to even attempt to compute QALY scores for every individual, and even 
if one did there is no guarantee that they would be consistent over comparatively short 
periods of time. So it can be argued that the use in priority decision making of the 
QALY (or other 'quality of life' measures) emphasises efficiency over equity - 
furthering the interests of collective average welfare over individual welfare. 
Additionally, the use of QALYs introduces a bias against those with limited life 
expectancy who can generate only a limited number of QALYs. Thus the QALY 
measure actively discriminates against the elderly. This raises another problem, the 
difficulty of trading off quality of life against life itself As Harris (1988) states: 
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Most people think, and for good as well as prudent reasons, that life 
saving has priority over life enhancement and that we should first 
allocate resources to those areas where they are immediately needed to 
save life; only when this is done should the remainder be allocated to 
alleviating non-fatal conditions (Harris 1988; quoted in Klein et al. 
1996: 33). 
Again, we see the 'rescue' principle being re-asserted to obstruct 'rational' decision 
making. This highlights another problem of using an economics-based counterfactual 
argument to aid the priority-setting process. As Hardin (1980) asserts, 'professing a 
petty faith in counterfactual conditionals... such as a 'heroic' answer must be found, 
implies that there is a 'heroic' and painlessly acceptable answer' (Hardin 1980: 61-62). 
The basis of the QALY argument is that the QALY is acceptable because it 
approximates to those counterfactual conditions that would apply if a market existed. 
However, even if one accepts the logic of the argument, it carries no moral weight. 
Just because something has a low cost per QALY ratio does not mean it is more 
acceptable that a treatment with a higher ratio. For example, an individual undergoing 
gender reassignment may experience an enhanced quality of life post-treatment that 
yields a low cost per QALY ratio, but this does not stop many people from voicing 
their opinions that this is an inappropriate use of NHS resources. The opposite of this 
also applies when a QALY analysis is used for therapies which many do not regard as a 
legitimate 'health' need, IVF treatment is a prime example. For many health care 
purchasers IVF is a problem area (Redmayne and Klein 1993). Many health authorities 
do not consider it a health need that merits funding. Yet it is a moot point whether this 
reflects the opinion of the general public. In the absence of such information, the 
QALY on its own is not a sufficient basis to make priority decisions. The calculation of 
QALYs for IVF is itself difficult, spreading the calculation across all the individuals or 
couples, and taking into consideration the number of expensive cycles of treatment 
typical needed, the QALY yield might be quite small. But if one factors in the number 
of QALYs a new life would generate the end result could be quite high. Overall, the 
use of QALY is complex and fraught with difficulties. In certain circumstances their 
use may be beneficial as a heuristic device. However, QALYs can never absolve the 
purchasing authority from making difficult choices about allocating resources to meet 
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local health needs. The assessment of health needs is fundamental in that it is the basis 
of priority decision making. The concept of health needs assessment is discussed in the 
next section. 
Assessing Health Needs 
One of the defining characteristics of the NHS as a health care system is its command 
economy structure. Within command economies there is a tendency to confuse the 
roles of supply and demand. In the economic analysis of market exchange the filriction 
of supply and demand remain separate. In many ways the 1990s the NHS quasi-market 
reforms echo this in the separation of purchasing health care - the demand function - 
from providing health care - the supply function. However, in reality this demarcation 
of roles is not as easy to maintain. To illustrate this one can turn to Klein et al., who in 
evidence to the Health Select Committee (26 May 1994), outline four elements the 
ideal purchasing model should contain: 
The purchaser has to develop a currency of evaluation for assessing both 
existing commitments and new claims on resources: the criteria to be used 
when deciding on how to determine priorities among competing claims and 
allocate resources. 
2. The purchaser has to draw up an inventory of existing service provision: that is, 
there has to be a benchmark picture of what the authority's money is currently 
buying and for whom. 
3. The purchaser has to assemble the evidence about unmet needs or frustrated 
demands: to establish in what respects, and to what extent, existing provision 
falls short of what should be available to the public. 
4. The purchaser has to compare the competing claims on resources according to 
the criteria already developed in order to determine spending priorities. 
Crucially, if benefits (however measured) are to be maximised, existing 
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commitments must be treated exactly like new candidates for spending in this 
exercise. 
The first and fourth points, a call to develop a currency of evaluation and to compare 
claims on resources, appear tailor-made for the QALY or its equivalent. The second 
point about benchmarking is relevant for a health authority charged with providing the 
best possible health care for its population. If this means changing the distribution of 
resources then it is best to know how these resources are presently arranged. And 
finally, the third point makes clear that the purchaser must devise a way to describe the 
demand for health care in the local population. Taking all four points together, it is 
clear that the role of the purchaser is not simply to respond to demand, but also to 
construct demand by some means and then manage supply using cost and quality 
measures so that they roughly match. As with the discussion of the construction of the 
QALY as a measure of utility, the methodology employed in this process is all- 
important. Constructing the means of understanding supply and demand, is essentially 
the same as constructing a discourse in which 'health' becomes meaningful, which in 
turn constructs individuals subject to that 'health' discourse 
Since the introduction of the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act, District Health 
Authorities have been given the statutory duty of arran ging health care for their client 
populations, with the additional injunction that they should seek to meet local 'health 
needs'. With the current emphasis on effective use of resources, Health Needs 
Assessment (HNA)holds forth the promise of bringing into sharper focus the demand 
element of health care as opposed to the 'supply-led' provision of health care that has 
hitherto characterised NHS priorities. However, promising as HNA may be in theory, 
it is the means by which it is attempted that will have a potent effect on whether a 
balance between supply and demand will be possible. To highlight this, there will be a 
brief discussion of two contrasting (but not mutually exclusive) methodologies - one 
based on epidemiology, the other on social research. These two approaches mirror 
different definitions of 'health need'. On one hand, health need can be defined as the 
'ability to benefit' from health care, emphasising a primarily medical model, which in 
effect links 'health need' to the supply function as well as demand. Yet on the other 
hand, we have an apparently wide definition of health expressed in the Government's 
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Me Heal& of Me Natioli initiatives that includes elements that are not overtly 
'medical' concerns such as life-style, diet and exercise, in order to maximise the 
nation's 'health' (see Bradshaw 1994). 
The appeal of epidemiology to any 'rational' investigation of health needs is its 
appearance as a branch of 'hard' medical science. It deals with demographics and the 
statistical incidences and prevalence within populations of neatly categorised diseases 
and illness. Obviously such a relatively straightforward approach has great appeal for 
any DHA setting priorities for spending within a defined population. For instance, if in 
the light of an epidemiological study a population exhibits an unusually high 
occurrence of respiratory problems or heart disease, it would be remiss of any health 
authority not to take this into account, both in terms of provision of treatment, and 
within limits, prevention. The problem occurs if 'health' is only perceived within this 
medical model, when epidemiology shares the same disease categories that produce the 
definition of health 'need' as 'ability to benefit' from health care. It then follows that if 
you cannot benefit from existing health care provision then there is no expression of 
`need' and therefore, it is not amenable to epidemiological analysis. The concept of 
need thus becomes circular and reinforcing, need becomes confused with both the 
supply and demand functions for health care. Therefore the dynamic for change in 
health provision becomes purely medical and potentially very conservative in nature, 
with a risk of perpetuating unconscious biases and treating symptoms not causes. 
Moreover, the health purchasing agency runs the risk of not fulfilling its remit of 
maximising 'health gain' for its population within the resources allocated. 
The assessment of 'health need' does not necessarily have to be defined so precisely. 
The World Health Organisation defines health more widely as 'a state of physical, 
mental and social well being, and not only the absence of disease and disability. This 
opens up the debate on health needs to include a host of non-medical interests. It also 
overwhelms the neat categorisations of epidemiology. Health, and therefore health 
need, becomes more fluid, multidimensional, invites investigation of other non-medical 
causes of ill-health and ultimately opens up the concept of health for consideration 
from the perspective of a variety of differing value systems. This is the realm of the 
social researcher used to confronting value-laden evidence and unconscious biases (see 
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Williams and Popay 1994). Within this wider definition of health, non-medical factors 
come to the fore and have the habit of spilling into the areas of responsibility of 
agencies other than the DHA. This means that legitimate claims of 'health need' will 
come from areas outside the immediate responsibility of the Health Authority. Thus, a 
wider definition of 'health needs' implies that one must include any actions or policies 
that increase the overall levels of 'health' within the population. These may be as 
diverse as preventative medicine and health promotion, or general government policy, 
such as increasing the quality of the housing stock, maintaining a clean water supply 
and promoting a stable labour market, which emphasise measures that fall outside the 
remit of the health system. This appears to advocate a return to a public health model 
of health, or 'New Public Health' (NPH), as discussed in Chapter 3 (see Armstrong 
1993; Nettleton 1995). The problem for the purchasing agencies is making this wider 
definition of health meaningful within the restrictions of a formal health care system. 
However, when the definition of health changes so does the understanding of how 
individuals fit within new discourse of health care. The consequences for the individual 
constructed within the 'New Public Health' discourse is explored in the next section. 
The construction of the individual in the 'health' discourse 
The focus of governmentality analysis is, at its most basic, an investigation of the 
discursive space that 'renders reality thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to 
political deliberation' (Rose and Miller 1.992: 179). Extending this analysis to health 
care, one could argue that rationing/priority-setting debate, the use of QALYs, audit, 
particular forms of health needs assessment and the concept of the New Public Health, 
are all aspect of a problematisation within a discursive space that makes health care 
amenable to political action. To be more specific, it is more appropriate to characterise 
these phenomena as part of a re-problematisation of the 'health' discourse, as part of a 
shift in the articulation of liberal governance from collective forms of welfare to one 
that emphasises individual rights and responsibilities. By defining health as something 
more than the absence of illness (as in the WHO definition), agencies charged with the 
duty to generate 'hea Ith', need to make it part of a 'calculus of health' in order to 
demonstrate effectiveness. An understanding of health in terms of quality of life, as in 
the New Public Health formula, is one such approach. Therefore, the health agency has 
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to show that for a given allocation of resources it is trying to maximise the aggregate 
level of quality of life for its population. One of the consequences of this is that the 
agency will emphasise preventative strategies as part of health promotion. However, to I- 
maximise aggregate 'health', health promotion must focus on individual behaviour. As 
McQueen (1989) argues, the collective and the individual are linked: 
... 
because the rhetoric of health promotion and the New Public Health 
is social, but the actions, the behavioural base, are at the individual 
level. How else can one explain public health rhetoric which argues that 
social conditions affect health outcomes and then, in turn, argues that 
the appropriate solution is to eat better, exercise more, drink less and 
give up smoking (McQueen 1989: 342; quoted in Nettleton 1995: 237). 
An intrinsic characteristic that arises from the definition of population health as being 
dependent on individual behaviour is that it becomes part of the duties of the 
responsible citizen not to indulge in those behaviours likely to result in ill-health and 
thus add to the burden on society through the provision of health care. However, since 
most of these behaviours are as commonplace as not eating the right food or drinking 
too much, then the implication is that we are all at risk of adding to aggregate levels of 
ill-health. Therefore, the health agency, in terms of the NPH discourse, is really in the 
business of managing health risk. This was a theme explored in Chapter 3, where it was 
argued that neo-liberal health policy leads to a re-coding of health problems as social 
and behavioural problems. The individual is encouraged to perform a kind of self- 
governance, to engage in a form of self-entrepreneurialism of health or 'prudentialism' 
(O'Malley 1992) and to avoid risky behaviour that places a burden on the rest of 
society. In effect, the management of health risk is one of the most fundamental forms 
of governance. 
If risk an intrinsic element of the management of health in neo-liberal forms of 
governance, then it is wholly consistent with the definition of neo-liberals as essentially 
a reflection of neo-classical economics. The subject of this economics discourse, homo 
ecmiondcus, is the same kind of prudential, rational, self-governing individual 
described above. However, because of the well known problem of market failure in the 
provision of health care, hoino ecmionficus is not the subject of the discourse of health 
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economics. To mimic market conditions and make health amenable to understanding 
within an economics discourse, a number of proxv indicators have to be created - in 
the NHS these include the creation of the quasi-market and its constituent 
technologies, such as audit and evidence based medicine. As mentioned earlier, many 
of these technologies are based on aggregate calculations. As a consequence, the 
subject is constructed through the use of statistics as being a collection of risks factors 
similar to that of the insurance technologies (see Ewald 199 1 
The author of these new health technologies is an emergent form of 'expert', the health 
economist. The function of this form of expertise in neo-liberalism is to allow closer 
supervision of the health system so as to control its impact on public spending. Neo- 
liberal forms of health care governance have to put in place methodologies and 
technologies that generate legitimacy for government intervention in health care and 
the de-collectivi sing of the welfare state without paying too high a political price. The 
health economists provide such a legitimising device in the form of economic 
rationality. As Ashmore et at. ( 1989) observeý 
In general, their [health economists] goal would be to replace 'ad hoc 
and politically motivated decision-making, as far as possible, with an 
impersonal means-ends calculus analogy to that of the idealised 
individual actor which provides their basic model of economic 
rationality (Ashmore et al. 1989ý 36). 
This economic model may be the basis of a 'strong programme', where it is posited 
that economics provides 1he rationale for arranging health care. Or it might be a 'weak 
programme', in which economic analysis is suggested as a possible source of technical 
help in decision making , (ibid. ). Either way, the economic rationale provides a 
justification for the decision-making process, allowing it to pass the test of 
'reasonableness'. If the decisions on priorities are seen to be 'reasonable', le are based 
on a rational process, then they may also be said to be defensible in public debate and 
be less problematic politically. The basis of these assertions is, as noted in Chapter 3 ), 
that free market economics is 'capable in principle of addressing the totality of human 
behaviour, and, consequently, of envisaging a coherent, purely economic method of 
programming the totality of governmental action' (Gordon 1991 ý 43). This use of 1. ) 
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economic models of behaviour as the basis for explaining all social behaviour can be 
seen in the work of Gary Becker (1976) and the 'new institutional economics' (NIE) 
of Oliver Williamson (1975). 
One of the most persuasive critiques of this economic paradigm is provided by the 
work of US sociologist Mark Granovetter and his concept of the embeddedness of 
economic action in social relations. Granovetter's work is not only a response to the 
imperialism of economic theory, it also represents a willingness to challenge economics 
on its own terms, to '[open] up... the academic debate about the economy to include a 
genuinely social perspective' (Granovetter 1992: 1). He recognises that his programme 
must be subtle enough to avoid the traps inherent in both disciplines, and broaden the 
economist's concepts of methodological individualism and economic action, without 
setting up this new economic sociology as a new form of imperialism. Granovetter's 
concept of economic activity being conditioned by pre-existing social relationship 
provides a critique of neo-liberal economics. As Granovetter and Swedberg (1992) 
argue: 
Economic action is socially situated and cannot be explained by 
reference to individual motives alone. It is embedded in ongoing 
networks of personal relationships rather than being carried out by 
atomized actors. By nehrol-k we mean a regular set of contacts or 
similar social connections among individuals or groups. An action by a 
member of a network is embedded, because it is expressed in 
interaction with other people. The network approach helps avoid not 
only the conceptual trap of atomized actors but also theories that point 
to technology, the structures of ownership, or culture as the exclusive 
explanation of economic events (Granovetter and Swedberg 1992: 9). 
The additional benefit of discussing Granovetter's work is that it provides a key 
element missing from govermnentality analysis. In Chapter 2 it was argued that 
Foucault 'paints a picture of a totally normalised society, not because he believes our 
present society is one, but because he hopes we will find the picture threatening' (Hoy 
1986: 14). The problem is that in presenting the different formulas of governance as 
totalising, even if it is only for heuristic effect, the components of the 
power/knowledge discourse of governance become reified as 'ideal types, such as 
'welfare liberalism' or 'neo-liberalism'. However, what is clear is that one cannot 
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simply assume that similar forms of governance result in the same forms of social 
behaviour, institutions or governments nationally or internationally, when tested 
empirically. Granovetter's concept of extra-discursive networks of social relations 
introduces a mechanism that allows the inclusion of contingent factors that modify the 
totalising discourses described in governmentality. The extra-discursive element of 
network relationships inhabits the 'non-discursive "residue... (Fox 1997: 44) between 
non-discursive reality and the limits of the power/knowledge discourse. It can be 
argued that it is this 'gap' that allows the space for a nuanced account of the changing 
structures of governance to develop. 
The embeddedness of economic action in social relations 
Despite sociology's long tradition of investigating the economic aspects of social life it 
can be argued that it is ideas of economic behaviour that have dominated this century. 
This is especially so in more recent times with the rise of neo-liberalism. Traditionally, 
classical economics has postulated that the economic is inextricably linked with the 
social, that the order of 'the market' is the order of society. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that individuals, as Adam Smith asserts, have a fundamental 'propensity... to truck, 
barter and exchange one thing for another' (Smith [1776] 1976: 17), that it is natural 
order to behave as rational beings and further one's own self-interest. The institutions 
of the state are there to be impartial regulators of civil life and the market, so the only 
proper government is therefore limited government. There can be no aggregation of 
interests that puts itself above the interests of the individual without their consent, to 
do so would damage society. The consequence is that atomised individuals are a 
prerequisite to perfect competition (Granovetter 1992: 56). This idea of the aton-tised 
nature of economic behaviour is central to modem neo-classical economic theory. It 
conjures up the vision of the informed individual with a stable set of preferences 
pursuing his or her self-interest in allocating scarce resources to maximise their own 
individual welfare. This discourse privileges economic relations above non-economic 
relations. Social relations act as a drag on the efficiency of the economy, in effect 
social relations, have become the epiphenomena of the market. However, this kind of 
economic theorising also means that much of what is interesting in the social world 
cannot be articulated and so is sidelined as a set of inconvenient exogenous variables 
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that are not amenable to rational calculation. 
From Granovetter's sociological perspective the elimination of the 'noneconomic' 
from the simplified, abstract models of economic action in neo-classical theory results 
in it being too narrowly formulated. To focus on rational action as exclusively that 
which is considered to be economically rational is to neglect the equally rational 
pursuit of non-economic goals, such as those concerned with the approval of one's 
peers, questions of status and concepts of sociability. This strikes at the heart of the 
concept of economic actions of the atomised individual abstracted from social relations 
which lie at the centre of neo-classical economics. As Durkheim states, '... members [of 
society] are linked by ties that extend well beyond the very brief moment when the act 
of exchange is being accomplished' (Durkheim [ 1893] 1984: 173). They share a history 
of past relations and probable expectations of future relationships. As Granovetter 
argues, to perceive the individual atomistically as devoid of social context is to 
njidersocialize the conception of human action. Yet as Granovetter notes, when 
economists do include social factors they tend to oversocialise the concept, creating 
stylised groups - such as Piore's segmentation of the labour market (Piore 1975) - or 
stylised 'typical' individuals (Becker 1976), where to know the role the individual 
plays is to know their behaviour. Rules and norms of authority become internalised and 
unconscious. 
Granovetter's use of embeddedness is thus part of a conscious effort to avoid both the 
under and oversocialisation of the atomised individual prevalent in economic analysis, 
and equally as part of governmentality analysis. But equally he is striving to avoid the 
charge of oversocialisation often levelled at sociology. The embeddedness of economic 
action in social relations through networks of concrete, personal relationships is a 
means of introducing flexibility into economic action and avoiding the dangers of 
functionalism. Additionally, if individuals have pre-existing social relationships then the 
atomistic relationship of economic exchange no longer is the sole guarantor of trustful 
behaviour. In effect, networks of social relationship provide an alternative mechanism 
-for reducing opportunistic behaviour. This will be discussed in the next section. 
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Trust and malfeasance 
One of the problems that stems from the concept of the de-contextualised, aton-ýistic 
individuals of classical and neo-classical economics is what stops them acting 
opportunistically? The usual formulation to account for the general absence of 
malfeasance is to point to the market as a generator of normative standards of 
behaviour. In an oversocialised, Hobbesian sense, these rules and norms are 
internalised and order and trustworthy behaviour ensues. However as Granovetter 
points out, new insights into the less-than-Perfect market at the micro-level gives 
ample scope for opportunist behaviour. Therefore, other mechanisms must be 
formulated to account for it. The advent of new institutional economics (NIE), 
provides one such account within the framework of the neo-classical model. The re- 
interpretation of social institutions allows them to be seen as an efficient, evolutionary 
response of the market to issues of trust and malfeasance. They provide a legalistic 
arena where implicit or explicit contracts (Okun 198 1) or authority structures that act 
through 'fiat' (Williamson 1975), can regulate and therefore negate opportunist 
tendencies. This is seen in the NHS reforms of the early 1990s, where trust relationship 
that formed the basis of welfare liberalism, were re-constructed in market terms, for 
example through contracts between purchasers and providers, or re-establishing trust 
with medical professionals through the audit process. However as Granovetter 
observes, '[t]hese conceptions are undersocialised in that they do not allow for the 
extent to which concrete personal relations and the obligations inherent in them 
discourage malfeasance, quite apart from the institutional arrangements' (1992: 60). 
Further-more, they are not mechanisms that produce trust, they merely act as a 
substitute for it. The problem of untrustworthy behaviour does not go away - it is an 
invitation to find even more ingenious ways to act opportunistically or for 
professionals to re-assert their autonomy. 
Granovetter argues that concrete personal networks of relationships provide a more 
subtle and convincing approach to trust and malfeasance. Reputations become personal 
constructs - an aggregation of personal and others' assessment of past experience of 
trustworthiness. This infon-nation is cheap, of good quality and from sources with 
whom one has ongoing social, as well as economic, expectations of trust and good 
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faith. For example, contacts between organisations are generally based on prior 
knowledge of each other. There will be networks of buyers, sellers, purchasers and 
providers etc. whose relationshipswill not be based on narrow, atomistic spot-market 
exchanges but on well-founded expectations of future behaviour. There is no need for 
the tight complex contractual arrangements - an informal word to smooth things out 
and a desire to 'keep the lawyers and the accountants out' (Macaulay 1963: 61) may 
be enough. And as Eccles (198 1) suggests in his notion of the 'quasi-firm', informal 
arranaements can be as an effective means of control as authority by 'fiat' in the ID 
hierarchy. Thus there is no need to rely on undersocialised notions of institutional 
arrangements or generalised reputations. However, Granovetter strives not to fall into 
the trap of replacing one type of functionalism with another. There are limits to the 
scope of networks of social relations, as they '... penetrate irregularly and in differing 
degrees in different sectors of economic life, thus allowing for what we already know: 
distrust, opportunism, and disorder are by no means absent" (Granovetter 1992: 61- 
62). Personal expectations of trust can be abused by individuals and groups of 
individuals with even more disastrous consequences. And there is nothing stopping one 
network of social relations being in conflict with another. In Hobbes's 'state of nature', 
conflicts would be limited to one's immediate neighbours; networks allow for conflict 
on a much grander scale. The implications for classical and neo-classical economic 
theory are severe. There is no role for the influence of networks of social relations on 
economic action in standard economic theory. Yet as Games Theory has shown, the 
better and more certain one's knowledge is of the intentions and motivations of others 
the more it has an effect on our rational decision making process. One can speculate 
that even if the initial economic conditions of two situations were identical, but there 
existed a network of prior relations in one and not in the other, the economic 
behaviour of those involved in each may be completely different - and be beyond the 
capacity of classical theory to explain. 
The evolution of institutions 
in the previous section the role of institutions in maintaining trust and suppressing 
malfeasance was mentioned, yet there was no discussion of the greatest problem 
concerning institutions - where do they come from? Classical economics builds 
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upwards from the microeconomic to the macroeconomic but there is no economic 
mechanism that can account for their creation. One can put this another way - how can 
a market comprised of atomised self-seeking individuals with transitory relationships 
based on exchange, spontaneously create overarching macro-institutions? The 
response of the economist is either to treat the problem as one more exogenous 
variable or invoke a vague concept such as 'culture' as a kind of 'dells ex lllacllilla' 
(Granovetter 1992: 254). In governmentality analysis the evolution of institutions is a 
direct result of a problematisation that has arisen within a particular formula of 
'governance. 
The creation of institutions regulated by expertise are part of the solution. 
New institutional economics provides a similar understanding of institutional evolution. 
Williamson re-interprets institutions as rational, efficient market responses to certain 
failures of the market. The mechanism invoked is one in which an evolutionary process 
selects a particular institutional structure that is the optimally efficient solution to a 
particular problem. As Andrew Schotter argues, '[e]conomic and social systems evolve 
the way species do. To ensure their survival and growth, they must solve a whole set 
of problems that arise as the system evolves. Each problem creates the need for some 
adaptive features, that is, a social institution... Every evolutionary economic problem 
requires a social institution to solve it' (Schotter 1981: 1-2). 
For Granovetter there is no need for adaptive narratives to account for institutional 
development. He sees them as being constructed by the interaction of networks of 
interests 'against the background of constraints given by the previous historical 
development of society, polity, market, and technology' (1992: 18). Therefore, 
institutions are a product of the embeddedness of economic actions within social 
relations. It is argued, 'that institutions are not the kind of objective, "external" realities 
they seem. Instead they are typically the result of a slow, social creation; a way of 
doing something "hardens" and "thickens" and finally becomes "the way things are 
done" (ibid.: 17). Also it is suggested that the development is path-dependent, that is 
to say chance plays a part early on before it 'thickens' and 'hardens', altering the 
structure of the institution so that the most 'efficient' solution does not necessarily 
always succeed. It is in this early stage '... that networks may play a crucial role in the 
formation of an economic institution; once the development is "locked in", their 
strategic importance declines' (ibid,: 19). In essence, Granovetter is rejecting 
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functionalist arguments, particularly those of Williamson, but is also presenting a 
critique of functionalist arguments inherent in governmentality analysis that derive 
from the use of 'ideal types. However, the difference between NIE and 
governmentality is that NIE is principally an economic discourse, a totalising discourse 
at that, consequently it is still unclear how macro structures arise even if they are 
crational' solutions. Governmentality, as part of the wider Foucauldian programme, is 
predicated on seeking to understand the changing nature of discourse and with it the 
context in which institutions operate. However, governmentality does have a non- 
discursive space in which resistance can exist, disrupt discourses and lead to change. 
Therefore, the usefulness to governmentality of the role embeddedness of social 
relations is in the way it creates ripples in the smooth surface of the power/knowledge 
discourse. The ripples are the contingent elements that define evolutionary 
development. In terms of the NBS, they are the background noise of competing 
networks of interests - political, medical, financial - that interact as the new health 
discourse in the NHS 'hardens' and 'thickens' into an institution that soon 'becomes 
the way things are done'. 
Conclusion 
The two aims of this chapter were, firstly, to outline some of the key concepts in the 
rationing/priority-setting debate and second, (and more importantly) to place this 
debate within a governmentality context. The first section of the chapter explored in 
some detail the conceptualisation of health and health care provision within an overtly 
economic discourse. This new health discourse re-codifies in predominantly economic 
terms the problems associated with providing an effective health care system. As a 
consequence, health care becomes amenable to a rational discourse that seeks to 
overcome the obstacle of 'market failure'. In particular, it was argued that the 
changing articulation of governance from welfare liberalism to neo-liberalism led to a 
re-problematisation of health care in which implicit and explicit forms of priority- 
setting and rationing became key issues. 
The second part of the chapter discussed some of the new technologies of health 
governance, such as the QALY or the QWB index, which act as proxies for market 
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conditions and provide a 'calculus of health' in which economic concepts can be 
expressed. However, one of the consequences of this is that the subject of this health 
economics discourse is not the same as the one that inhabits the world of classical 
economics. The use of proxy measures shifts the focus of the economics discourse 
away from the individual to that of an idealised, statistical construct which can be 
inserted into a 'rational' calculation of health. The result is that individuals can only 
enter into the health economics discourse when defined in terms of the statistical 
calculations of risk. The role of organising health care provision is transformed into the 
management of 'risky' individuals. The use of quality of life measures leads to the 
concept of 'health' and health need becoming much more widely defined, as witnessed 
by the development of the concept of the New Public Health. Therefore, the concept 
of risk iswidened to include practically all aspects of life. To the extent that everyone 
is included in the 'risk society'. 
The discussion of Granovetter's concept of the embeddedness of economic action in 
social relations plays a dual role in the chapter. The idea of embeddedness is used to 
critique the totalising nature of economic models of social behaviour which creates the 
notion of the 'risky' individual. However, additionally, the notion of embeddedness 
also provides a key element missing from governmentality analysis. The extra- 
discursive nature of network relations introduces a nuanced account of discourses and 
their resultant practices explored by governmentality analysis. This is particularly 
relevant to the analysis of institutional development, such as that of the NHS, outlined 
in the next chapter. 
Part Two of the thesis situates the recent development of the NHS within a 
governmentality theoretical framework, and presents and analyses empirical evidence 
describing the role played by health authorities in commissioning health services to 
meet local health needs. The analysis will examine the influence that new technologies 
of priority setting have on shaping the 'rationing' debate and the influence of the 
cconsumer' on health authority commissioning decisions. 
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Chapter 6 
Health governance and the NHS 
Introduction 
As previous chapters have sought to demonstrate, Foucault's notion of 
governmentality provides a coherent and practical framework with which to explore 
changes in the governance of health care. This is especially so if Foucault's ideas are 
used in combination with the work of others who have widened his analysis to include 
other areas social investigation (see Rose 1993; Rose and Miller 1992; Osborne 1993, 
1997; also see Chapter 3). The purpose of this chapter, and Chapters 7 and 8, is to 
apply this framework to the governance of the British health care system, in particular 
to examine the British National Health Service and the part it plays within health 
governance. The most important function of this chapter is to place the development of 
the NHS within an historical context that illustrates the changing nature of health care 
governance in Britain. The relevance of this framework to contemporary policy making 
will be further explored in Chapters 7 and 8 with the presentation of empirical material. 
However, it is clear from the discussion of Foucault's ideas in previous chapters, 
(particularly in Chapter 2 ), that historical data have to be treated with caution within 
governmentality analysis. Whilst it has been stated that the govemmentality framework 
explicitly rejects the deterministic 'grand narrative' in its presentation of historical 
evidence, this does not mean that the context it provides adds up to nothing more that 
a simple chronology of events. Governmentality analysis does supply a structure in 
which to situate historical changes, but does so by pointing, out how contingent those 
changes are on other factors. Therefore, before presenting a goverrimentality account 
of the development of the NHS, it is vital to clarify some of the issues that arise from 
the method of investigation implicit within governmentality analysis. 
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Narrative, periodisation and process 
The two immediate differences between conventional historical accounts of 
institutional development, and the interpretation placed on the same evidence by 
governmentality analysis, are both related to Foucault's explicit rejection of historical 
narratives. The two problematic areas that arise centre on the use ofperiodisation 
within the governmentality account of the historical evidence and the questioning of 
the concept of a process shaping government policy. In turn these apparent problems 
can only be understood by reiterating some of the core concepts within 
governmentality analysis. 
The method associated with governmentality analysis is essentially Foucault's concept 
of genealogy (see Chapter 2). Foucault describes genealogy as a method that seeks to 
'identify the accidents, the minute deviations - or conversely, the complete reversal - 
the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those 
things that continue to exist and have value for us' (Foucault 1984: 8 1). In effect, 
Foucault is arguing that there is no direct mapping between the organisational 
structure a particular institution evolves and the form of governance that dominates 
that particular society. However, this does not mean that forms of governance do not 
shape, in the widest sense, the development of institutions. Particular forms of 
governance represent the boundaries of the rational discursive space that renders 
reality as amenable to a form of political calculation. Furthermore, as part of 
governmentality analysis it is argued that institutions develop and wield power over 
others because they form the locus where key technologies of regulation operate 
within the overall formula of governance (see Chapter 3). Institutions, as centres of 
rational calculation and producers of normative standards, are conduits through which 
particular forms of governance manage and regulate sections of society. 
One of the features of institutional control, and governance in general, is the use of 
4expertise' as part of the calculus of regulation. In Chapter 4 it was argued that the 
function of expertise is highly contingent in two ways. Firstly, there is no iron law 
which dictates which forms of knowledge become forms of expertise. Often expertise 
emerges from a morass of competing knowledges, for example, in the nineteenth 
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century the emergence of 'scientific' medicine as opposed to other forms of medical 
knowledge. Whether a systematic body of knowledge emerges as an expertise is 
entirely contingent on the formula of governance wid any number of exogenous Cl 
factors. Two ostensibly similar forms of governance could, in theory, incorporate 
different kinds of regulatory expertise depending on the differing historical 
circumstances that formed the previous formula of governance. One of the 
consequence of this is that the nature of expertise, and therefore of institutions, is not 
fixed. If the formula of governance changes, so does the regulatory function of that 
form of expertise and any institution in which it is incorporated. In extreme 
circumstances this may mean that some institutions may cease to be relevant within a 
new formula of governance because the knowledge they utilise no longer has the status 
of regulatory expertise. The second contingent factor concerning expertise is that the 
structures which develop as part of the management of the body of expert knowledge 
are themselves a reflection of wider social factors, such as gender, race and social 
status. The variation in potency of these factors within different societies will influence 
which practical bodies of knowledge become forms of expertise, which become 
socially marginalised, and which are allotted a supporting role in the division of labour 
controlled by a dominant forms of expertise (see Stacey 1988; Witz 1992; Nettleton 
1995). 
In the light of these contingencies, it is important not only to explore the documented 
historical circumstances which characterised the development of the NES as an 
institution, but to place this development within the context that takes into account the 
formula of governance that prevailed at the time. The most important aspect of this 
scheme is that it obviates the need to present an evolutionary narrative to account for 
the development of the NHS as an institution. Instead, it highlights the changing nature 
of the problematisation of rule which gives the NHS meaning as a locus of regulatory 
technologies. However, in a clear divergence from conventional narrative accounts of 
institutional and policy formation, governmentality analysis is compelled to emphasise 
the discontinuity arising from the discrete periodisations associated with the different 
problematisations of liberal rule and forms of governance. Furthermore, what is 
particularly relevant to this chapter, is that the dependence on contingent factors within 
institutional formation means that there is often a discrepancy between the 
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periodisation associated with changes in problematisations of rule and the periodisation 
associated with institutional change. it will be argued in this chapter that the changes in 
the form of liberal governance do not automatically signal immanent changes in the 
organisation and function of institutions. An institution, such as the NIHS, formed as a 
solution to the problems of delivering health care within one problematisation of rule C. 
may be left substantially unaltered in its function until a new set of concepts has 
evolved within the new problematisation of rule that make it amenable to political 
calculation. 
One of the consequences of this rationale is that it identifies the process of policy 
making as the key factor in the transition of institutions as functional elements of 
regulation within the new formula of governance. In many ways this is not a 
contentious statement as the policyprocess does imply some form of transformation 
from one state to another. However, where governmentality does deviate from 
conventional analyses of policy making is in asserting that the sets of categories and 
concepts that form the basis of political discourse are only meaningful within particular 
problematisations of rule. This statement has major ramifications for the analysis of 
policy making. The most important implication is on the notion of a policy process 
itself In many ways the notion of shifts in the problematisation of rule within liberal 
forms of governance is analogous to the Kuhnian concept of paradigms shifts in the 
natural sciences (Kuhn 1970). The idea that categories and formulations only have 
meanin- within the then dominant paradigm implies that when shifts in the paradigms 
occur the meaning attributed to these categories and formulations also changes. Stated 
in these terms it is evident that analysing policy making from a governmentality 
perspective has the effect of emphasises discontinuity rather than continuity within the 
policy process to the point where it calls into questions the viability of the very concept 
of a policyprocess. The result of this argument is that governmentality analysis 
presents an implicit critique of conventional policy analysis. The kernel of this critique 
is that the analysis of the power relations between actors within the policy arena, 
(particularly from a pluralist standpoint or a reaction against pluralism), is in essence a 
discussion of the problems that arise and are meaningful within a specific formula of 
governance. Therefore, any form of analysis which seeks to uncover a long-standing 
policy process would be potentially flawed because it cannot fully take into account the 
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changing meaning of the categories which form the basis of any policy debate. The 
further implication of the governmentality viewpoint is that commentators and 
academics that engage in policy analysis are themselves seen to represent forms of 
expertise who utilise specific forms of specialist knowledge essential to governance. 
These groups have the function of developing new categories that aid political 
calculation and ultimately may generate new problems which may only be resolved 
within a new fon-nula of governance. For example, in terms of health care governance 
and the NHS, one group (whose influence was briefly discussed in Chapter 5 and will 
be again later in this chapter) is that of health economists who represent a relatively 
new form of expertise which has been particularly influential within the contemporary 
health policy debate. However, it has to be noted that the assumption in 
governmentality analysis that it can critique other forms of analysis by appearing to 
except itself from being implicated in the dominant formula of governance has not 
gone unchallenged. In Chapter 2 it was acknowledged that Foucault"s epistemological 
position has come under severe criticism. These epistemological problems have not 
been resolved and are perhaps irresolvable. However, this chapter and the two that 
follow, attempt to demonstrate that governmentality analysis of the policy process and 
the formation of the NHS as an institution does result in new insights that were not 
immediately available to conventional forms of analysis. 
The role of population in liberal governance 
As mentioned above, this chapter does not seek to present a conventional historical 
account of the founding of the NHS as an institution. However, the alternative 
framework employed in the chapter does make use of the common body of evidential 
material provided by more established accounts, such as Yjein (1995), Allsop (1995), 
and Webster (1998). Indeed the govemmentality account of NHS does employ a 
similar periodisation when dealing with historical evidence. There is a shared pattern of 
creation followed by consolidation in the 1950s and 1960s and then a period of crisis 
and fundamental reorganisation starting in the late 70s until contemporary times. 
However, underlying these changes governmentality analysis suggests there is a more 
fundamental periodisation at work involving shifl in the formula of liberal governance 
in Britain. Rose ( 1993) identifies three distinct - 'if not sharply delineated or mutually 
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exclusive' (ibid.: 285) - problematisations of rule within UK governance which cover 
three time periods: the early to late nineteenth century; late nineteenth century to the 
mid-twentieth; and the period leading up to contemporary times. Each of these periods 
represents a shifl in the formula of liberal governance. The first period is associated 
with the 'classical' liberalism of the 19'h and early 20th centuries with its emphasis on 
laissez-faire economics. The second period from the mid-20'h century until the early 
1970s, sees the beginnings of the welfare state and 'welfare liberalism'. The third 
period marks the re-emergence, in the 70s, of classical economics in the form of neo- 
liberalism. The rest of the chapter uses these broad categorisations to gain insight into 
the contingent factors that gave rise to NES in 1948, its function as a part of health 
governance within the welfare state, and finally, how the NFIS had to adapt to the new 
circumstances of a neo-liberal formula of governance. 
Although the evidence is shared, the meaning of that evidence is open to a range of 
interpretations. For example, given that the NHS is a key element of the British welfare 
state, govermnentality analysis searches the historical evidence for its origins as an 
regulatory institution by looking at earlier forms of liberal governance. In Chapter 2 it 
was argued that liberalism, as it evolved in the eighteenth century, placed the well- 
being of the population as the central concept of governance. This contrasts with 
earlier forms of governance such as described in Macchiavelli's 77ie Pfince, where the 
i-aison d'&al revolved around the protection of the physical integrity of land or 
possessions, of which populations form a. part. This is not to say that liberalism was the 
only early form of governance to derive existential meaning from identifying the 
strength of the state with the well-being of the population rather than the physical 
integrity of territory. The 'cameralist' or 'police' states in the German speaking 
territories after the Thirty Years War also shared this preoccupation (see Pasquino 
1991). However, unlike liberalism, in the 'police' state the regulation of the population 
and the regulation of the mercantile economy were fused together, there was no 
autonomous rationality to economic activity (Gordon 1991). The state guaranteed 
prosperity for the population through the provision of administrative order. But this 
order could only come about through the continuous intervention by the state in 
society in order to generate knowledge about the population. The simple equation for 
state governance was that knowledge equals order, and order equals prosperity. 
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By contrast, the form of governance exemplified by liberalism does grant an 
autonomous existence to the function of the political economy. The state no longer 
needs to intervene to guarantee order. In this formula, social and economic order is the 
reflection of a natural order. Within the narrow limits of mercantile capitalism 
intervention by the state would be largely unnecessary. In this classic form of 
liberalism, government is relegated to a regulatory role, maintaining the apparatuses of 
state that guarantee the 'civil society'. However, with the advent of industrial 
capitalism in the early nineteenth century this restricted role for the state came under 
increasing pressure as regulation of the labour force, and the population as a whole, 
became a central factor in the efficient working of the economy. As Foucault argues, 
the regulation of population (through bio-poiver) was 'an indispensable element in the 
development of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible without the 
controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of population and the adjustment of 
the phenomena of population into economic processes' (Foucault 198 1; in Rabinow 
1984: 263). This highlights the central dynamic within the problematisation of rule 
reflected in liberal forms of government. As Rose states: 
the recurrent dilemma of liberal government [is] the fear of not 
governing enough versus the fear of governing too much. Liberalism 
inaugurates a kind of perpetual dissatisfaction with government, a 
perpetual questioning of whether the desired effects are being 
produced, of the mistakes of thought and policy that hamper the 
efficacy of government, the imperative not to govern more but to 
govern better (Rose 1993: 292). 
Within this form of liberal govermentality the state has the duty to regulate the 
economy to guarantee prosperity. But the question is how much should the state 
intervene in the 'natural' order of society to fulfil its governmental remit? Conversely, 
if industrial capitalism is itself the cause of harm to certain sections of society, is it the 
proper role of government to ameliorate its worst excesses by having an active official 
role in the regulation of society? This dilemma is apparentwhen dealing with the 
governance of health care. The general health of the population is clearly linked with 
overall levels well-being. Moreover, the general health of the population has a bearing 
on the productive capacity of the economy. Hence the dilemma. If the conditions 
137 
associated with industrial capitalism are injurious to health, and ill-health is damaging 
the productive capacity of the workforce, then can this dilemma be resolved within the 
problematisation of rule that informs a particular formula of govemance? If it cannot 
will there be a shift in the formula of govemance in an attempt to resolve this dilemma? 
This is the background to the next section which explores the historical circumstances 
that led to the founding of the NES. 
The State and the provision of health care 
The first problem with searching for the origins of the NES is where to start. If we 
begin from the basic premise that the NES is an institution that has meaning within a 
liberal form of governance then we must start with early problematisations of liberal 
rule. The late seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries witnessed the first flowering 
of liberal forms of governance. However, it is equally apparent that the earliest forms 
of liberal governance did not reflect the same concern for population health that would 
be associated with later forms of health care governance. That is not the same as 
suggesting that there were no forms of organised health care. In the early nineteenth 
century there were many sources of health care services, ranging from the practitioners 
of folk medicine to voluntary hospitals, including prestigious institutions dedicated to 
teaching medicine (see Stacey 1988; Abel-Smith 1964). Yet, even if one takes all these 
sources together, clearly they did not constitute a health care System. Nor was there 
any pretence that they should. In the early nineteenth century the concept of a 
systematic form of health governance had not become part of the problematisation of 
liberal governmentality. However, the pressures of an rapidly expanding and mobile 
population needed to meet the needs of newly emergent forms of industrialism were 
putting pressure on even this meagre provision of health care. As Stacey (1988) 
observes: 
The flood of people to the towns in the eighteenth century, which 
increased in the nineteenth, dislocated the networks of healers based 
upon the domestic domain upon which the great majority of the people 
had relied. Notwithstanding the serious hazards of eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century hospitals the common people therefore turned to 
them for succour in times of illness (Stacey 1988: 62). 
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With high population density came the real danger of epidemic killer diseases such as 
cholera, typhoid and tuberculosis. For early nineteenth century policy makers this 
spectre of illness and 'contagion' only added to the existing perception of danger, of 
social disorder, and moral and political chaos, that were associated with the influx of 
working people into newly industrial areas (see Morris 1976). It has been argued that 
one of the primary reasons for the introduction of the Poor Law of 1834 was to 
regulate this new population of poor labourers and their families (Dean and Bolton 
1980). This is the first real instance of the state, albeit the local state, becoming directly 
involved in the management of population health. However, this was not management 
of the population as a whole but a section of the sick-poor who were seen to be 
'deserving' of treatment. The 'undeserving' poor, the malingerers and the feckless, 
were to be dissuaded from taking advantage of the generosity of the state by the 
harshness of the regime in the workhouse and the workhouse infirmary. In many 
respects, it could be argued that the Poor Law represents the beginnings of the welfare 
state (and ultimately the NHS), or at the very least it marked the beginning of the shift 
in the formula of liberal governance that would see the welfare state as part of the 
solution to the problem of governance. This assertion is sustainable because of two key 
factors that the Poor Law represents. Firstly, as already mentioned, it associates the 
state with the regulation of the population, even if it is only a section of the population. 
The second important factor is that the Poor Law was based on the use of state- 
licensed officials, the parish Medical Officer together with doctors, who utilised forms 
of knowledge that later become forms of expertise. 
In the previous section there was a conscious attempt to distinguish between 
'expertise' and 'knowledges'. This, in part, is to emphasise the difference within 
governmentality analysis between bodies of systematic knowledge which have a 
regulatory ftinction within a formula of governance and those which do not. One of the 
key features of expertise is that it enjoys a certain degree of state sponsorship. In 
Chapter 4 it was argued that this is one of the key characteristics of the medical 
profession and professions in general. The concept of expertise together -Vvith the 
principle of professional autonomy, allows the state to govem 'at arms length'. One of 
the consequences of maintaining and expanding a expert body of knowledge is that the 
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concept of population increasingly become part of a nexus of Professional calculation. 
Expertise mediates lived reality so as to make it amenable to analysis, and ultimately 
amenable to regulation (see Latour 1987). In conceptualising the role of expertise this 
way, the discussion of public health initiatives in the previous section acquires an 
added dimension. Early public health legislation had invariably included a medical 
practitioner, be it part of the Poor Law Act of 1834 or the Public Health Act of 1848. 
However, it -was not until the Medical Act of 1858 that medicine had the power to 
regulate entry into the profession and legal authority to control the use of medical 
knowledge. Once this had happened it was perhaps only a matter of time before a 
monopoly over practise was enforced and all aspects of health intervention would fall 
within the rernit of the profession. Thus, because of the pre-existing involvement in the 
organisation of UK public health services, medical professionals became historically 
embedded in the structure of state regulated health care. Often this close association 
with the provision of state sponsored health care went beyond passive involvement 
and, in many instances, resulted in influence over the composition of the service itself. 
This can be seen in the involvement of the medical profession in the discussions leading 
to the 1911 National Insurance Act. As Day and Klein (1991) note: 
The alterations [in the detail of the Act] were all of a nature which 
brought the system more into line with the wishes of the profession. 
The position thus secured by the [British Medical] Association has 
never been lost - on the contrary, each successive Government has 
acknowledged the Association as the representative organisation of the 
whole profession, a gain which itself would justify all the energy and 
money expended during the struggle (Day and Klein 1991: 5; quoted in 
Allsop 1995). 
The reference to the 1911 National Insurance Act also highlights another dimension of 
health care governance in the late-Dineteenth and early twentieth centuries, that the 
subject of the developing regulatory discourse was not the population as a whole but 
specific section within it. Although the 1911 National Insurance Act did represent the 
first involvement by the state in the provision of health care to individuals (not directly 
but through 'Approved Societies' and insurance companies) it was never designed to 
provide medical cover for all the population. The Act was specifically targeted at the 
working poor, those earning below a certain minimum income. In effect to provide 
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working men, but not their wives and families, access to general medical services. To 
some extent the health of poor children had been acknowledged earlier in the 
Education Acts of 1906 and 1907 which created the school meals and school medical 
services respectively. And this was reinforced in 1918 by the Maternity and Child 
Welfare Act. However, taking all these government initiatives together, they cannot be 
seen as reflecting an altruistic movement towards a comprehensive health care system 
or reflect the principle of universalism that characterised the ethos behind the founding 
of the NES. Arguably the rationale behind the Acts mentioned above, and other state 
interventions, had more to do with the 'problem' of a potentially volatile and 
impoverished urban population. 
Stacey (1988) observes that Britain in the early twentieth century before the outbreak 
of the First World War, was characterised by domestic unrest, as 'a number of tensions 
which had been inherent in the change-over to a factory based economy, sharp 
divisions between management and labour and tension also in the structuring of the 
Victorian bourgeois family erupted in those years' (Stacey 1988: 98). Clearly this lends 
itself to a Marxist analysis, for example that of Navarro 1978, where he interprets the 
combination of political, commercial and medical interests that formulated the 
provision of health care in the 1911 National Insurance Act in particular, as reflecting 
the ideology of dominant class interests obstructing the 'real' interests of the working 
classes. However, Stacey argues that this class account is incomplete. In her account 
of the origins of the National Insurance Act she adds an extra dimension of gender 
which she argues Marxist accounts neglect. Stacey notes that linking health insurance 
contributions with the working wage systematically discriminates against women who 
were limited in their opportunities for paid employment. The presumption was that the 
natural place for women was in the home. The relevance of this for governmentality 
analysis is that the domestic environment was (and still is) where the bulk of health 
care took place, utilising the unpaid labour of women in their 'natural' role of wife or 
mother. In terms of goverrimentality analysis, this assumption of gender in the 
provision of health care and the eligibility of individuals to receive state help is also 
part of the governance of health care in that it reflects the 'mentality' of governance. 
Governmentality analysis is concerned with uncovering the tacit assumptions that make 
governance amenable to rational discourse. Embedded within that rational discourse 
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are those unspoken assumptions about social status, race and gender which place limits 
on the production of policy. 
The origins of the NHS 
The discussion so far has presented a series of interventions and initiatives by policy 
makers that resulted in more and more of the population becoming eligible to receive 
state regulated health care. The situation by the early twentieth century is presented by 
Rose and Miller (1992) when they observe that: 
The programmes of social government that proliferated in the 
nineteenth century involved complex alliances between private and 
professional agents - philanthropists, charitable organisations, medics, 
polemicists and others, and the state - formed around problems arising 
in the multitude of sites with the social body. From the latter half of the 
nineteenth century onwards, these programmes, and the schemes they 
gave rise to, were gradually linked up to form the apparatus of the 
state. These connections were, no doubt, inspired by diverse aims and 
principles, but they appeared to offer a chance, or impose an obligation, 
for political authorities to calculate and calibrate social, economic and 
moral affairs and seek to govern them (Rose and Miller 1992: 191- 
192). 
The question that has to be addressed is how these different programmes 'inspired by 
diverse aims and pfinciples' came together in 1948 to become the NHS? However, 
perhaps this is the wrong question to ask, as it presupposes a historical, almost 
evolutionary, process at work. The more cogent question is what were the 
circumstances in which the problematisation of governance could shift so as to 
construct the NES as a rational solution to the problem of liberal health governance? 
Providing an answer to this question is central to the govemmentality form of analysis. 
The same question will be posed later with regards to the NHS reform process in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. It is argued here that these major changes for the NHS are 
inextricably linked to shift in the underlying formula of governance. 
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British health governance between the Wars 
No event as momentous as the creation of the NHS happens out-of-the-blue, and the 
NHS is no exception. As early as 1905 the socialist activists Sidney and Beatrice Webb 
in a Minority Report attached to the Royal Commission on the Poor Law had argued 
for a national state-financed health care system. In the Years after the First World War 
there were several reports and Royal Commission findings that advocated the 
expansion of the National Insurance scheme to cover all the population. For example, 
in 1920 the Minister of Health's Consultative Council on Medical and Allied Services 
(the Dawson Report), argued that 'the best means of maintaining health and curing 
disease should be made available to all citizens' (quoted in Klein 1995: 4). This was 
joined by other reports that either pointed out the deficiencies of the existing system or 
called for a national health care system. As Ham (1992) summarises: 
Later reports from the Royal Commission National Health Insurance in 
1926, the Sankey Commission on Voluntary Hospitals in 1937, and the 
British Medical Association (BMA) in 1930 and 1938, all pointed to 
shortcomings in the existing pattern of services, and made various 
suggestions for change. These included the need for greater co- 
ordination of hospitals, and for the extension of health insurance to 
other groups of the population. The Royal Commission' report also 
suggested that health service funding might eventually be derived from 
general taxation instead of being based on the insurance principle (Ham 
1992: 13-14). 
In his account of the creation of the NHS, Klein (1995) argues that all of these reports 
amounted to a convergence of opinion that some form of collective provision of health 
care was the best solution for maintaining public health. Klein describes this consensus 
as: 
the movement in ideas which made it seem inevitable that some kind of 
national health service would eventually evolve - dictated, as it were, by 
the logic of circumstances, rather than by the ideology of politicians or 
the demands of pressure groups. Basically, tfiýs consensus embodied 
agreement on two linked assumptions. These were that the provision of 
health care in Britain, as it had grown up over the decades, was both 
inadequate and irrational (Klein 1995: 2). 
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In terms of governmentality analysis Klein's overly deterministic account is inadequate. 
The idea that the NHS was 'inevitable' leaves more questions than it answers. Klein 
points out that the increasing technical nature of health care and the ad hoc 
arrangement for funding general and hospital services meant that the status quo was 
unsustainable. He suggests that because of these circumstance, the NHS emerged from 
a combination of benign paternalism and a technical exercise informed by a kind of 
administrative rationalism (see Ranad6 1997). 
Governmentality analysis would suggest that this rationale is problematic on two 
counts. The first is the danger with this form of historical rationalisation of creating 
consensus where none really existed. Taking the creation of the NUS as a logical end- 
point and then working back through the historical record will tend to privilege those 
pieces of evidence that seem to fit a pre-determined pattern and minimise the 
importance of those which do not. The second point to be made is that even if Klein is 
entirely correct when he identifies a convergence in rhetoric leading up to the creation 
of the NES, the question still arises of why did it occur at that particular time and why 
did it take so long for things to change, remembering that the Dawson Report was 
produced as early as 1920? What had changed in the meantime to make the NHS a 
rational solution to the problem of health governance? 
A new formula of health governance 
One of the strengths of governmentality analysis is that the questions posed at the end 0 
of the previous section form an intrinsic part of the analytical framework. For example, 
using goverDmentality analysis it becomes apparent that the technical problems which 
Klein identifies around funding and technology are not the exogenous variables they at 
first seem. The analysis identifies them as the epiphenomena of a particular form of 
health governance in which embedded medical expertise was allowed to develop a 
pattern of health care provision that reflected the hierarchical structures within that 
profession. As mentioned earlier, Klein observed that the pre-NHS provision of health 
care services was 'both inadequate and irrational'. The gulf between the 61ite teaching 
hospitals and the local infirmaries, once part of the Poor Law system, was immense. 
Not only in terms of the quality of care on offer but in the geographical distribution of 
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services. Clearly there was much scope for reform, but how did the NHS become the 
preferred solution? It could be argued that in this respect the notion of a developing 
consensus is slightly misleading. There were unquestionably consistent calls for reform 
but it is equally apparent that not all of the reformers had the goal of creating a health 
care system that was collective, comprehensive and state-funded, covering the whole 
population. Many of the calls for change were based on rationales that were mutually 
antagonistic. For example, while the BMA advocated changes based on the extension 
of insurance coverage to include almost all of the population, at the same time, it 
vehemently opposed state funding. This was perceived as a threat to both professional 
autonomy and to income derived from private practice. Clearly, it is not enough to just 
list the ideas for reform and expect them to form a coherent whole. The coherence 
comes from understanding how these articulations of a new form of health care 
provision reflect a change in the problematisation of rule that makes a reform process 
meaningful. 
The end of classical liberal governance 
The political and economic context that gave rise to the articulations of reform have 
been alluded to earlier in previous sections of the chapter. The social unrest at the 
beginning of the century, described earlier by Stacey, gave way to the horrors of the 
First World War. In economic terms the war was followed by a period of economic 
expansion. However, this proved to be short lived. The General Strike of 1926 saw 
unparalleled industrial strife which was later overshadowed by the looming spectre of 
mass unemployment in the 1930s. The factors that were at the root of this of this 
economic and social unrest have been debated endlessly, but one of the key 
components was undoubtedly the strict adherence to classical economic policies by 
successive governments in the 1920s and 1930s. The classical economic response to 
economic upheaval was to tighten control of monetary policy and maintain low public 
spending. However, the economic orthodoxies of the nineteenth century no longer 
seemed to fit the post-war circumstances in which Britain found itself. The return to 
the gold standard in 1925 until 1931 (when economic pressure forced a humiliating 
retreat), was a vain attempt to retain Britain's imperial status as a leading reserve 
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currency. The downturn in global markets left governments with little choice but to 
tighten monetary policy and protect their own markets. This had the inevitable effect of 
exacerbating unemployment and further reducing economic growth. 
This was the context in which calls for health reform were taking place. Moreover, it 
also provides the rationale for why early calls for reform had only a limited impact. The 
inescapable problem is that state health care systems necessarily increase public 
spending. As Allsop (1995) states: 
Following the Royal Commission on National Health Insurance in 1926, 
one of the stumbling blocks to the assumptions of state responsibility 
had been the fear of the high level of public expenditure to which the 
central government would become committed (Allsop 1995: 25). 
Such an open-ended commitment would be anathema to policy makers basing their 
calculations on classical economic theory. The inter-war years saw public spending 
running at about 25-27% of GDP, much higher that the 10- 12% average of the two 
decades before the war, therefore the pressure was to cut public spending not to 
increase it. This inability to articulate a reform process within the prevailing economic 
paradigm is the key to understanding why it took so long for radical change to be 
initiated. A comprehensive universal health care system was incompatible with classical 
economic theory. Therefore, a reform process could only become meaningful within a 
new problematisation of liberal governance and a new economic paradigm. Such an 
alternative paradigm was already in existence in the form of Keynesian economic 
theory. Keynes's theory, developed in such works as A Reatise oil Money (193 0) and 
The General Aeoty of Employment, Interest andIfoi7ey (193 6), presented a re- 
articulation of how capitalist economies function. At its centre was the radical notion 
that economic systems had no automatic tendency to seek equilibrium and full 
employment. The logic of this argument meant that it was the duty of the government 
to intervene in the economy to influence demand as well as supply. Higher levels of 
public spending were therefore no longer anathema but positively encouraged. 
Further-more, it provided a rationale for governments to engage in new forms of social 
policy to counter the more egregious inequalities that arise in the distribution of 
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economic resource within capitalist economies. Clearly the distribution of health 
resources also falls within this remit. 
By the late 1930s it would appear that all the factors were in place to produce a new 
national health system. The ground had already been prepared by the calls for reform 
from sources inside the policy making community which reflected a new articulation of 
liberal capitalism in the form of Keynesian economic theory. What is more, the 
orthodoxies of classical economics and the formulas of governance which it sustained, 
had demonstrably failed to meet the new challenge of mass unemployment and 
economic depression. However, despite all these elements coming together at the same 
time it needed the catalyst of another World War to break the political and economic 
logjam. The experience of mass unemployment giving way to mass mobilisation under 
a war-time command economy increased optimism that peacetime Keynesian 
economics would succeed where the previous form of governance had failed. 
In this respect, the Beveridge Report of 1942 can be represented as the clearest and 
most influential articulation of a new form of liberal governance based on the virtues of 
solidarity and collective responsibility that would finally overcome the 'five giants' that 
had plagued pre-war Britain - Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness. And as 
part of the measures to tackle the ills of the past, new institution had to be created, the 
most important being a National Health Service that would be free at the point of 
delivery and cover the whole population.. Plainly, this was a radical departure from the 
pre-war organisation of government-sponsored health services which concentrated on 
specific groups within the population, such as the working poor and their families. The 
case was made earlier that the nature of these earlier health services had an overt 
regulatory element aimed at managing the potential threat from a volatile section of the 
populace. In contrast, the new form of welfarism outlined by Beveridge was based on a 
form of collective social insurance. This shifl in the subject of health governance is one 
of the key aspects of governmentality analysis. The important point which must be 
reiterated is that when the discourse of health governance changes so do the subjects 
of that regulated and disciplined by that discourse. To illustrate this point, Rose (1993) 
observes that health governance within the new welfare liberal problematisation of rule 
employed its own kind of regulatory discipline: 
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Social insurance is an inclusive technology of government... It 
incamates social solidarity, collectivising the management of the 
individual and collective dangers posed by the economic riskiness of a 
capricious system of wage labour, and the corporeal riskiness of a body 
subject to sickness and injury, under the stewardship of a 'social' state. 
And it enjoins solidarity in that the security of the individual across the 
vicissitudes of a life history is guaranteed by a mechanism which 
personifies what citizens share by virtue of their common sociality. 
Social insurance thus establishes new connection and associations 
between 'public' norms and procedures and the fate of individuals in 
their 'private' economic and personal conduct (Rose 1993: 293). 
This new formula of welfare liberalism establishes a new discourse of governance, 
creating a bounded rational space in which lived reality becomes open to political 
deliberation. However, as argued in Chapters 3 and 5, the discursive space of 
governance may appear to be totalising (indeed needs to appear as totalising in order 
to function), but in reality there is a limit to what the discourse can describe. Because 
of the existence of a non-discursive 'residue' (see Fox 1997), it is not possible to 
predict how the institutions of governance develop their internal structures. Ham 
(1992), working within a different theoretical framework, captures some of the essence 
of this problem when he states that: 
the administrative structure of the NHS which came into being in 1948 
was the product of the bargaining and negotiation which had taken 
place in the policy community in the proceeding years. It was therefore r), 
a representation of what was possible rather that what might have been 
desirable (Ham 1992: 15-16). 
It is in these circumstances that the ideas of Granovetter (1985; 1992) discussed in the 
previous chapter, come to the fore. He describes the process of construction of 
institutions as the 'mobilisation of resources through social networks, conducted... 
against the background of constraints given by the previous historical development of 
society, polity, market, and technology' (Granovetter and Swedberg 1992: 18). Tws 
process can be seen exemplified in the creation of the institution of the NHS. The 
production of the White Paper A Natioizal Health Sei-vice in 1944 created an arena 
where the resources of the medical profession, politicians and civil servants could be 
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mobilised through network relationships to construct some sort of compromise. The 
main stumbling block was the vexed question of professional autonomy within a state 
funded system. Many of the reforms included in the White Paper provoked vehement 
hostility from a medical profession who perceived the new institution as a treat to 
income and professional status. Although the political manoeuvring that went on to 
persuade doctors to sign up to the new systemwas in many ways an astute piece of 
negotiation, a subtle combination of brinkmanship with a policy of 'divide and 
conquer', the final arrangements for doctors were highly favourable to the profession. 
Hospital doctors would have significant control over their conditions of employment 
(which included self-regulated merit awards), consultants could still continue to see 
private patients and there would be special status for teaching hospitals. In the much 
quoted words of Aneurin Bevan he had gained support for his proposals by 'stuffing 
their mouths with gold' (see Allsop 1995: 27). The concessions to general practitioners 
were equally as significant, perhaps in the long run even more so. GPs were able to 
maintain their status as independent contractors and receive a guaranteed income 
through a capitation formula. 
Within govemmentality analysis the generosity of the compromises offered to the 
medical profession is indicative of their central importance in the governance of health 
care as part of a regulatory form of expertise. In Chapter 4, it was argued that that the 
more a form of expertise is associated with the functioning of the formal state, ie 
within an institution such as the NUS which is state funded and state owned, then the 
more autonomy has to be given to those who utilise that expertise in order for it to 
function. Formulas of liberal governance, by their nature, distinguish between those 
domains which are the appropriate arena of formal political activity and those domains 
which are private, inhabited by autonomous self-regulating individuals and their 
families. Within forms of welfare liberalism this private/non-political domain is 
regulated through the use of expertise as a 'neutral' body of scientific knowledge (see 
Osborne 1997). Therefore, the formal state cannot be seen to directly regulating the 
private/non-political domain without compromising the use of a particular form of 
expertise as a regulatory technology. However, there are many problematic aspects to 
this arrangement. 0 
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To restate the position, governmentality analysis maintains that the NES can be viewed 
as one 'solution' to the problem of providing health care within the confines of a 
welfare liberal form of government discourse. However, it is a 'solution' that only 
creates a new set of problems in the functioning of health governance. One of the 
greatest problems is that the prominence of autonomous of expertise in the delivery of 
health care allows for only limited managerial control over the actions of those who 
utilise that expertise. Autonomous professions tend to develop 'enclosed' structures 
that make it difficult for those outside the profession to challenge the decisions made 
by experts. The second problem is that as institutions are formed, or as Granovetter 
describes, as they 'harden' and 'thicken' and finally becomes 'the way things are done" 
(Granovetter and Swedberg 1992: 17), there is a tendency for the closed nature of 
profession structures to define the ethos of the institution. Moreover, network 
relationships that were so important in shaping the compromises that led up to the 
founding of the institution become one of the few sources of governmental control. 
However, this mechanism also works in reverse so that professional interests can 
influence policy making at the highest level. 
Taken to, -, ether, it is clear that government cannot simply impose its will on institutions 
defined in terms of professional relationships. Therefore, the irony is that institutions of 
welfarism that depend on expertise, such as the NES, cannot be controlled from the 
centre even though they are the products of an economic paradigm that allows for 
direct government intervention. Therefore, the NFIS 'solution' only gives rise to a new 
set of tensions between central government and medical expertise over bureaucratic 
control over the health care system. This problem of control is highlighted by Rose and 
Miller (1992) who argue that: 
[W]elfare was not a coherent mechanism that would enable the 
unfolding of a central plan. The networks were assembled from diverse 
and oflen antagonistic components, from the warring Whitehall 
Departments to peripheral and ad hoc agencies. This was no 'state 
apparatus', but a composition of fragile and mobile relationships and 
dependencies making diverse attempts to link the aspirations of 
authorities with the lives of individuals. Assembling and maintaining 
such networks entailed struggles, alliances and competitions between 
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different groups for resources, recognition and power. The problem 
posed for the next thirty years, for those aspiring to form a 'centre' 
from which the welfare apparatus could be governed, was one of 
regulating those who claimed discretionary power because of their 
professional or bureaucratic power (Rose and Miller 1992: 193). 
This struggle for bureaucratic control has been central to many of the disputes that 
have plagued the NHS since its inception as an institution of welfare liberal 
governance. The management structures that were put in place by the 1946 Health 
Services Act offered little in the way of strategic central control mechanism. 
Management was fractured rather that centralised. There were 'Executive Councils' 
that supervised GPs and other primary care practitioners such as dentists, pharmacists 
and opticians. Local Authorities still had responsibility for a range of services including 
maternity and child welfare, health visitors and vaccination and immunisation services. 
On the hospital side several bodies were created to oversee the running of various 
aspects of the service. For example, there were 'Regional Health Boards' (14 in all), 
with responsibility for managing the bulk of hospital services through 'Hospital 
Management Committees'. The exceptions were the teaching hospitals which were 
administered by boards of governors. Although, these new structures were more 
streamlined than the collection of disparate organisations that governed pre-NHS 
health care, at their heart lay the same dilemma that had troubled earlier forms of 
management. The problem was that while clinicians were free to make the decisions 
that ultimately determined the allocation of resources they themselves were not 
responsible for managing those resources. In this respect the new management 
structures offered only weak oversight. Moreover, because of the newness of the 
service many of the parameters of managerial responsibility had yet to be worked out. 
As Bevan observed in 1945 of the new management organisations, 'admittedly this is a 
field in which there is room for development in the technique of government, but the 
problems that will arise should not be incapable of solution' (Memorandum by the 
Minister of Health 1945; quoted in Klein 1995: 18). 
Two points can be made with reference to the limits of early NHS management. The 
first is that despite many achievements in rationalising hospital services, such as the 
better use made of infectious disease hospitals and the amalgamation of local authority 
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and voluntary hospitals (see Ham 1992), very little had changed in the distribution of 
health care resources from that inherited from the pre-NHS service. As Allsop (1995) 
points out: 
[t]here was almost no capital investment in the new hospitals or major 
rebuilding. So the marked inequalities in the distribution of hospitals 
and beds which had been a feature of the pre-war service remained. 
Forty-five per cent of the hospitals had in fact been built before 1891 
and were deteriorating rapidly (Allsop 1995: 40). 
It was not until the Hospital Plan initiative in 1962 that large amounts of resources 
were committed to the problem of the uneven distribution of hospital services 
throughout the country. In terms of the distribution of financial resource for health 
care services, this did not come until the Resource Allocation Working Party (RAWP) 
was set up in 1976. The aim of the RAWP policy was to produce a fiinding formula 
that would allow, over time, an equitable distribution of resources between regions. 
The funding formula has been revised several times since, both in response to 
methodological criticisms and to 'fine tune' the formula and make it more sensitive to 
local health needs (see Sheldon and Carr-Hill 1992; Peacock 1995). The current 
amended formula was introduced in 1995 in time for the resource allocation for 
1995/6. 
The second point to be made about limited managerial control over how resource 
decisions are made within the health system is that it leaves politicians the difficult 
problem of deciding the appropriate level of global funding. The early history of the 
NHS is characterised by a concern that health care costs were getting out of control. 
The notion in the Beveridge Report that demands on health care would be self-limiting 
as the population became healthier were providing to be illusory. For example the 
expenditure on the NHS in 1952-3 was 1393 million, a great deal more than the 1170 
million anticipated by Beveridge (Watkin 1978). Political pressures began to build up. 
In 1951 Bevan resigned from the cabinet in protest at charges for optical services and 
dental work that had been imposed to limit spending on the NHS to L400 million (see 
Klein 1995: 3 1). The Guillebaud Committee, set up in 1952 to inquire into the cost of 
the NHS, was more sanguine about rapid increases in the health care budget, pointing 
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out that much of the increase was due to increases in general prices. Indeed, in 1951 to 
1955 the NHS budget experienced real growth of only 1.1%, and in the next five years 
by 2.1 %. It was only in the 1960s that growth reached the 3% level and this in part 
was due to the building of the much needed new hospitals as part of the 1962 Hospital 
Plan. However, the feeling that NHS spending could easily get out of control was not 
assuaged by statistics. For the politicians who were (and are) held to account for the 
services the setting of health care budgets would always remain a problem. As Enoch 
Powell observed during his tenure as Minister of Health, it had become: 
a positive ethical duty for (providers) to besiege and bombard the 
government and force or shame them into providing more money... and 
more money again (Powell 1966; quoted in Ranade 1997: 2). 
With no mechanism in place to act as a buffer between the constant demand for more 
and more resources from clinicians and calls to limit public spending from the 
Treasury, any public perception that the health service is not meeting the health needs 
of the population is quickly translated into the rhetoric of 'crisis'. Therefore, the 
management of 'crisis', nationally and locally, itself becomes part of the governance of 
the health care system. 
New forms of health care management 
The latter comments again illustrate one of the key aspects of governmentality analysis 
- that tension between autonomous expertise and bureaucratic control is characteristic 
of liberal forms of governance. As noted earlier, this is especially true of the NHS 
where medical expertise was embedded in its institutional structure from the outset. 
Therefore, governmentality analysis suggests that the problem of control over the NHS 
is indissoluble linked to the relationship between the centre and autonomous expertise. 
However, as stated in Chapter 4, the centre/expertise relationship does not imply a 
forrn of 'dualism'. It has to be reaffirmed that in governmentality analysis the role of 
the state and the function of autonomous expertise are basically two aspects of the 
same form of governance. Both are part of a regulatory process within a particular 
articulation of liberal rule. However, the nature of this relationship between these two 
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forms of regulation will be defined in terms of the dominant form of governance. When 
there is a shift in the problematisation of rule then there is an associated shift in the 
regulatory context in which expertise operates and its bureaucratic management. In the 
light of this, the following section of the chapter presents the governmentality 
argument that the problems in management of the NES at any one time are 
manifestations of the fundamental centre/expertise relationship within the governance 
of health care. The initial discussion will focus on major managerial initiatives in the 
1960 and 1970s that characterised the relationship between health service bureaucracy 
and medical professionals. 
In the 1960s, as the health care provision continued to expand in size and complexity, 
new concerns emerged about the role of management in the NHS. Klein (1995) 
attributes this emphasis on new administrative technologies to the possibilities that 
were opening up due to economic growth. As Klein argues: 
Consensus in the era of non-growth had meant making, the best of the 
statits quo. Consensus in an era of growth meant an opportunity to 
develop new policy tools and organisational formulas; to let experts 
loose on the problems that had been put into cold storage during the 
lean years (Klein 1995: 57). 
Whether the use of consensus is appropriate way of cbaracterising the relationship 
between the various element within the health services - medical, political and 
bureaucratic - is a moot point. The identification of economic growth as the impetus 
for a new kind of administrative rationale for the NHS has an intuitive appeal. 
However, in terms of the governmentality framework this form of explanation is seen 
to be deficient in that it fails to appreciate the limits of management as articulated 
within the governance of health care. It was noted in the previous section that the 
relationship between medical expertise and bureaucratic control often manifested itself 
in terms of disputes about global budgets. In many ways the management initiatives of 
the 1960s and 1970s were a response from the centre to limit the possibility of these 
conflicts escalating into 'crisis' proportions and causing political damage. However, 
what governmentality analysis highlights is that despite the adoption of new and 
sophisticated administrative frameworks the fundamental relationship between the 
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centre and medical expertise remained unchanged. The new administrative rationale 
provides no mechanisms for control over the decisions of individual medical 
professions which collectively determine resource allocation. 
To illustrate this point there will be a brief exploration of two notable examples of this 
new administrative rationale in action. The two examples are the Salmon Committee 
on the staffing structure for senior nurses in 1966 and the so-called 'Cogwheel' 
Reports from 1967 onwards, directed at generating a sensitivity to managerial issues 
within the medical profession. Each in their way demonstrate different aspects of 
managerialism when applied to the health service and the relationship between health 
service administration and the diverse groups within the NES that utilise medical 
knowledge. The key difference between these two initiatives is the nature of the 
relationship between the two groups that were the focus of these new managerial 
concerns. Whilst both nursing and clinicians share the same body of scientific medical 
knowledge only one of them is thought of as possessing all the attributes of an 
autonomous profession body employing regulatory expertise. This was reflected in the 
manner in which the Salmon Committee and the Cogwheel Working Party were 
constituted and their conclusions operationalised. 
For example, the Salmon Committee was chaired by a leading businessman, Brian 
Salmon from the food distributors Lyons, not by senior a health service nursing 
administrator. In contrast, the Cogwheel Working Parties were designed from the 
outset to have a significant input from medical professionals. This difference in 
structure was reflected in report findings. The Salmon Commýittee report recommended 
that there should be a division between nurse managers and nurse practitioners in order 
to bring about more effective managerial control over the nursing function. The 
interesting point is that health service management felt it could impose new 
administrative structures on increasingly unionised nursing staff without having to 
incorporate them into the decision making process that devised those changes. On the 
other hand, the Cogwheel Report limited itself to promoting a 'managerial 
consciousness in the medical profession' not the imposition of a managerial view 
(Allsop 1995: 45). As the first Cogwheel Report stated: 
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The hospital sector is the most complex, sophisticated and costly sector 
of the medical care services; problems of management proliferate in an I- 
organisation with many branches, many functions and many specialties; 
we believe that many clinicians fail to appreciate fully the importance of 
their role in management problems (Ministry of Health 1967; quoted in 
Allsop 1995: 45). 
The tone of the report reflects the power of the medical profession within the NHS to 
circumscribe managerial influence over areas traditionally within the remit of 
professional responsibility. Administrators could only ask clinicians to 'appreciate' the 
problems of management. They was no question of administrators imposing a new 
management structures or redefining the division of health care in which medical 
professional were situated. 
Although the Cogwheel Report and the Salmon Report represent only two of the 
numerous management initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s, they illustrate the problems 
for administrators seeking control of all aspects of health service activity. When faced 
with a autonomous form of medical expertise there appeared to be no articulation of 
management within the welfare liberal form of health governance to legitimately 
challenge clinical decisions. As Klein (1995) observes of the Cogwheel process: 
If all consultants became aware of the effects of their individual 
decisions on the total use of resources, it was argued, they would 
themselves have an incentive to apply pressure on colleagues who use 
their beds wastefully: it would make it clear that one consultant's 
extravagance was another consultant's loss (Klein 1995: 77). 1 
The reported marginal impact of the Cogwheel initiative (Watkin 1978) seems to have 
only exacerbated the problem for administrators of controlling resources within the 
health care system. The existence of professional expertise places limits on the 
legitimacy of managerial control over the (clinical) decisions making process. It is the 
collective impact of these professional decisions which ultimately determines the 
allocation of resources. Therefore, in these circumstances, efficiency initiatives can 
only be furthered by health service managers by devising optimal administrative 
structures that support and operationalise clinical decisions. In economic terms the 
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goal is productive efficiency - maximising activity within the constraints of the global 
budget. 
This search for productive efficiency and more efficient forms of organisation can be 
seen as the defining rationale behind the major NHS reorganisation of 1974. As Klein 
(1995) notes, the original organisational structure of the NHS with its separate set of 
administrative structures for hospitals, general practitioners and services provided by 
local authorities reflected 'political expediency, not administrative logic' (Klein 1995: 
82). The reorganisation sought to unify health service administration by creating 
Regional Health Authorities (RHAs). Within each region there were a number of Area 
Health Authorities (AHA), coterminous with local authorities, and with planning and 1. 
management responsibilities. Each AHA had a Family Practitioner Committee (FPC) to C) 
administer the contracts of GPs and other primary care practitioners such as dentist, 
pharmacists and opticians. Beneath this level of administration were the District 
Management Teams (DMTs), and in a concession to the prevailing concept of 
consumerism, each district had a Community Health Council (CHC) to represent 
patient interests (the role of CHCs is discussed in Chapter 8). The reorganisation had 
three main aims (see Ham 1992): to unify health services (with the exception of GPs) 
under the control of one authority; to co-ordinate activity with local authorities; and to 
introduce better management of the type initiated by the Salmon Report and the 
Cogwheel programme. C 
However, despite all best intentions the reorganisation was dubbed a failure. As Allsop 
(1995) observes: 
The 1974 reorganisation of the NHS had been an ambitious attempt to 
increase efficiency, priority setting and democracy in the NES. 
However, the effect of the reorganisation on those working in the NES 
was traumatic and the years following were associated with industrial 
disputes, public dissatisfaction and loss of financial control. The 
planning and management systems were soon seen to have failed. The 
response of the government was to set up a Royal Commission (Allsop 
1995: 55). 
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in many ways the 1974 reorganisation was a victim of its own ambition. For example, 
the administrative logic of coterminous boundaries between AHAs and local 
authorities was seductive but in practice this arrangement was fraught with difficulties. 
However, governmentality analysis would point to a more fundamental reason why the 
reorganisation was perceived to be unable to meet the goals it set itself of improved 
'efficiency, priority setting and democracy'. This was because the relationship between 
the centre and professional medical expertise had not been reorganised and nor could it 
within the particular form welfare liberal health governance in which the NES 
operated. Therefore, no new articulation of management responsibility evolved that 
could challenge entrenched medical power. Moreover, this was as equally true of the 
initial response of the incoming Conservative government 1979. Its White Paper 
Patients First proposed a new reorganisation, implemented in 1982, which replaced 
AHAs with smaller District Health Authorities more sensitive to the health needs of the 
local population. (The CHCs surviving relatively unscathed). This reorganisation 
corrected some of the administrative and organisational difficulties that were a direct 
result of the 1974 reorganisation but again it left the relationship with the medical 
profession and the centre substantially unaltered. 
The beginning of a new form of health governance 
As stated earlier, it is not the intention of this chapter to present a conventional 
historical narrative about the institutional development of the NHS. The primary aim of 
the chapter was to highlight the value of using a governmentality framework to analyse 
the role the NHS plays within a particular form of liberal health governance. 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the periodisation so far employed within 
governmentality analysis is not fundamentally different from more conventional 
accounts of the development of the NES - even if the basic dynamics of change do 
differ radically. The sequence of creation, consolidation and crisis is shared with many 
histories of the NHS, such as Klein (1995), Allsop (1995), and Webster (1998). 
However, when it comes to chronicling the period of radical change for the NHS in the 
1980s and 1990s there is a divergence between conventional accounts and 
govemmentality analysis. The problematic period begins with the arrival of the 
Thatcher government in 1979 and the identification of this event as a watershed in the 
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political, social and economic life of Britain. Clearly this was the beginning of a major 
restructuring of the political landscape. However, governmentality analysis makes the 
key distinction between changes in the underlying problematisation of liberal rule and 
changes in the governance of health care. In other words, the Thatcher government 
may signify a fundamental shift within liberal governance from welfare liberalism to 
neo-liberalism, but this does not imply that there will be a simultaneous shift within all 
areas of governance, in particular health care governance and its institutions. It will be 
argued that changes in the governance of health care that reflect the shift within liberal 
rule could only take place once a new conceptualisation of the regulatory role of health 
care within neo-liberalism had evolved. Moreover, this shift is signalled by a new 
relationship with medical expertise and the creation of new set of subjects for the 
health discourse. 
Previous chapters have outlined the radical nature of the Thatcher and Major 
governments, so in this section there will be only a brief description of the changes that 
took place in the NHS under these regimes. The most important function of this 
section is to draw parallels with the situation in the 1930s and the calls for reforms to 
the health system described earlier in the chapter. The main parallel is the sense of 
failure that preceded both these times of radical change. In the 1930s it was the failure 
of classical economics, in the 1970s it was the failure of Keynesian demand 
management. The Thatcher governments were unashamedly neo-liberal in character, 
privileging 'the market' as the dominant aspect of the political economy. In the 1980s 
the policy of privatisation and encouragement for citizens to became part of a 'share 
owning democracy' were the leilmolivs of government policy. However, when it came 
to the NES the government was more cautious. As Mohan (1995) observes: 
[The White Paper] Patients First (DHSS 1979) did not recommend any 
departure from the then system of consensus management; nor did the 
Royal Commission. However, an implicit goal of the 1982 
reorganisation was an attack on the 'unnecessary proliferation' of 
administrative posts after the 1974 reorganisation, while the 1982 
reorganisation was also accompanied by strict management cost limits 
for health authorities. It was not until 1983 and publication of the 
Griffiths Report that the question of management appeared on the 
political agenda (Mohan 1995: 59). 
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The Griffiths Report of 1983 was indeed a radical document in its call for more 
efficient and effective forms of management. This is summed up in the oft-quoted 
comment by Griffiths that 'if Florence Nightingale were carrying her lamp through the 
corridors of the NHS today she would almost certainly be searching for the people in 
charge' (Griffiths 1983: 12). The Griffiths Report advocated the idea of a 'general 
management' process to stimulate management and to provide leadership and 
responsibility. One of the other key recommendations was that clinicians should be 
encouraged to become part of the decision-making about providing services, in part as 
recognition that clinicians were the 'natural managers' because of their closeness to the 
actual management of patient care (ibid.: 19). To further this aim concepts such as 
cresource management' and 'management budgeting' were devised as a means of 
involving clinicians in management decision making. The success, or lack of success, of 
these Griffiths related initiatives have been thoroughly explored by other commentators 
(see Cox 1991; Flynn 1992; Harrison et al. 1992; Harrison and Pollitt 1994). However, 
there are two things which have to be addressed when discussing the Griffiths Report. 
The first is that the Report does represent something of a harbinger of the changes that 
were yet to come. The Report reflects a model of management derived from the harsh 
environment of the commercial marketplace. It is a model based not on encouraging 
consensus but of providing strong leadership and clear lines of authority. This leads to 
the second point to be made which was also raised in Chapter 4, that despite its 
radicalism, the Griffiths report is in much the same tradition as the Cogwheel Reports 
of the 1960s and 1970s. The call for the incorporation of clinicians into manaQement 
structures does not represent a re-articulation of the problem of health governance. 
The relationship between the medical profession, as practitioners of a form of 
regulatory expertise, and the state remains the same as it had done since the founding 0 ID 
of the NES in 1948. As such, the Griffiths Report does not reflect a new form of (neo- 
liberal) health governance. 
The obvious problem this creates for governmentality analysis is in providing a 
rationale for the apparent difference between the periodisation. identified with the shifl 
in the fundamental problematisation. of rule, and the subsequent shift from a welfare 
liberal to neo-liberalism form of health governance. In the mid-1940s there was a clear 
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link between the shift from classical liberalism to welfare liberalism and the creation of 
the NES and the welfare state. However, it is equally apparent that the analogous shift 
in liberalism and the rise of neo-liberal economics in the 1970s and 1980s was not 
immediately accompanied by a radical restructuring of the NBS even though other 
parts of the welfare system had been subject to fundamental change. It was not until 
the late 1980s that the major reform process attempted to change the NHS into an 
institution reflecting neo-liberal values. The obvious difference between 1948 and the 
1980s was the absence of the crystallising factor of a major world war. The other 
difference was that by the 1980s the NHS had become firmly embedded in the social 
and political fabric of the country and no coherent articulation of neo-liberal health 
governance had evolved. Therefore, for the Conservative governments of the 1980s 
and 1990s, the management of the NHS was never going to be less than highly 
political. The fear that the service might be privatised prompted frequent assurances 
that the NUS was 'safe in their hands'. Even so, this did not protect the government 
from the political impact of a series of 'crises' in NHS in the 1980s and from the 
perception that the service was in turmoil as a direct result of Conservative 
stewardship. 
In other areas of government activity the neo-liberal rhetoric of the market and 
consumer empowerment had resulted in a radical reduction in the involvement of the 
state in the provision of services. Clearly one of the rationales behind this process of 
de-coupling the state from the various aspects of the political economy was the hope 
that this would lead to a de-politicisation of administration (see Offe 1985). With the 
ccrises' in the NHS becoming increasingly damaging to the government's political 
standing, and with full-scale privatisation not a viable option, other means of managing 
the Service had to be devised. In many respects conventional accounts provide an 
invaluable insight into the key groupings and personalities that influenced policy 
formation in health care. However, from a governmentality perspective, what is 
missing from these accounts is an understanding of the problematisation of health 
governance which government policy seeks to address. In an earlier section of the 
chapter iswas argued that even in the mid-1980s no new articulation of health 
governance had evolved, especially in terms of the re-articulating relationship between 
formal state and autonomous medical expertise. However, in the late 1970s and early 
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1980s a new discourse of health economics was emerging and with it a different form 
of expertise that could be seen as a basis of a new form of health governance more in- 
keeping, %vith a neo-liberal economic paradigm. 
The importance of health economists to the policy process cannot be overestimated. It 
is perhaps no coincidence that the transition from welfare liberalism to neo-liberalism 
that begin in the 1970s was accompanied by a renewed interest in the economics of 
health care. Indeed, many commentators have remarked on the remark-able growth in 
the numbers of economists working within the increasingly well defined area of health 
economics in the 1970 s and 1980s (Ashmore et al. 1989; Colvin 1985). As Ashmore 
et al. state: 
... there was no community of 
health economists in Britain before 1970; 
even though there were undoubtedly several academic economists at 
that time who were professionally interested in health. Since that date 
an organised community has come into existence (Ashmore et al. 1999: 
5). 
This growing influence of health economics has major implications for the policy 
process. The shift in liberal governance created the opportunity for numerous forms of 
expertise, both new and old, to re-conceptualise their role as regulatory disciplines 
within a neo-liberal framework. This was doubly important for the discipline of health 
economics. Whereas health care in the past was always considered to be inherently 
problematic for economics theory (see Arrow 1963), the work of health economists 
increasingly made it amenable to a rational, and therefore 'neutral', economic 
discourse. As stated earlier, the use of 'neutral' expertise provides a regulatory 
discipline that potentially could begin a process of de-coupling of the state from direct 
invention in the administration of health care that would ultimately lead to its de- 
politicisation. 
Clearly such an outcome would appear attractive to a government suffering political 
damage from the perception that their stewardship was damagging to the health care 2- 
system, as was the case for the Conservative government in the 1980s. Therefore, it 
would appear that it was in the best interest of government to incorporate the 'neutral' 
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expertise of health economics into the discussion of health policy. In this respect, with 
the acquiescence of central government, Ashmore et al. identify three strategies 
adopted by this forra of economic expertise in furtherance of their discipline. The first 
was an 'educative strategy' designed to persuade health practitioners of the merits of 
economic concepts when applied to health care. The second, and main strategy 
Ashmore et al. identify, was to directly influence the policy making process by acting 
within the health care bureaucracy or acting as consultants to it. The third strategy was 
to encourage a public debate about the economics of health service provision. The 
effectiveness of these strategies is clear from the absorption of key concepts from 
economic theory, such as efficiency and cost-effectiveness, into the mainstream debate 
about the policy direction for the NUS. The outcome of this influence is that 
increasingly many forms of analysis unconsciously adopted an essentially economic 
discourse when discussing health policy. The emergent debate often revolving around 
the 'reality' of rationing health care in the NES and whether it is best done implicitly 
or explicitly -a concept which only has meaning within an economic discourse. 
However, as Chapter 5 also demonstrated, re-conceptualising health care in economic 
terms has major implications elsewhere, particularly in terms of the subject of the new 
health discourse - the relationship with medical expertise and the strategic aims of 
management within the health care system. 
Using a governmentality framework, therefore, emphasises the influence of economics 
in re-conceptualising the policy arena and points to the functional role of health 
economists as a group that uses and institutionalises a form of regulatory expertise 
within neo-liberal health governance. The strategy of health economists (described by 
Ashmore et al. above) is, therefore an implicit part of a new articulation of policy that 
re-problematises the governance of health care. However, it is one thing to transform 
the abstract domain in which political thought is conceptualised, it is quite another to 
devise practical policy options that operationalise the new problematisation of neo- 
liberal health governance. This becomes especially difficult when it involves 
transforming institutions, such as the NES, which were created as part of the previous 
form of liberal governance. However, by the 1980s there were many groups, 
principally on the political right such as the Institute for Economic Affairs and the 
Adam Smith Institute, who had produced radical plans for restructuring the NES, for 
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example through the use of voucher schemes or 'opting-out' of the state system for the 
equivalent in private insurance cover. However, whilst many of these schemes were 
considered not to be viable options, they did extend the process of re-problematising 
health governance in terms of neo-liberal ideology. One of the more influential 
elements of this re-problematisation was provided by the American academic Alain 
Enthoven (1985). He suggested that the 'gridlock' in the NES could be eased with the 
use of concept of an 'internal' or 'quasi' market within the NHS. In his formulation, 
consumers would be free to choose a health care provider, modelled on the Health 
Maintenance Organisation (HMO) system in the US, who would be then free to 
purchase health care services from whichever source they deemed most appropriate. 
The only limit on purchasing was the fixed budget allocated to each HMO-type 
provider. 
The idea of the internal market proved to be a potent concept. In 1989, after a six 
month review process, the government produced the White Paper Mm-kingfor 
Palien1s. In this document it was proposed that an internal market be constructed 
within the NHS. Unlike the Enthoven model, the purchasing function would be 
assigned to District Health Authorities and Family Health Service Authorities 
(responsible for GP budgets), with providers formed from existing providers, some 
given new semi-independent Trust status others, temporarily, to be Directly Managed 
Units under Health Authority control. In a concession to the merits of the HMO 
model, some GPs could claim 'fundholding' status and control their own budgets. 
Many of the consequences of these radical reforms have been discussed in previous 
chapters. However, although radical policies have been applied to the NHS before, 
Workingfor Patients arguably reflects a new form of governance of health care. Just 
as in the 1930s and 1940s a set of circumstances had come together to create a new 
discourse of liberal governance. In particular, the new role of Health Authorities to 
purchase health services to meet local health needs widens the debate about the 
governance of health care considerably. Using the language of economics and 
especially health economics, the commissioning of services to meet that need implies a 
form of strategic purchasing that seeks to maximise outcomes given limited resources. 
Unlike previous forms of management where the aim was productive efficiency, the 
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new imperative is to produce allocative efficiency. In other words, the setting of 
priorities for health care spending. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has placed the development of the NHS within the theoretical context of 
governmentality analysis. However, as the first part of the chapter illustrated, the use 
of historical data in support of an analysis that explicitly rejects the notion of narrative 
does give rise to a number of problems. The two principal problems being the use of 
periodisation. within the governmentality framework and the role played by the policy 
process in shaping the articulation of governance. It is apparent that the 
governmentality approach to periodisation and process represents a radical departure 
from conventional accounts of NHS formation and function. Governmentality analysis 
emphasises the changing nature of the problematisation of rule that gives the NIHS 
meaning as a locus of regulatory technologies and expertise (both medical and non- 
medical). In doing so it highlights the discontinuities between different 
problematisations of liberal governance. However, it was argued that the contingent 
factors which determine institutional formation often produce a discrepancy between 
the periodisation identified with one problematisations of rule and the periodisation 
identified with institutional change. Therefore, institutions such as the NHS, created as 
a 'solution" to the problems of delivering health care within welfare liberalism, may 
initially be unaffected by a shift to new form of governance. It is only when a new set 
of concepts specific to health care governance has evolved that institutions such as the 
NHS can be made amenable to political calculation within the new problematisation of 
liberal rule. 
The latter part of the chapter described how the 'welfare liberal' formula of 
governance had shifted in the 1970s and 1980s and had been transformed into a new 
formula of governance based on ideas derived from neo-liberal economic theory. The 
implications of this new form of governance in terms of health care have been 
discussed in other chapters. It was argued that the re-problematisation of governance 
in terms of economic axioms creates a new range of subjects for the health discourse 
and produces new technologies of regulation. In particular, the de-collectivisation of 
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social insurance transfers the burden of risky behaviour on to the individual (see 
Chapter 3). Therefore, the management of risk also becomes a form of health 
governance. Additionally, this re-calculation of risk, combined with the new 
technologies of regulation such as health economics, audit and effectiveness criteria 
(see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5), produces a potentially more explicit means of managing 
priorities in the health care system. In the next two chapters further empirical evidence 
from primary research will be used to evaluate the impact of the reform process 
initiated by the 1989 White Paper [Voi-kingfol- Patients, that reflects a neo-liberal 
formula of health governance. The analysis will focus on new forms of managing the 
system, including the management of expertise, and the re-conceptualisation of the 
subject of the health discourse as the basis of the decision making process. 
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Chapter 7 
The local governance of health: discourses and practices 
Introduction 
The previous chapter described how the NHS has in recent years undergone a radical 
'reform' process based on the organisational principles derived from 'free market' 
economic theory. Given that the Conservative administrations of the 1980s and 1990s 
were to some degree ideologically committed to 'rolling back the state, the 
employment of radical free market ideas and the advocacy of market solutions to social 
problems only exacerbated the concerns of those in the centre and on left of the 
political spectrum that the NHS, the symbol of post-war welfarism, was about to be 
"privatised' by stealth. The split in provider and purchaser functions and the 
introduction of the 'internal market' in health care, inevitably led to the suspicion that 
this was the precursor to a form of privatisation similar to that which befell many 
previously state owned enterprises and utilities. As event have proved, fears of 
privatisation have been largely unfounded. The NES continued its near monopoly of 
health care provision and remained state owned and state financed, and true to its 
founding principle of free treatment at the point of service. 
However, this is not to say that the reforms have left the NES unaltered. The reforms 
process introduced many new forms of regulatory technology, such as clinical/medical 
audit, evidence based medicine, contracting - and especially commissioning, which 
were new to the organisation's cultures (both managerial and clinical) that previously 
characterised the provision of health carewithin the Health Service. The novelty of 
these new organisational structures, combined with the speed of introduction, meant 
that they were largely untested and their effect on the NHS unpredictable. The research 
outlined in this and the next chapter, directly engages with the debate generated by the 
reform process. The findings are analysed in the context of the theoretical framework 
derived from the Foucauldian concept of governmentality described in some detail in 
previous chapters. Govemmentality seeks to investigate the way in which forms of 
governance are made tangible realities within a power/k-nowledge discourse. in this 
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context, the health reforms of the 1980s, and particular the 1990s, are viewed as 
mark-in), a shift within the discursive space of health governance. It is argued that there g 
has been a shift away from a 'welfare liberal' form of governance, as represented by 
the pre-reform NES, to a post-reform neo-liberal formula of governance. 
However, as highlighted in the previous chapter, the use of govemmentality analysis 
has major implications for the collection of empirical data. The problems associated 
with periodisation associated with the different fornaulas of liberal rule within 
govemmentality only add to the dilemma of deciding to present data either in support 
of a snapshot view or a longitudinal study. The difficulty with govemmentality in this 
respect, as already stated, is that the analysis is predicated on uncovering and 
understanding shifts that take place in the problematisation of liberal governance. 
When shifts in the problematisation occur so do shifts in the concomitant regulatory 
discourse of governance and with it the concepts and categories that make lived reality 
open to political calculation. Therefore, it is clear that conventional 
historicaUlongitudinal studies run the risk of misinterpreting the evidence by 
emphasising continuity when in fact the phenomena under investigation may have 
changed in meaning and function over the time period of the study. 
However, the analysis of change over time is still important to governmentality analysis 
for other reasons. Again in the previous chapter it was noted that the policy process 
itself Plays an important function in generating the categories and concepts that form 
the basic discursive elements of a particular problematisation of governance. 
Moreover, it was argued that the analysis and discussion of policy provides a key locus 
where new problems arise which are only resolvable through the transition to a new 
form of governance. However, evidence for this change cannot be obtained simply and 
directly from primary sources by interview data for example, because this would be in 
effect the same as asking the respondent to think extra-discursively. Therefore, because 
of the inherent difficulties of longitudinal evidence within governmentality analysis, the 
two inter-linked functions for the policy process can only be accessed by recourse to 
secondary sources. These include commentaries and analysis of the contemporary 
policy process and longitudinal studies using conventional forms of analysis. 
Nonetheless, as the previous chapter outlined, using data in this way does imply a 
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critique of conventional accounts of policy formation by emphasising the functional 
role academic and other analysts fulfil as a regulatory form of expertise. 
An additional difficulty associated with governmentality analysis is that unlike many 
other forms of analysis employed in the reform debate, governmentality does not seek 
to provide any external validation of the 'success' or 'failure' of the reform process. In 
some senses this can be regarded as a weakness of governmentality analysis and 
Foucault's position in general; an inability to engage in any form of critical normative 
debate. However, in many circumstances this is also one its strengths. For example, 
discussing the reform process purely in economic terms, and taking into account the Z) 
indeterminacy of health as a concept, one can find oneself quickly trapped in a 
means/ends debate. Would the reforms be declared a success if the actors who inhabit 
the internal quasi-market exhibited behaviours that closely resembles those observed in 
free market transactions? Does one just presuppose that health and welfare are being 
increased as a result? Conversely, would the failure of the quasi-market to approximate 
'real' market conditions mean that the Health Service is not efficiently meeting health 
needs for the population? The strength of governmentality analysis is that this 
distinction of means and ends is not regarded as a problem. The means and ends are 
aspects of the same power/knowledge discourse. In the particular case of the health z: 1 
reforms, the means of securing increases in health and welfare through the quasi- 
market and its associated technologies is constructed within the same discourse that 
creates subjects amenable to those health technologies, as well as the very notions of 
health and healthiness. 
In Chapters 3 and 5, it was argued that because of the problematic nature of health and 
health care within traditional economic theorising, health governance was only open to 
political regulation through the provision of collective welfare and the use of expertise. 
However, with the shift to a neo-liberal form of governance predicated on the 
privileged position of market relationships within the political economy, a means had 
to be found to make health and the health system amenable to regulation within this 
new discourse. The NHS reform process can best be seen in this context. The 
construction of the managed or quasi-market and the other technologies associated 
with it, represented the process of understanding health in primarily economic terms. 
169 
As argued in earlier chapters, governmentality analysis suggests that the subject of this 
new health economics discourse is no longer the hoino economicus of classical 
formulas of liberalism, but more resembles the self-regulating, prudent individual who 
has a duty to minimise their own 'risky' behaviour in order to reduce the burden they 
place on society as a result of their actions. The consequence is that those managing 
the health care system also must address this problem of minimising collective risk. 
Therefore, risk management becomes a form of governance. A further development of 
this is that health risk management opens up other dimensions of health other that 
those defined in narrow clinical terms. Quality of life rather than the absence of disease 
becomes part of the calculus of health. As a consequence, there is a renewed interest in 
health promotion and disease prevention strategies. 
To investigate these issues in greater detail, it is necessary to undertake detailed studies 
of health service managers" accounts of their practice. The empirical evidence outlined 
in this chapter will seek to establish if the concerns outlined above are reflected in the 
stated rationales of those charged with the duty of commissioning health care in the 
NHS - District Health Authorities. It will be argued that the role of commissioning 
given to District Health Authorities as part of the reform process embodies many of 
the key elements of the new form of health governance. The term commissioning as 
applied to the post-1991 Health Authorities implies a strategic understanding of how 
to meet local health care needs through the appropriate purchasing of health care. As 
such it is argued that this new role represents a major departure from the traditional 
role of management within the NHS. Rather than acting as administrators of the health 
care system they are now required to be pro-active and willing to instigate change. At 
the same time it will be possible to comment on other previous studies of post-reform 
purchasing activity and add to the general debate about the nature of the 'reformed' 
NUS. 
Survey of selected Health Authorities 
The empirical evidence in this chapter is derived from semi-structured interviews 
(n--23) conducted separately with the Chief Executives and principal directors of six 
English District Health Authorities from two NES regions. The Authorities were 
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Table I Health authority research sample: key statistics 
Health Authority A B C D E F 
Revenue Budget 1995196 6 135 210 115 290 225 
225 
(EM) 
Local population 320000 465000 310000 720000 580000 510000 
% of Population covered 47% 37% 35% 55% 25% 60% 
by GP Fundholding 
Position with respect to >5%ovcr 2%under <I%ovcr <1% <1% over <0.5% 
new funding formula under under 
targets 
Locality Funding plans Yes No No No Yes Yes 
selected after a review of Purchasing Plan/Commissioning Intentions for 1996/97 from 
those who authorities that outlined a clear priority setting agenda. An additional factor 
in the selection process was the authority's anticipated future growth potential vis-A- 
vis the revised funding formula. A full description of the selection criteria is given in 
Appendix A. The interviews took place from July 1996 to January 1997. The average 
length of each interview was approximately one hour. In order to preserve anonymity 
for those participating in the research, each Authority has been designated a letter from 
A to F and standardised titles have been employed for individual interviewees. What 
follows is a brief description of the particular characteristics of each authority (also see 
Table I for additional information). 
Authority A was described by its Chief Executive as comprising two distinct 
populations; one relatively affluent, the other exhibiting many of the problems 
associated with the inner-city. The provision of health care services was dominated by 
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a three or four major trusts, the biggest two accounting for approximately 50% of all 
health authority expenditure in 1995. The authority had anticipated growth monies in 
line with national average and was surprised to find the revised funding formula 
calculated that they were significantly over funded. At the time of the interviews the 
authority was asking for their funding position to be reviewed. Authority A was one of 
the two authorities in the sample who were actively pursuing a locality funding 
strategy, devolving the commissioning function to local teams principally made up of 
GPs' with strategic and financial oversight from the authority. The percentage of the 
population covered by GP fundholding practices was 47%. 
Authority B also consisted of two distinct areas. In Authority B's case the distinction 
was also geographical. The first area was dominated by a large industrial town with a 
significant ethnic, mainly Asian, population. The second area was made up of a large 
town with an above average elderly population. This area also incorporated a large 
rural hinterland. Each of these areas was dominated by a single large trust which 
provided many specialist services, several of them regional specialities. However, it 
was anticipated that with the completion of a major expansion programme of a Trust 
hospital within a neighbouring district, the neighbouring authority would shift some 
contracts to their own area and reduce activity in one of the Trust hospitals within 
Authority Bs areas. In terms of financing, Authority B was 2% under-funded with 
regards to the national funding formula. The population covered by fundholding in the 
district was 37%. 
Authority C consisted of a mixture of rural and urban populations spread over a large 
area. In addition, it had the smallest population of all the sample of authorities, 
comparable only to the population of Authority A. The district was dominated by a 
single large Trust hospital with many relatively new and expanded facilities. Several 
other Trust hospitals provided services for their local population. Also a significant 
amount of activity was contracted with a very large Trust in an adjacent authority. At 
the time of the research a review of acute services for the district was taking place. In 
particular, the authority was in the process of choosing between two of the smaller 
Trusts for the site of a new ME unit, which was proving to be contentious. In terms 
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of overall funding the authority was marginally over-funded. The level of flandholding 
was 35%. 
Authority D had the biggest population of the sample authorities, covering a large 
metropolitan area. It had a diverse population expected of a city authority. Like many 
major cities it was served by several Trust hospitals, many of which had teaching 
status. Prior to the interviews taking place, the authority had just completed a major 
review of acute services which in part was a reflection of the problems caused by the 
duplication of services within the teaching hospitals. Unusually for a major conurbation 
it was very close to its funding target and thus anticipated average growth. 
Fundholding was high at 55%. 
Authority E had the second largest population divided between three distinct areas 
each with an urban centre and associated rural population. All of the areas were served 
by a major Trust hospital but many services were purchased from a neighbouring 
authority that acted as the regional centre for specialist care. With the abolition of the 
regional tier of management a proportion of the authority's funding allocation was 'top 
sliced' as a regional levy in part to meet the expense of running the teaching hospitals 
in this neighbouring district. Additionally, the authority was in the process of 
rationalising its own acute service in the three districts which was proving to be 
politically difficult. This authority had by far the lowest level of fundholding in the 
sample at around 25%. In terms of funding allocation it was slightly less that 1% over 
target. 
Authority F was a predominantly urban authority covering several large towns but 
with a significant rural population. Within the district there were several large Trusts 
serving distinct populations. Many specialist services were purchased from Trusts in 
neigbbouring authorities or from two reasonably near regional centres. At the time of 
the research there were no discussions about any radical rationalisation of acute 
services. Like authority A, this authority was actively engaged in a form of locality 
funding working with both fundholding and non-fundholding GPs to commission 
services for their local populations. The level of fundholding was the highest in the 
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sample at 60%. In overall funding terms they were less that 0.5% under target, so 
anticipated average growth in the near future. 
It was a function of the selection procedure to include as many variables as possible 
within such a small sample of six authorities. Within the sample there are several 
different types of authority - city, urbanfrural etc., a range of population sizes, variable 
levels of GP fundholding. Additionally, two of the authorities were committed to 
locality funding with one discussing it as a future option. In terms of funding, three 
authorities were below their target allocations and three above target, one significantly 
so. However, with the exception of authority A, it has to be noted that most of the 
authorities were relatively close to their targets so it is a moot point whether this 
variable is meaningful in the context of this study. The initial selection process relied 
on information from authority Purchasing Plan/Commissioning Intentions for 1996/97. 
However, at time of going to press the authorities had not received official notification 
of their allocations for financial year 1996/97 and so had to indulge in speculation as to 
future growth monies. Therefore, the implications of the ftinding formula had not at 
that time been fully assimilated and incorporated into future funding plans. As it turned 
out, 1996/97, being a pre-election year, the allocation for the NHS was a little more 
generous than anticipated. 
Health Authority structures and organisation 
The 'reform' process instigated by the Woi-kingfoi- Patients white paper (DoH 1989) 
officially began in April 1991 with the creation of the 'internal market'. Contracting in 
the first year was restricted so that a 'steady state' could be maintained until 
purchasers became more comfortable with their new role within the 'reformed' NHS. 
Subsequent years saw a relaxation of controls as purchasing authorities developed new 
organisational skills needed to operate within the internal market. Many studies have 
described this changing role of purchasing organisations in the early stages of the 
reform process (see Appleby et al. 1992; Appleby 1994; Freemantle et al. 1993; 
Rana& 1995). The new role of purchasing was accompanied by changes to the 
purchasing or-ganisations themselves. Many health authorities merged with their 
neighbours leading to a significant reduction in the total number of authorities. In 1991 
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there were 190 Health Authorities, by 1994 there were 108. To illustrate this, in 
RanaWs (1995) study of purchasing organisations as they were constituted in 1990- 
9 1, the authority with the largest population in her survey at 3 09,000, is equivalent in 
size to the authority with the smallest population of the sample authorities, authority B, 
who considered themselves a comparatively small authority (see Table 1). Additionally, 
Health Authorities and Family Health Service Authorities (FHSAs) were merged in 
April 1996 to produce single authorities responsible for the full range of purchasing. At 
the same time as the average size of Health Authorities was increasing, the level of GP 
fundholding was also increasing and becoming an important factor in overall 
purchasing activity. By 1994 the proportion of the population covered by fundholding 
was 36%, by 1996 it has risen to around half the population (Audit Commission 1996; 
Ranad6 1997). Another significant change was the level of services provided by 
organisations with trust status. The initial wave of trust applications accounted for 
approximately 13% of NHS expenditure. This had risen to 95% by the fourth wave in 
1994 and 98% in 1996 (Smee 1995). 
The significance of the statistics highlighted above is that the empirical interview 
evidence to be presented in the rest of this chapter describes a time of relative stability 
for health authorities. Taken as a whole, 1996 marked the first opportunity to see the 
purchaser and provider functions clearly delineated. The strength of the research is that 
it describes a relatively mature process of purchasing at work. It is worth commenting 
that all the authorities included in the research sample above are still in the same 
configuration at the time of writing (July 1998) as when the inter-views with directors 
took place in 1996/7. By 1996, when the initial interviews took place, the level of 
merger activity had declined from its peak in 1991-94. Each authority had already 
merged with their FHSAs. There were no Directly Manager Units (DMU) providing 
health care in the district. Contracting arrangements had been in place for several years 
and GP fundholding was an established practice in all districts. Moreover, the 
purchasing role was beginning to move out of the shadow of the supply-side provider 
interests that had dominated the thinking of policy makers when the internal market 
was created (see Ham 1994). As Hunter states, the initial reform process was 'almost 
exclusively concerned with introducing supply-side changes without really attending to 
the question of what the changes were actually for' (Hunter 1993: 33). Therefore, 
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because of its original inchoate nature it becomes doubly important to examine how 
the role of purchasing has developed within the 'reformed' NHS and, more 
importantly, to ascertain tol what degree this developing role was informed by a 
coherent rationale. 
Organisational structures: commissioning local health care services 
In an earlier study of eight purchasing authorities, Freemantle et al. (1993) 
distinguished between two distinct organisational structures; one dominated by 
directorate function (finance, public health, planning etc. ); the other having a flatter 
managerial structure with more cross directorate input into the decision making 
process. To some extent the evidence from the current sample of six authorities on the 
whole supports this analysis. However, there is one major difference. All of the six 
authorities in the survey described their current managerial structures in terms of 
havin moved, or were in the process of moving, away from a rigid directorate 9 It) 
structure to the cross-directorate or 'mixed matrix' model described by Freemantle et 
al.. Additionally, some authorities had the extra dimension of locality based 
commissioning. The comments below of a Director of Commissioning were typical of 
the responses to questions of management structure. As he states: 
There is a 'before', and a current consideration of 'how it will be'... 
Purchasing activity has previously been delivered through the finance 
director. And it has been very much an efficiency, financially specific 
hospital based hospital contract, type of approach. And because of the 
financial problems of [in the city], has in a sense, not been integrated 
with the other agendas. To the authority's credit, it was recognised in 
the change on the I' of April [ 1996], so what we have come up with is 
a different kind of structure and a different approach to create, I think-, 
much more integration - so the end result reflects much more where we 
are trying to get to... We are moving towards what we are calling a 
commissioning team approach, which is to take certain specialities or 
certain services, and identify a relatively consistent group of people who 
will bring together the necessary skills and perspectives as a 
commissioning team. In most of those instances we will devolve the 
budget for those specialities or services to that group of people... So it 
will include someone from the market management part of my 
directorate. It will include someone from finance. It will always have a 
public health doctor in it. And that is the core team of people. It will 
have others as appropriate (Director of Commissioning, HA Q. 
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This cross-directorate approach also extended to the management of locality 
commissioning. The Chief Executive of authority F described a situation where 
'directorates mix and blur', with locality managers recruited from different 
departments. Although each authority had a slightly different management structure, 
the rationale behind changes in management organisation remained constant. This was 
a desire to deliver what was described as a 'change agenda' that focused on the 
broader concept of 'commissioning' instead of the 'technical' exercises of purchasing 
and contracting. There was unanimity between authorities that this distinction was 
more than a mere question of semantics. The authorities perceived their primary role of 
commissioning to be the development of a strategic overview in order to meet health 
needs in the district and this was done through the operation of effective and 
appropriate purchasing and contracting. 
However, it is evident that using the term 'commissioning' is open misunderstanding 
and will need some additional clarification. As described earlier in the chapter, one of 
the strengths of governmentality analysis is that it is sensitive to changing meaning of 
categories and concepts within the discourse of governance. The idea of 
commissioning is one such concept whose meaning has changed along with the 
discourse of health governance. The term commissioning is not new to health service 
management. In the pre-reform NIFIS many new services or facilities were 
'commissioned' as part of the continual development of the health service. However, in 
the post-reform NES, it is argued that commissioning has taken on a new meaning. At 
the very least comrnissioning can be viewed as a form of strategic purchasing. 
However, strategic purchasing implies a new set of goals for health service 
management, in particular for managers within District Health Authorities given the 
new remit of meeting local health needs. The concept of health needs itself entails a 
wider understanding of health to include non-clinical values. Indeed. Paton (1996) 
defines the commissioning criteria as reflecting: 
the desires of patients; the desires of the public more generally; the 
opinions of general practitioners; the opinions of a whole range of 
professionals, health and otherwise; and cost or cost-effective 
considerations (Paton 1996: 134). 
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The notion that commissioning is qualitatively different from the technical function of 
purchasing or contracting was also reflected in the interview data with health authority 
directors. The comments of the Director of Public Health below are typical of a 
'holistic' understanding of commissioning expressed by respondents in all Authorities: 
Commissioning is strategic overview, but also much more involvement 
with other agencies. Whereas contracting tends to be only those we are 
actually giving money to. If I could put it as crudely as that (Director of 
Public Health, HA Q. 
However, it was also acknowledged that there was still a great deal of confusion and 
fluidity of terminology about commissioning, purchasing and contracting. As one 
Director of Commissioning stated: 
I hear about colleagues in other commissions or other health authorities 
... [they] don't seem actually to my mind to be commissioning. All they 
are doing is purchasing. We can all purchase... but if you are actually 
really wanting to influence and change health care, and improve quality 
of health care then you've got to get into some of the rather difficult, 
more exposed debates with clinicians (Director of Commissioning, HA 
A). 
As the above illustrates, the 'strateizic' nature of comnýssioning implies forging new 
relationships with other agencies, with the medical profession and with local people 
whose health needs are to be met. However, it was clear from the interviews that the 
Health Authorities were still evolving a language of strategic planning that could 
conceptualise their new role in a coherent way. As part of this process all the 
Authorities were engaged in changing their management structures in order to 
operationalise their new strategic function. As one Chief Executive stated: 
Basically you have a choice for structure between a system which is 
strongly process dominated. It really gives you the traditional pattern of 
uni-disciplinary departments each headed by a director which are very 
good at delivering the process side of the agenda. So you would, for 
example, have a director of finance, you would have a director of 
planning. They would be very good at making sure that all the financial IP 
processes are followed or the planning processes are followed. The 
weakness of that sort of structure is that you tend to get little cross 
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fertilisation from one directorate to another. And also that our core 
business is health, our currency is health services, our key stakeholders 
are by and large professionals, usually medical professionals - so 
hospital consultants, general practitioners, other health professionals - 
and indeed patients who do not think in terms of directorates of finance 
and planning and things like that. They think in terms of either 
healthcare systems, like acute services, or more specifically individual 
services (Chief Executive, HA Q. 
Therefore, whereas the old management structures were seen to be process-driven, or 
more specifically finance-driven, the new forms of management structure, which all the 
authorities in the sample were moving towards, appear to privilege the more strategic 
commissioning function. Moreover, to further this agenda of (commissioning health 
services to meet health needs) it was argued that this was best delivered by the Public 
Health directorate or a directorate for strategic planning. As one Chief Executive 
stated, 'what we are trying to achieve... is placing actual contracts with providers, that 
process should be very much informed by the work of the development directorate, 
and particularly the Director of Public Health'. As a consequence of moving on to this 
Public Health agenda, the rhetoric of meeting health needs and of 'health gain' 
effectively opened up the concept of health to include the potential for pro-active 
interventions by strategic management. The use of health promotion and disease 
prevention strategies, focusing on 'risky' behaviour indulged in by individuals, clearly 
resembles the 'New Public Health' concept mention earlier. As one Director of 
Commissioning argued: 
The strategic framework-, and a lot of the work that supports that, is 
about trying to change the language and change the approach... You 
are actually using different language about health gain, for instance, 
which is important language. But then, within that we are talking about 
personal responsibility for your own health, how do you involve local 
populations in that debate, how do you make people aware of their 
responsibilities, what responsibilities do they have to the health service 
in their use of the health service? Then you are moving on to their 
opinions about priorities because you are obviously not going to be able 
to do everything, which is the rationing debate (Director of 
Com"ssioning, HA E). 
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This last statement inevitably leads to a set of problems about how this strategic vision 
is operationalised within the post-reform NUS. In particular, how does a public health 
led purchasing agenda fit within the confines of the internal market? What will be the 
consequences for provider competition within the market? In Chapter 5 it was 
observed that when policies derived from a market based rationale are used in 
situations that have hitherto resisted economic theory, the solutions involve the 
creation of measures that act as proxies for economic concepts. Often this results in 
adverse effects, privileging efficiency above equity and aggregate needs over those of 
the individual. This is because the subject of these constructed economics discourses 
are not the rational, self-interested individuals of classical economic formulas, but 
intersections of risk factors that personify the individual. Taking this to the next level, 
one could speculate that if individuals are only amenable to a regulatory economics 
discourse through this calculation of proxy variables, then the reformed NES and the 
role of purchasing are equally constructed within the same discourse. Therefore, just as 
individuals are regulated within a forrn of health governance then one would expect 
that the activities of purchasing authorities would be managed through the calculation 
of a different set of proxy variables that increase political regulation. 
This form of health governance has already been alluded to with reference to the 
Osborne (1997) in Chapter 3. He argues that neo-lib eral forms of health governance 
depend on the production of 'surrogate' variables 'that will stand measure for 
otherwise abstract ideas of health... Neo-liberalism abandons the quest for an absolute 
that would be 'health' and opts for determinant strategies, targets and specifies 
instead' (Osborne 1997: 185). However, what is not clear is the extent to which 
politically usefhl surrogate variables - ie reductions in length of waiting lists, efficiency 
indexes, the Citizen's Chat-lei-, Heallh of the Nation targets and so on - compromise 
the delivery of the purchasing authorities' strategic agenda. What the construction of a 
regulatory economics discourse seem to be have created is not one single coherent 
form of health governance but a multi-layered form of governance that works on 
several distinct levels within the overall governance of the health service. There is the 
cmicro' level where providers compete with each other within a form of managed 
market in health care and where medical specialties within provider organisations 
compete with other specialties for resources. There is a 'meso' level where health 
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authority purchase health care as part of a commissioning strategy to maximise 'health 
gain' within their local population. And there is a 'macro' level of government 
regulation that seeks to demonstrate effective stewardship of the health system as a 
whole. Each one of these levels of analysis of the 'reformed' NHS can be said to 
reflect a neo-liberal form of governmental discourse. However, because the discourse 
in effect constructs a market where none has previously existed, each level of 
governance has to have its own set of proxy variables which may or may not be 
consistent with each other. In order to understand and explore the potential for conflict 
between these levels of governance it is valuable to concentrate on the meso level of 
analysis and the rationale of purchasing authorities. This level of governance forms a 
bridge between the other two levels. The meso level is where macro policies are 
operationalised and micro level problems are negotiated. Therefore, the later sections 
of the chapter will deal with purchaser attitudes to central government imperatives, but 
the next section discusses purchaser/provider relationship both through the formal 
mechanisms of contracting and through other non-market relationships. 1) 
Contracting and the internal market: local discourses and practices 
As many commentators have theorised, the introduction of the purchaser/provider split 
and the notion of competition within the health care system has the effect of placing 
the internal, 'quasi-market as the 'radical core of the NHS reforms' (Ranad6 1995). 
Therefore, when discussing the quasi-market phenomenon in this theoretical context, it 
is not surprising that contracting as the open expression of market exchange has also 
become central to the debate on the reform process. As Flynn and Williams (1997) 
assert, 'contracting in the NHS has evolved as part of a fundamental restructuring of 
the welfare state' (1997: 1). Furthermore, given that the concept of the market and 
market exchanges are the life blood of economics it is perhaps inevitable that the quasi- 
market and contract literature has been dominated by an econon-tic understanding of 
market behaviour. As Le Grand (199 1) observes: 
There is much yet to be discovered about quasi-markets... In many 
ways the present government has made a gift to economic analysis, both 
standard microeconomic theory and more recent developments such as 
transaction cost analysis (Williamson 1975,1985). It has also provided 
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a set of quasi-market 'experiments' against which to test those theories 
(Le Grand 1991: 1267). 
It is relevant to note the use of Williamson's transaction cost analysis as an alternative 
way of theorising market relationships. As discussed in Chapter 5, the ideas of the 
cnew institutional economics' associated with Williamson seek to understand 
institutional behaviour within the context of complex and problematic markets. New 
institutional economics suggests that when institutions are faced with certain failures of 
the market - through information asymmetries, for example - that it is a rational, 
efficient market response to internalise the provision of services 'within the institution's 
hierarchy. In effect, the institution makes a rational decision that the transaction cost of 
generating enough information to minimise the risk of malfeasance and opportunism 
dealing with external contractors is greater than the potential increase in inefficiency of 
providing the service internally. Obviously this has direct relevance for contracting 
with the NHS internal market. It could be argued that the complexity of economic 
calculation within a comprehensive health system, like the NES, is so great that the 
process of efficient contracting is outweighed by the transaction costs of producing 
contracts. In economic terms this is a strong argument. However, it still essentially 
presents an overtly economic rationale for market behaviour. 
As noted in Chapter 5, recent decades have seen a more sociological body of literature 
develop that re-examines the role played by social relationships in economic action. 
The ideas of Mark Granovetter (1 985; 1992) represent such a reformulation of the 
basis of economic action. As stated in Chapter 5, he argues that the embeddedness of 
economic action in social relations through networks of concrete, personal 
relationships introduces a new flexibility into models of economic behaviour. He 
suggests that institutions do not necessarily face the stark choice of external contracts 
versus absorption into the organisational hierarchy. Using the concepts of networks C, 
and embeddedness, contracting becomes a more sophisticated process. At one extreme C. 
there is a 'hard' form of contracting that equates to the atomistic, spot-market, of 
standard economic theory. At the other is 'soft' contracting which takes account of 
pre-existing social relationships. In this soft form of contracting contracts take on a 
more symbolic meaning, reinforcing existing relationships based on well-founded 
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expectations of trustworthy behaviour that counter the need for highly specified 
contract negotiation. This nuanced approach to contracting causes a number of 
problems for the testing of economic theories that Le Grand suggests quasi-market 
policies represent. If contracts within the quasi-market do not develop beyond the 
simple description of agreed activity, such as block contracts in the NHS, this is 
strongly indicative that the quasi-market has in some way 'failed'. However, the 
implication of the concept of embeddedness suggests that simple contract relations 
may be coupled with sophisticated relationships that enhance the delivery of services. 
Without this extra sociological information the picture is incomplete. The research 
findin,,, s outlined below engage in this debate by exploring the nature of the contract C, 
relationship and adding to the knowledge of purchaser/provider relationships revealed 
by other studies of contracting (see Flynn and Williams 1997). 
Contracting, purchasing and commissioning 
It was noted earlier that the purchasing element within the NHS internal market was 
one of the least developed aspects of the reform process with 'no set values... clearly 
enunciated to guide and to legitimise purchasing procedures" (Salter 1993: 171). In 
this respect it is interesting to note how official guidance to purchasing authorities 
gradually changed as the internal market developed (see Flynn and Williams 1997). 
The earliest guidance from the Department of Health (DoH 1989) reflected the 
rhetoric of the market and included injunctions against monopoly behaviour or the 
forming of cartels that would distort the internal market. However, at the same time, it 
was emphasised that the market is a means to an end, not an end in itself. The ultimate 
aim of the reform process is to provide a better NHS. Hence the call to both sides of 
the purchaser/provider split to work in such a way as to 'maximise the total quality and 
quantity of service' (DoH 1989: 16). It was not until 1993 in a series of speeches by 
the then Minister for Health, Brian Mawhinney, that a clearer articulation of 
purchasing function emerged. The speeches outlined seven steps for purchasers for 
making 'tangible improvements in people's health' (Mawhinney 1993: 24). They 
included: 
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" strategic planning 
" effective contracting to achieve improvements in quality and efficiency 
" knowledge-based health care 
responsiveness to local people 
cooperation with providers 
local alliances 
appropriate organisational capacity 
The advice contained in the 1994 guidance document (DoH 1994) reinforces many of 
these points. Especially important was the suggesting that 'constructive cooperation' 
can complement competition for the overall betterment of the Health Service. In this 
formulation of the relationship between purchaser/provider one can see a tacit 
acknowledgement the limits of competition when faced with the problem of a market 
in health services. The difficulties of monopoly supply, monopsony (where there is a 
single purchaser), uncertainty about outcomes, principal/agent problems and so on, all 
apply to the provision of health services within the NHS. It is suggested in the 
guidance document that ideas of 'contestability' could be invoked in order to stay true 
to the market ethos. Contestability suggests that some forms of monopoly provision 
are permissible because, in certain circumstances, the whole service could be subject to 
challenge from another supplier, and hence open to competition. These circumstances 
occur when there are low or no 'sunk' costs or barriers associated with entry into or 
exit from the market (Baumol 1 983). Clearly some health provision is highly 
contestable and many of the sample authorities mention market testing of some 
services. In general, those services tended to be of a specialist kind, such as a drug 
addiction service one authority contracted with an independent organisation. However, 
more typical of the responses from the authorities was a discussion of the potential 
benefits of a threat of exit might bring about rather than increases in competition. For 
example, as one finance director stated: 
One of our hospitals is under-performing on its eye contract, and on the 
number of cataracts it does. One of the things we've said is that we are 
looking at possibly bringing a third party into the district to do 
cataracts. Now that seems to have motivated on face value, at least the 
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leading consultant, towards trying to make up the contract deficit 
(Director of Finance, HA B). 
This director qualified his comments by suggesting that in general it was not realistic 
that you would not place the bulk of contracts with the local major trusts. However, he 
went on to argue that it was sometimes important to put providers on notice that the 
purchaser/provider relationship had to change and the authorities were serious about 
their intentions. As another Director of Finance explained: 
We went through a process early on of market testing a few services 
just to show the providers we are willing to do it. And we market tested 
dental services and a few others, and we did save some money on those 
and that was reinvested in something else. But I think it was more about 
a process ofjust the providers at the time were quite cocky about, 'well 
you just have to give us your money, don't you'. So we said, 'no we 
don't. We'll do this. Sod off. And they got a bit twitchy and it was 
quite entertaining. But we did it and the upshot of that was it changed 
our relationship with providers and we got into a much more mature 
relationship about those discussions. Not the, 'we'll provide whatever 
we feel like and you'll pay it... This is what we need. We need to 
provide you with this'. And we are saying, 'well maybe that's not 
necessarily what we want'. And we get to a much more vigorous 
debate now and we'll even debate about what needs to be done 
(Director of Finance, HA A). 
The question that now arises from this statement is what role the contracting process 
plays in this 'mature' relationship between purchasing authorities and providers. It was 
evident that all the authorities in the sample were following official guidance and 
moving towards more 'sophisticated' contracting (see NHS1\4E 1993). That is to say, 
they were moving away from 'block' contracts and adopting a mainly 'cost and 
volume' approach to contracting, supplemented with a few specialist 'cost per case' 
contracts. However, as the comments of the Chief Executive below suggest, the move 
towards more sophistication was more an exercise in pragmatism that anything else. 
[Contracts] have become more sophisticated, more detailed, we've 
broken them down more. They are a lot more sophisticated. We try not 
to be silly over some contracts - A&E, for example is a block 
contract... But for some contracts, breaking them down doesn't make 
sense. You can do an enormous amount of work and achieve very little. 
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Where others you need to know a great deal about (Chief Executive, 
HA F). 
In a quasi-market context this shift in contracting type could be seen as evidence of 
success. Block contracts, which characterised the earliest forms of contracting, are 
essentially the safest option for purchasers. They place the financial risk of 
miscalculating demand onto the provider. However, while block contracts give the 
purchaser a degree of financial security there has to be a trade-off against the ability to 
monitor the delivery of the contract by the provider. At the other extreme, 'cost per 
case' contracting has the opposite problems. Contracts are easy to monitor but it is the 
purchasers who face the financial risk if demand for the service is greater than 
anticipated. Additionally, monitoring involves some form of transaction cost which has 
to be included in the overall equation. The 'cost and volume' type of contract in effect 
is a compromise between these two positions. It shares financial risk between the 
purchaser and the provider and is easier to monitor. This question of risk and 
monitoring re-emphasises the role that trust plays in purchaser/provider relationships. 
Purchasers who depend on block contracts could be characterised as having a low 
risk/high trust relationship 'with providers: a low risk of financial problems for 
purchasers but also having to be reliant on providers not to indulge in opportunist 
behaviour. In contrast, 'cost per case' contracting implies that purchaser/provider 
relationship involves high risks but low trust. It is the process of contracting that forms 
the mechanism which limits provider opportunism. So it could be argued that the 
closer contracts resemble the cost per case ideal the more purchaser/provider 
relationship resembles a market interaction. 
The immediate problem for the formulation of the contract/mark-et relationship 
outlined above is that the evidence from the sample authorities suggests that contracts 
were coalescing around cost and volume type. This was exemplified by the comments 
of this Director of Finance. 
Yes we started with all block contracts. We very quickly moved into 
cost and volume contracts. We very quickly thereafter moved into the 
cost and volume contracts within indicative targets for each speciality 
and that was basically for all contracts. If there wasn't a contract of that 
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shape, it was a hybrid of that or it was ECR's. There are some contracts 
where the base contract is, most of the contract is stable. So we just say 
yes, we have those indicative targets but we won't cost and volume 
around it because the risk is minimal and there's no point in it. But 
there are these specialities where there are risks involved for both 
parties so we put a cost and volume target onto that. A hybrid of some 
description but it is not a pure block because every speciality has a 
indicative target (Director of Finance, HA A). 
In general, the responses indicated that contracts represented a search for stability 
rather than wholesale endorsement of competition. In one authority there was a 
conscious decision to keep block contracting despite pressure from Trusts to move to 
cost and volume. As the Director of Finance stated, 'we have relatively unsophisticated 
contracts but relatively sophisticated relationships'. The indications were that the 
relationships that were being formed through contracting were of a more long-term 
nature. This comment from a director of strategy was typical: 
We've done two things. We've moved to a longer term package with 
the hospitals. So with the Community Trusts now we have a three year 
package that gets rolled forward, and it includes within it service 
developments, but balanced with efficiency savings. So they get a 
longer term perspective and we negotiate around the margins of 
change, depending on our priorities. And other priorities which have 
come up from GP discussions.... So there has been a move towards a 
longer term total package. And there have been individual service 
changes around service frameworks and specifications. But the more 
general move has been that longer term thing (Director of Strategy, HA 
D). 
Clearly stable, long-term relationships embodied in contract obligations do not 
resemble the active market envisaged in the early reform process. However, to counter 
this there is some evidence that GP fundholders as purchasers (who generally have cost 
per case contracts) do have a more dynamic relationship with providers, which is 
reflected in treatment price (Glennester et al. 1994; Propper and Bartlett 1997). On the 
whole the evidence from the sample authorities suggested that applying purchasing 
leverage to reduce treatment price was not one of their major objectives. The search 
for stability outweighed competition. So it is no surprise that the authorities in the 
sample did not see contracting as their most important activity. Contracting was 
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described more as a technical function done at the end of the year, a process through 
which commissioning was operationalised and financial 'reality' brought to bear, as 
these comments suggest: 
Contracting, at the end of the day, is the mechanics of turning 
commissioning into reality, isn't it. Commissioning is actually deciding 
the shape of the services you want and the content. We approach 
commissioning - we essentially have a commissioner board which 
included Directors of the health authority and GP representatives. At 
the end of the day health authority makes decisions on the shape of the 
services we buy, and particular in the area of change we are looking for. 
Where contracting is essentially the mechanical process at the end of it 
of agreeing the figures and the activity issues and negotiating (Director 
of Finance, HA B). 
Contracting is just a piece of process at the end of the line that enables 
us to agree activity against a financial commitment for the services that 
we xvish to buy. So it's process, it's not a central function if you like. 
It's a function that we have to do once we've decided what health care 
we want, how we want it delivered, how much it costs and how much 
of it we want. We then set all of that in the context of, 'and by the way 
provider here's your money and for that we expect that' (Director of 
Commissioning, HA A). 
1. 
This differentiation between the technical process of contracting and the strategic 
process of commissioning was a consistent theme repeated by all the sample 
authorities. Indeed it was striking that many of the non-finance directors consciously 
distanced themselves from the contracting process to avoid the technicalities of 
contracting compromising the commissioning function. As these directors of 
commissioning stated: 
I mean I do not see myself as contracting. I see contracting as a support 
function. I see it as a function that takes place in another directorate... 
we don't get driven, if you like, by contracting. Although occasionally 
information through the contracting route about excess activity in a 
particular service, or whatever, might give us rise to do a piece of 
commissioning work. But generally speaking it should be the otherway, 
it should be commissioning driving contracting, and contracts should 
change in answer to pieces of commissioning work (Director of 
Commissioning, HA A). 
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I suppose that the first thing I would say is that, and I will overstate 
this, I'm not concerned in the slightest about purchasing. And to a 
lesser extent about contracting. What I am particularly concerned about 
is commissioning as a ne-%v health authority. In that, the change we are 
trying to bring about is to see the purchasing and contracting 
approaches... match with the commissioning strategy (Director of 
Commissioning, HA D). 
It appeared that within the terms of reference of what they saw to be their 
commissioning remit, the sample authorities did not place a high value on competition 
within an internal market. Moreover, they saw the commissioning function as more 
than just demand management. Commissioning also involved managing supply. In this 
context the internal market is actually an obstacle to the efficient distribution of 
resources. Trusts are in effect in competition with each other. They are in the business 
of increasing activity not decreasing it. In the light of this, is was clear that contracting 
was an important 1ever' for the authorities in matching supply and demand and in 
particular, countering so-called supplier induced demand. As the two examples below 
demonstrated, contracting was seen as a means of constraining Trust activity. 
We've got a bit of a row running with the Trusts about sleep apnoea. 
And we've said, 'we're sorry but we didn't ask you to develop this 
service. We've never wanted it. What little we need in that area we can 
get elsewhere. Thank-you very much. We are not going to pay for it'. I They leap up and down and say we have invested all this money in it, 
and we say, 'tough'... (Chief Executive, HA F) 
What we have to steer clear of, it's crucial, is that they don't market the 
service to the GPs, and the GPs start referring to a new service ... 
it 
causes hellish problems if they are actively and aggressively marketing 
the GPs and the GPs are saying 'yes refer them there, they provide 
that', and we may already have an existing contract with them but it 
may not be for that particular service that is being marketed. And that is 
happening more and more and more (Director of Contracts, HA C). 
The irony in both these examples was that Trusts were being admonished for acting in 
the spirit of the reform process. The internal market is predicated on provider 
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competition. Again this calls into question the authorities' commitment to competition 
within the internal market. 
Contracting and Trust regulation 
An additional aspect of contracting that the sample authorities utilised was its property 
as a technology of discipline. In this respect contracting does not stand alone but 
works in conjunction with a host of other technologies. The three that were cited most 
often were audit, accreditation and 'care pathways'. These forms of disciplinary 
technology all to some extent fall within the scope of 'evidence based medicine' (see 
Chapter 4). The key technology on which the others to some extent depend is the audit 
process; the principal means by which evidence of effective treatment is established in 
the care system and the means by which adherence to guidelines and protocols is 
monitored. Only when this process has been gone through can its findings be 
incorporated into contracting. As this Director of Primary Care observes: 
Well our GP non-exec. would say we should only be buying or 
contracting with people who deal with audit as part of their everyday 
business. It should be part of their core service... They shouldn't be 
doing any practice that isn't based on audit work. Now that's a nice 
utopian view and we need to get to that, but I think that we have a lot 
of practices in primary care who don't audit, we have a lot of people in 
secondary care who only audit the bits that are interesting to them... 
audit should be part of a reporting mechanism as far as I'm concerned 
(Director of Primary Care, HA A). 
Accreditation is a variation on this procedure. The most prominent accreditation model 
available at the time was that Produced by for cancer services (based on a report by 
Kenneth Calman, Chief Medical Officer). Instead of individual clinicians being 
accredited, a nexus of people, facilities, equipment are given accreditation for a defined 
period of time. The provider has to rearrange the division of labour within a specialty, 
perhaps introducing a sub-speciality consultant and so on, in line with 
recommendations. As one Chief Executive stated, 'I think it would be very difficult for 
a health authority to commission services once this process has been completed from a 
non-accredited surgeon in the field of cancer. Other respondents were more sceptical 
190 
about its general usefulness as a model and were worried that it might build 
unavoidable costs into the system, would be bureaucratic and hard to monitor. But on 
the whole most saw merit in the accreditation process. 
I think that'swhere we are going. I mean on the primary care side that 
is clearly going to start happening more and more as we get primary 
care taking on minor procedures, shall we say. I suppose I am not 
optimistic that we will move that fast on it simply because, how would 
we accredit? Who would we have in our resource to actually monitor? 
You know what I mean. I suppose that is a worry. Encouraging 
organisations to set up accreditation processes by peer review from 
external [reviewers]- great! If that is what we are saying. It's that 
second bit, but it feels like it's encouraging (Chief Executive, HA D). 
Those authorities that were interested in expanding the accreditation model also noted 
that if it was possible to accredit then 'disaccreditation' was also a possibility. In effect 
it would be the equivalent of the threat of exit that exists with contestability. However, 
the same problems would apply to disaccreditation as it does to exit, perhaps even 
more so. The accreditation process by its nature involves a commitment from both 
providers and purchasers, both have to commit time and resources to set the 
framework in place. Therefore, given this commitment it is a moot point whether 
disaccreditation would be a viable option in disciplining providers. It is the monitoring 
of the accreditation criteria that form s the basis of provider regulation. 
The idea of 'care pathways' is similar to that of accreditation. In effect it involves a 
series of services each of which are accredited or agreed through audit. Taken together 
they create an holistic approach to a service, looking at the whole care package from 
entry until exit from the system. For the most part this form of defining the type of 
service the authorities wished to purchased was being actively pursued only by only a 
few authorities in the sample. And of those, either it was part of their filture plans for 
purchasing or it was reserved for particular forms of service. One example was 
maternity care. 
We are already moving towards that in certain areas, but it's not an 
easy one to get too far into, because you are into all the inherent 
problems within the service of being able to cost for that pathway 
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properly, and how well can we identify those services. That's a problem 
for the Trusts rather than us in a sense. But in principle we are - for 
instance, particularly maternity services, where it is sensible to see a 
pathway right through from primary care, right through to potentially 
up to tertiary care for the very sick babies, but predominantly into the 
secondary area. It would almost be a package of services available for 
maternity (Director of Finance, HA E). 
It was argued that one or the attractions of care pathways for the purchasing 
authorities, as suggested by the above comment, was that the particular care pathway 
model was produced by the Trust not the authority. The Trust had to commit 
resources to develop a fully costed and audited pathwaywith built-in monitoring 
procedures and only after this was done would the authority decide whether to 
purchase the service in that form. The additional advantage was that it provided a 
mechanism for highlighting any substantial deviation from the agreed treatment 
methods. Potentially, an individual clinician that consistently strayed from the pathway 
would be noticed and their actions scrutinised. As many respondents noted, this form 
of discipline through contracting with Trusts was one of the few levers that the 
authorities had at their disposal to control clinical behaviour. However, at the same 
time there was a marked reluctance on the part of authorities to use exact contract 
specification except as a last resort when all else had failed. Interestingly it was the 
Directors of Public Health that showed the greatest reluctance to use formal sanctions, 
preferring informal consultation and peer pressure to bring about a change in clinical 
behaviour. Chief Executive and finange directors were more willing to use the Trusts 
as employers to make the change. As an illustration of this, a Chief Executive was 
given the scenario of a consultant who appeared to be performing too many grommet 
operations to correct glue ear, and was asked to comment on the authority's response. 
Well we say to the Trust, 'with reference to the contract we have with 
you, we've calculated the cost of grommets. We're not going to reduce 
your contract by that much, but we want some more of another thing. 
Now if you are stupid enough to go on underwriting this guy doing it, 
that's you problem. But we wish you to know that's not the way we 
want' (Chief Executive, HA F). 
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However, this comment, and similar ones made by other non-Public Health directors in 
response to this scenario, was almost always followed by the admission that so far it 
had not been necessary to do this. More often than not, problems were resolved by 
discussion with the Trust's medical director and a 'sensible' agreement was achieved. 
Often this agreement was reached after additional pressure was put on Trusts by GPs 
at the prompting of the authority. It was, as one Chief Executive put it, a case of 'more 
men with stethoscopes round the table rather than men in grey suits' being more 
persuasive when dealing with clinical behaviour. 
The problem with the above discussion of the disciplinary nature of the contracting 
process, and its associated technologies, is that there is a danger of overemphasising 
the confrontational element of the purchaser/provider relationship. At times focusing 
on this dimension of relationship acts as a corrective to earlier studies that describe an 
internal market dominated by providers (see Freemantle et al. 1993). While it is 
undoubtedly correct to say that the authorities in the sample were concerned about 
provider activity, the impression was not of authorities having been 'captured' by 
providers. Indeed, it could be argued that the authorities felt it was part of their 
commissioning role to give Trusts some protection against the vagaries of the internal 
market. For those authorities undergoing a rationalisation of acute services it was seen 
as a particularly important part of their strategic remit to not only manage demand but 
also manage supply. Clearly authorities cannot manage demand as they would wish 
without the co-operation of local GPs,. including fundholding GPs. To further this, in 
all of the authorities there were formal and informal mechanisms of eliciting 
representative views from GPs and including them in the commissioning process. 
Locality management is perhaps the most formal strategy of all to incorporate GPs, 
fundholding and non-fundholding, into commissioning. Although the role of GPs in 
setting commissioning priorities will be discussed more fully in the next chapter, it is 
important to note the am bivalent relationship patient-centred GPs seemed to have with 
the strategic commissioning process. GP opinions are fundamental to the 
commissioning process that determines the mix of services the authority decides to 
contract. As this comment by a Chief Executive illustrates: 
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One reason we have been close to GPs is because of the major 
reorientation of services... and of course we don't refer patients, it's 
GPs that refer patients. So if we move contracts from one place to 
another to commission major new services..., unless the GPs are signed 
up to those changes then of course they won't happen (Chief Executive, 
HA Q. 
The problem for the authorities, as they saNv it, was that strategic thinking has never 
been part of the GP job description. Therefore, it was seen as central to the authority's 
commissioning remit to 'get some of the 'God's Eye' picture through and actually 
move the District'. And this meant guaranteeing amounts of business to Trusts to keep 
them viable and to match the demand for health care services expressed in contracting. 
As a director of strategy observed: 
Sometimes you have to say [to GPs], 'think it through what will 
happen, and think it through what you want to do with that contract'... 
there will be some priorities that will be important to them, which we 
think 'well that is not a strategic priority really'. And there will be 
others, to us - for example, one of the dilemmas was on junior doctors 
hours - which I actually feel is a worthwhile priority, and I know it is 
provider focused... Now GPs are just saying that is nothing to do with 
us, that is Trust business. Let them worry about that. So, we have to 
find a way of getting them to understand the implications of us not 
doing that. And the way you do that is to make it very practical for 
them. So, for example, you say, well in some of the smaller surgical 
specialties, if they don't do this theyAill lose accreditation, if they lose 
accreditation they lose the Senior Registrar. If they lose the Senior 
Registrar, it folds in that hospital (Director of Strategy, HA F). 
What was clear was that the authorities in the sample were well aware of the new 
possibilities that the reform process had given them to make strategic decisions and 
influence the health agenda. All the authorities felt that that they had many more 
instruments to make change than they had previously and were on the whole optimistic 
about making real and substantial changes in the mix of services in the long run. As 
one director of commissioning stated, 'my job more and more is trying to build the 
things that are levers for change... Which for me was what commissioning was about'. 
However, it is equally fair to say that the authorities in the survey still felt that making 
changes was difficult, and only really possible at the mar gins of activity. Moreover, 
they asserted that many of the obstacles in the way of making strategic changes were 
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not because they were ill-equipped to meet the challenge but, more relevantly, there 
were perverse incentives built into the system that preventing them from fulfilling their Zý I= 
remit to the fullest extent. Furthermore, these obstructions were not financial or 
managerial but political. 
Political regulation of the Health Service 
It would be wrong to suggest that all forms of political-macro-level of regulation I 
produced by the reform process were seen by the authorities as antagonistic to their 
strategic commissioning role. Many of the key strategic targets set by the political ZD 
centre as part of such initiatives as Health of the Nation and a 'primary health care led' 
NES are entirely consistent with the wider understanding of health and health care that 
looks at quality of life rather than absence of disease. The five Health of the Natioll 
target areas - heart disease, cancer, mental illness, HIV/A1DS and sexual health, 
accidents - are essentially programmes of health promotion and disease prevention. At 
their core are efforts to change behaviour and reduce individual risk factors such as 
smoking, unhealthy diets and risky sexual practices. The sample authorities on the 
whole had no problems with Health of the Nation. They felt comfortable that they 
could accommodate the targets within the overall commissioning strategy - with a little 
modification to suit local circumstances. As one Chief Executive commented: 
Many of the national priorities coincide with local priorities. So there is 
not a problem. If you look at cancer, renal dialysis, cardiovascular 
disease, Changing Childbirth, they are very much things that we want to 1. do anyway. So that is nice and easy (Chief Executive, HA F). 
Furthermore, more than one director interviewed noted that as the NHS was a 
national health service there should be no concern about meeting national priorities. 
The only minor caveat from the authorities was that many of the targets involved 
action that was beyond their role as health authorities or was very long term. Even so, 
they still felt that it was part of their remit to take the lead in working with other 
agencies to meet the targets. 
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A more problematic area is the idea of 'a primary care led' NHS, loosely defined as 
taking decisions 'as close to patients as possible' (NHSME 1995). For the authorities 
this presented something of a dilemma. Clearly, if decisions are taken as close to 
patients as possible then this gives added weight to the opinions of GPs who are the 
leading primary care practitioners (and to a lesser extent the opinions of other primary 
care workers). Consulting GPs, as previously noted, was regarded by all the authorities 
as one of their most important activities. However, despite this ongoing relationship 
with GPs, both fundholding and non-fundholding, one of the fundamental difficulties 
for the authorities in operationalising a primary-care led strategy was overcoming their 
doubts about the true nature of the initiative. This scepticism is illustrated in the 
following comment by a director of commissioning. 
They have heard a lot of the language about a primary care led NIHS 
and are very, very suspicious. They say, 'well it is fine language. Show 
us any money. Show us any shift. You arejust going to dump on us. 
You are just going to cut down the beds in the acute and dump the stuff 
on us and not help us sort it out and not support us with any service 
network'. So they are very, very suspicious (Director of 
Commissioning, HA E). 
The dilemma for the authorities is that while they did appear to be committed to a 
primary health care led NFIS and shifting resources to meet the new priorities as 
directed fforn the centre, at the same time other directives from the Region or the 
centre had the effect of forcing the authority to act in the opposite direction. Other 
research has highlighted the this discrepancy felt by providers between rhetoric and 
action, especially in the non-acute services such as community care (Flynn et a]. 1997). 
Similarly, in their review of purchasing plans and commissioning intentions Klein et al. 
(1996) point out that despite the fact that health authorities declare that they are 
committed to shifting resources from the acute sector and into priority areas like 
mental health, the evidence of real resource commitments showed little change in acute 
expenditure in the early to mid- I 990s. The implication is either that the authorities are 
being disingenuous and that the scepticism of GPs and some providers is well founded, 
or that the authorities are committed to change but cannot deliver it for other reasons. 
The evidence from the sample authorities suggests the latter. 
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The interview data indicated that many respondents believed they had little room for 
manoeuvre when faced with demands from the agenda produced at the centre that 
reflected national priorities. Interestingly the most pessimistic were the Directors of 
Public Health. The response of one Director of Public Health when asked about the 
degree to which the authority was constrained by national priorities illustrates the 
point. As she stated: 
At the moment totally. The first national priority is not to give us any 
extra money. But having said that we were talking the other day about 
Health of the Nation, with cancer Calmanisation, with pressure on 
intensive care beds, with pressures on medical emergency admissions, 
with pressure on us improving our access to renal services. They are all 
priorities raining down. I feel like there is no room at all (Director of 
Public Health, HA C). 
Other directors where more sanguine about the situation and pointed to the abolition 
of the Regional tier of management as a source of extra local flexibility. However, at 
the same time they pointed out that the region acted as a buffer against direct political 
pressure. It was also stressed that initiatives such as Health of the Nalion and a 
"primary health care led NHS' did reflect many local priorities and that it was, as noted 
earlier, a question of placing them in a local context. Even so, all respondents felt that 
pressure from the centre did constrain action by authorities to meet local needs as they 
saw them. It could be argued that with the process of commissioning still a relatively 
novel experience, it was hardly surprising that the centre would be concerned that they 
should give authorities a sense of direction in what was still uncharted waters. The 
number of directives might have been considered excessive at one point (see Klein et 
al. 1996), but this holds out the promise that once the system started to settle down it 
might be expected that the pressure to conform to national priorities would diminish. 
That is not to suggest that new priorities would not arise and dominate the agenda. As 
one Chief Executive described, that is a process which authorities have to contend with 
already. 
The more interesting things are the ones that blow-up, either because of 
a continuing problem that appears to have little resolution or because of 
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really high profile individual issues... which starts of as a one-OfF high 
profile issue, then in the course of the follow-up action appears to 
identify a major resource issue and there is a very high imperative to 
resolve that and make sure it doesn't happen again (Chief Executive, 
HA Q. 
However, these are not the pressures from the centre that really concerned authorities. 
The two areas that caused the most problems for authorities and compromised their 
commissioning renýt were waiting lists and most of all the efficiency index. 
Commissioning and political imperatives 
Taken together, the Health of the Nation initiative and a primary care led NES are 
both quintessential 'new public health' programmes. They are concerned with 
promotion and prevention strategies, emphasising personal responsibility and a self- 
management of health risk. As such they comprise a coherent package of health 
reforms that reflects a neo-liberal form of health governance. However, an intrinsic 
part of health governance is the formal manifestation of governmental power. The 
difficulty for any government held to account for the stewardship of the NHS is that 
benefits that accrue from these initiatives are long term. The problem for governments 
is that even if health does improve according to the set targets and can be attributable 
to the health service itself, these measures do not reflect the political imperative of 
demonstrating the 'success" of day-to-day stewardship of the health system. This need 
to prove effective stewardship leads to direct pressure on a health authority to meet a 
political set of indicators. As mentioned earlier, it was argued that the abolition of the 
Regional tier exposed the authority to direct political pressure. As one director 
commented: 
[And] I think the proximity of the political level now to us as a health 
authority, rather than being at a distance, has actually made quite a bit 
of difference because you do tend to get the political imperatives 
coming straight to Health Authorities, and straight to health authority 
decision making committees. Where before they tended to be mediated 
through Regional Health Authorities in a kind of, 'Ooh, what are we all 
going to do with this, sort of approach. In the sense that it has made 
things much more immediate and having much more of an impact, and 
also having the political level imperative attached to it, which is coming 
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from the centre, 'you will do this', rather than 'what can we do about 
this'. That has changed the amount we are able to do on a local level 
quite a lot I feet in the past 18 months or two years or so (Director of 
Public Health, HA E). 
The two most prominent measures that demonstrate this political dimension are the 
length of waiting lists and the efficiency index which purports to demonstrate levels of 
activity in the NHS. Of these the waiting list initiative was seen by most of the 
respondents to be the least injurious to local priorities. As these two directors 
observed: 
... But even locally, and even with 
GPs etc, on the whole, most people 
would acknowledge that, OK it skewed priorities but, you know, very 
long waiting list are not defensible really. But what it's done is put in 
huge amounts of financial pressure into the system because waiting lists 
are a way of rationing, and always have been (Director of Strategy, HA 
F). 
The emphasis on the waiting list is linked to the amount of time you've 
m list for 15 months, been on a waiting list. So if I've been on a waitina 
with a relatively minor condition, you get on the waiting list but you've 
only been on the waiting list for 6 months, but you're actually in greater 
need of treatment that I am. ToughL I'll get it because I've been on 
longer than you have. And that's because heads will roll if the magic 
numbers and dates aren't reached. So I think that kind of national 
policy has an adverse effect (Director of Public Health, HA D). 
Overall the impression gained from respondents was not that they considered reducing 
waiting lists was a 'bad idea', far from it, many agreed with the comments above that 
long waiting times were indefensible. However, at the same time there was a degree of 
apprehension that neither the average length of the wait nor the health need of 
individual patients were taken into account. Instead the key statistic used by politicians 
to monitor success was the reduction in the lotal numbers of people waiting. As other 
commentators have pointed out there is a danger that targets based on this simplistic 
measure are open to misinterpretation. As one former advisor to the Major 
government commented, 'who cares, when visiting their local supermarket, how many 
people nationwide might be waiting to go through he checkout in that chain, rather 
than how quickly they themselves will be out of that store? (Hockley 1998: 2-3). The 
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convenience for politicians is that waiting list reduction is one problem whicli can be 
ameliorated in the short term by spending more money even if in the long run the 
evidence suggests that ultimately this may be counterproductive. When waiting lists are 
reduced to lower levels the evidence is that GPs change their referral behaviour 
correspondingly and increase demand for specialist services by referring patients that 
they had not previously as a direct result of long waiting list (Henderson et al. 1993). 
Overall, all the respondents interviewed said that to some extent the effect of 
prioritising waiting lists reductions did skew local priorities but the additional concern 
was that they forced the authorities to increase activity, especially in the acute sector. 
This pressure to increase activity was the major problem associated with the other 
measure of activity - the efficiency index. As the name implies the efficiency index 
seeks to measure activity within the NHS as a proxy for measurement of health gain. In 
essence the efficiency index is a measure of 'value for money' but does so using a very 
narrow criterion. Every health authority is given an index target to meet and so has to 
ensure that Trusts, who actually provide the measured activity, also meet their targets. 
Without exception, the efficiency index was the topic that elicited the strongest 
comments from respondents. This was not because the authorities were against a 
'value for money' indicator, the concern was about the way the index was measured. 
Like waiting lists initiatives, it was viewed as having a bias in favour of acute services. 
The problem for the authorities was that in a health service that produced 'appalling 
data', the primary currency of the index was based on the monitoring and collection of 
Finished Consultant Episode or FCE numbers. By their nature, more FCEs are 
generated within an acute care setting than anywhere else in the service. However, it 
was forcibly pointed out by many directors, especially Directors of Public Health, that 
they considered the FCE figures as close to meaningless. The comments of two 
Directors of Public Health illustrate this: 
I mean FCEs. The biggest way to flannel figures is to look at FCEs- I 
mean again, if I went into hospital and I was seen by six different 
consultants, that's six different FCEs. I'm only the one body lying in the 
one bed and I might have seen the six of them during a two day period. 
And then we get these wondrous statements that the NHS is seeing 
more patients that ever. Baloney! Or words to that effect (Director of 
Public Health, HA D). 
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The whole system is actually driven around the number of FCEs. And 
the increases and the cost releasing efficiency savings, and all the other 
perverse incentives, all encourage Health Authorities and Trusts to 
inflate the amount of activity year-on-year. It is stupid system (Director 
of Public Health, HA E). 
For most authorities in the sample meeting the efficiency index was not seen as the 
problem. The more problematic area was that many authorities wanted to reduce acute 
activity, as their commissioning intentions had indicated, but could not do so without 
having to manipulate the efficiency figures. This meant maximising efficiency gains 
from acute Trusts to compensate for increases in activity elsewhere. There was a 
general impression that the authorities treated the efficiency index with some disdain 
because it distracted the authority from their 'proper' role of commissioning. The 
comments below, from a Chief Executive and a director of purchasing, were 
representative of the views expressed. 
If when it comes to the contracting process to balance between pound 
notes, waiting times and efficiency - efficiency was a thing, when you 
had sorted the other two out, you then see what you are left with. You 
didn't actually take it massively seriously. Not least of which because 
we are not in the game of necessarily generating more activity all the 
time, are we? I didn't think we were actually. We might be in the game 
of reducing activity in certain areas. So why have a formula that 
actually encourages you to keep buying more. Doesn't make sense to 
me (Chief Executive, HA D). 
The one national priority which everybody has kicked against is the 
efficiency index.... You've got the priorities of things like mental 
health, continuing care, primary care led NHS. And all those are 
actually not just not going to generate lots of FCEs but actually should 
be reducing FCEs. And the efficiency index is so crude and so loaded 
for acute activity, and not for community activity and even if you 
changed that shift, the community activity data is pretty raw compared 
to hospital data. And the whole thing is loaded. But when you talk to 
Directors of Finance they say, 'Well, it's the only reason we've done 
better than other public departments with the Treasury over the last 5 
years, because each year you've been able to prove you've done 
more'... It's pathetic. And, you know, every year we are down to what 
have we got in our back pocket to stuff into the efficiency index. It's 
just playing the game. It's just feeding the beast. But it takes 
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management time and effort away from what we ought to be doing 
(Director of Purchasing, FIA F). 
The general feeling -was that efficiency indexes, like -waiting lists, were part of the 
political 'game' which had to be entered into by authorities whether they thought it 
relevant or not. This is an illustration of the relevance of governmentality analysis in 
the way that regulatory discourses have the power to circumscribe behaviour without 
'having first to be interiorised in the people's consciousness' (Foucault 1980: 196). 
For those that expressed a opinion there was a view, as one Director of Public Health 
put it, that 'the politicians have got it every way at the moment'. This was echoed by 
the comments of other directors. For examPle: 
Yeah you can measure a FCE but it bears no relationship to patients. 
But then politically FCEs are marvellous things because the more and 
more sophisticated we get and the cleverer and cleverer providers get 
about shifling folks around the system and getting three FCEs for every 
one patient, the more somebody can stand up in parliament and say 
'there is more health care going on than every before', what we do is 
we count more of it (Director of Commissioning, HA A). 
When it comes to comparing micro (providers), meso (strategic purchasers) and macro 
(political) influence over the reformed health system, it is clear from the last series of 
comments that purchasing authorities felt constrained by macro-level priorities. 
However, what was unclear was the degree to which this political dimension was in 
turn influenced by 'the ability of interest groups (particularly doctors) to manipulate 
public opinion to their advantage' (Freemantle et al. 1993: 547). This is indeed an 
important point which will be returned to in the in the next chapter. However, the main 
finding that stems from the analysis of this macro level of governance is not that formal 
political control is problematic because it is susceptible to external influence but 
because it uses an intrinsic calculus of regulatory control that is often antagonistic to 
other levels of governance. Just as purchasing authorities appear to need to stifle 
competition to further their own commissioning agenda, then formal political 
regulation involves the monitoring of variables that seem to be at variance with the 
commissioning aims of purchasers. 
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Conclusion 
In this. chapter a governmentality framework was used to explore the implications for 
health management practices of the-NHS-r--_f4xTn process -of the late 1980s and early 
1990s. It was argued that these reforms reflected a shift from welfare liberalism to a 
neo-liberal discourse of health governance. Empirical case -study data were presented 
that explored the rationale of those health service managers within health authorities 
charged with the specific duty of commissioning health care to meet local health needs. 
It was argued that this strategic role of commissioning represented a new direction for 
management within the NHS as part of a new discourse of health governance. 
The evidence presented in this chapter leads to the conclusion that the development of 
the strategic purchasing role within health authorities has produced a very consistent 
set of management structures, and an understanding of the commissioning remit that 
seems to reflect a common ideology. Despite some minor differences of emphasis, the 
interview data suggests that all the purchasing authorities saw it as their duty to make 
real changes in service provision to meet local health needs. The basis of their activities 
was the new commissioning role, driven by Public Health concerns. However, it was 
notable that the internal/quasi-market and the rhetoric of competition - the supposed 
cornerstone of the reform process - seemed to play only a limited role in fulfilling their 
commissioning remit. This is exemplified by the comment below from one director of 
commissioning. 
... The market language in the NHS, to me, has never been true, because there is no market. The reasons for that, being that you cannot 
take the ultimate steps which would happen if you were in a true 
market, of shifting business around to a large extent. Which would 
mean major closures. In would actually mean Trusts going to the wall 
now. The way that debate will come will be through specialty 
configuration, and a different route. It isn't through market forces. And 
the other thing. We talk about money following patients, the truth of 
that is that money is very limited that you cant let money follow 
patients, because in destabilises two large organisations in the local 
Trusts. And therefore, money actually doesn't follow patients, and 
Trusts who try to behave in a way that says there is money in the 
system, if we do things at risk, what they have tended to do is increase 
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their own costs and increase the costs of their host purchaser but 
, without attracting the money because it is not in the system (Director of 
Commissioning, HA E). 
As these comments indicate, the commissioning role in effect has to stifle competition 
in order to function properly. Paradoxically, one of the rationales behind this behaviour 
by the purchasing authorities was, as stated above, the need to protect Trusts from the 
destabilising influence of the market. As a consequence, as described earlier, there was 
little enthusiasm to use contracting in general as a formal expression of a market 
interaction. Many of the contract relationships appeared to function in more of a 
symbolic way. Apart from being a technical exercise in operationalising strategic 
decision making, contracting also reflected a disciplinary process and a means of 
bringing a degree of stability to the post refon-n health system. However, despite this 
expression of commitment to their commissioning remit, all the authorities in the 
sample felt that they were hampered to some degree by the priorities imposed from the 
centre. This reinforces the observation made at the end of the last section that micro, 
meso and macro levels of governance often work against each other even though they 
are all products of the same neo-liberal form of health governance. This in itself 
provides a valuable critique of totalising and deterministic discourses of governance. 
However, this is not to confuse the totalising discourses described by governmentality 
analysis with governmentality itself 
The fracturing of health governance has major implication for health policy. It is 
evident that the tension between the macro, meso and micro levels of governance is an 
inherent part of this form of neo-liberal governance. Therefore, the fact that each 
'level' of governance has different, and often conflicting, criteria with which to judge 
success or failure implies that the de-politicisation of administration is unachievable. 
The imposition of a market rationality - albeit in the form of a quasi, internal market - 
in practice does not provide a 'neutral' discourse of governance. The question that 
now arises is what will be the impact of this fragmented form of governance when 
authorities, as part of their conunissioning activities, are faced with making hard 
decisions about priorities, (especially when the extra dimension of GP opinion and the 
purchasing role of fundholders is taken into account)?. The rhetoric of change adopted 
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by authorities was fundamentally a reflection of their new management function. It was 
unclear how new management structures and new forms of control will be relevant 
when the decisions to be made about prioritising treatments are essentially moral 
problems based on value judgements. Whereas the reform process eventually 
delineated a theoretically coherent set of purchasing principles in terms of management 
function, it is debatable whether this coherence extends to the production of priorities. 
If it does not, then one of the central tenets of the commissioning strategy will be 
undermined. This will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
Commissioning for health: hearing the voice of the consumer 
Introduction 
The previous chapter showed that the market-based, neo-liberal, rationale of the 1990s 
NES reforms created a new role for purchasing authorities, that of 'commissioning'. 
Interview evidence indicates that commissioning, as opposed to the technical function 
of purchasing and contracting, was ebaracterised by a broader understanding of the 
concept of health and featured a more strategic management role centred on increasing 
'health gain' and meeting local health needs. To aid this new management function a 
number of novel technologies, such as audit, evidence based medicine (EBM) and 
notions of clinical effectiveness, were invoked as a means of furthering the 
commissioning agenda. One of the logical consequences of trying to fulfil this 
commissioning remit is that it eventually begins to raise questions about the historical 
patterns of services that have developed as part of NHS provision. In essence, the 
technologies of commissioning both question the effectiveness of historical patterns of 
services in meeting 'real' health needs and themselves form the basis of a 'rational' 
process that can be brought to bear on the problem. However, the effect of rearranging 
patterns of purchasing to meet this declared health need, means that purchasers are 
faced with the problematic decision of prioritising services, and those patients that 
benefit from them, to make best use of available resources. In other words they 
potentially find themselves in a more intense and explicit rationing debate than 
previously. 
Rationing and priority-setting in general were explored in earlier chapters. However, 
two points must be reiterated. The first is that in economics terms, health care 
rationing is inevitable. Where there is no market there is rationing. In the pre-reform 
NHS, rationing was done implicitly, by clinicians. The post-reform NES, with its use 
of a market rationale, potentially makes the decision-making more transparent, and 
hence, the rationing/priority-setting process becomes explicit (Harrison and Wistow 
1992). The second point follows on from this. On what basis will the rationing/priority- 
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setting decisions be made? The technologies described earlier that are implicated in 
management function (eg audit), basically depend on the notion of effectiveness and 
scientific medicine to legitimise their use. By themselves they do not form the basis of a 
rationing agenda. They may form the basis of a decision to purchase, or not to 
purchase, particular services, but they do not provide a means of comparing services 
and trading-off marginal benefit against money invested. There are such measures that 
have been constructed to act as a generic currency of health, the QALY is an example, 
which incorporate valuejudgements that act as a quality of life weighting on post 
treatment outcomes data. But-even these proxy measures lack one fundamental 
ingredient - the legitimacy that comes from reflecting social values, or in a market 
sense, reflecting consumer values. 
To illustrate these points, in the next section there will be a brief exploration of the 
importance of 'consumerism' and consumer 'empowerment' to neo-liberal forms of 
governance, and in particular, neo-liberal forms of health governance. This will be 
followed by a discussion of evidence concerning rationing/priority-setting policies 
pursued by the sample purchasing authorities. After this examination of priority-setting 
in action there will be an exploration of the role played in the priority-setting debate by 
specific groups and institutions, such as GPs, user/carer groups and especially 
Commum ty Health Councils (CHCs), that mediate particular consumer/patient health 
concerns to purchasing authorities. The question underlying all these concerns is 
whether purchasing authorities can fulfil their commissioning remit and take control 
the priority-setting agenda. 
Consumerism and health care 
One of the key characteristics of Conservative government policy since 1979 was an 
almost fetishistic concern with increasing choice and 'empowering' the individual. As 
Barnes and Prior (1995) observe: 
Set against collectivist ideas of public welfare and the extensive role of 
government in the provision of services, 'choice' has become one of the 
clarion calls of the 'new Right' prescriptions for a consumerist form of 
citizenship and for models of public service which empowers users as 
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participants in the market. Consumer choice is the demand-side txvin of 
supply-side competition, as the public services are reshaped through the 
application of principles of liberal economics (Barnes and Prior 1995: 
53). 
The basic premise of neo-liberal economics, as noted in other chapters, is that the 
moral basis of a civil society is founded on the ability of the individual to exercise 
choice in the pursuance of enlightened self-interest. Therefore, any neo-liberal reform 
process must be predicated on the imperative of including as much consumer input as 
possible. It could be argued that ideas of consumerism are not new. Indeed, later in the 
chapter there will be a description of the role played in the 'reformed' NES by 
Community Health Councils. CHCs were specifically created to represent the interests 
of patients and NES users to the health authorities in the wake of the 1974 health 
service reforms. In some ways one can view the creation of the CHCs as a means of 
making up for the deficiencies in a reform process that took place ivilhill the 
institutionalised corporate structure of the NHS, which remained 'producer-oriented 
rather than consumer-oriented' (Harrison and Pollitt 1994: 37). The reform process in 
the 1970s (and to some extent reforms in the 80s) did not seek to change the 
institutional nature of the NHS and extend patients and users control over the Service 
beyond that exercised at the ballot box. In contrast, the 90s reforms, and initiatives that 
preceded it like the Griffiths Report (1983), did seek to change the nature of the NUS 
as an institution, and as part of this transformation placed the needs of the consumer 
and enhancement of individual choice at the forefront of the reform process. 
Choice and empowerment was the mantra that accompanied all the major reform 
processes instigated by post-] 979 Conservative government. It was evident in housing 
policy, education reform and a host of others. The extension of choice into areas of 
government activity that informed these reform processes reflected the simple 
counterfactual embedded deeply in neo-liberal economics - where there is no choice 
and the consumer is not sovereign there is inefficiency. But more importantly, without 
individual choice there is no legitimate moral basis for social policy. Therefore, it 
becomes a moral as well as an economic imperative to 'reform' previous forms of 
collective welfare. Not only must they be inefficient and thus detrimental to general 
welfare, they also deny the basic right to choose, to make decisions as informed 
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individuals. However, in this formula of governance the fight to choose also involves 
certain duties and responsibilities. The most fundamental duty is that citizens have to 
continuously exercise choice. As Giddens puts it, 'we have no choice but to choose' 
(Giddens 1991: 81). This leads on to another responsibility already discussed in 
previous chapters, that of the citizen to choose prudently and not indulge in risky 
behaviour that would place unnecessary burdens on the state. Taken together it can be 
seen that within neo-liberal forms of governance choice and risk are intrinsic and 
inseparable. 
However, an obvious difficulty arises when individuals cannot exercise choice directly, 
for example in circumstances where consumers lack expert knowledge, and choices 
have to be made on their behalf In these circumstances a reform process has to find a 
way of building into the system a means of representing consumer values. The NHS 
reforms are a prime example of this process at work, involving an ambitious attempt to 
transform an institution traditionally based on paternalism to one based on 
consumerism (Klein 1995). The language of NHS refonn in the White Paper Morking 
for Patients (1989) and the subsequent NHS and Coninninity Care Act (1990), had an 
overtly consumerist dimension. The three key aims of the reform process were; to 
devolve responsibility; secure value for money; and ' to give patients, wherever they 
live in the UK better health care and greater choice of the services available (DoH 
1989: 3). 
Clearly it is one thing to promise choice, the more difficult problem is translating the 
rhetoric into concrete action. One option pursued by Government was the extension of 
the Citizens Chai-ter initiative to cover the NHS. The Palient's Charter, created in 
November 1991 and expanded in subsequent years, set out a number of 'rights' for 
NHS patients, such as limits on various waiting times and basic standards of quality in 
NHS facilities - but only 'as circumstances and resources allow' (DoH 1991: 6). The 
spirit of the Chat-tei- programme, as outlined by the then Prime Minister, John Major, 
was to 'make consumer views count' in the public sector 'where choice and 
competition are limited' (1991: 4). However, the Palient's Chanel- with its 'confusing 
mixture of citizen's rights and customer service standards' (Allsop 1995: 191; 
Montgomery 1992) does not appear to provide the appropriate mechanism for 
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extending individual choice over the form of clinical treatment that patients receive. 
Therefore, the Patient's Chartei- has only a limited function in regulating the provision 
of health services. However, the Patient's Charter was not the principal means of 
representing consumer values within the NHS. The creation of the internal market 
itself Presented alternative ways of including consumers in the purchasing of local 
health care. 
One of the inherent problems in the NHS internal market was that those who exercised 
a real degree of choice over which treatment and therapies were purchased in the 
Health Service were generally not the same as those who ultimately receive that 
treatment. Therefore, a quasi-market in health care in itself is not enough to guarantee 
the satisfaction of those economic counterfactually conditions that would obtain if a 
free market in health care were possible. Obviously, counterfactual conditions by 
definition cannot satisfied. However, in theory, the closer the approximation to the 
circumstances that would operate under those conditions, the more effective the quasi- 
market. In effect this is the equivalent of saying that the more the decisions made by 
purchasers reflect the collective decisions of informed self-interested consumers., the 
more acceptable, economically and morally, are those purchasing decisions. An 
obvious method of reflecting local consumer values would be to introduce some kind 
of democratic accountability into process. Indeed between the 1974 and 1991 
reorganisations of the health service, many health authority board members did come 
from the Local Authorities. However, this was always a very limited form of 
democracy and there were always questions as to the real influence non-executive 
members of health authorities had on the decision making process (Allsop 1995). 
The 1990s reform process did not take the democratic route. Health authorities were 
divested of local authority representatives, and, to reflect their new streamlined 
managerial agency status, those members were replaced by non-executives 
predominantly from the local business community. Therefore, in order to reflect local 
consumer values health authorities were given the task of engaging with the local 
population in order to understand local health needs. As the NHS priorities and 
planning guidance for 1996/97 states: 
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Health authorities should have a strategic plan for, and should be 
engaged in, systematic and continuing communication with local 
people, representative and voluntary groups (especially Community 
Health Councils) in respect of the development of local services, 
purchasing plans, specific health issues and health promotion as 
appropriate. Particular attention should be paid to addressing the 
concerns of those with special needs (NHSME 1995). 
One important early initiative along these lines was set out in the document Local 
koices: The kieus of the Local People ih Purchasingfor Health (NHSME 1992). In 
this document it was suggested: 
If health authorities are to establish a champion of the people role, their 
decisions should reflect, so far as is practical, what people want, their 
preferences, their concerns and values. Being responsive to local views 
will enhance the credibility of health authorities but, more importantly, 
is likely to result in services which are better suited to local needs and 
therefore more appropriate (NHSME 1992: 1). 
There are a number of points to note in this advice to health authorities . The 
first is 
that systematically engaging with the local population is not solely a means of meeting 
local health needs, it is also a managerial strategy 'of establishing credibility and 
legitimacy' for the authority (Ranad6 1997: 15 1). Another point is that combining the 
purchasing and planning guidance together with the Local Moices initiative presents 
something of a problem for health authorities. To what extent can authorities follow 
local opinion before it starts to infringe on the health needs of those disadvantaged 
groups within society? Official encouragement to engage with the local population and 
reflect local values clearly was not intended as the first step in 'establishing a 
dictatorship of the uninformed' (Hunter 1993; quoted in Klein et a]. 1996: 128). One 
of themes that emerged from the interview data collected from the sample authorities 
was a concern, particularly from Directors of Public Health, that in the consultation 
process some voices may not be heard. For example, one Director of Public Health 
stated: 
One of my roles is to -I will say things like, 'What about people with 
learning difficulties? What about people with physical disabilities? And 
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what about the classical Public Health underrepresented groupsT And 
my role is partly to promote the interests of those groups in that debate. 
Not to say a formal debate, but in the discussion that goes on. So it's a 
very woolly thing, but that is the reality of it that is how it works 
(Director of Public Health, HA B). 
It was felt that while authorities must reflect local opinion they were not obliged to 
follow it blindly. Equity had to be balanced with efficiency in order to meet local health 
needs. The problem is in striking the balance between the two. The logic of the reform 
process, and the need for individual choice, privileges efficiency over equity. There 
appears no way of redressing the balance without rejecting the rationale of 
empowerment and returning to a public services ethos. As Bames and Prior argue, 
'public services exist not just to meet the needs of individuals (and therefore can be 
legitimised only by aggregate individual choices), but that they exist to meet public 
purposes: they are in part a response to the collective needs of society' (1995: 55; 
authors' emphasis). In the light of this problem, the next section explores how the 
sample authorities established their priorities and how much they are informed by the 
assessment of local needs. 
Rationing, priority-setting and health needs assessment 
One of the criteria for selecting the authorities in the research sample was the inclusion 
of a set of well defined priority goals in their purchasing plans or commissioning 
intentions. Many of the sample authorities ranked these goals in terms of high, medium 
or low priorities. However, only one authority included in their purchasing plan a 
detailed list of services that the authority had decided not to purchase as extra 
contractual referrals (ECRs), except in circumstances of 'overriding clinical need. The 
document was very explicit in its description of the services to be excluded. In 
character it closely resembled the type of selection criteria produced by Berkshire HA 
that had made front page national news some months earlier (Crail 1995). Indeed the 
Chief Executive of the sample authority was surprised how little attention their own 
exclusion list had caused. 
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In terms of, is the authority content to say that it will no longer, other 
than in very specific circumstances, use resources to purchase that -form 
of treatment - yes we have done that quite openly and with very much 
less media interest than elsewhere in the country, which is always 
something which surprises me... I think it was Berk-shire health 
authority who took a very similar list to our own and got an awful lot of 
media attention and I half expected my colleague in Berk-shire to fing 
me up and say how the hell did you get awaywith it. 
Taking evidence solely supplied in purchasing plans might lead any researcher to the 
easy conclusion that this authority, together with a handful of others, were alone in 
having a strict rationing policy. However, it was clear from discussions with other 
authorities in the sample that it was far from a unique occurrence. All the other 
authorities, whether they acknowledged that a formal discussion of exclusions had 
taken place in the authority or had not, had very similar list of services that they would 
not purchase except in extreme circumstances. As these Chief Executives described: 
One we have actually disinvested in ... a very thorough 
look at plastic 
surgery. Certain aspects of plastic surgery. We decided we would no 
longer purchase.... The classic example - there is nothing new here - 
tattoos acquired in adult life. But there were others, other areas. Unless 
there were very significant clinical reasons, breast enlargement ... Then 
orthodontics. We have a very strict protocol about what we will and 
what we won't do in orthodontics. Where do we go next? In Vitro, it's 
slightly more judgmental. But we do have some, 'so far and no further'. 
You know, we won't go on trying for ever ... again we 
have tried to say 
if there are very significant clinical indications to the contrary, we won't 
apply a blanket ban (Chief Executive, HA F). 
We actually agreed a list of services which as a general rule we 
wouldn't, but we've never said we will never buy something. So there 
is an escape clause. But there are certain procedure we have identified 
that we won't invest in and we're starting to have debates now about 
particular drugs. Should we fund this, should we not fund thatT. So 
what we've tried to do is, it's a very difficult subject for anyone to 
handle, for a health authority to handle. So what we actually did was 
not make it easy for them, but produced a list where there were 
restrictions in place elsewhere in the country, for a variety of reasons. 
So they've already had a debate prior to that. And then we've gone on 
from there (Chief Executive, HA B). 
213 
In effect, all the authorities had roughly the same policy with only slight variations in 
the lists of restricted services. Collating all the lists would produce the same selection 
of services that have been documented elsewhere (see Redmayne et al 1993; 
Redmayne 1995; Klein et al 1996). In general, the restriction criteria amounted as 
much to an ECR policy as a general policy of explicit rationing. Some services were 
restricted because they were seen to be operating outside orthodox medicine and 
questions were raised about their benefit to patients. One example was the reluctance 
of an authority to refer to a private allergy clinic. Another concemed referral to an 
organisation that provided residential care for those suffering from Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder. In these cases the criteria for restriction was lack of evidence of 
clinical effectiveness. Other services, such as tattoo removal and correction of bat ears 
in adulthood etc., posed the question of where collective provision ended and 
individual responsibility began. As the comment below by one director indicates, in 
some ways these rationing/ECR policies operating at the margins of authority activity, 
only formalised restrictions that already existed for these treatments. 
Actually the ones that are in here [the Purchasing Plan] in some 
respects are the fairly easy ones, not that this was easy ... And some of 
them are really social rather than clinical. Because I think there are 
really two aspects to it. One is whether something is actually clinically 
effective, And I think if we've got evidence that something is not 
clinical effective then that is fairly straightforward, we don't do it, we 
don't fund it. The difficulty is where something is effective but, like 
gender reassignment or fertility treatment. Is that something we should 
be using NHS money for? (Director of Service Development, HA Q. 
The more important question that arises from the use of these rationing/ECR policies is 
whether they will form a template for future activity, whether the methodologies 
involved in producing restricted lists are relevant to a more general debate on 
priorities. The response from the authorities pointed to something of a dilemma. The 
production of the restricted lists was seen as relatively straightforward with many of 
the treatments and services, as already indicated, taking place at the boundary of 
authority activity where restrictions already occurred. However, when questioned 
about whether the selection criteria used in the creation of restricted lists would 
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ultimately change historical patterns of core services the replies were more guarded, as 
the comments of a director of finance testify. 
It ought to. The question is whether we are there or not. Whether we 
can actually support that from a public health viewpoint, from a health 
needs viewpoint and a clinical effectiveness viewpoint. Big debate there 
(Director of Finance, HA E). 
It was evident from similar replies that none of the samples authorities had yet engaged 
in the 'big debate' about priorities. However this reluctance was not the result of a lack 
of sophistication in their approach to health care. It pointed more to an instinctive 
pragmatism when faced with the limitations of relying on supposedly more rational 
ways of doing things. As one Director of Public Health stated: 
I think when it comes to priority debates,... if you are to believe the 
rhetoric, the totally rational, in terms of Taylorism and scientific 
rationality around NHS planning, which is nonsense. That you would 
believe there is this rational process of how many hip operations do we 
need, where can we get them at the best price and quality, where are we 
going to contract for them. That sort of stuff And the other end of it, is 
the very supply driven, medically dominated process which we have had 
in the past (Director of Public Health, HA B). 
This was echoed in the comments of one Chief Executive: 
Personally I don't think you can convince Joe Public of any rationale 
around these issues. All I think we can achieve as a purchaser is to try 
and convince the public that in taking the decision we took we took 
them against a background of relatively easily understood common 
sense set of principles. We cannot win the argument in my view because 
Joe Public, and I'm a Joe Public as well, if something has happened to 
me or my family then your view of life is significantly changed at that 
point and I just think it's unrealistic to expect mass numbers to come up 
with a set of answers which we will feel comfortable with. Possibly. But 
you know very well that when you are up on the public stand that's not 
the discussion you will have with individual groups (Chief Executive, 
HA A). 
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As one might expect from this comment there was little unprompted talk of QALYs 
(Quality Adjusted Life Years) or their alternatives in the replies from directors. As one 
director of finance argued: 
We aren't health economists. We don't have a very easy way of 
measuring the value of one pound doing that compared with another. 
Better minds than mine and better minds than most peoples in the health 
service have struggled all these years with health economics and not 
one of them have come up with a practical way of measuring the value 
of a pound. Even QALYs, all of the years in development they are still 
not deemed to be practical or usable. So now, I don't fool myself that 
we can do it (Director of Finance, HA A). 
Generally, the interview data suggested that purchasing authorities did not feel that 
they had the tools or the vocabulary necessary to enter into a general priorities debate. 
Moreover, this reluctance mixed with pragmatism also was carried over to assessing 
the health needs of the local population. 
All the authorities in the sample had an epidemiological approach as the basis of their 
health needs assessment. However, this was often accompanied by other 
methodologies such as focus groups and Rapid Appraisal exercises (see Ong and 
Humphris 1994). But these alternative methodologies were used sparingly and aimed 
at specific target groups, such as researching the views of women in the Changing 
Clfildbiz-ffi exercise. One reason given was the expense and consumption of 
management time (see Kelson 1995). The other reason given was that the data that 
was generated by these methods was often difficult to convert into concrete decisions. 
This was illustrated by the reflections of one Director of Public Health on a recent 
Rapid Appraisal in which the authority had been involved. 
Its main dilemma is that it's very difficult to prioritise the stuff you get 
in the rapid appraisal exercise with the other problems in the district... 
Now as far as we can tell access to emergency services after hours in 
that area aren't particularly bad. And certainly in terms of a more 
formal health needs assessment, it would be very hard to say that's their 
major health priority but it is certainly something in the perception of 
the local population they see that as a major issue, access to out of 
hours services. And it is difficult to address that. It would cost an 
enormous amount of money to extent out of hours services for the local 
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population, and probably not produce very much health benefit. So it 
produces this sort of, I suppose, dilemma here on a rational point of 
view, there is not a lot of sense in pursuing that (Director of Public 
Health, HA F). 
Most Authorities in this study were well aware that they were new to the job of 
canvassing local views. None of the authorities had been involved in setting up arenas 
where wider health issues could by regularly discussed by members of the public in the 
form of 'Citizens' Juries' or the like, of the kind that bad been created in one or two 
other authorities in the country (see Maynard 1996; Richardson and Bowie 1995). On 
the other hand some, authorities had experimented with asking certain groups, mainly 
user/carer organisations, to participate in an exercise of ranking health priorities. The 
results were mixed. One of the authorities thought it worth pursuing, others were less 
sanguine about the whole enterprise. As one Director of Public Health observed: 
I have a lot of reservations about that style of working. I know a lot of 
people believe that it is one way of involving the public and in getting 
informed opinions. I question just how informed the opinions are if you 
simply seat a number of people in a room and ask them what they think- 
about X, Y or Z... We've had some experience of discussion at health 
authority board level about such things as whether or not we should 
purchase IVF etc. What should be our views on fertility services. That 
exposure does not encourage me to go to the big wide world and ask 
them their opinions. Because it tended to be personal opinions rather 
that be based on any reading or scientific fact or whatever. Also if you 
look at the Oregon experiment there are lessons to be learned there 
because the people who came to the public meetings tended to be 
predominantly the medical and the nursing professions and others 
(Director of Public Health, HA D). 
However, most directors saw public involvement as a difficult but potentially 
rewarding exercise. A minority of directors expressed doubts about whether such 
methodologies could have any real impact in shaping local priorities. One Chief 
Executive was particularly forthright about the value of public consultation exercises. 
Gimmicks... I think a lot of it is, I'm awfully sorry, I really do. Now 
[the Director of Public Health] might give you a totally different view. 
But I've seen the work that some people have done, then you say, 'Well 
where has that taken you and what has that actually achievedT And 
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they look a little hurt at that point. It is almost as if doing the exercise is 
cathartic (Chief Executive, HA F). 
Taking all these comments together it was clear that the public, or specific groups 
within the local population, had only a limited impact on the authorities' priority- 
setting agenda. Therefore, to understand how the agenda is sustained one must look to 
those groups whose decisions have traditionally shaped the patterns of services within 
the N-HS - historically this has been the preserve of the GP. Given the limits on time 
and resource, this research could not include direct investigation of GPs' views. 
However, the interviews with health authority managers addressed the question of the 
role GPs played in priority setting. 
The influence of GPs on priorities 
It is one of the defining characteristics of the NHS that GPs have played a dominant 
role in its development as an institution. GPs traditionally have acted as gatekeepers 
into practically all the other sections of the health service, the only alternative method 
of entry being through A&E admission. In some ways it can be argued that this is one 
of those happy accidents of history. The GP gatekeeper role has been seen as one of 
the key mechanisms in controlling UK health care costs compared to other countries 
(OECD 1992). Therefore, because of the structure of the NES, the aggregate effect of 
GP decisions to a large degree dictates the pattern of priorities around which health 
authorities have to allocate resources. In the post-reform era, health authorities have 
been busy trying to involve GPs in discussions about a wide range of priority and 
resource allocation issues, such as appropriate ECR activity, encouraging GPs to 
consider locality funding etc., encouraging them to participate in creating a 'primary 
care-led NHS' (see previous chapter). In many ways this kind of behaviour by a 
strategic management could be seen as a classic attempt to control behaviour, and 
ultimately manage demand. However, there are other factors at work here. GPs can 
also be viewed as acting like proxy consumers. When they make decisions about 
treatment for their patients it could be argued that they are acting like the mythical 
informed consumer. If they can be integrated into the health authority decision making 
process it would somehow have the effect of legitimising those decisions -a case of 
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'white coats' instead of 'grey suits'. Survey afler survey has shown that when the 
public is asked which group is to be trusted with defining priorities in health care, I 
clinicians consistently top the poll - by a very wide margin. 
Many of the respondents in the survey of health authorities also placed GPs at the 
forefront of the priorities debate. Some directors, particularly those with responsibility 
for primary care, saw it as their role to 'make sure that GPs are given a fair crack of 
the whip' in terms of decisions made about policy and contracts with Trusts. As one 
director of primary care stated: 
If one of the localities were to say, 'we don't want to place a contract 
for mental health serviceswith this provider, we want to place the 
contract with another provider'. And there was a view back here that 
said, 'well, actually, that's a bit inconvenient, it's messy. We would 
prefer to contract for all localities with one provider'. I think part of my 
job is to say, 'hang on a minute. If GPs are asking for that there must be 
a reason. Let's find out what it is. And if it's valid, let's respect their 
wishes'. So it is about helping to deliver a primary care led NHS 
(Director of Primary Care, HA F). 
However, at the same time as emphasising the need to include GPs in the decision 
making process, many directors pointed out the difficulties of slavishly following GP 
opinion. The basic problem was seen to be the traditional GP culture, ie that it is not 
part of the GP role to think strategically or work co-operatively with other GPs in the 
district. The stated underlying reasons for this took two forms. The first was the 
traditional view of GP activity. As one Director of Public Health stated: 
You've got an individual patient or an individual family sitting across 
the desk from you. And your sole responsibility then is to look after 
that individual or the family. The rest of the population doesn't really 
matter... If you are going to have a primary care outlook then you have 
got to become population orientated. Even is it your own practice 
population and not the population of the whole district. Now then that 
means you have to start thinking about the patients you are not seeing z1: 1 C7 
but should be seeing. And much more about prevention and promoting 
good health rather than simply preventing disease. Now that is going to 
need a revolution in thinking. People are going to need much greater 
support (Director of Public Health, HA D). 
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The other suggestion was that GPs were not patient-centred but busilless-centred who 
looked out for their own interests. This applied to non-fiandholders as much as 
fundholding GPs. This view was not exclusive to non-medical directors, several 
Directors of Public Health voiced the same opinion. This approach to GPs is illustrated 
by the following comment by a director of strategy: 
GPs aren't patient centred, they're business centred. It's taken me a 
long time to come to terms with that. Everyone think their GP's prime 
focus is the best interest of their patients, and I'm not saying that a lot 
of them aren't extremely dedicated, committed, they want the best. But 
first and foremost, they are small businessmen. And they have to be able 
to look for financial gain, sustain their business. And that's what they 
look to first, even the best of them (Director of Strategy, HA F). 
However, the problem that remained for the authority was that if GPs acted in their 
own interests, or those of the patient, they could not be relied upon to consistently 
reflect the authority's commissioning role, and may, in certain circumstances, be in 
conflict with it. Many directors pointed out that authorities had to make priority 
decisions taking the needs of the district as a whole into consideration. This included 
making decisions about patients needing specialist treatment that GPs only rarely saw 
in their surgeries. This situation was described by one Chief Executive: 
Take mental health. What GPs are interested in are what are unkindly 
called the worried well. We have major issues with forensic psychiatry, 
the deeply traurnatised group. The GPs come into contact with 
infrequently and so are not so much interested in. That's one. Drug 
addiction, they would far rather that people just went away. I mean to 
say that is not a good model of care. So there are conflicts of interest 
(Chief Executive, HA F). 
The general pattern was that authorities were willing to follow the GPs' lead only in 
certain areas of care where GPs were seen to possess the dominant form of expertise, 
such as primary care and community services. In other specialist areas different groups 
were to be incorporated into the commissioning process. One of such group were the 
users and carers. For example, a Chief Executive argued that: 
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In areas of chronic care, where learning disabilities is a classic example - 
people with learning disabilities have it for life. Their parents for 
example, will know far more about the issue round that than a GP, who 
may or not have any, or very limited experience. And for those clients I 
prefer to get a view of the service from them or their reps rather than 
from any body else (Chief Executive, HA D). 
However, like GPs, the relationship between the interests of user/carer groups and the 
authorities commissioning remit can be problematic. This is discussed in the next 
section. 
User/carer groups: the case of fl-Interferon and recombinant factor VIII 
All the authorities in the sample emphasised their sensitivity to the opinion of users and 
carers when developing new services or reorganising existing ones. The comments 
below by a Director of Public Health were typical of the responses from directors. 
I think the other major way of consulting with people is though the 
service reviews and making sure that the local voluntary groups, the 
users groups, the carers groups are involved because it is much more 
real when you are talking about the needs of people with disabilities, or 
whatever, there is something crisp to catch hold on rather than nebulous 
global health issues (Director of Public Health, HA C). 
For authorities, the obvious advantage of working with such groups was that they 
directly represented consumer/patient interests or were the consumers themselves. 
However, caution was also expressed that many of the groups were partisan by nature, 
and this needed to be taken into consideration when including them in service 
development discussions. Another problem with these groups, it was suggested, was 
that difficulties would arise when there existed different factions within the same area 
of concern, all competing for attention. This is reflected in the observations of one 
director of service development: 
I think what we would do is where we are looking for representation 
and input, in terms of people sitting in groups and participating in 
working groups, we would actually ask the CVS [Council for 
221 
Voluntary Services] for representatives rather than going straight to any 
particular group because there is always the danger of one group not 
being seen as representative by other groups in the same field. So it is 
best to go through the CVS to ask for a general representation rather 
than go to any particular organisation. When it actually comes to 
consulting, then yes, we would involve all the relevant organisations 
(Director of Service Development, HA Q. 
Apart from service development it was clear from the interview data that user/carer 
groups had other ways to influence the priority-setting debate. One of the examples 
most often cited by directors of user/carer influence was in the introduction new, and 
many times unproven, drug therapies. To illustrate the dilemma faced by directors in 
funding such treatments, there will be a brief discussion of two such novel therapies - 
fl-Inter-feron in the treatment of Multiple Sclerosis and recombinant factor VIII used in 
the treatment of haemophilia. The debate about the introduction of these new and 
usually very expensive drug therapies has been documented elsewhere (for example 
Freemantle and Harrison 1993, on Interleukin-2). The case of fl-Interferon and 
recombinant factor VIII represent just two of a number of new high profile drug 
treatments that have been developed by drug companies either as a means of treating 
previously intractable conditions or are marketed as safer and more effective 
treatments than established drug regimes. The controversy surrounding both these 
drug treatments highlights a number of problems for health authorities seeking to retain 
control of the their own priority setting agenda. This becomes even more difficult 
when there is a difference of opinion between medical professionals and user/carer 
groups over the efficacy of such treatments. 
The case of fi-Interferon illustrates some of the difficulties faced by health authorities 
in coping with new drugs designed to treat diseases for which there were no drug 
treatments. 17-Interferon is the first new product to treat (but not cure) the chronic 
disease of Multiple Sclerosis (MS), especially for patients with the relapse-remitting 
form of the disease and without significant disability. The drug has the effect of 
reducing the frequency of relapses as the disease process progresses. For this reason 
Interferon has been described as a 'drug company's dream-ticket', in that MS is 
incurable, relatively common and that fl-Interferon is fairly expensive (Rous et al. 
1996: 1195). The cost works out at approximately L 10,000 per patient per year or 
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133,000 per relapse avoided (Richards 1996: 1159). It has been estimated that if all the 
patients in the UK with relapse-remitting MS (45% of the total) were to the treated 
with #-Interferon then the total cost may be as much as 1380m per annum - equivalent 
to 10% of the total drugs bill (see New 1996). 
Clearly, uncontrolled prescribing of fl-Interferon would have had a major impact on 
health authority spending. In recognition of this a guidance letter was produced by the 
NHS Executive on prescribing the drug (NHSE EL(95)97). The drug would only be 
available through consultants at regional centres and each authority - in collaboration 
with the MS Society - would have to devise a protocol for its use that would set in 
place patient selection criteria. However, what worried the authorities in the sample 
was not the problems associated with protocol production but that #-Interferon had set 
a precedent for the introduction of other contentious drug therapies. The most 
problematic aspect was the absence of debate about the impact these drugs would have 
on the allocation of resources to meet other more pressing local priorities. This 
concern is illustrated by the response from a Director of Public Health. 
Take drugs. There are two decision. One is in principle is this a drug 
that the NHS should be providing? The second decision is, if it should 
be provided, for whom and under what circumstances? The first of 
those decisions onfl-Interferon was taken by default - 'fl-Interferon is a 
good thing' - from on high. The problem then was managing the 
introduction and that was about protocols and so on, and health 
authorities putting aside development money if they could. That process 
is starting to be used as a templa te for other drugs and other 
technologies. I'm a little concerned about that, because if I am 
straightaway into a debate about how do I manage the introduction of 
things, and for whom should it be available. It begs the question of 
whether it should be in the first place and I don't think there is yet a 
mechanism for asking those questions, that initial question (Director of 
Public Health, HA B). 
This concern was echoed in other authorities. As Rous et al. point out: 
Purchasers were unable to decline funding for a marginally effective 
drug and thereby undertake explicit rationing. To ensure prescribing 
was within the guidelines, a vast communication network had to be 
sustained with managers, general practitioners, neurologists, the 
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Multiple Sclerosis Society, and professional advisers in all the 
purchasing authorities. The workload involved was considerable (Rous 
et al. 1996: 1196). 
However, the lack of debate about purchasing at authority level did not prevent a lively 
debate within the medical profession from developing. The medical evidence about #- 
Interferon and its long-term effectiveness was disputed by several senior neurologists. 
It was suggested by that P-Interferon should not be made widely available and that 
resources would be better spent on other kinds of support for MS sufferers (McDonald 
1995; also see Drug Therapeutics 1996). It was apparent that some of those who 
opposed the introduction of fl-Interferon felt that the proper evaluation procedures had 
not been adhered to and that non-clinical values had prevailed. As one consultant 
public health physician noted: 
... 
it would appear that a small number of enthusiastic neurologists and 
an active patient lobby has dictated policy at a national level. It is a very 
high risk strategy to introduce this drug into routine use on the basis of 
a single, small clinical trial and accelerated licensing process, especially 
when the lost opportunities represented by costs are so great (Richards 
1996: 1159). 
In response to such claims the chief executive of the MS Society emphasised the 
'responsible way the NIS Society [had] sought to work with those managing this 
complex situation' (Cardy 1997: 600). Furthermore, he stated: 
The NIS Society has worked hard to ensure access to authoritative 
information and to reduce expectations. As a result, patients in Britain 
have not made a stampede for interferon beta (ibid. ) 
On the whole, the experience of sample authorities reinforced this sentiment and 
expressed satisfaction with the production of the protocol. They were no reported 
serious problems with the NIS Society and, in general, it was stated that they had acted 
cresponsibly' in the protocol discussions. However, one director suggested that they 
had unrealistic expectations of the effectiveness of the drug, and that the MS Society 
thought P-Interferon was 'the best thing since sliced bread'. 
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At the core of the controversy over the introduction of fl-Interferon is the question of 
effectiveness. It was clear one of the key elements in the dispute between 
representatives of MS sufferers and the medical profession about the usefulness of the 
drug was the different values each group attached to patients' state of health. For some 
neurologists, the important factor in opposing the introduction of fl-Interferon was that 
it 'has no significant effect on the development of disease in multiple sclerosis' (Harvey 
1996: 297). The narrowness of this view based on clinical indicators and ultimate end- 
states for patients was starkly at odds with the views of many patients, where the 
reduction in frequency in relapse is a justifiable goal in itself. As one chairman of a 
local MS group asserted in a letter the BMJ: 
Multiple sclerosis is a distressing, humiliating, and often long drawn out 
disease with no cure. For this reason, quality of life, for patients and 
their families, is paramount. A drug that can reduce the frequency and 
severity of relapses, whether or not it diminishes the progress of the 
disease, will be of great clinical benefit to many patients, improving 
their situation physically, psychologically, and socially. Surely 
happiness, feeling better, and increased health have great value 
(Bumfield 1997: 600). 
In this respect, the quality of life aspect for MS suffers is of equal value to that 
accorded to preventing the disease from progressing. Therefore, it could be argued 
that in their own terms, many NIS sufferers view the use offl-Interferon as a legitimate 
use of resources. The potential improvement in the quality of life for suffers is in itself 
justification enough. However, in terms of clinical measures of post-treatment 
outcomes based on changes in the physical health status of the patient, these quality of 
life values were not readily amenable to calculation as part of a general disability 
measure. Therefore, it is apparent that when there are conflicting, but equally valid 
ways of conceptualising outcomes, then the measurement of effectiveness will be 
compromised. And if effectiveness is the criterion which informs the priority-setting 
debate then the transparency and explicitness of the debate will also be compromised. 
The example of #-interferon illustrates the difficulties that even a controlled 
introduction of a new drug had for authorities trying to prioritise services. These 
difficulties were compounded for drugs that found their way onto the agenda with little 
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or no forward planning. Such a drug is recombinant factor VIII. Like P-Interferon, 
recombinant factor VIII was a new expensive drug, in this instance to treat 
haemophilia. However, unlike fl-Interferon, there was already a similar, well 
established drug on the market, a heat treated factor VIII, which was much cheaper 
and regarded by many as equally effective. The problernwith this form of factor VIII 
was the perception of a small residual danger of infection from HIV and hepatitis 
viruses that may not have been removed in the purification process. The genetically 
engineered recombinant factor VIII presented no such dangers. In effect this 
represented the classic problem trading-off risk against cost. For the authorities, the 
result of this calculation was the decision not to purchase the new form of factor VIII. 
However, for many parents and user groups the risks were too great and this led to 
pressure on consultants to prescribe recombinant factor VIII. Unfortunately for some 
of the sample authorities, treatment had been approved on the basis of a simple ECR 
request and so had slipped through the system without scrutiny. This was common 
knowledge within other authorities, as the observations of a neighbouring authority's 
Chief Executive demonstrated: 
My understanding is not only were the consultants saying that this drug 
is suitable for this person, they were saying another reason for 
prescribing it was if the parents believe there is a danger - so they were 
redefining what clinical effectiveness meant. Because if you take the 
drug as it stands, there are question marks over the drug. Well, it is not 
proven that it is any better than the high purity, but the consultant was 
taking it further because the parents were saying they believe it is was, 
it should be prescribed. And you can go on like that for numerous 
drugs. And if you take the example, you had a haernophiliac child, you 
had haemophilia which is an emotive issue, you've got children which is 
an emotive issue. Parents, consultants, whatever, on the one hand. So 
everybody says 'Yes, vote for that drug'. On the other hand at the same 
time we have a drug which is now being released for people suffering 
for HIV and AIDS. It's less emotive in terms of it being prescribed, but 
that drug has been proved to be more effective. Not which one do you 
go for. The one that Joe Public would react to first and foremost, it's a 
child. Or what? And actually the decision we've made is, we've said no 
to recombinant factor VIII, and yes to the HIV/AIDS drug. And that's 
purely on clinical effectiveness grounds (Chief Executive, HA B). 
The consequence of this uncontrolled prescription of the new form of factor VIII was 
that when the authorities became aware of the situation, some found themselves in the 
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difficult position of having some haernophiliacs on the drug and others in effect being 
denied it. As one director put it: 
I feel very sorry for the Authorities that have got one or two [children 
on recombinant factor VIII]. Because they didn't know they had them, 
until it happened. That's put them in a really difficult position. I mean, I 
said yesterday before the public authority, that we are extremely lucky 
that we are not one of the districts with one or two on it. Then you are 
faced with the decision of do they come off it, or we accept that the 
clinicians have taken this decision, but we're not having anymore. And I 
think we would probably had to go with that one, because to force 
someone off a treatment once it's offered. I think that's why, if you 
like, I think it is extremely important that the Trusts managerially are 
keyed into what their clinicians are doing. Because that should never 
have been allowed to happen (Director of Strategy, HA F). 
As a result of their situation the authorities involved were for a time the focus of 
intense local media scrutiny, often of an emotive kind. In the end it was only resolved 
by intervention from the centre and the production of national guidance. 
Again, as with #-Interferon, there was a clear difference in the value judgements 
involved in estimating the efficacy of recombinant factor VIII. For haemophilia 
sufferers recent history had shown the inherent dangers of using clotting factors 
derived from blood products. Contamination of products with HIV and hepatitis 
viruses had led to many sufferers becoming infected and being further disabled or dying 
as a result. Therefore, it is understandable that perceptions and acceptance of risk were 
much different for sufferers. Even the theoretical residual risk associated with the 
cheaper purified factor VIII was thought by many to be unacceptable. 
The clear implication of both P-Interferon and recombinant factor VIII is that, like GPs 
in the previous section, the views of user/carer groups cannot be directly incorporated 
into health authority commissioning plans. The disparate and partisan nature of the 
groups will oflen result conflict with the strategic aims of commissioning. Health 
authorities are compelled by their remit to allocate resources to meet the health needs 
of the local population as a whole. The demands of particular groups for more 
resources have to be balanced against the equally legitimate claims of other groups and 
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the needs of the local population. However, the examples of P-Interferon and 
recombinant factor VIII illustrate that this balancing act may prove problematic for 
commissioning health authorities. The lack of an explicit debate about priorities 
indicates that there is no language of prioritisation in which competing claims for 
resources can be discussed rationally and without emotion. Moreover, the use of 
governmentality analysis strongly indicates that the failure of such a language to evolve 
appears to be a function of the fractured nature of governance rather that a lack of will 
on the part of health care commissioners. 
The role of CHO 
One of the key features of the recombinant factor VIII affair was that the controversy 
spilled out of the narrow confines of specific pressure group activity and began to be 
championed by the local Community Health Councils in their role of health 
'watchdog'. The rest of the chapter will therefore focus on CHCs and their relationship 
with health authorities. The evidence to be presented is based on semi-structured 
interviews (n=9), conducted between March and July 1997 with a selection of Chief 
Officers of CHC that operated in the districts of the sample authorities. The average 
duration of interviews was 45 minutes. For the purposes of identification each CHC 
has been given a code letter from A to I (please note these code letters do not 
correspond to those given to sample authorities, in order to prevent identification). 
As noted above, CHCs were specifically created in 1974 to represent the interests of 
patients to health authorities and provide for 'the expression of local opinion' (DHSS 
1972). The council of the CHC is composed of members appointed by the Regional 
health authority, usually half are notninated by the local authority, a third nominated 
from the voluntary sector and the remainder nominated by the Region itself In total 
this comprises about 18-24 members. Many of the CHCs in this study sample also had 
co-opted members that acted as a reserve to maintain numbers if necessary. In addition 
to the members there was a small number of paid staff which included the Chief 
Officer. It is the role of the Chief Officer to co-ordinate general Council activity and to 
provide confidential support in the complaints procedure. The CHC has two main 
roles; monitoring the operation of the local health service, making recommendations 
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for improvement if necessary; and to be the source of information to public on health 
matters. To meet these aims the CHC has a set of limited statutory powers, these 
include the right to consultation about major service changes, the right to ask for 
information from health authorities, including the right to observe at authority public 
meetings. In addition the CHC has a right of inspection of certain NHS provider 
organisations, but this does not extend to GP premises or the automatic right of 
inspection of non-NHS providers. These limited powers do not include the monitoring 
of contract negotiations or participation in the audit process. This was despite a plea in 
1989 by the Association of Community Health Councils for England and Wales 
(ACHCEW) for formal involvement in audit. This was denied on the ground that audit 
was a professional activity and not within the CHC remit of monitoring quality 
(Harrison and Pollitt 1994). 
Taken together with low levels of funding, many commentators have argued that these 
limited powers to shape local provision health services and weak powers of inspection 
of providers amount to a serious handicap to CHC effectiveness (Allsop 1995; Lupton 
et al. 1995). Despite their weak position, the CHCs have survived a series of NHS 
reforrns more or less intact, notwithstanding regular calls for CHCs to be abolished 
(DHSS 1979), be reformed themselves (Butler 1998), or become absorbed into health 
authority management (Insight Report 1996). Indeed others have pointed out that the 
1990s reforms opened new opportunities for CHCs (ACHCEW 1992; Bames and Cox 
1997). Moreover, the priorities and purchasing guidance (1996/97) referred to earlier 
in the chapter, specifically singles out CHCs as organisations that have to be part of a 
consultation process with local people. However, there is one major difference in the 
circumstances that CHCs now find themselves in compared to past experience. They 
are now faced with a rival as 'champion of people', namely the health authorities 
themselves. 
Health Authority or CHC: the people's champion? 
Significantly, the dominant view amongst those Chief Officers interviewed in this study 
was that the health authorities were iiot the people's champion. As one Chief Officer 
stated: 
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I certainly don't see it that way... they are not the 'champion of the 
people', that's a very different role because that"s much more of a pure 
role and that's where the CHC has a much more purer, independent 
ability to act. Because the health authority has to take into account 
other agendas. They have to take into account the consultants, the 
managers' view, the financial view, etc.. And we as a CHC can take a 
purely patient oriented view of services of possible changes and 
possible reconfigurations. And I think that is the difference (Chief 
Officer, CHC G). 
Moreover, most CHC chief officers contrasted the many years of CHC experience of 
canvassing local patient/user use vAth the health authorities' perceived lack of 
expenence. 
You've got a responsibility to get an informed view... What 
alternatives are there? And that is why I say that it's not a one off It is 
a very sophisticated process and I don't think health authorities, and 
Trusts, have really got to grips with it. They think they can do it, but 
they are very poor at it... [w]e've been doing it for 21 years, well 23 
years now, since 1974. That is something that we have been doing 
(Chief Officer, CHC F). 
If [the health authority] had to suddenly start up doing things like 
Citizen's Juries or patient's councils, or whatever, it would be extra 
work that's so different from what they are doing now. But we are half 
way there, if you will (Chief Qfficer, CHC H). 
... the 
health authority... they're not good at consultation. Classic 
example of their public consultation was to arrange a public meeting at 
a hotel, which has got an hourly bus service, upstairs, for young mums 
at lunch time. And the second meeting aimed at mums and young 
women was in the evening time when you are trying to put your kids to 
bed, you know. And then they wonder why they didn't get anybody 
coming (Chief Officer, CHC B). 
But the irony was that CHCs and health authorities, shaped by differing conceptions of 
consumerism, should have very similar difficulties with representativeness. It has to be 
acknowledged that CHCs also suffer from a similar democratic deficit as befalls health 
authorities. Perhaps it is an indication of the sensitivity to this issue that most CHCs 
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Nvere quick to pick up on a question about the background of members and interpret it 
in the same manner. For example: 
What you want to know is are they middle class. And the answer is yes, 
90% they are... mostly middle class, yes (Chief Officer, CHC A). 
Interview responses indicated that for the bulk of Chief Officers this was only a minor 
deficiency. The membership itself might not be representative of the local population in 
which the CHC was situated, its patch, but a kind of direct representativeness could be 
manufactured through Regional appointments that reflected the geographical and 
ethnic composition of the area. As one Chief Officer stated; 
... I mean 
it doesn't say anywhere in statute that [the CHC] has to 
represent the population in microcosm or whatever... They certainly aim 
to have a bias in favour of what you would call the vulnerable groups, 
or minority groups, whatever you want to call them. And I think, and I 
haven't really had a lot of thinking time on that one, I think that is a 
good thing. We do try to some degree to make it fairly representative in 
microcosm. I'm not sure it is necessary (Chief Officer, CHC 1). 
For most CHCs this was not seen as an insurmountable problem because, like the 
health authorities, they saw representativeness as emanating from the In-ocess of 
eliciting local patient/user views, and from the direct involvement of CHC members in 
local user/carer group. 
The representativeness comes from the work. I think it should come 
more from the members. But I would say, you know, if you divided up 
a pie, 10- 15% works through the members (Chief Officer, CHC 1). 
However, most of the CHC Chief Officers made the distinction between representing 
the local community and representing the interests of the local community. With 
varying degrees of enthusiasm, they envisage that they might be placed in a position of 
supporting very contentious health authority decisions - ie the rationalisation of local 
acute units - that they know instinctively would not be the consensus view of the local 
population, but which the CHC supports because it saw the change as being in the best 
interests of the local population. In effect, they endorsed the decision because they 
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believe it would have been the decision the public would arrive at if they were as well 
informed as the members of the CHC. 
... I mean 
it sounds superior to say it, very oflen we are in the fortunate 
position of having access to better information that the general public, 
whoever that might be. And we have to use that information to decide 
on our priorities and what we are going to do about them, and take a 
view about what is the best interests of our community. And that is a 
different issue. And I think that is much more along the lines of how 
CHCs do work, the community's interests rather than being their 
representatives. And sure maybe that's as good as we can hope for, 
maybe that's OK (Chief Officer, CHC Q. 
But above all, the CHC did not want to run the risk of being seen as agents of the 
health authority, or acting as their mouthpiece. 
... And of course [we) run risks of losing credibility and respect and being seen as a local voice. You know, I think there is a fine line they 
tread between of being seen to be the 'Champion of the people' or the 
lap dog of the Authorities (Chief Officer, CHC C). 
Nevertheless, this kind of thinking did seem to have its limits, and did not appear to 
extend to putting district level patient interests above the interests of their own local 
patch. Only one CHC Chief Officer suggested that that this was part of their CHC's 
policy. 
The CHCs might differ in the view of what is in the interests of patients 
but we wouldn't be parochial and say [our patch] is doing great out of 
this, that's fantastic, we'll support that, if it meant it severely 
undermined a service or... could severely undermine a service in a 
neighbouring hospital or could even undermine the hospital... In fact 
I've been criticised for looking at the wider interest and not responding 
to what local people say should happen, even if it is at the expense of 
somebody else. And I've checked it out with members and that is a 
clear position for [our] CHC, and I know that conflicts with the way 
some people see the job (Chief Officer, CHC G). 
Ideas of pan-CHC alliances to counterbalance health authority influence did not seem 
to be evident, quite the opposite in fact. It was not a case of 'my patch, right or 
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wrong-', but that was nearer the mark than assuming that CHCs within a district 
operate on a strategic, district level of thinking. 
.... Sometimes I get the sense that health authorities use us against each 
other. And they sort of get surprised when we say all power to so-and- 
so because she [another Chief Officer] is in charge of her district. It's 
her job to get the best services for her district but I will always fight my 
comer here .... 
(Chief Officer, CHC 1). 
Even so, all the CHCs saw themselves as being more representative of the local 
population than their own health authorities. Several of the Chief Officers drew 
attention to the health authority's perceived remoteness from the local population, both 
socially but also physically. Phrases such as 'in their Ivory Tower', 'distancing 
themselves' were not uncommon. The feelings of many CHCs are summed up below; 
... perhaps 
it's the location [of the authority offices] - the middle of 
nowhere. Which we have complained about and said how do you 
expect the public to come to your board meetings unless they have got 
a car? 'Well there is a bus service'. Yes, but it's like three quarters of a 
mile from the bus stop. And it's not a very user friendly building... 
(Chief Officer, CHC B). 
Importantly, the health authority respondents, of those that expressed an opinion, 
tended to agree that the CHCs, despite being a form of quango themselves, were more 
representative of the local population than the health authority itself 
... CHCs are slightly more effective [as champion of the patient], but health authorities are quangos. They are unrepresentative and there are 
tensions which exist in health authorities between the executives and the 
non-executives. But the non-executives in the past might have included 
elected councillors and people from the Local Authority. And now a lot 
of people are there because of their business interests, because of their 
skills in management. And so health authorities have some difficulty in 
getting political legitimacy from the population they are actually serving 
(Director of Public Health, HA E). 
But at the same time the health authority respondents were less than flattering about 
the quality of work that the CHCs produced from their independent consultations with 
233 
the local populace. It was described as 'without scientific rigour... very poor market 
research... health authorities and Trusts don't have to act on them because of the way 
in which they have been collected'. Those who expressed an opinion seemed to 
suggest that the CHCs have potential but this, in general, can only be realised when 
working with the health authority using the 'correct' methodologies as supplied by the 
authority. The CHC was seen as at its most useful when disseminating health authority 
information so that the local community could appreciate the health authority positions 
on various issues. 
CHC influence on the priorities debate 
It can be gauged from the above remarks that in general, (5 out of 6 health authorities 
and a majority of the directors interviewed) thought that the CHCs were marginal to 
authority activities, especially in the production of the annual Purchasing Plan and 
general strategic thinking - CHCs were 'recipients rather than shapers and influencers'. 
This is the conclusion drawn by most CHC respondents. As one Chief Officer stated 
when asked about the CHCs influence on changing health authority priorities, 'If the 
health authority was a thousand miles long, about half an inch. [laughs] Not a lot... one 
gets the impression time and time again that they have already decided what they are 
going to do and the CHC gets invited to sort of twiddle around the edges' (Chief 
Officer, CHC Q. Even some of those Authorities which attested to good working 
relations with CHCs attributed this to the fact that 'they don't cause us a problem'. On 
the whole, there seemed to be little enthusiasm from health authorities to include CHCs 
in their discussions. The CHC was 'still a distant, kept at arms length, organisation. ' 
(health authority director). This echoes previous research (Appleby 1992; Dunham and 
Smith 1993) At the most extreme, some of the health authority respondents did little to 
hide their views that CHCs were, in their experience, politically motivated and 
personality driven organisations. A similar point was made by health authorities in 
previous studies (see Harrison and Wistow 1992). 
... But they really should be our best source of representing the public, 
what they want. They are very oflen one of the worst sources for that in 
that they represent the particular political prejudice of the people 
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involved and very little in terms of the vast majority of the public (Chief 
Executive, HA F). 
However, it was evident that Chief Officers themselves did not regard their CHCs as 
having a political agenda, especially a party political agenda, except in the sense that 
many of the causes advocated by CHCs had a political dimension. When it came to 
involvement in CHC activities of political appointees from local authorities, the 
majority of the Chief Officers voiced some disappointment at the level of commitment 
shown. This is illustrated by the comments of the Chief Officers of CHC F and CHC 
D: 
I think Local Authorities have not taken on board the importance of the 
CHCs. You'll find that Local Authorities complain bitterly about the 
lack of representation within the NHS. And will rail against the fact that 
they lost representation to Health Authority boards and that they don't 
have automatic representation on Trust boards, although they are not 
excluded. And yet they do nothing about, or very little about, their 
nominations to the CHCs, which are, you might say, almost the last 
bastion for true democracy and representation within the NHS. And I 
find it strange that they complain on the one hand but don't do anything 
to remedy the situation on the other hand. They don't take hold of the 
opportunity (Chief Officer of CHC F). 
If you look down on the list of the ones that don't turn up on a regular 
basis - you feel they are not committed to the CHC - they are probably 
the Local Authority representatives. We've got more actual councillors 
now. Of course they don't have to appoint councillors, they can appoint 
anyone they want. In some ways you need to have councillors because 
they a representative back-ground, don't they. They are representing the 
community. But I suppose again, their first loyalty is to the Borough 
Council, and the first call on their time. So they are quite poor attenders 
really (Chief Officer of CHC D). 
Additional antagonisms Nvith health authorities often occurred around differences of 
interpretation in the meaning of the terms 'participation' and 'consultation' (see Ham 
1980). Several CHCs noted that they believed that their health authority used these 
terms interchangeably. 
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I mean you often get, 'well it's in the Purchaser Plan', when we get into 
a situation where you challenge something that they have implemented, 
'it's in the Purchaser Plan'. And I've had a letter this morning where we 
have challenged something and I've got, 'it's been discussed with you, 
the changes in this service. And I can't remember having any formal 
discussions on the introduction, on the changes and the development of 
this service (Chief Officer, CHC B). 
Yes we do [have much influence on the Purchasing Plan]. We're always 
sent... No, no why am I not honest on this. We got the contracting 
document and it was completely and utterly useless, apart from the fact 
that we had three days in which to comment. Which meant I was the 
only person who had the time to look through it. Didn't really much 
matter because there really was so little we could comment on usefully 
anyway. It just said to be decided or as so and so. It was absolutely, 
well, I felt it was a formality. And I'm not sure they've got to grips with 
that properly themselves (Chief Officer, CHC A). 
Another area of conflict stemmed from confused notions of consultation and 
responsibility, especially important when CHCs were encouraged from above to 
participate in strategic discussions (Dorrell 1992). The CHCs expected to be included 1. 
in these discussions, but at the same time they reserve the right to distance themselves 
from any decisions in order to preserve their own autonomy and independence. For 
example: 
The stance that we've taken is that we wish to be in on strategic level 
discussions, planning discussions, putting forward the views of users 
and the community, but we will not sign up to the decision... But when 
it actuall comes to making the decision we say that isn't ours. So in y ýn 
other words we don't want a voting right on the decision. Then we 
would be captured because, quite rightly, the health authority would 
say, 'You signed up to this. You were instrumental in making the 
decision. Now you are challenging it. No, well we've given you all the 
infon-nation, we've said what we needed to say, you've considered it, 
this is the decision you 've reached. We can agree with it on behalf of 
the best interests of the community, but we might challenge it on behalf 
of an individual (Chief Officer, CHC F). 
In many instances CHC representatives were active participants in the groups that 
decide the structure of the guidelines for restrictive treatments. However again the 
CHCs reserved the right not to be bound by any decisions, and would challenge them if 
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necessary by advocating the cases of those individuals denied treatments by the 
decisions. It was not their job to set priorities, it was asserted, but make sure that 
individuals and certain groups are not marginalised in order preserve a degree of equity 
in the health system. The complaints procedure becomes all important in giving 
disadvantaged constituencies a voice - such as transsexuals and the restriction placed 
on gender reassignment - and making sure that the health authority can justify their 
decisions. 
I think we will be involved in the rationing debate... Because it is 
clearly there, and it's clearly going to be on the agenda. And we 
wouldn't want to be involved in developing an Oregon style list of 
services because the exceptions are always there, and the CHC would 
be on a hiding to nothing to approve a list. So very much not wanting 
to get involved in approving decisions but definitely wanting to be 
involved in the debate. And ensuring the debate is carried through 
appropriately and ensuring there has been, yes, consultation... and 
they've really thought it through before they have come to a decisions. 
But also pushing that it shouldn't be a local health authority agenda, it 
should be a national agenda (Chief Officer, CHC G). 
And really I don't want to get involved in making the decisions [about 
priorities], what I want to get involved in as we are, if the people want 
to appeal against this what is the procedure and can we help them 
through that. I think that is much more our role. We shouldn't be 
making the decisions, they're paid to do that not us... I'm sure we 
should have input in the debate but not the decisions... It's not our role 
to make decisions. To pass through the patient's point of view, which 
we do have, gratuitously and by seeking it out. To pass it through 
because that's the knowledge they need to make the decisions (Chief 
Officer, CHC A). 
Many directors interviewed accepted the position that the CHCs must at some point in 
the discussion distance themselves from the process to preserve their independence. 
But other Directors interpreted it as whimsical and capricious behaviour, a sign that 
that CHCs are not serious players in the debate. Thus: 
... they see their role as being the promoter for better services... and I don't mind this, but they don't see their role as the ones that have to 
say, 'Well OK, there are priorities so we'll prioritise. It's our duty to 
prioritise'. There's a bit about, 'Power without responsibility is the 
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prerogative of a..., [Interviewer: 'A harloff],... Ah now, I didn't say 
that, you said that. (Chief Executive, HA D). 
You're aberrant... they get fed up with our 'irresponsibility' at times 
(Chief Officer, CHC G). 
Therefore, because of the importance of GPs, health authorities may not feel they need 
to seek a form of legitimacy by co-opting CHCs into decision making. Although it was 
evident that one or two of the Authorities in this study did consider the local CHCs as 
'stakeholders' in the process, most health authorities appeared not to need or want to 
involve CHC much beyond the statutory requirements, except in specific 
circumstances, such as the reorganisation or introduction of new services. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of the chapter was to present an exploration of the importance of the 
concepts of 'consumerism' and consumer 'empowerment' to neo-liberal forms of 
health governance. Of particular interest was the way in which these concepts informed 
health authority commissioning activity and the production of rationing/priority-setting 
policies. To illustrate this discussion there was an examination of the role played in the 
priority-setting debate by three specific groups and institutions. They were GPs, 
user/carer groups and Community Health Councils (CHCs). Each of which could 
legitimately be seen to represent the interests of the health care consumer and reflect 
some form of health need within the community. 
Overall, the evidence presented in this chapter indicates that public opinion had little 
direct impact on health authority activity or the priority setting agenda. This was 
despite the new role for authorities as 'champion of the people'. It was clear that the 
opinions of GPs continued to dominate the purchasing agenda. This appeared to be for 
two reasons. Firstly because they personified a form of primary care level expertise and 
secondly, that when acting in their patient's best interests they behaved like 'proxy 
consumers'. However, GPs could not be relied upon to act strategically when deciding 
on treatments for their patients. This problem was repeated when authorities 
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incorporated other groups, such as user/care representatives, into the strategic 
commissioning process. The case of #-Interferon and recombinant factor VII illustrated 
this point. The evidence suggested that these groups were useful to authorities because 
they were able to bring an unmediated understanding of user and carer health needs to 
commissioning. However, user/carer involvement in commissioning was treated with 
suspicion by some directors because of the fragmented and partisan nature of the 
groups. Even so, it was evident that a number of the sample authorities considered 
user/carer groups to have more influence over the commissioning process than the 
official consumer representatives in the district, the Community Health Councils. 
In investigating the role of CHC activity, it is evident that although this study was not 
as extensive as other recent pieces of research into health authority/CHC relationships 
(eg Lupton et a]. 1995), it is broadly consistent with their findings. The key findings 
about the concept of representativeness indicated that CHCs saw themselves as being 
more representative of the local population than their own health authorities. This 
sentiment was one with which the health authority respondents tended to agree. 
However, five out of six of the health authorities, and a majority of the directors 
interviewed, thought that the CHCs were marginal to their activities, especially in the 
production of the annual Purchasing Plan and general strategic thinking. This presents 
a picture of CHCs being marginalised by their health authorities, and despite the 
occasional victory, having little impact on policy making. Although some of the health 
authorities did seek to include (or co-opt) CHC representatives in decision making 
processes, they still felt that, in general, CHCs had little to offer at present. 
Furthermore, health authorities in the study were increasingly interested in engaging 
with other voluntary sector organisations and user groups, together with,. and 
sometimes instead of, the CHCs. When it came to the thorny issue of rationing and 
priority-setting, most CHCs felt that they should be included in rationing debates but 
reserved the right not to be bound by any decisions so as to preserve their own 
independence. The CHC/health authority relationship has historically been seen as 
problematic but with both organisations now striving to become more professional, 
they are increasingly contesting the same ground. The CHCs, the weakest of the two 
by far, have been placed in an unenviable position. They can remain as they are and risk 
being further marginalised and the voice of the consumer being lost, or become part of 
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the health authority's strategic planning process and risk losing their oxvn 
independence. 
From the evidence presented in this chapter it can be argued strongly that purchasing 
authorities lacked the means or vocabulary to embark on a full scale priorities debate. 
However, it has to be emphasised that this was not because of any lack of enthusiasm. 
All the authorities had embarked on a limited process of formulating local priorities, 
but this was mostly at the margins of authority activity, ie ECRs, which had little 
impact on overall priority arrangements. The question posed was whether these small 
scale attempts to bring some king of 'rationality' to the priorities debate could be 
scaled up to become the basis of a 'big debate' on priorities. This research shows that 
this did not seem to be happening. On the one hand, authorities seemed to be daunted 
by the enormity and complexity of devising global strategies. The response was to fall 
back on to a form of pragmatic incrementalism, aided by the use of managerial 
technologies such as audit and effectiveness criteria. On the other hand, authorities in 
their guise as commissioners of health care services lacked a language of priority- 
setting to legitimate essentially moral decisions about priorities. 
In the previous chapter it was argued that the reform process (based on a neo-liberal 
'free' market rationale) led to the fragmentation of health governance and placed 
constraints health authorities' commissioning role. The case-study evidence presented 
in this chapter clearly shows that the imposition of the same consumerist rationale did 
indeed lead to the fracturing of the voice of the consumer. It was clear that the various 
groups that influenced local priority-setting - GPs, user/carer groups, CHCs - all had 
their own agendas. Using a govemmentality approach, the substantive point is that this 
fracturing of the consumer voice into several, potentially conflicting, agendas is not to 
be viewed as a 'failure' of health governance to be rectified, but is an intrinsic part of 
it. As argued in the previous chapter, the problematisation of health using a discourse 
that is essentially economic in character presents a theoretically coherent form of 
governance. However, the means by which this neo-liberal economic discourse is re- 
conceptualised within health governance (so as to make health amenable to a new form 
of political calculation) can only be achieved by a re-conceptualisation of consumer 
sovereignty. In effect, because individual consumer sovereignty is not accessible, the 
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commissioning authorities have to construct a proxy consumer in the form of an 
aggregation of disparate needs and desires. However, it is arguably the case that many 
groups will legitimately represent consumer values even if they do conflict with others 
(as in the case of fl-Interferon and recombinant factor VIII). Therefore, the totality of 
consumer opinion cannot be accessed through these groups. For specific developments 
this is oflen acceptable, but in terms of the 'big priorities debate' it falls well short of 
what is needed. Therefore, the expectation that the reform processwill start a new era 
of explicit rationing may be unfounded. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion: reviewing the evidence and looking to the future 
Introduction 
This chapter recapitulates some of the key theoretical issues that emerged in the 
preceding chapters and the empirical evidence about the central theme of the thesis, the 
management of priorities within a state health care system. Additionally, there -will be a 
brief discussion of contemporary policy making as exemplified by the 1997 White 
Paper Me neiv NHS. inodei-ii, depetidable. The White Paper was the first substantial 
policy document produced by the new Labour government. As part of their manifesto 
pledges, the Labour party had committed itself to the a partial dismantling of the 
Conservative reform process, including the abolition of the internal market and the 
ending of the 'two-tier' service supposedly brought about by GP fundholding. The 
implication for the theoretical framework employed in this thesis - the notion that 
contemporary politics reflects a neo-liberal form of governance - could be quite severe. 
The empirical research presented in the previous chapters might be overtaken by 
events, since it describes a form of governance which may no longer apply to 
contemporary policy making. However, the contention in this chapter is that 
governmentality analysis can accommodate changes in political regime and still present 
valuable insights into the new policy direction for the NHS. 
Establishing the govern mentality framework 
The ambition of Chapters 2 to 4 was to make the case for governmentality as an 
analytical framework and a practical methodology, that could account for changes in 
contemporary welfare policy. In an effort to establish the usefulness of governmentality 
analysis as an example of postmodern or post-structuralist thinking, it was contrasted 
with post-Fordist frameworks. The contrast was heightened by the fact that post- 
Fordism has proved an influential model in the theoretical understanding of the modem 
welfare state (see Jessop 1989; 1991; 1992; 1994), but only partly influential in the 
analysis of health service provision (see Harrison et al. 1992). Both theoretical 
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frameworks, post-Fordism and govemmentality, use the same historical evidence to 
situate changes in welfarism as resulting from a shift in regulatory regime. However, as 
Harrison (1998) notes, 'whilst post-Fordism and postmodemism have a number of 
insights and observations in common... they imply fundamentally different 
epistemologies' (Harrison 1998: 27). The value of the post-Fordist comparison is that 
it is a prime example of a framework that relies for its epistemological coherence on 
the presentation of a grand or meta-narrative. In comparison, postmodern approaches 
reject the grand narrative framework. The question is whether rejecting this narrative, 
postmodernism also rejects a belief in some kind of 'progressive' politics based on 
cuniversal' notions as citizenship and individual rights (see Taylor-Gooby 1994). One 
of the strengths of the postmodern approach is that concepts which rely on 
universalism are themselves challenged, often to reveal tacit assumptions about race 
and gender (Williams 1994). But this strength is also a weakness. Postmodern analysis 
critiques and disrupts the neat categories associated with grand narrative 
epistemologies, but what postmodemist analysis does not do, or even attempt to do, is 
provide an alternative unique epistemology to put in place of grand narrative accounts. 
Therefore, it is open to question whether postmodemist analysis can be the basis of an 
alternative form of emancipatory politics. This is a telling criticism of postmodernism 
and it is a theme explored in Chapter 2. However, in that chapter there is no attempt to 
resolve the problem except to point out that postmodern ideas can be the basis of 
political action but only in the form of a personal politics not universal one. However, 
an argument was advanced that this does not prevent postmodern ideas from being of 
practical use. 
Foucault's concept of govemmentality is a case in point of a practical use for a 
postmodern/post-structuralist theoretical framework. Governmentality is the 
investigation of the discursive space which 'renders reality thinkable in such a way that 
it is amenable to political deliberation' (Rose and Miller 1992: 179). It provides a 
framework and a methodology with which to investigate the changes that occur within 
societies in response to shifis in the mentality of governance and the problematisation 
of the political space. Yet, the best one can say about such concepts as 'mentalities of 
governance' and 'problematisations of rule' is that they are essentially metaphors for 
describing lived reality, not descriptions of reality itself As such, govemmentality is 
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simply a 'heuristic device', nothing more (see Dreyfus and Rabinow 1986). However, 
if such an theoretical framework produces an interesting new understanding of the 
policy making process then it has proved itself to be of practical value as an analytical 
tool. If, on the other hand, it provides no new insight then it can easily be rejected 
without rejecting the entire analytical framework. Compare this with post-Fordist 
accounts. Post-Fordist frameworks do not deal in analog and metaphor, they deal in ff 
'ideal types' which are deemed to possess some kind of descriptive property associated 
with 'real' phenomena. To subscribe to a post-Fordist analysis argument is to subscribe 
to the underlying theory. The use of post-Fordist theory cannot be reduced to a simple 
investigative device. As Mohan argues, this leaves authors who wish use this strategy 
open to the accusation 'of borrowing the terminology without subscribing to the 
theory' (Mohan 1996: 680). 
One significant insight derived from the governmentality approach is that it introduces 
a new account of power relations between the various parties that influence the policy 
making process. This was explored in Chapter 3. In effect, governmentality presents a 
telling critique of many contemporary analyses of policy formation (in terms of health 
policy see Navarro 1978; Ham 1992; Harrison et al. 1990; Allsop 1995). Probably the 
most influential approach that is critically discussed in the chapter is that of Robert 
Alford (1975) and his use of the concept of 'structural interest' as a factor in the 
production of health policy. The Alford approach was critically assessed on two 
counts. The first was an examination of the usefulness of the Alford model within the 
context of the NHS. The second, more substantive consideration, concerned Alford's 
concept of power as a separate entity linked to structural interests. For Foucault, 
power is indivisible from knowledge, they are both aspects of a discourse which 
creates the categories of individuals that provide the subjects of that power. Therefore, 
govemmentality is not a methodolog for identifying those individuals, groups or gy 1W 
institutions who somehow possess power over others through their position within a 
particular organising structure. It is a means of understanding how a power/knowledge 
discourse develops certain technologies of government through which groups and 
individuals are legitimised in their use of power over others. In this instance, one of the 
key technologies of regulation is embodied in the concept of 'expertise' (see Chapter 
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4). It was argued that the welfare state, and therefore the NHS, is itself a nexus of 
regulatory technologies that ffinction within a particular forrnula of liberal governance. 
Therefore, another of the strengths of the governmentality approach in that it able to 
present an analysis of both discourses and practices within the same framework. For 
example, in the discussion of power relationships above it is evident that many of the 
analyses of the these relationships are at a very high level of abstraction. In the case of 
governmentality, with its incorporation of the concept of power/knowledge, it is 
possible to move quite easily from the abstract notion of a 'mentality' of governance to 
the real effects it has through the subjectification of individuals within discourse. As 
such, govemmentality analysis is ideally suited to the collection of empirical data in 
that it identifies concrete issues which result from the subtle interplay of discourse and 
practice. 
This comprehensiveness and the facility to move between levels of analysis is not 
shared by other theoretical approaches mentioned in previous chapters. The concept of 
'structuration' associated with Giddens, mentioned in Chapter 2 because of its 
similarity with Foucault's formulation of agency for subjects within a 
power/knowledge discourse, illustrates this point. The high level of abstraction of 
cstructuration' theory makes it difficult to operationalise empirically, whereas 
governmentality analysis can operate at both levels simultaneously. The same can be 
said of the Kuhnian notion of paradigm shifts alluded to in Chapter 6. The analogy 
between shifts in liberal governance and paradigm shifts in the natural sciences is self 
evident. However, in contrast to the Kuhnian theoretical scheme, the ability to explore 
the concept empirically is easily done within governmentality, in that a practical 
method of investigation (Foucault's concept of genealogy) is embedded within the 
analytical framework. Furthermore, the ability to move from abstract concepts to the 
exploration of real practices is not at the expense of a loss of coherence. 
However, this coherence does have its consequences, the most problematic of which 
are the epistemological problems associated with governmentality analysis. In many 
respects this does represent something of a trade-off - epistemological rigour against CP 
coherence. As previous chapters have demonstrated, the epistemological problems of 
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governmentality, and Foucault's position in general, are difficult questions to resolve 
definitively. They are perhaps irresolvable. But all analytical frameworks have their 
difficulties and it is often the case of selecting a theoretical framework which is best 
suited to the problem to be investigated. The thesis argues that the problem of 
understanding the changing nature of health care within liberal regimes is a suitable 
subject for governmentality analysis, and that the chapters in Part 2 provide examples 
of its empirical application. 
Liberal health governance 
The theme that runs through the thesis is that the creation of the NHS represented a 
solution to a problematisation of health governance posed within a particular formula 
of liberal governmentality, termed 'welfare liberalism'. One of the characteristics of 
this formula of health governance was that it was based on concepts of solidarity and 
the collectivisation of social risk. Moreover, this emphasis on collective provision was 
accompanied by increased autonomy for the medical profession as practitioners of the 
dominant form of regulatory expertise. The consequence for those with political or 
managerial responsibility for the health system was that this provides only limited 
strategic control over the evolution of health care priorities. However, the arrival in the 
late 1970s and 1980s of a new formula of liberalism based on neo-liberal economic 
theory, initiated a re-problematisation of health care that re-articulated health 
governance within a market environment. This new form of neo-liberal health 
governance, with its rhetoric of empowerment and choice, placed great emphasis on 
personal responsibility, in effect re-coding many health problems as social problems 
amenable to solution through changes in individual behaviour. Therefore, it becomes 
the duty of the individual to engage in a forrn of self-entrepreneurialism of health, a 
kind of 'prudentialism', to avoid risky behaviour that would place an unnecessary 
burden on the rest of society. 
An additional consequence of this the new formula of health governance is that 
management of the health system becomes associated with 'commissioning' health care 
to meet local health needs through the operation of effective and appropriate 
purchasing and contracting. Commissioning implies a more pro-active management 
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style and a new relationship with professional expertise. The reforms initiated by 
Moi-kingfor Patients in 1989 introduced a package of novel technologies aimed at 
furthering control over the health care system. The development of internal market, the 
wider use of audit and evidence based medicine, all hinted at new methods of 
managing expertise. Potentially these technologies could create a market in expertise, 
where professionals must compete with each for scarce resources by demonstrating the 
clinical effectiveness of proposed treatments and therapies. The other side of this is 
that priority decisions will become more explicit and potentially more overtly political. 
Therefore, managers have to secure legitimacy from consumers of health care by some 
means to 'de-politicise' the issue of priority setting. However, the absence of a 
'neutral' market in health care means that the construction of a technical quasi-mark-et 
and the use of its associated technologies, provides only a partial legitimisation for the 
priority decision-making process. The problem for managers commissioning health 
care is that consumer interests are translated as health needs, and become part of the 
priority-setting agenda, through the mediation of a number of other groups and 
institutions, such as GPs, user/carer groups and Community Health Councils (CHCs). 
The practical question then is whether purchasing authorities can devise a coherent 
priority-setting agenda that reflects fragmented consumer interests? 
Assessing the evidence 
In Chapters 7 and 8 empirical evidence derived from interview data was presented that 
explored many of the topics outlined above. The purpose of this section of the chapter 
is to present a brief r6sumd of these findings and discuss them in the context of other 
surveys of post-reform health authority and CHC activity. 
The main finding from Chapter 7 was that commissioning, as conceptualised within 
neo-liberal health governance, was seen by all authorities as their primary role. 
Moreover, commissioning reflected a strategic vision for the provision of local health 
care. The strategic framework of commissioning appeared to reflect a wider 
understanding of health and health need. The language of 'health gain', health 
promotion and disease prevention programmes emphasised the quality of life aspects of 
health care rather than the narrow definition of health based on absence of disease and 
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disability. This was often accompanied by calls for people to be made aware of their 
responsibilities when using the health service. The notable consistency between 
authorities pointed to a common ideology that underpinned their thinking. In its purest 
form, this ideology resembled that associated with 'New Public Health' strategies 
discussed in Chapter 3. However, it was argued in the Chapter 7 that the ideology 
associated with neo-liberal health governance was only one part of a multi-layered 
form of health governancewithin the NHS. 
One of the more interesting findings of the research was the virtual absence of the 
language of competition. This was slightly surprising given that one of the most 
important elements within the reform process was the creation of an 'internal market' 
in health care. However, in terms of governmentality analysis, the failure of a language 
of competition to develop would appear to be directly linked to the fracturing of 
governance within health care. In support of this argument, the evidence indicated that 
one of the reasons why a competitive market had not emerged (apart from the 
technical difficulty that many Trusts were monopoly of suppliers of health care services 
within an area) was that marketing of services by Trusts was antagonistic to the health 
authorities' commissioning remit. It was clear that many of the authorities conceived of 
commissioning as having both supply and demand elements. On one hand, 
commissioning was realised through the technical function of purchasing and 
contracting. Yet, on the other hand, it was also concerned with shaping supply. 
However, Trusts, as part of their remit within the internal market, were in effect in 
competition with each other, looking to increase activity not decrease it. The 
implication was that the internal market for health authorities was actually an obstacle 
to commissioning and the efficient distribution of health resources. 
The assertion that competition was in effect being suppressed by the authorities in the 
sample was supported by the evidence as to the function of contracting within 
commissioning activity. It was clear that contracting was not primarily a mechanism for 
expressing market relationships between authorities and Trusts. The evidence pointed I 
to four other functions for contracting that reduced the impact of competition in the 
internal market. The four functions of contracting were: 
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" to managing supply 
" to distribute financial risk 
" to act as a disciplinary mechanism 
" to increase stability in the health service 
All the indications pointed to a complex relationship between authorities and Trusts. 
Significantly, and contrary to earlier findings, such as Freemantle et al. (1993), these 
were not characterised by 'provider capture, but of an emerging dominance of the 
relationship by health authorities. At times the contracting procedure appeared to 
reflect the idea of 'soft' contracting where contracts took on a more symbolic meaning, 
taking into account pre-existing relationships based on trust that countered the need 
for highly specified contract negotiation. At other times the evidence suggested a more 
antagonistic relationship, in which contracts played their part as mechanisms of 
control. The use of technologies such as audit, accreditation and 'care pathways' and 
effectiveness criteria were deployed as part of these mechanism of managerial control. 
However, although it appeared that authorities were developing technologies that 
made them the dominant partner in the purchaser/provider relationship, all authorities 
to a large extent felt that their commissioning remit was being constrained by demands 
to meet criteria laid down at the regional or national level. Many of the national 
initiatives associated with this 'macro' level of governance, such as Health of the 
Natimi targets or calls for a 'primary care led NHS', did coincide, or could be made to 
coincide, with local priorities. However, other pressures from the centre to 
demonstrate activity, such as meeting efficiency index targets and to a lesser extent 
reducing waiting, were considered to be political in origin and a distraction from the 
authorities 'proper' role of commissioning. As suggested in Chapter 7, this fracturing 
of governance is not to be regarded as a failure of the new health discourse but as an 
inevitable product of it. It is argued that conflict between different levels of governance 
will not be resolved by further policy initiatives. This is simply because each of the 
three levels of governance represents a different aspect of the same neo-liberal 
regulatory discourse. However, it is only by fracturing governance that the discourse 
can make health care amenable to a form of political calculation. Therefore, the 
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governance of health care within this neo-liberal form of health governance will remain 
higWy political. 
The difficulties for health authorities in setting local priorities in health care as part of 
their commissioning remit were explored in Chapter 8. The evidence suggested that 
authorities approached the priority-setting agenda with a subtle mixture of 
sophistication and pragmatism. The authorities appeared to have no appetite to indulge 
in a large-scale reorganisation of priorities. The two main reasons appeared to be that 
firstly, the constraints placed on authority activity (described above) dominated the 
authority's priority-setting agenda and left the authorities only limited discretion over 
arrangement of local priorities. The second reason reflected the belief of many of the 
directors questioned that health care was intrinsically too complex to be reduced to 
simple economic calculation. This was reflected in an ambivalence towards rationing 
technologies such as QALYs or an Oregon-type solution. Instead the authorities 
appeared to be adopting a more pragmatic approach to priority setting that depended 
on the use of other more managerial technologies such as audit, clinical effectiveness 
and evidence based medicine that provided a calculus of trust between management 
and expertise. It is these technologies that dominated discussions about priorities. 
One of the surprises that emerged from discussion with directors about priorities was 
the similarity between 'rationing' policies. Only one of the authorities in the sample had 
published in its purchasing plan an explicit rationing policy. Yet it was clear from the 
interviews and other documentary evidence, even for authorities that had not declared 
that they were engaging in a rationing debate, that each of the authorities had a similar 
list of services that were restricted. The type of services on these list have been 
described many times by other surveys of authority activity (see Redmayne et al 1993; 
Redmayne 1995; Klein et al 1996). In general, they were marginal, low-volume, 
services operating at the boundaries of authority responsibility, usually purchased as 
ECRs. In essence, the restrictions imposed on these services was part of an ECR policy 
based on clinical effectiveness criteria. However, it was unclear from the inter-view data 
whether these ECR policies would (or could) form the basis of general rational policy. 
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Therefore, despite this consistent approaches to rationing marginal treatments, it was 
not apparent, as Harrison and Wistow (1992) observed, how this could develop into a 
, vider rationing technology that could be conveyed to the public. The pragmatic 
position adopted by many directors was that a more explicit rationing, or priority- 
setting decisions, could only take place against a background of relatively easily to 
understand 'common sense' sets of principles. The difficulty appeared to be that these 
sets of principles operated at such a high degree of generality that any expectation of a 
consensus necessary to legitimise rationing decisions was thought unrealistic. The 
experience of several directors of discussions on priorities within the authority only 
reinforced this opinion. This was reflected in the attitudes of some directors that 
techniques such as Rapid Appraisal and focus groups - as a means of eliciting the 
views of the general public on local health needs - would have only a limited impact on 
the priority-setting agenda. Therefore, health authorities sought legitimacy for their 
actions from other sources. 
The main influence on priorities were the opinions of GPs - as has traditionally been 
the case in the NBS, The evidence from the data suggested that that GPs were being 
incorporated into the decision making process because of two factors: that they 
represented a form of expertise at primary care level; and that they acted as 'proxy 
consumers', acting in their patient's best interests. However, it was apparent that this 
was only of limited value to authorities when pursuing their commissioning remit. 
When GPs acted in their patient's interest (or their own self-interest) they could not be 
relied upon to take into account the health needs of the whole district and act 
strategically when deciding on treatments for their patients. This problem was repeated 
when authorities incorporated other groups, such as user/care representatives, into the 
strategic commissioning process. The case of 84nterferon and recombinant factor VII 
highlighted in Chapter 8 illustrate this point. The evidence supported the assertion that 
these groups were useful to authorities because they were able to bring an unmediated 
understanding of user and carer health needs to commissioning. However, caution was 
expressed by some directors that many of the groups were naturally partisan, and this 
needed to be taken into consideration when including them in service development 
discussions. Even so, it was clear that in a number of the sample authorities, user/carer 
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groups had more influence on the commissioning process than the official consumer 
representatives in the district, the Community Health Councils. 
Within the sample of health authorities, five out of six, and a majority of the directors 
interviewed, described CHCs as having only a marginal impact on their health 
authority's commissioning agenda (see Lupton et al. (1995) for a similar finding). This 
was despite the fact that health authorities saw CHCs as being more representative of 
the local population than the health authorities themselves. Although some health 
authorities were keen to include CHC representatives in some aspects of the 
commissioning process, in general the authorities were dismissive of CHC input (for 
similar findings elsewhere, see Harrison and Wistow 1992). As Barnes and Cox (1997) 
have also observed, a number of the authorities suggested that it was more appropriate 
to seek representative views from user/carer groups and voluntary organisations rather 
than engage in discussion with the local CHC. When CHCs were involved in 
discussions on priorities, CHC insistence that to preserve their own independence they 
could not be bound by any decision, was often interpreted by authorities as indicating 
that CHC were not serious players in the priorities debate. 
Summing-up the evidence 
In terms of govemmentality analysis, the principal theme that emerges from the 
empirical data presented in chapters 7 and 8 was of a new form of pro-active 
management within health authorities struggling to operationalise their commissioning 
remit. It was clear that the new discourse of health care management which had 
created this strategic commissioning role was not entirely reflected in the practices of 
health authorities. It is argued that the fragmentation of governance and the resulting 
conflict of interests between providers, commissioners and politicians limited the ability 
of authorities to implement an explicit 'change agenda' and re-organise the historical 
pattern of services. The evidence suggested authorities have not developed the means 
of entering into a explicit priorities debate for two basic reasons. The first is that 
authorities could not rapidly change the historical pattern of services even if they 
wanted to, because of the constraints placed on their activities by national imperatives. 
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The second reason is that explicit priority setting involves making judgements about 
social values not just about allocating resources. This difficulty was compounded by 
the fragmented voice of consumer interests. The technologies of audit, clinical 
effectiveness and evidence based medicine, only take priority-setting debate so far - in 
terms of cost-effectiveness. As such they are valuable tools in the management of 
priorities. However, governmentality analysis strongly indicates that the inherent 
contradictions within neo-liberal health governance means that the ability of 
commissioning authorities to make legitimate calculations of costs and benefits when 
devising those priorities will remain just beyond reach. 
Future directions: The new NHS. - mo(lern, depen(lable 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, in 1997 the new Labour government 
produced their first substantive document on the future direction for the NES. The 
White Paper entitled 77te neu, NHS. modei-ji, dependable outlined six key aims for the 
new health policy. They were: 
" First, to renew the NHS as a genuinely national service. Patients will get fair access to consistently 
high quality, prompt and accessible services right across the country 
" but, second, to make the delivery of healthcare against these new national standards a matter of 
local responsibility. Local doctors and nurses who are in the best position to know what patients 
need will be in the driving scat in shaping services. 
" Third, to get the NHS to work in partnership. By breaking down organisational barriers and 
forging stronger links with Local Authorities, the needs of the patient will be put at the centre of 
the care process 
" but fourth, to drive efficiency through a more rigorous approach to performance and by cutting 
bureaucracy, so that every pound in the NHS is spent to maximise the care for patients. 
" Fifth, to shift the focus on to quality of care so that excellence is guaranteed to all patients, and 
quality becomes the driving force for decision-making at every level of the service 
" and sixth, to rebuild public confidence in the NHS as a public service, accountable to patients, 
open to the public and shaped by their views. 
(DoH 1997: 11) 
To meet these aims, the new government committed itself to the abolition of the 
internal market, but to retain the 'purchaser/provider split' and replace contracts with 
long-term 'service level agreements'. However, the main change is in the 
commissioning function. The plan as outlined in the White Paper, is that the primary 
253 
responsibility for purchasing and 'commissioning' will be gradually devolved, over a 
four-stage process, to 'primary care groups' comprising GPs and community nurses. 
The consequences for health authorities will be significant. The White Paper outlines 
seven key responsibilities for health authorities. These are: 
assessing the health needs of the local population, drawing on the luiowledge of other 
organisations 
drawing up a strategy for meeting those needs, in the forrn of a Health Improvement Programme, 
developed in partnership with all the local interests and ensuring delivery of the NHS contribution 
to it 
deciding on the range and location of health care services for the Health Authority's residents, 
which should flow from, and be part of, the Health Improvement programme 
determining local targets and standards to drive quality and efficiency in the light of national 
priorities and guidance, and ensuring their delivery 
supporting the development of Primary Care Groups so that they can rapidly assume their new 
responsibilities 
allocating resources to Primary Care Groups 
holding Primary Care Groups to account 
(DoH 1997: 25) 
In effect, the proposals in the White Paper restrict the District Health Authority's role 
to one similar to the former Regional Health Authorities. However, the detail of the 
new health authority role is not really the issue under discussion. The more important 
question in the context of this thesis is whether the new plans for the NHS represent a 
shifl in the formula of health governance? The new arrangements for health authorities 
raise a number of key issues discussed in previous chapters, such as management 
control over the priority decisions and forms of legitimacy. Indeed, many of the 
problems are heightened by the proposed changes, in particular, the problem of 
maintaining strategic oversight and overcoming the traditional individualistic culture of 
GPs if they are to work together, and with others, within the new co-operative ethos of 
the 'primary care groups. As always, 'the devil is in the detail', but the weakening of 
health authorities' power does seem to compromise the strategic nature of 
commissioning. In combination with the ending of the internal market this appears to 
be a radical re-working of health governance. Yet in other spheres of government 
activity, social security, education and law and order, many of the themes associated 
with neo-liberal governance such as personal responsibility and questioning the limits IC 
of government activity, are still articulated as part of new Labour philosophy. 
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The question of a new formula of health governance is thus still open. One of the key 
points is whether the internal market, contracting and the purchaser/provider split are 
separate elements or intimately linked. If one of the elements is removed does this 
mean that the whole structure of governance collapses in on itselp. Or are they 
separate and mutually independent elements, none of which are essential factors in 
determining the form of health governance? The question is made more difficult 
because much of the terrninology is still imprecise. What exactly are 'service level 
agreements'? Are they contracts by another name? This reflects the nature of the new 
proposals themselves. Do they represent a 'radical vision of the future' for the NHS 
(Ham 1998: 3)? Or do they still retain 'the key elements of the old internal market' 
(Glennester and Le Grand 1998: 19)? At this early stage of development, deciding 
which of the two is correct is virtually impossible. 
However, the evidence presented in earlier chapters does provide some insight into the 
new proposals. For instance, the evidence suggested that contracts were becoming 
more long-term, privileging stability over competition. It appear that 'service level 
agreements' are similarly constructed, so it may mean that little in effect will change in 
the relationship between commissioner and provider. Again the evidence suggested 
that competition played only a limited part in the internal market, so abolishing the 
internal market but retaining the purchaser/provider split may be less radical than at 
first anticipated. Many of the key technologies of associated with the previous form of 
management, such as audit and evidence based medicine, will be retained. In fact there 
usewill be institutionalised through the creation of a 'National Institute for Clinical 
Effectiveness' (NICE) and a 'Commission for Health Improvement' (CHI), to 
disseminate good practice and monitor quality standards. Clearly the most radical 
difference is in the creation of the 'primary care groups' to take over commissioning. 
However, even here there are echoes of the past. In Chapter 6 there was a brief 
discussion of Enthoven's (1995) original plan for the NHS modelled on the Health 
Maintenance Organisation (HMO) system in the US. With the creation of the primary 
care groups perhaps it is an idea whose time has come, and new modalities of health 
governance will evolve. 
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Using the Foucauldian framework of 'governmentality' it can be seen that the 
discourse of rationing and priority-setting in the NUS, and the institutional practices in 
which it is embedded, operate at a much more fundamental level than surface political 
activity would indicate. It is clear that the shift to a neo-liberal form of governance 
(and the subsequent shift to a neo-liberal form of health governance) has created a new 
means of conceptualising lived reality -a process of making it amenable to political 
calculation. This new mentality of liberal government creates a discursive space in 
which political activity becomes 'thinkable' and which in turn defines the ambitions and 
limits of policy action. Therefore, it is clear that radical change in the governance of 
health care only comes about through a shift in the problematisation of liberal 
governance, not merely in the transition from one political regime to another, although Z; I 
the two may coincide. 
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Appendix A 
Methodology 
This thesis is based on a case study sample of six English District Health Authorities 
and their constituent Community Health Councils (CHCs), with data generated 
principally through semi-structured interviews. Other methodologies that have been 
used in previous studies of health authority activities were considered and rejected for 
differing reasons. The two dimensions that were taken into account as part of the 
procedure to select a case study research design were: a) the relevance of the 
methodology to the research question explored in the thesis; and b) the practical 
limitations involved in PhD research. 
Initially, a methodology based on questionnaires was considered as a practical option 
(see Appleby et al. 1992; Appleby 1994). The advantage of this method is that it 
allows one to survey a large population relatively cheaply. The disadvantages are that 
the questions used must be drafted very precisely to avoid ambiguities and maximise 
the amount of information generated. One of the problems associated with this 
methodology is the potentially low return rate and the acknowledged possibility that 
those questionnaires that are returned may have been completed by individuals other 
than the intended recipient who may not be in a position to fully answer the questions 
posed. However, the most important problem associated with this method, in the 
context of this thesis, is that the research problem is in part about the discourse and 
'mentality' of governance. As such it is not about the measurement of activity but 
about the shared symbolic meanings involved in devising health priorities. 
This latter problem is also apparent in methods that depend upon examining published 
materials (see Klein and Redmayne 1992; Redmayne et al. 1993; Redmayne 1995). 
Although this method is a useful starting point when embarking on a research project, 
it soon becomes clear that there are inherent limitations when it is used as the sole 
basis of research. Logistically, it is a very practical method. However, the nature of the 
public documents being studied are often of such a high level of generality or are very 
formal in their presentation that they do not convey the ideological context in which 
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the document is produced. So it is important to develop the methodology beyond the 
analysis of officially published documents and to engage directly with those who 
produced the original material. 
One method that would allow for direct observation of the policy making process if 
that of the ethnographic approach (Harrison et al 1992; Pollitt et al. 1990). This form 
of research, which involves studying behaviour in a 'natural' setting, would be an ideal 
means of exploring the interaction of forces, and the underlying assumption, that 
influence the production of policy. However, the difficulties associated with this 
methodology are the problems of access and time, as well as the logistics of field 
observation. The limited resources of PhD research place severe constraints on the 
ability to observe the full cycle of policy making. Additionally, there is the problem of 
securing sufficient and continuing access to key informants. In the case of health 
authorities, the confidential (and controversial) nature of much of their work may make 
it 'off-limits' to most postgraduate researchers. 
In the light of the above, it is evident that the methodology of the case study, using 
semi-structured interviews is a form of compromise. However, the use of case studies 
and the collection of interview data is itself a robust and well-established methodology. 
Its use in this thesis follows similar methodologies employed in many influential studies 
of managerial behaviour within the NHS (see Harrison and Wistow 1992; Ranade 
1995; Flynn 1992). However, the particular use of case study in this thesis is 
something of a compromise. The central theme of the thesis is understanding the 
context in which priority debates take place. But because of resource and time 
constraints, and the problems of defining a representative sample and arranging access, 
there was no attempt to collect data from groups who have input into priority 
decisions other than health authority directors and CHC Chief Officers. The most 
important omission is interview data from GPs (fundholders and non-fundholders). 
However, to partially compensate for this, there were devised a number of question in 
the interview schedule for directors that specifically addressed the nature of GP 
involvement (see Appendix B). 
258 
The case-study selection procedure 
The empirical evidence in this thesis is derived from semi-structured interviews 
conducted separately with the Chief Executives and principal directors of six English 
District Health Authorities. Using the revised RAWP formula (see Peacock 1995; 
Peacock and Smith 1995), sixty-three Health Authorities (HAs) were initially selected 
to cover a wide range of potential 'winners' and 'losers' from the RAXVP process as 
well as providing a selection of metropolitan, inner-city and rural Health Authorities. A 
letter was sent requesting a selection of information from each of the HAs. This 
included budgetary data, Purchasing Plans for 1996/7 and the Authority's current 
Public Health Report. Of the original sixty-three selected HAs, five had ceased to have 
a separate identity due to mergers, forty-five sent Public Health documents and thirty- 
five Purchasing plans for 1996/7, several others sent plans for previous years or long- 
term strategic plans. Usually some financial information pertaining to RAWP allocation 
was included in purchasing documents. The documents were analysed closely and 
formed the basis of the selection procedure. They also provided a degree of 
'triangulation' when considering the interview data. After a review of Purchasing 
Plans, a number of District Health Authorities were selected from those authorities that 
acknowledged the rationing debate in their purchasing intentions and represented a 
cross-section of gainers and losers with resp ect to the new funding formula. 
To some degree the selection procedure was obscured by the fact that in several HAs it 
was unclear, at the time when the purchasing plans were being produced, which 
RAWP formula was being used, the old one or the new formula with its 'acute' 
weighting. This was relevant to the categorisation of HAs as winner or loser. One 
additional aspect of the document review was to see if RAWP funding patterns 
influenced patterns of priorities. The review highlighted a large degree of variation in 
the type of treatment and therapy that were candidates for disinvestment and which 
were considered to be priorities. The many treatments and interventions that were 
regarded as priorities in one HA yet candidates for disinvestment in others, became the 
object of future investigation and interest. 
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Table 2 List of participating directors for each Health Authority in the sample 
A B C D E F 
Chief Executive Chief Chief Chief Executive Director of Chief 
Executive Executive Public Health Executive 
Director of Director of Director of Director of Director of Director of Commissioning Finance Contracts Strategy Purchasing Public Health 
Director of Director of Director of Director of Director of Director of 
Primary Care Public Health Public Health Commissioning Commissioning Primary Care 
Director of Director of Director of Director of Director of 
Finance Service 
I I 
Public Health Finance 
I 
Strategy 
Development 
Selecting the case study sample and arranging access 
After this review and selection procedure twelve health authorities were approached 
for inter-view. A letter was sent to Chief Executives (and in one instance the Chair of 
the Authority) asking for help in the research in the form of semi-structured interviews. 
Of the twelve, four agreed to participate in the research immediately and two more 
authorities agreed afler a further request was sent. The rest of the authorities declined 
the request for help in the research process. Within the final sample of six authorities 
there were several different types of authority - city, urban/rural etc., a range of 
population sizes, variable levels of GP fundholding, and they were geographically 
spread across northern England. All of the sample authorities were situated in one of 
two NHS Regions. Additionally, two of the authorities were committed to locality 
funding with one discussing it as a future option. In terms of funding, three authorities 
were below their target allocations and three above target, one significantly so. 
However, with the exception of one authority, it has to be noted that most of the 
authorities were relatively close to their targets. 
The sample of authorities were contacted again and interviews were arranged with 
directors who had agreed to participate in the study. A table of participating directors 
(Table 2) is reproduced above. As part of the agreement of anonymity for the authority 
and individual directors each authority has been given a code letter (the same letter are 
used in chapters 7 and 8 for participating authorities) and the titles of directors 
standardised so that no unique title could identify an authority. The interviews took 
place on health authority premises with only the director and interviewer present. The 
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schedule for the semi-structured interviews is reproduced in Appendix B. The average 
length of interview was approximately one hour. Each interview was tape recorded and 
later transcribed and analysed. The total number of interview in this section of the 
research was twenty-three. The interviews took place between July 1996 and January 
1997. 
Selection of Community Health Councils 
After the interviews with health authority directors were completed, a letter was sent 
to all the Chief Officers of CHC within the districts of the sample authorities asking for 
help in the research. Of the total of thirteen CHCs, nine Chief Officers agreed to 
participate in the research. The same conditions and methodology as applied to 
authority directors was used for CHC interviews. All interviews with Chief Officers 
were tape recorded. Each respondent was guaranteed anonymity for themselves and 
the CHC. The average length of interview was approximately 45 minutes. The 
interview schedule is reproduced in Appendix C. For each of the sample authorities at 
least one Chief Officer of their constituent CHCs were interviewed. In certain instances 
all the CHCs were interviewed. This part to the fieldwork took place between March 
1997 and July 1997. Once the fieldwork was complete all the transcripts were collated 
and analysed. 
Conclusion 
Overall, it is believed that the case-study approach has yielded valid qualitative data 
which are of wider relevance beyond the areas in which fieldwork was conducted, and 
provide valuable empirical evidence for the theoretical analysis undertaken in this 
thesis. 
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Appendix B 
Interview schedule for health authority directors 
Organisation 
1. How is purchasing activity within the Authority organised? 
2. Could you tell me how your purchasing plan is put together? 
a) Are there working groups for particular areas? 
b) What is the composition of these groups - from which directorate are 
individuals drawn? 
3. Is contracting separate from commissioning in the Authority? 
4. Has the type of contracts negotiated with providers changed over the last two 
years? 
5. To what extent is investment in local priorities constrained by national policies 
such as 'Health of the Nation' and waiting lists initiatives? 
6. Does the HA anticipate any new growth money as a consequence of the new 
funding formula? 
Health Needs Assessment and GPs 
Health Needs Assessment 
1. What form of health needs assessment is used by the HA? 
a) Rapid Assessment 
b) Focus groups 
C) Priority debates etc. 
2. In what way has HA purchasing policy been informed by local health needs 
assessment? 
a) Could you give me an example? 
3. In your view, how have the local CHCs influenced commissioning strategy and 
the production of the purchasing plan? 
GPs 
1. How are GPs incorporated into the purchasing decision making process? 
2. How are GP views made known to you? 
3. Are there differences of view on priorities between fundholding and non- 
fundholding GPs? 
4. To what extent do you think there may be a potential conflict between GP 
interests and the HA's wider remit? 
Priority Setting 
Discussion 
lit recentyears there has been a vigorous debate about how to make the best use of 
limiledresources loprovide the maximum effective healtheare. Inevitably this will 
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involve detei-iiiiiiiiigprioi-itiesfoi-fitlidiiig and implies that infiattre some services 
may not befinded. 
1. Has your authority debated the need to disinvest in some services? 
2. Could you say more about the process involved in assessing individual 
services? 
a) Is there a specific working party for this issue? 
b) Which individuals are involved? 
C) What criteria are used? 
3. Many authorities have produced a specific list of services in which to disinvest, 
does your authority have a similar list or expect to produce one in the near 
future? 
4. Does the use of evidence based medicine inevitably entail challenging current 
clinical practices? 
a) One authority has stated that 'reviews of existing research evidence 
have been used to direct policy, sometimes challenging clinical 
viewpoints'. Could you comment on this? 
Protocols, Guidelines and Clinical Audit 
Discussion 
In many currentpurchasingplans it is evident that guidelines andprotocols and an 
enhanced rolefor clinical audit are being incoiporated into the purchasing and 
contractingprocess. 
1. Is the use of protocols and guidelines part of this authority's commissioning 
process? 
2. From where do these protocols and guidelines emanate? 
3. To what extent are medical professionals involved in approving the use of 
protocols and guidelines in commissioning? 
4. Another HA suggests that the Clinical Audit system needs tightening so it 
'becomes a purchaser driven activity which can lead to changes in purchasing 
and contracting to the benefit of the population' (East Lanes. p 13). Does this 
authority envisage a similar role for Clinical Audit? 
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Appendix C 
Interview schedule for Community Health Council Chief Officers 
Community Health Councils 
Organisation 
1. How is the Community Health Council constituted? 
2. How many members are there? 
3. How difficult is it to persuade people to become members of the Community 
Health Council? 
4. How do you gauge the opinion of the local population? 
5. Do you see your representativeness as problematic because members are 
appointed not elected? 
The role of the CHC 
1. What is the role of the Community Health Council? 
2. How is your workload balanced between working with the Health Authority in 
commissioning and developing services, and following up complaints and 
ensuring service quality? 
3. In an ideal world what role would the Community Health Council fulfil? 
4. Do you think that your local District Health Authority regards you as a major 
stakeholder when discussing policy? 
Relationships and Influence 
How much influence do you have over the final draft of the Health Authority 
Purchasing Plan? 
2. How much influence do you have on the Health Authority's priority setting 
agenda? 
a) Could you give me a recent example of where you have been able to 
modify new service developments and rationalisation? 
3. Do you or the Health Authority best represent patient interests? 
4. Should Health Authorities and Community Health Councils be directly elected? 
5. When new services are being developed do the other user/carer groups work 
through you to influence outcomes? 
Priorities 
In recent years there has been a grovving, and increasingly heated debate, about 
rationing health care. 
0 Where does the Community Health Council stand on this issue? 
In the US, in states like Oregon, these issues have been discussed openly by local 
citizen groups and rigorous lists of priorities produced. 
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